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ABSTRACT

“It Was Handed to Them”:
The Origins of Targeted Delivery and The Spirit of Nanomedicine
by
Marzena Woinska
Adviser: Lynn Chancer

Nanotechnology is widely recognized as an important field. Since the 2000s, nano-based
targeting has been a cutting-edge approach in cancer research. To specify what nanomedicine
means and describe its significance at the cultural level, this study harnesses data from peerreviewed articles published in leading scientific journals.
Balancing precariously between sociological theory and science and technology studies,
this project turns to nanomedicine’s origins to address broader questions regarding the
relationship between science and society and the causes of scientific discovery and technological
innovation. It tells the story of nanotechnology's discursive formations taking on a life of their
own and congealing into a zeitgeist or "spirit," as is reminiscent of the one described by Max
Weber in The Protestant Ethic. It concludes that nanotechnology-based targeted delivery was
not merely a scientific idea or a technical solution to the problem of cancer, but a broad cultural
logic based on the waning of thinking in terms of warfare and blunt force, and the rise of an ethos

centered around designing, creating and managing relationships, affinity, and engineering
compatibility between things normally understood as incompatible.
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PREFACE
Hannah Arendt wrote the passage below to celebrate—or mourn— Heidegger’s 80th birthday:
People followed the rumor about Heidegger in order to learn thinking. What was
experienced was thinking as pure activity […] can become a passion which not so much
rules and oppresses all other capacities and gifts, as it orders them and prevails through
them.
We who wish to honor the thinkers find it striking and perhaps exasperating that Plato
and Heidegger when they entered human affairs, turned into tyrants and Fuhrers. This
should be imputed not just to the circumstances of the times and even less to preformed
character […] The attraction to the tyrannical can be demonstrated theoretically in many
of the great thinkers […] it comes from the primeval, and what it leaves behind is
something perfect, something which, like everything perfect, falls back to whence it came
(2018, 419-422).

I, too, have— had— a “Heidegger.” This dissertation should have been for him, but I am not
Hannah Arendt… I always understood the profound danger of pity.

My “Heidegger” taught me that a theorist is someone with the capacity to fall in love with
every text they encounter. Without his intellectual generosity, I would never have mustered the
immense courage required to take on a project like this. Without his absence, I would never have
found the theoretical clarity, academic rigor, and moral fortitude needed to complete it.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It Simply Does Not Work
“But there is a lingering question: Why are all those seemingly up-and-coming
nanoparticle systems failing in clinical trials? When so many clinical studies have failed, the
approach used is usually reviewed and adjusted to find a better approach. Instead, the
nanoparticle field has been churning out over-engineered nanoparticles with minimal
improvement in treatment […] we need to get our sanity back to research.”
—Kinam Park (2013)

On March 5th, 2018, The Financial Times announced an opening of a “new prospect" for cancer
treatment based on a novel vision shepherded by a Nature Biotechnology article published a
month prior. Written by a research team from Arizona State University, the study documented
what the Financial Times called "the first time" and "the first successful attempt" to treat cancer
with a nanotechnology-based "targeted delivery" protocol that locates and kills cancerous cells
without harming healthy tissue. The article was mistaken on several fronts. Firstly, the idea of
targeting cancer cells is not “new.” Secondly, this was not the "first time.”
Moreover, thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it may not have been a "success" at all.
However, with the loss of origins (Husserl 1970), an "amnesia" (Sorokin 1956) that ostensibly
characterizes 20th and now 21st-century sciences from physics, biology, and sociology to
nanotechnology, repetition, and innovation have become indistinguishable. The same
"forgetting of origins" has made it possible for nanotechnology to celebrate myriad "openings"
and "first times" over and over again.
This dissertation tells the origin story of a nanotechnology-based cancer drug delivery
system often referred to as "targeted" or "direct" delivery. From the scientific literature alone,
"targeted delivery" in cancer nanotechnology appears like any other scientific project. The
numerous university departments, professional associations, conferences, and journals
1

dedicated to its mission seem to corroborate its status as a "normal science" (Kuhn 1962).
However, a more sober look at the status of the field paints a somewhat different picture.
Targeted delivery is undoubtedly based on an elegant, intuitive, and sophisticated paradigm.
However, to date, researchers in oncology labs are still struggling to translate their limited
experimental findings into the clinical realm. In the last few years, more and more scientists
have started to suspect that "nanomedicine has a delivery problem" (Torrice 2016). According to
Is Targeting our Target?, a well-cited meta-analysis of the literature published in the same year
, on average, only 0.7% of leading nano-based drugs locate and accumulate in tumors compared
to an accumulation rate of around 7%-16% associated with conventional chemotherapy drugs.
Its authors unequivocally stated that “despite over sixty years of research nano-based targeted
delivery has failed to benefit patient […] It simply does not work.” (Lammers et al. 2016, 75). In
another article published in the ultra-prestigious Journal of Direct Delivery, a leading
researcher demanded that his peers "face the truth about nanotechnology in drug delivery [...]
they have seen a gorilla when it is nowhere in sight" (Park 2016, 193).
From a clinical standpoint, targeted delivery simply does not work. It is a "delusion... a
make-belief story" (ibid). The truth is that nano-based targeted delivery drugs are worse at
targeting than drugs that do not target. Although bolstered by the weight of irrefutable empirical
proof, these publications had little effect on the discipline. Until 2020, most researchers
maintained that the key to successful nano-based targeted delivery is hiding in plain sight even
when reporting data to the contrary. Virtually all publications ended with permutations of
conclusions like ‘it's just not all the way there,’ or ‘it's almost there, just around the corner.’ All it
needs is a little push, a little more research, a little more governmental support, a little more
funding, a little more automation, a little more lenience from the FDA, a little more time…
Evidence or no evidence, targeted delivery in cancer nanotechnology was, until very
recently, the leading interest for pharmaceutical researchers. In fact, since 2016, the publication
2

of findings associated with research that may lead to the success of nano-based targeted delivery
in cancer has regularly increased. It is expected to increase even further, as is funding. In 2021,
the projected investment was around $136 billion (Alshehri 2020).
From a broad historical view, every new paradigm in medicine has had its naysayers, so
Park, Lammers, and others like them may just be less patient than their peers. However, if
science is “the only legitimate discourse on objectivity” (Derrida 2005, 27), a collection of
statements that have withstood the most rigorous attempts at falsification, as Popper claimed,
why does targeted delivery—whose raison d'etre is the premise that nanostructures find and
accumulate in tumors more effectively than any other drugs—continue to function as if had
scientific status when researchers have ample evidence to the contrary? This dissertation
maintains that the proliferation of targeted delivery in cancer nanotechnology should not be
treated as mere dereliction from duty or a deviation from scientific norms (Merton 1968). Nor
can it be explained away by political economy, by "big pharma" and its profit-seeking
tendencies, or by so-called "institutional factors" such as the "publish or perish" attitude that
compels researchers to broadcast every finding, however insignificant, or the circulation of
power through scientific networks. The broad argument is that the desire for a paradigm shift in
cancer treatment won out over cold, hard proof because cancer nanomedicine's rhetoric has a
resonance beyond its performance in the lab or the clinic. While nanomedicine may not have
fulfilled the need for a new approach to cancer, the obsession with treating disease without
violence, side-effects, collateral damage, or harm to healthy tissues that characterizes nanobased targeted delivery speaks to salient cultural tendencies and unmet social needs. As long as
those tendencies and conditions persist, targeted delivery will, too, evidence or no evidence.
To show that nanotechnology-based targeted delivery is not merely a scientific idea or a
technical solution to the problem of cancer, but broad cultural logic, this dissertation treats
cancer nanomedicine as a case of ideas, concepts, metaphors, and language taking on a life of
3

their own. It tells the story of nanotechnology's discursive formations migrating to and from the
confines of the laboratory and, over time, congealing into a zeitgeist or "spirit," not unlike the
one described by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic. As all sociologists—including this one—
know, to understand "spirits," one must approach them historically. Methodologically, this
means tracing the source of intuitions, concepts, ideas, and the circumstances of their
emergence as far back into the historical record as possible (Weber 2002, 72). Balancing
precariously between sociological theory and science and technology studies, this project turns
to nanotechnology's origins with the hopes of explaining why nano-based targeted delivery has
not been abandoned as a solution to cancer even if, as many scientists believe, they ought to
have been. It does so by utilizing Weber's historical approach combined with methods drawn
from cultural sociology to mine nanotechnology's earliest written records for hidden meanings,
metaphors, and themes that lie underneath the texts and connect them to broad shifts in
categories of collective thought.
BACKGROUND
Cancer will soon be the leading cause of death in the United States (Center for Disease
Control and Prevention 2016). It may be one of the "most dreaded diseases to haunt our
collective imagination" (Stacey 1997, 2), but cancer is more than an illness. It is a multi-faceted
phenomenon distinctively affected by factors as much medical, technological, and scientific as
they are social, cultural, and historical in origin. Cancer's high cost of treatment, the
disproportionately high death rate among African Americans from the disease, the public's
steadfast refusal to follow medicine's recommendations when, according to experts,
approximately half of cancers are preventable by doing so, and perhaps most significantly, that
cancer's treatment is often worse than the disease itself, cut across some the most salient
features of contemporary life in the US. Just like poverty, racism, the decline of scientific
authority, the large-scale collapse of the education system, or the imperative to weigh several
4

barely-distinguishable dismal options against one another to choose a "lesser evil," cancer
remains a problem without a solution even though a cure seems to be just around the corner. It
hides in plain sight— technically possible but "just not there yet" for reasons that may be as
much economic, political, historical, and social in etiology as scientific per se.
Numerous scholars have shown that discourses of the past and present have affected and
continue to affect cancer qua phenomenon (see Casper and Carpenter 2008; Stacey 1997; Jain
2007, 2013; Prior 2007). However, this dissertation focuses an analytic lens on cancer's cures
and treatments , also shaped by and in turn shaping the socio-cultural landscape. Cancer
nanotechnology is an especially salient case for sociological analysis for several reasons. The
"not yet— but theoretically possible" character of nano-based direct delivery, in particular,
makes nanotechnology a unique opportunity to observe, in general, how broader social,
political, and economic factors influence scientific thinking about what constitutes an acceptable
cure for cancer (or other diseases). At the same time, it also shows how scientific and
technological ideas, concepts, and models can take on a life of their own and, in turn, affect
society.
Discourses and practices around cancer and its treatment are a unique point of contact
between the social and technical milieus. As Alexander (2013) argued, dealing with social
problems always entails confronting the nature of evil. According to him, sociology’s scientific
aspirations pushed the issue aside, and contemporary sociology refuses to theorize evil
explicitly. Thus, the discourse about social or moral decline had to find another home. Illness
has always been used as a metaphor to enliven charges that society was corrupt or unjust and to
deal with its most urgent problems from urbanization to fear of foreigners during wartime.
Historically, cancer has allowed people to speak about a sense of evil in an era when religion
could no longer do so (Sontag 1978). Cancer was always an easy way to repackage ideas that
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could not be spoken aloud or addressed directly into the disease's character, behavior, or
etiology.
That cancer has been a stand-in for the worst social pathologies and dysfunctions at a
symbolic or discursive level is well established (Sontag 1978; Jain 2013); however, this
dissertation argues that the relationship extends beyond language. Cancer treatments and
cures— both in terms of what they have been comprised of and ideas and paradigms underlying
them— have changed in response to technological innovation and accumulation of knowledge
and political events, shifts in social values, and new forms of social organization. As this
dissertation will show, discourse associated with nano-based targeted delivery can speak to a
general logic and collective grammar underneath narratives concerning social problems. From
radical mastectomies to chemotherapy, radiation, and now nanotechnology-based targeted
delivery, the dominant forms of cancer treatment have uniquely mirrored back to society its
dominant values; they have identified, commented on, and reframed society's most urgent
problems. This dissertation considers how discourse about what proper cancer treatment looks
like can become a framing device for understanding society and its problems. It argues that
shifts in what constitutes a desirable approach to cancer have been and are responses to largescalesocial contradictions1.

A particularly well-documented case is the decline of the radical mastectomy. A radical
mastectomy is a surgery that involves removing not only breasts but also the lymph nodes, the
underlying chest muscles, and sometimes even ribs, collarbones, and shoulder joints. It was
used in every case of breast cancer, even the smallest of tumors (Moore 2012). Until the 1970’s
radical mastectomies were a gold-standard for treatment for breast cancer since the procedure
was pioneered by William Halsted in 1882, but today many are perplexed as to how such a
“brutal and disfiguring” (Leopald 2014) operation, which left patients with holes in their chests
exposing the ribcage underneath was ever thought to be a cure at all. In retrospect, the answer is
obvious. The proliferation of radical mastectomies corresponded to general attitudes regarding
women and their place in society. Operating under the dominant ideas of their time, surgeons
saw radical mastectomies as the only treatment for breast cancer because they understood
women and their bodies exclusively in terms of their child-bearing functions. Thus, since their
patients were post-menopausal, breasts appeared to them as expendable body parts (Schulzke
1
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THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Although nanomedicine is an exciting development in science and technology, this
project’s purpose goes beyond documenting a compelling case study: this is a theoretical
dissertation concerned with broader questions regarding the relationship between science and
society and the causes of scientific discovery and technological innovation. The work as a whole
argues that nanotechnology and its ideas were neither the product of individual genius nor were

2011). As long as these values remained salient, the medical establishment was incapable of
thinking about other ways of treating breast cancer. A pathologist testifying in a Senate hearing
in 1970 testified that the “male-oriented profession” performed too many radical mastectomies
and hysterectomies. Lerner (2010) adds that male doctors did so to “assert power in the face of
waning authority” (20). As social attitudes towards women shifted, cancer treatment changed
along with them. It is unsurprising that medicine “suddenly” realized that the radical
mastectomy has never been subject to scientific scrutiny despite almost a century of regular
clinical application until the 1970s an era characterized by wide-spread questioning of authority
by civil rights workers protesting segregation, liberals attempting to eradicate poverty, and antiwar protestors protesting the Vietnam war. Perhaps more significantly, the 1970s also saw the
rise of the second-wave women’s movement, who for the first time saw that radical
mastectomies as directly tied to Male-dominated medicine’s aggressive, competitive, technically
dominant, unemotional approach to illness (20) and as a result, the procedure appeared to them
as patriarchy made flesh and as “reflecting in more concentrated form the more generalized
violence towards women by society as a whole” (ibid)— not a cure for cancer. Following a
groundbreaking clinical trial, which demonstrated beyond a doubt that radical mastectomies
lacked any clinical justification, medicine agreed. It then responded with new breast cancer
treatments including the lumpectomy, modified mastectomy, as well as non-surgical options
that acknowledged women’s newfound agency, bodily autonomy, reflected a unique view of
women and their bodies that went beyond their biological role and affirmed women’s new role
as participants in (some parts of) public life. By accepting conservation of the breasts as a
legitimate project, medicine also authorized a new emphasis on large breasts that was already
beginning to unfold in pornography and US popular culture, contributing to a discourse that
located femininity in breasts. According to Audre Lorde, it turned reconstructive surgery into yet
another compulsory form of compulsory femininity. Although advances in pathology, radiation,
and drug therapies contributed to the decline of the procedure, its “erasure” from medical
practice was not just a medical or scientific fact. Today radical mastectomies are extremely rare
and are performed only in cases, where cancer had spread to the chest wall muscles or chest
muscles (Lazaraviciute and Chaturvedi 2017). While the rise of less invasive treatments options
can be attributed in part to dissatisfaction with medicine’s approach to breast cancer, this
discontent was only surface level. The desire for alternatives to radical mastectomies speak to
larger, more general unfulfilled needs. Medical problems are often social problems in disguise.
Unlike lumpectomies and non-surgical options, which quickly replaced radical mastectomies,
cancer nanomedicine is “not there yet.”
7

they "socially constructed" in the traditional sense. It concludes that nanotechnology and its
conceptual underpinnings were, in Derrida's words, passively "handed" to more or less willing
recipients (1989). Like Weber's "spirit of capitalism," the ideas that make up nanomedicine's
discursive substrate predated nanotechnology. Before nanomedicine's assemblage of concepts
was specified, stabilized, and consolidated into a research program and materialized through
laboratories and engineering practices, traces of its conceptual logic lurked underneath the
technical language of experts and discursive formations in cultural and political milieus. Not
unlike nanotechnology, which is rumored to have arisen in 1959 from Richard Feynman's
famous utterance "there is plenty of room at the bottom," the inspiration for this project lie in
two sentences. The first, a throwaway line, was written by Derrida in 1962 to introduce Edmund
Husserl's Origins of Geometry.
Derrida wrote: "geometry was not discovered by Euclid... it was handed" (1989, 86) to
him. It was a rhetorical statement put forward to reveal a blind spot in Husserl's historical
thinking not meant to be seriously entertained in a literal sense. The second line was written in
1988. In Science and Power, Stanley Aronowitz chastised Louis Althusser for treating history
"as if it was made by structures—not by men” (170). Not being one to deviate from custom,
Aronowitz went on to add the accusation of idealism "which has no place in Marxism" (176) to
his list of Althusser’s theoretical missteps just for good measure. By its tone alone, the meaning
of Aronowitz's line was unmistakable. Thus, to seriously wonder whether one can indeed
produce a sociological account wherein history is made by something "other than men" was far
from a proper response.
Derrida once asked, "are not non-communication and misunderstanding the very
horizon of culture and language?" (1989, 82). He understood that errors and misapprehensions
are not defects to be avoided but also conditions for new possibilities. Being allowed to
imagine— even for a moment—that Aronowitz and Derrida meant what I wanted them to mean
8

instead of what they did, provided the space to write a narrative that is not altogether
sociological as it does not address the economy, politics, or institutional arrangements precisely;
a narrative that is not historical exactly, since it does not focus on names, dates, and places; a
narrative that tells nanomedicine's story as the consolidation of ideas, concepts, and images into
a "spirit."
Aronowitz and Derrida’s lines may have been dramatic, unequivocal, and evocative, but
they were not unique. On the contrary, they speak to a problem at the heart of the social
sciences. Most sociological questions address, in some way, what became of the
structure/agency problem. The Structure/ Agency issue acquired its name in the 1970s in
Anthony Giddens’ Central Problems in Social Theory, but it can be traced back to Emile
Durkheim, who insisted on the power of “social facts” and rules to determine individual and
collective behavior. The heart of the debate is whether individuals have free will. That is,
whether they have control over their actions and destinies or whether they are merely subject to
circumstances that determine their behavior (Tan 2011, 37). Sociologists know that individuals
cannot be completely free. If individuals were free and rational, their actions could not be
constrained and coordinated; therefore, no regular social intercourse or other collectivity could
occur. They often describe these constraints or facets of social reality with properties that preexist and determine individuals as “structures” or “institutions.”
Although it is clear that society needs at least some predetermined if not permanent
patterns to ensure that the relations between elements have some measure of coherence and
stability, some scholars are sympathetic to the notion of “agency” and insist that society also
consists of individuals, whose consciousness and capacity to act meaningfully must be
recognized. Thus, most respond to the structure/ agency debate question by oscillating between
the two poles. While acknowledging that no social system can be a product of individual free
choice, most theorists agree that actors vary in their transformative capacity and believe that all
9

members of society exhibit some measure of agency in their daily lives. They see society as an
interplay of structure and agency, but the structure will win out in the final analysis for many. As
Giddens put it, systems determine what people do and what they cannot do; they are shaped and
reproduced by individuals. In the last few years, several prominent sociologists have expressed
that contemporary theory associated with Giddens Bourdieu, Bhaskar, and Habermas is too
binary and have attempted to move beyond the polarity associated with the structure/agency
binary framework.
The structure/ agency problem took on two incarnations in discussions and debates
concerning the sociology of science and technology. The first was the problem of genius. Robert
Merton, who established science and technology as legitimate areas of interest for sociologists,
set a precedent for sociological treatments of this question early on. His position – namely, that
“the great scientists, the undeniable geniuses, are altogether dispensable, for had they not lived,
things would have turned out pretty much as they did” (1968, 313) – has held up well.
Contemporary scholars do not rely on individual genius to explain innovation, and most grant
the most potent explanatory power to “context”—that is, culture, society, or the economy.
However, a few (have refused agency, consciousness, and creativity altogether despite being in a
perfect position to do so as sociologists influenced by a rich theoretical heritage and concerned
with asocial and supra social forces over and above—and perhaps even autonomous to—human
beings. The second is the issue of contingency or social construction versus “technological/
scientific determinism.” Technological determinism stands on the “structure” side of the debate.
Although agency is a central issue in the study of innovation, it is not a question about individual
agents but control over scientific and technological processes in general. That is, to what extent
do the tools we use control our social relations and worldview? Who, if anyone, controls
technological change? To what extent are technologies thrust upon us by elites, path-dependent
decisions from the past, or some other technological logic? Merton insisted that innovation
10

occurs in almost pre‐determined patterns. In this regard, the long-term influence of his ideas
did not fare as well. Until the 1980s, many scholars understood science and technology as
autonomous, out-of-control history-shaping processes or forces; by now, technological
determinism is discredited to the point where it has become a critic’s term and a term even of
abuse in some academic circles (Kline 2001, 541)2.
Most contemporary scholars see science and technology as products of society, as
entities that are "socially constructed." Social construction is a complex position that
emphasizes choice and contingency rather than the forces of necessity and treats innovation as a
multi-centered, complex process (Winner 1993, 367). Most constructivist explanations of
scientific and technical progress emphasize knowledge production. In general, scholars
associated with this tradition, see knowledge production as a psychological and social process.
(Bloor 1976). According to Bijker and Pinch (1995), technical progress is grounded in meaningmaking. One of their most notable claims is that scientific and technological products are
unworkable not because they perform a function but because social groups have accepted them.
Other constructionists foreground the role of politics, gender, ethnicity, class, gender, and other
factors in accounting for technological development (MacKenzie 1990). Feminist approaches, in
particular, have a long tradition of showing how science's understanding of the world and
technological developments that concretized that knowledge has been shaped by unequal power
relationships between men and women3.

According to Cutcliffe and Mitcham (2001), “the claim that social construction has finally laid
to rest technological determinism of the more critical and theoretically oriented scholars
undergirds the main origin story of science and technology studies” (87).
3 Most notably, Cockburn (1979), used baby bottles and other artifacts associated with childrearing to show how ideas about gender define what technology is and what it is not. She claims
that men have been traditionally understood as strong, manually able, and technologically
endowed while women were regarded as physically and technically incompetent. For this
reason, artifacts associated with men came to be defined as "technologies," and those associated
with women were not and have been excluded from sociological analysis; and Hubbard (2003)
2
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Eventually, science and technology studies also grew tired of the structure/ agency
debate. After Bruno Latour introduced “actor-network theory” to the field, scholars gave up the
distinction between society, science, and technology altogether and began to see them as
mutually constitutive. This ‘actor-network’ perspective replaced structures with contingent and
fragile networks of association and assigned agency to objects or "non-human actors." Indeed, it
was a theoretical developmentsthat rendered the concept of agency relatively meaningless and
did away with the binaries underpinning the structure/ agency framework. Actor-network
theory refuted both the social constructionists’ claim that science and technology were simply
reflections of society, culture, or politics, and the technological determinists’ argument that
technology and the scientific knowledge are autonomous prime-movers that cause historical
change.
As scholars took up Latour’s challenge, they often became ethnographers who went into
laboratories to observe what scientists and engineers actually “do.” The value of attending to
science and technology as practices is evident. Witnessing the day-to-day work undertaken by
scientists and engineers allowed the discipline to move beyond understanding innovation in
terms of formal structures of knowledge production as described, for example, by Popper.
Examining scientists’ practices and “epistemic cultures” brought the specificity of the scientific
method into focus. It allowed scholars to ground the relationship between science, technology,
and society in specific case studies that generated concrete and empirical accounts of how
scientific discoveries or technological inventions emerged and of their relationship to broader
society. Similarly, refusing the taken-for-granted assumptions about where society ended, and
science and technology began, freed scholars from thinking about causality beyond human

traced the role of Victorian morality around sexuality in shaping Darwin’s theory of biological
evolution.
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agents and seeing the agentic character of objects and other entities. In other words, doing away
with the dualism and reductionism that drew sharp distinctions between social and scientific
things brought to light the contingency and complexity of the innovation process. Without
denying these advantages in this history of thinking about science and technology, this
dissertation seeks to return to a binary style of reasoning to bring into focus the contradictions
and determinism that were lost when scholars of science and technology abandoned
oppositional thinking that demanded ironclad distinctions between entities.
In response to Patricia Clough's (2009) demand to connect methodological and
theoretical changes in the social sciences to technical developments, this dissertation seeks out
fragments of ideas and values embedded in the discourse around the emergence of a new
scientific discipline. To illuminate the intimate relationship between the social sciences and
science and technology empirically, it documents the convergence between language, concepts,
and categories deployed to understand socio-cultural problems and nanotechnology’s universe
of ideas. The thesis aims to show that shifts in socio-cultural thought mirror or are mirrored in
discourse associated with the rise of nanotechnology. More specifically, it traces socio-historical
changes in US society between the 1950s and 1960s and then the 1980s and 90s, treating the
rise of nanotechnology as a barometer of social values. A central argument here is that
nanotechnology, generally speaking, was and is not only a science or technology but a
reshuffling of ideas, assumptions, and categories of thought in the collective imagination.
Nanomedicine is thus characterized here as a cultural phenomenon, a new way of seeing the
social world, a logic, or “spirit,” that congealed into a particular style of thinking about human
problems and their solutions. To help guide the reader through what came to be a rather
substantial assemblage of data and theoretical reflections, the remainder of the introduction
discusses the methodology and structure of the dissertation and provides an outline of chapters
to come.
13

METHODOLOGY
Is it possible to produce a sociological account wherein the cause of change is something
other than "man"? And if so, how does one write such a narrative without succumbing to
idealism; the "theological niceties" or "childlike fancies" (Marx 1992, 163) of the "valiant fellow
(who) had the idea that men were drowned in water because they were possessed with the idea
of gravity" (ibid)? By returning to the classics. Contemporary sociologists of science and
technology grant the most potent explanatory power to culture, society, or the economy (Braun
2015; Rose 1994; Merton 2002), but very few have refused agency, consciousness, and creativity
altogether even though they had the theoretical means to do so. Sociology has a rich intellectual
heritage and a vast collection of asocial and supra social forces over and above—and even
autonomous to— individuals. One of these is Max Weber’s “spirit” of capitalism.
Just as Weber discovered the predictive value of religion—which for him, was an
autonomous sphere— on economic processes vis-à-vis its unseen but very powerful force, this
dissertation will show that scientific and technological evolution can be understood as processes
animated by something akin to Weber’s “spirit" of capitalism. Considered old-fashioned and
regressive even in his own time, Weber, the historical methodologist, may be incomplete,
contradictory, and confusing. Still, few knew spirits the way he did, and even fewer understood
that sociologists are not historians. Weber’s methodological writings may indeed be evocative
but never quite adequate; however, in writing them, Weber intended to give the budding
historical sociologist an orientation and a guide for where to look in the data. They are a
foundation, not a blueprint. According to his philosophy of history, each historical era is
characterized by specific patterns of rationality; thus, the sociologist's job is to capture that
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elusive "spirit" of the times. According to Weber, developing a “conception” or personality of an
epoch is a descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative task (1949, 98)4.
Unlike historians, sociologists “live and suffer from their dual task: to develop
generalizations and explain particular cases” (Roth in Weber 1978, xxxvii); sociologists
formulate and construct theory—not merely gather data. “The knowledge of the cultural
significance of concrete historical events and patterns is exclusively and solely the final end
which, among other means, concept-construction and the criticism of constructs also seek to
serve” (Weber 1949, 111). Since history is the empirical rearrangement of a reality based on
theoretical constructs and concept formation are “essential parts of method” Weber (1949, 58), a
Weberian historical analysis begins with theory. Before one confronts empirical data, one must
formulate categories with which to order it (110).
A historical sociologist of the Weberian variety treats historical events as symptoms of
value-orientations and recognizes that such a task is mainly interpretive. History is not simply a
series of events. Events must somehow fuse, and the medium for this binding is akin to a "spirit
of the times,” which includes values and categories of thought. Thus, a sociologist's task is to
interpret events and ask what they mean by excavating the cultural values and ideas underneath
them. To do so required tracing and explaining the origins of concepts and ideas as far back into
the historical record as possible. Weberian historiography is oriented to drawing connections
between phenomena to explain their meaning. Following Weber, this project embraces the
presupposition that science does not begin with the empirical (or objects) but with ideas.
Weber’s treatment of the Gothic period exemplifies his approach to history. The origin of
the Gothic style was primarily the result of the technically successful solution of an architectural

Although we are accustomed to understanding the ideas of an epoch as the ideas that have
dominated the mass or at least a decisive number of people living in the epoch, the very idea of
the epoch is not empirical. It must be constructed by the sociologist (Weber 1949, 95).
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problem, namely, the problem of the technical optimum in the construction of abutments for the
support of the cross-arched vault. Architects in the Romanesque or the Renaissance style were
very strongly oriented towards the technical problems of the dome. For Weber, the sociological
question concerned the meaning of Gothic architecture, which he believed could be found by
explaining the shift of attention from one problem to another. Weber concluded that the
“meaning” of Gothic architecture lies in understanding “the convergence of this primarily
technically conditioned revolution with certain largely socially and religiously conditioned
feelings [which] supplied most of those problems on which the artists of the Gothic epoch
worked” (30). More broadly, he concluded that changes in the architectural problem- complex
are “socially conditioned,” they go hand-in-hand with shifts with sociology-cultural changes.
While Gothic architecture solved “quite concrete problems,” it was also a technical solution to
problems of a spiritual nature arising from these changes. To answer Weber's call to attend to
the "characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move” by examining “ the cultural
significance of contemporary events: and seeking “the causes of their being historically so and
not otherwise" ( 72), this dissertation treats cancer nanotechnology's targeted delivery systems
as an instantiation of an ethos, not unlike his spirit of capitalism, which animated the actions of
Benjamin Franklin and existed before capitalism became an economic formation. Suppose the
discovery of nano-based targeted delivery can be thought of as animated by something akin to a
spirit. In that case, the task is to specify and describe the concepts, ideas, and values embodied
in nanomedicine’s approach to cancer and then trace these back to their origin.
As the construction of abutments to support the cross-arched vault, nano-targeted
delivery combines cultural factors with scientific and technical ones. It was and perhaps is also a
technical solution to technical problems. What "spiritual”—or other— problems" did
nanotechnology seek to solve? What specific cultural factors combined with scientific and
technological ones made targeted delivery an adequate solution to the problem of cancer instead
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of other possibilities? I follow the model of concept construction Weber laid out in The
Protestant Ethic to answer this question. Just as Weber mined Benjamin Franklin’s journal for
the spirit of capitalism, I seek the spirit of nanotechnology in its formal texts, Feynman’s Plenty
of Room Speech and Eric Drexler’s Engines of Creation. Since these particular texts may be
regarded as controversial, if not illegitimate, for scholars in the area, I will explain my decision
to focus my analytic attention on them before describing my methodology in-depth.
MAX WEBER AND THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS
To scientists and engineers, the origins of nanotechnology are clear. This certainty about
how their discipline came to be is an effect of a poor sense of history. Good scientists often make
the worst historians. According to the origin story found in all its textbooks, nanotechnology
began with an utterance. A brand-new discipline arose out of Richard Feynman's5 “prophetic"
Plenty of Room speech delivered at Cal Tech 1959 wherein he stated that "there is plenty of
room at the bottom." Feynman received the "first vision" of nanotechnology (Murty et al., 2013),
"opened a new field," or "described a field for which a name is yet to be coined" (Rogers et al.
2014). His insights lay dormant until Eric Drexler built on Feynman's vision and "laid the
foundation for molecular machine systems and molecular manufacturing" in his seminal book,
Engines of Creation: The Coming of the Era Nanotechnology in 1986 (Doelle et al. 2009, 72).
Drexler was nanotechnology's "first apostle," who "promoted and popularized the discipline"
and prepared it to receive government funding (Styx 1992). Drexler is also believed to have
founded nanomedicine. His text described nanotechnology as a promise and means of
transcending medicine's "stone-aged tools" that forced doctors to kill, burn, poison, and
mutilate cells and organs in their fight against disease and disorder. According to Drexler,

Richard Feynman was an American physicist whose theory of quantum electrodynamics as
well as his work on particle physics paved a pathway for the formulation of quantum mechanics
and earned him a Nobel prize in 1966.
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nanomedicine would heal without violence or war, "without harming a single healthy cell"
(1986, 97). In 1986, Drexler's vision belonged in a science fiction novel, but today
nanomedicine's inventions are in hospitals, clinical trials, and research laboratories.
Nanotechnology has been hailed as "the greatest engineering device since the industrial
revolution" (Bharali et al., 2010: 332), and nanomedicine is a fully-fledged and fully funded
discipline. In the early 2000s, nanomedicine, which includes developing drugs, drug delivery
systems, and imaging technologies from particles made with polymers, lipids, viruses, and other
substances, set its sights on bringing about a paradigm shift in oncology. Today,
nanotechnology's most common application is in cancer research. Within that, the field's "holy
grail" is "targeted" drug delivery systems that directly locate and recognize cancer cells and
deliver medications to tumors. Unlike chemotherapy, which works via the logic of waging war,
killing, poisoning, and mutilating, nano-based pharmaceuticals are said to collaborate with the
body, interact with its interior structures, form affinities, and co-operate with its biomolecules
(Invernici 2011) and treat cancer without any discomfort, pain, or even death associated with the
side effects of chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery.
Nanotechnology became an autonomous field with the opening of the National
Nanotechnology Institute in 2000. As nanotechnology produced "real" innovations that could be
mass-manufactured and sold on the mass market, the Feynman/ Drexler narrative no longer
appeared as a fitting account of its past. Social scientists were eager to give nanotechnology a
"real" history with new funding opportunities created by its institutionalization. In 2008,
Christopher Tourney wrote one of the most notable challenges to the origin story told by
nanoscientists. Tourney argued that Feynman's Plenty of Room speech had been retroactively
read into nanotechnology's history and that while Feynman may have seen something that
others did not, his vision did not set the intellectual parameters for the discipline nor lead
directly to the progression of nanotechnology as a science (2008, 133). Similarly, according to
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the head of NASA's Nanotechnology Project put it: "real scientists" doing "real work in the
laboratory" do not have time or patience for Drexler's nanobots or the science fiction he had
"spun" (Selin 2007). In 2016, an "exhaustingly comprehensive" Royal Academy of Engineering
report on nanotechnology discussed Drexler as only a minor figure in the appendix of
nanotechnology's history. (ibid)
The Feynman/ Drexler narrative is nothing more than a fantastic account for
professional historians. Good sociologists and historians avoid the desire to assign a single
starting point or foundational event and focus on economic, political, and social influences
(Jones 2008). They focus on the “social context” of scientific and technological innovation. This
distinguishes them from scientists, who are said to make poor historians because they treat
concepts as if they were real. Unlike professional historians, they praise ideas or individuals who
have been successful, emphasize progress, and tell a story that glorifies and glories the present
(Butterfield 1998). They also pin the hopes and dreams for the future on history (Winsor 2006).
“Context” is an antidote to the mythic power of visionaries and various forms of “reification”
that lead people to become attached to ideas and imbue them with heroic qualities.
Methodologically, foregrounding social context protects researchers from being seduced by the
concepts they study and the temptation to write false narratives that accept progress and glorify
the present (Butterfield 1998). Thus, rejecting the Feynman/ Drexler narrative is an unspoken
maxim for those invested in crafting a proper historical or sociological account of
nanotechnology’s origins.
While the nanoscientists’ version of history cannot hold up to even the slightest criticism,
something is alluring about the notion of a discipline arising out of a single statement. When
ideas are stripped of all capacity to cause change when utterances and texts no longer hold
power—mythic or otherwise— and are treated as mere outcomes of “contexts” such as the
economy, politics, or culture, something essential about what nanotechnology is, falls away.
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Nanotechnology was always about ideas. It was and an ideology. The key is to specify what kind
of ideology and treat it as one. The nanoscientists’ sense of origins may be false and ideological.
However, their stories do not need to be rejected as objects of analysis altogether. Given that
sociology has the tools to engage with discourse without believing it, Feynman and Drexler’s
writing ought to be subject to the most rigorous analysis and treated not simply as a series of
texts but interrogated as objects imbricated in larger socio-technical realities because they are
ideological.
In addition to Feynman’s speech and Drexler’s book, this dissertation takes peerreviewed publications in the field of nanotechnology-based direct-delivery as primary data.
Since what many refer to as the “turn to practices,” scholars of science and technology have
developed a sense that observing scientists in action, interviews, and archives are closer to
reality than scientific papers; an assumption that rests on the idea that experiences of a person
or documents not prepared for public consumption are more “authentic” than published papers,
which are seen as secondary sources. As Hannah Landecker, whose scholarship draws solely on
the publication record and treats scientific literature as a primary source, cogently argued,
formal publications are the only way to get at the texture and density of a field. Examining the
“mass of research” in the publication record also allows the researcher to move away from
studying a specific scientist or laboratory and turn their attention to understanding the
movement of a field as a whole. Like her book, Culturing Life: How Cells Became Technologies
cogently demonstrated, an empirical focus on the statements made by scientists in print is the
methodological path to “highly specific empirical data on the general” (2009, 23).
Landedecker’s approach is by no means unprecedented. Science and technology studies
has a rich history of textural analysis. Donna Haraway, for example, used a similar method to
examine texts written by 19th-century biologists. Deeply struck by the biologists’ use of
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“baroque” language to describe embryo development, she defined science as the “consolidation
of metaphors” and “shared images” (2004).
Following Landecker, Haraway, and others, I turn to texts. A cursory glance at the data
instantly revealed that these scientific texts are not merely technical, instrumental devoid of
passion, whose purpose is to summarize the results of particular experiments. For example, one
scientist described his nanoparticle as “a minuscule bead coated with gold... decorated with
dyed‐silica nanoparticles and magnetite nanocrystals” (Bharali 2010, 45); others theorized
nanomedicine as deploying “covert tactics for old drug therapies, launching pathology‐seeing
particles through the body’s systems, like the Trojan horse waiting for battle” (Papasani 2011,
801); or “invoking a response from the body’s protective machinery... thus the final goal of
nanostructures is to hijack or bypass these defense systems” (ibid). While Landecker and
Haraway’s methods enabled them to find broad themes and find general patterns by attending
to metaphor and ideas within a particular scientific discipline at a specific time, my project’s
orientation is a little different. It seeks to account for nanotechnology's cultural significance and
value; it asks how it contributed to broader cultural trends.
CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
While this dissertation owes a great debt to historians and Science and Technology
scholars, my analysis extends beyond nanotechnology. It seeks to theorize these patterns into
something akin to a spirit or force or form of collective thought. I want to use a “bigger lens” to
get at what Weber called “spirit” or “ethos” or Evitar Zerubavel characterized “as generic
structures in phenomena that do not appear to be related” (2007, 136-137). However, Weber
provided the philosophical foundation and specified what a study of this sort should capture
(i.e., the “spirit,” “ethos,” or “values”); he did not stipulate how to extract such a “spirit” from
empirical data. The last ten years have given rise to a series of methodologies grouped under the
umbrella of “cultural sociology.” Although diverse in scope, these methods share an orientation
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to meaning and common patterns. One of these is the “Strong Program,” which Alexander and
Smith described as:
Controversial, transparent and ambitious... inspired particularly by Durkheim’s religious
sociology, but also by a cultural reading of Weber’s political and institutional work, the
Strong Program insists that social life is not fully or even mostly rational. It continues to
be deeply meaningful, involves feelings about the sacred, good, and evil, and has
diﬀusely symbolic, theatrical, and often quasi-ritualistic qualities. For this reason, many
Strong Program products set out to oﬀer starkly alternative readings of presumed sites of
instrumental rationality such as war, ﬁnance, punishment, or scientiﬁc information
(2018, 19).
Sociology’s sanctioned answers to questions concerning science and technology tend to
be limited to material resources, information control, networks, interests, manipulative elites, or
other things or people that we can point to and measure because they are “real” (Reed 2007;
Cutler 2006). However, the Strong Program admits non-material forces and insists that
meaning is instrumental in determining outcomes. Doing so grants ideas and values certain
autonomy and treats culture as a force that shapes institutions. The Strong Program opened the
door for thinking beyond institutions and attending the non-material forces that cause people to
take up specific projects. Methodologically, this translates to treating meaning, visual culture, or
aesthetic sense as primary vis-a-vis traditional sociological conceptions of power; a concern with
searching for hidden meaning, a focus on non‐material forces (spiritual or symbolic)6,
commitment to hermeneutically reconstructing social texts richly and persuasively, and with
sensitivity towards binaries, fleeting references, and iconography.
One critical approach to studying culture in this way parades under the banner of “social
pattern analysis.” If nanotechnology is indeed a “spirit,” as I argue, traces of this “spirit” must be
general, and its impact must be seen across various domains in both science and society. In

For Alexander and Smith, that force is culture but, in this dissertation, the nature of this force
is undecided, however like Alexander and Smith’s version of the concept, it functions over and
above BOTH society and science/ technology.
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other words, it must be a clear and distinct pattern. To get at these patterns, one begins by
collecting many cases from diverse settings and allowing the analysis to guide what kind of data
to be collected, then seeking commonalities between them by looking away from the specifics
and looking at a pattern underneath them. That is, divorcing the cases from their context and
lumping them into common patterns regardless of their origin. On a practical level, this means
carefully attending to texts in their specificity—to codes, narratives, and symbols that create
webs of meaning. In methodological terms, this requires “bracketing wider-social relations” and
treating texts as self-contained universes.
Similarly, for Wagner-Pacifici, who famously deployed a structural-hermeneutic
approach to her language analysis, specific worldviews are represented in specialized discourse.
The task of the cultural researcher is to “trace representational tendencies or... excavate patterns
of representation of concepts” (1994, 2). That is, to seek patterns in metaphors and language
that will point to what Weber characterized as a “worldview or “evaluative attitudes.”
DATA AND PROTOCOL
Nanotechnology began as excitement about new micro-level forces. As a downshift to the
nanoscopic scale revealed the things previously thought to be inert and stable were, in fact,
active and malleable, scientists and engineers began to consider the possibility of engineering
matter one atom at a time. Since its origins, nanotechnology promised to revolutionize the
world, and like Weber’s “spirit of capitalism,” it came together as parts. To document the
convergence between metaphors, categories, and logic underneath expert discourse which gave
rise to nanotechnology as a field and forms of thought in the natural and social sciences and US
politics and culture, I compared major texts in nanotechnology’s history to texts that were
published in the same period. Following Zerubavel’s (2009) plan for data collection, I worked
backward and started with the status of nanotechnology today. I took 40-top cited articles in
cancer nanomedicine and analyzed them for patterns in themes, metaphors, and language
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patterns using Atlas Ti. A diverse collection of thematic patterns emerged. The strongest had to
do with a discourse about force, specifically how nanomedicine is an alternative to violence and
destruction. I designated this as characteristic of nanomedicine and asked where this discourse
came from and why it took on the meaning that it did. I then traced this theme back through the
history of nanotechnology. To document shifts in the discourse, I divided the history of
nanotechnology into four distinct periods (i) The mid-1950s and 1960s— the earliest iterations
of nanotechnology in Richard Feynman’s “Plenty of Room” Speech, (ii) The late 1960s and
1970s; Peter Speiser the discovery of encapsulation and nanotechnology’s first application to
drug delivery (iii) The 1980s and 1990s; Eric Drexler’s Engines of Creation and (iv) 2010present; nanotechnology’s application in cancer.
I then constructed a universe of discourse around each period to show that the patterns
or themes were general (i.e., not limited to nanotechnology). These “universes” were populated
by texts associated with intellectual shifts in the natural and social sciences that resulted from
new inventions and discoveries. Although it is difficult to judge the relative importance of
findings in the natural sciences, I classified them as “major” when they were awarded the Nobel
or significant prizes or are mentioned in established narratives of the history of science and
technology. Similarly, the social science texts were assembled by looking at book reviews
published in the American Sociological Review, the American Sociological Association’s list of
recipients of book awards, and University of California, Berkeley’s “Books of the Century,” a list
compiled by intellectual historian Daniel Immerwahr. Since it is much more challenging to
establish the relative importance of the social science texts compared to texts in other groups to
be eligible for a closer examination, they had to meet at least one additional criteria: (i) its
author was elected President of the ASA, (ii) its author is included in the sociological canon as
reflected by their presence in textbooks, (iii) it occupies a position within the top 20 most cited
articles in sociology during its period, or (iv) if not a product of sociology directly, it must
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include a widely-read text within other disciplines. Once the general patterns and themes within
the “science” group were identified, these themes and patterns were “mapped on” to those in the
“social science” group to identify commonalities and divergences. Texts exhibiting the identified
patterns most clearly were selected for more detailed examination. These shared metaphors,
ideas, concerns, and intellectual were then used as a basis to examine texts in other spheres,
such as politics or popular culture, and to link them to more major scale historical events. Just
as Wagner-Pacifici discovered an unexpected discourse about domesticity underneath
discussions of gentrification, by looking underneath the surface of texts from a variety of
disciplines, which had little to no contact with one another, I discovered that despite their
authors’ lack of engagement, or even familiarity with one another’s work, they share a
theoretical orientation as if they had co-determined one another. I argue that these deep
homologies owe their existence to a force over and above both science and technology and
culture and society. I refer to this force as the “spirit of nanotechnology.”
CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE
This dissertation traces the origins of nanotechnology by telling its story in a way that is
balanced precariously between the naïve faith in sources and belief in the mythical power of
ideas (which often characterize scientists’ historical accounts) and a focus on “context” (by
which I mean the economy, politics, and socio-cultural formations used and insisted upon by
recognized historians and scholars). Inspired by Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, it does not attend to dates on a calendar, events, or proper names, but
treats the history of nanotechnology as a series of shifts in collective thought.
The first empirical chapter, “From Poisoning the Enemy” to “Managing Interactions,”
opens the dissertation by describing and specifying contemporary nanomedicine’s “worldview”
or “evaluative attitudes.” Using peer-reviewed articles written by leading figures in the field
between 2010 and 2016, it theorizes nanomedicine’s “essence” or “spirit” as something akin to
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“engineering compatibility,” which for nanoscientists means designing, creating, and managing
interactions. The rest of the dissertation explains why nanomedicine’s intellectual character took
the form it did by treating “engineering compatibility” as rhetoric concretized in material
practices within nano-oncology laboratories. As per Weber’s approach to historiography, it
breaks the notion of “engineering compatibility” into its discursive components.
To reflect its methodology, this dissertation is organized conceptually into three parts,
each tracing the evolution of a particular concept, or “component.” Part I deals with the notion
of scale. As nanotechnology embarked on a journey towards legitimating itself as an
autonomous science, its discourse on scale and structure took on the role of a “fulcrum” upon
which other relations are concentrated (Foucault, 1971). Chapters 3 and 4 explore early
nanotechnology’s engagement with the notion of scale to show how the idea of smallness
grounded and justified nanotechnology in the accounts of its founder, who claimed that
problems could be solved at the nanoscale through interventions that do not require coercion.
The promise to eliminate conflict, contradiction, and other forms of friction by shifting down in
scale culminated in nanotechnology’s agenda of making incompatible things compatible as an
alternative to coercion and conflict. Chapter 3, “A Faulty Tool” looks at the theme of scale as it
manifested in Feynman’s 1959 speech in terms of his promise that moving down in scale and
addressing things at the level of their rudimentary units (i.e., atom-by-atom) would lead to novel
solutions to problems that thus far have remained insolvable. Chapter 4 introduces Drexler’s
Engines of Creation and shows how “proportion” and concern with creating a world
proportional to human beings came to define nanotechnology’s cosmology.
Part II addresses the notion of “structure.” Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with
relationality. When one no longer looks at things from the point of view of the whole, things
start to look a little different. From a bird’s eye view of the system, the whole appears
harmonious, and integration looks natural, effortless, and spontaneous. However, when one
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zooms in and pays attention to the parts, it becomes apparent that the processes of getting the
parts to work on behalf of the whole are repressive coercive, destructive, and from the point of
view of the unit, outright intolerable. And as this intellectual shift crystallized and the collective
gaze turned to the microscopic, it became clear that things do not fit neatly together, and force
and coercion are required at every level of the system to keep it from falling apart. Chapter 5
examines Feynman’s description of a whole that is organized but not integrated; a whole created
and held together to the decline of functionalism and the rise of the idea that the whole is
oppressive to its parts and that underneath the veneer of functionalism’s spontaneous and cooperative interactions between units, wholes are held together with coercion and force. Chapter
6 returns to The Engines of Creation to explain how nanotechnology came to represent the
possibility of eliminating all negative elements, contradictions, and conflicts. It argues that
Drexler’s introduction of “compatibility” into nanotechnology’s theoretical foundation
culminated in a promise that atom-by-atom engineering would make incompatible things
compatible, what I characterized as “engineering compatibility.” Chapters 7 and 8 turn to the
birth of nanomedicine. They argue that nanotechnology legitimated its place in pharmaceutical
research by promising a solution to the destruction resulting from microscopic applications of
force and coercion, which had recently entered the collective concern. In concrete terms, this
part in of the narrative shows how the shift in thinking about scale and structure documented in
parts I and II culminated in microencapsulation and targeting, two strategies that concretized a
generic desire to fix problems without the use of destructive force. Thus, Part III of the
dissertation concerns the idea of “destruction.”
Chapter 7, “Dissolving the Insoluble,” theorizes microencapsulation as not merely a
novel form of drug delivery but a way of thinking about what to do with the pathological,
harmful, and noxious elements in society. Chapter 8 documents nanomedine’s meditation on
coercion coalescing into the notion of “targeting,” which in turn became a discourse about
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compa tibility and relationships. The dissertation ends with a discussion of targeted delivery’s
failure in cancer and its resurrection in immunology via an innovative delivery system utilized in
vaccines that could, or should have ended the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020.
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CHAPTER 2
FROM “POISONING THE ENEMY” TO
“MANAGING INTERACTIONS”
Targeted Delivery in Cancer Nanomedicine 2010-2016
“Treating cancer with current chemotherapy delivery techniques is like spraying an
entire rose garden with poison to kill a single weed.”
—Center of For Nanomedicine,
Johns Hopkins (2016)
Nanotechnology has been hailed as the most significant engineering device since the industrial
revolution by scientists and engineers (Bharali et al., 2010). In the early 2000s, nanomedicine
became a cutting-edge approach to cancer research. Since then, "nano" has become a prefix
attached to everyday products, including Nano USB receivers, Apple's iPod Nano, Reebok's
Nano trainers, and even Nano Towels that promise to replace toxic chemical cleaners. Although
the term "nano" is well-established in today's cultural lexicon, few seem to know precisely what
nanotechnology is or why it is significant. Even fewer are aware that nanotechnology's dominant
application is in cancer research. According to experts within the field, nano-based medicines
are not simply another class of drugs to be added to the already-bloated market; they stand to
fulfill a dream of all scientists that had fought and continue to fight cancer on the laboratory
front, that is, to treat and perhaps even cure cancer without harming healthy tissue by
"targeting" cancer cells directly. The tendency of "para scientific" publications to exaggerate and
over-report scientific findings has been well-documented; however, "real scientists doing real
work in real laboratories" (Selin 2012, 203) routinely make similar claims. According to
Lawrence Tamarkin, a leader in the field and inventor of Aurimune, a gold nanoparticle that was
once regarded as the most likely to become nanomedicine’s first successful cancer treatment,
oncology's current paradigms will be turned on their head if even a single nanotechnology-based
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targeted delivery platform can pass even one human clinical trial, cancer will become” a chronic
illness, not a death sentence” (Schneider 2009, 20)1 easily managed by pharmaceuticals that no
longer wage war and poison but treat the disease in co-cooperation with the body's molecules
and cells. Nano-oncology’s “goal is to suppress the growth of cancer cells by disrupting the blood
vessels that support cancer growth and thus keep cancer at bay with a less invasive, less
traumatic procedure” (ibid).
As has been very well documented, even before Richard Nixon declared war on cancer in
1971, cancer treatments—surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy— have traditionally used
military-inspired language to promise patients that medicine's arsenal of weapons can defeat
cancer through a superior show of force. As this chapter will show, nano-based targeted delivery
offered something different: the possibility of curing cancer without conflict, violence, or killing.
This chapter examines cancer nanotechnology's discursive landscape by mining peer-reviewed
articles published in leading nanotechnology and cancer journals between 2010 and 2016 for
metaphors and other linguistic features that lurk underneath the surface of the texts. In
attending to themes, narratives, and general logic within these formal scientific accounts, this
chapter begins theorizing cancer nanomedicine’s discourse as a meditation on force and
destruction in a broad sense.
As the set of peer-reviewed articles will show, nano-based targeted delivery is, above all,
a solution to the actual or perceived aggression associated with conventional treatments such as

Newer molecular drugs and gene-based approaches also use the notion of “targeting” to make
similar promises (see, for example, Afrasiabi et al. 2021). However, unlike nanomedicine, which
positioned itself as an alternative to chemotherapy, genomic-based approaches tend to accept
chemotherapy as a mode of treatment, and research within the field has focused on refining
chemotherapy protocols. Secondly, these new molecular drugs have been developed with the
agenda of becoming a steppingstone towards “more sophisticated cancer cell killers,” which
draws on an evolutionary understanding of cancer. Cancer nanomedicine developed a new
understanding of cancer, which led researchers to disavow killing, violence, and force and
understand treating cancer as a chronic disease as a terminal goal.
1
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chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery, whose side effects are often seen as worse than the
disease itself. The sense that cancer treatment is too violent and that medical cures are killing
people has circulated among the lay public since chemotherapy became a standard treatment in
the 1950s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, critiques of medicine congealed around the idea
that medicine is "imperialist" and war-like (for example, Illich 1976). Scholars have noted that
medicine's violent and war-like tendencies are especially prevalent in discourse about cancer.
The deep affinity between the military and medicine, often referred to as "bio-militarism," has
been brought to light by attending to the structure of language, logic, and systems of images that
permeate the medical culture, scientific knowledge, and public and private expressions about
the disease (Montgomery 1991). Illness as Metaphor, wherein Susan Sontag linked the notion
that cancer is a "ruthless invasion," an "evil, invincible predator" (1978, 7) to prevailing ideas
about morality, is perhaps the most widely recognized of such critiques. For Sontag, cancer
treatments were often understood as worse than the disease itself. She characterized surgery as
almost genocidal: "As was said about "the Jewish problem" [...] to treat cancer, one must cut out
much of the healthy tissue around it" (82). Radiotherapy, to her, was like aerial warfare, which
"bombards patients with toxic rays"; chemotherapy was akin to chemical warfare as it "poisons
the enemy within" (65). In the last decade, biomedicine also grew alarmed at its military
metaphors. With mounting evidence of the harmful consequences of the aggression associated
with military-based imagery, medical practitioners and researchers have even called for
oncology's "comprehensive demilitarization" (for example, Nie et al., 2016).
“WITH NEW TREATMENT OPTIONS COME NEW METAPHORS”
—Fujimura (1996)
Nanotechnology’s first book, Eric K. Drexler's The Engines of Creation, is best known for
AI-powered factories reduced to the size of a fingernail and tiny and self-assembling nanobots
that now dominate popular imagery concerning nanotechnology. However, underneath his
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science-fiction'esque narrative lay another desire. According to Drexler, “the simplest medical
applications of nanomachines will involve not repair but selective destruction. Cancers provide
one example; infectious diseases provide another. The goal is simple: one need only recognize
and destroy the dangerous replicators, whether they are bacteria, cancer cells, viruses, or
worms” (109). Drexler believed that introducing atom-by-atom engineering into the clinic would
liberate medicine from its "crude” (100) “stone-age,” and “primitive” tools (235) that rely on
brute force and cure disease through slaughter, burning, cutting, and poisoning.
Consider “delicate” surgery from a cell’s perspective: a huge blade sweeps down, chopping blindly
past and through the molecular machinery of a crowd of cells, slaughtering thousands. Later, a
great obelisk plunges through the divided crowd, dragging a cable as wide as a freight train
behind it to rope the crowd together again. From a cell’s perspective, even the most delicate
surgery, performed with exquisite knives and great skill, is still a butcher job. Only the ability of
cells to abandon their dead, regroup, and multiply makes healing possible (85).

With the advent of nanobots, which enter cells without harming them and carefully
repair damaged tissue molecule-by-molecule, medicine would finally be able to heal without
killing.
As Drexler predicted, nanomedicine eventually became a "normal science" (Kuhn 1962),
as evidenced by numerous university departments, professional associations, conferences,
textbooks, and journals dedicated to its research agenda. Nanotechnology is exciting because
matter becomes radically malleable when reduced to the nanoscopic scale. At the nano-scale,
molecules can be assembled atom-by-atom to make new configurations so that scientists can
revert unfavorable properties into desirable ones. Nanotechnology allows scientists and
engineers to "literally fine-tune" matter, from its weight, shape, color, reactivity to its melting
point by rearranging, adding, or subtracting individual atoms (Emerich 2003). For these and
other reasons, medicine quickly embraced nanotechnology, giving rise to what is now called
nanomedicine (West and Halas 2003). Within that, the field of drug delivery saw
nanotechnology’s potential almost instantly: its very existence as a scientific discipline is owed
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to the fact that some of the most potent and efficacious drug molecules developed cannot be
administered because they are too toxic, irritating, or simply incompatible with the biology of
the human body.
By the early 2000s, nanomedicine became a “magical hope for the medical world”
(Gupta et al., 2010). Cancer researchers developed an extreme affinity for nano-based
approaches because oncology had been suffering from a delivery problem since the invention of
chemotherapy, as only a tiny portion of medicinal compounds reach the tumor. The ability to
make molecules atom by atom meant overcoming the body's resistance to drugs could be
approached through engineering rather than brute force, like surgery, radiation, and
chemotherapy. Instead of increasing the dose of toxic chemicals or poisonous rays administered
to the body, nanotechnology allowed scientists to think about "creating highly biocompatible
structures that can seamlessly move within or become integrated into biological systems"
(Sanna 2014, 266-267), to precisely tailor matter and transform its undesirable properties into
desirable ones, or to make the incompatible compatible. The notion of “making the incompatible
compatible” was not simply a technical project but a formative aspect of nanomedicine’s
visualization practices, that shaped how nanoscientists see and understand cancer.
A COMPLEX AND HETEROGENEOUS DISEASE
When nanoscientists gaze at cancer tumors, they do not see an enemy to be defeated.
Cancer appears to them as populations of cells and tissues sustained by makeshift, poorly built,
and barely functional infrastructure. For nanoscientists, cancer is not an aggressive invader but
a "complex," "heterogeneous," and "multifactorial" disease. Researchers tend to describe cancer
not as “invaders that begin their program of destruction from within,” but as an unfortunate but
inevitable problem faced by all multicellular organisms or an "orderly process gone wrong"
(Weinberg 1998, 1-3). As one research team put it: "When cells become old or damaged, they die
and are replaced by new cells, but sometimes cells do not die when they should [and] new cells
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form when the body does not need them. These extra cells form a tumor" (Estanqueiro et al.
2015: 632). The scientist’s vision of tumors suggests ecologists’ descriptions of rainforests or
other environments that support complex ecosystems made of a panoply of unique lifeforms.
Like rainforests, which are threatened by human activity, for nanoscientists, tumors are
vulnerable.
Since their vision has been shaped by the imperative to attend to the smallest of units,
nanoscientists see cancer as a cellular disease and characterize tumors as "complex
microenvironments," i.e., something akin to habitats for diverse populations of cells and tissues.
While emphasizing that normal and cancerous tissues are so similar that it is often difficult to
distinguish between them, researchers conceptualize the difference primarily in how their
vasculature is constructed. Normal vasculature is arranged orderly; it has a regular branching
order and distinct hierarchically organized components such as arterioles, capillaries, and
venules. These vascular structures are tightly woven to protect vessels from penetrating foreign
elements. Researchers believe the gaps, holes, and crevices that characterize cancerous
architecture make tumors uniquely permeable.
Many accounts emphasize the tumor’s haphazard construction practices and use
“disorganized” and “dysfunctional” to describe its architecture. Tumors are poorly constructed
because they "make it quickly" and "make it work now." As database engineers know, too much
emphasis on "quickly and now" inevitably leads to violations of principles of good design. Since
tumors proliferate rapidly, they lack the time needed for organization and planning. The
"necessity to provide oxygen and nutrients to its cells" (Shi 2017, 34) leads to poor construction.
As their population expands, tumors need more and more infrastructure for waste disposal and
oxygen and nutrient delivery. The pressure to provide it "now" leads to creating functional,
albeit poorly designed structures. Due to their constant growth, tumors always contain too many
cells and insufficient resources. Therefore, the cancer is forced to add more and more structures,
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each less organized and more chaotic than the last. When it comes to choosing building
materials, contractors know that "you get what you pay for." Tumors cannot grow vasculature on
their own, so they "recruit" new vessels or "engulf" existing blood vessels (ibid). The only vessels
available for recruitment are low-quality ones that typically lack components needed for
regulation. As a result, the infrastructure they build consists of "tortuous" vascular structures,
"networks" with "haphazard patterns of interconnection and branching" (ibid) where blood and
fluid flow in both directions. Poorly planned construction and use of low-grade materials lead to
tumors with problems, including poor blood flow and insufficient drainage, which creates an
overly acidic environment and hypoxia (oxygen deprivation). These conditions make tumors
"vulnerable" to not only high interstitial pressure and, rapidly shifting blood flow (Nakamura
2016) but also nanoparticles. In particular, the tumors’ permeability provides a unique
opportunity for intervention by nanostructures.
From the researchers' point of view, these and other features of cancer tumors are
"exploitable." Thus, many describe nanomedicine as "taking advantage” of the tumor's
structural defects. According to one article, “nanoparticles and their payloads have also been
favorably delivered into tumors by taking advantage of the pathophysiological conditions" (Sun
2014, 12321). According to another team, the tumors' poorly planned vasculature "render the
vessels permeable to macromolecules" (Xu 2015, 4). Taking advantage of the tumor's
permeability and limited capacity to rid itself of waste and harmful substances is the basis of
what is called "passive targeting." However, discovering another set of defects in the tumor leads
scientists to believe that nanomedicine can go further and create drugs that target tumors
actively and directly. Nanostructures can "target" cancer because tumors "over-express" specific
genes and proteins. With subatomic chemistry's new insights into the nature and function of
bonds between molecular structures, nanoscientists realized that these "over-expressed"
substances could function as "lures" to attract compounds with whom they share a high level of
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affinity or as "beacons" that guide nanoparticles directly to the tumor. Thus, nanomedicine's
drug delivery project is primarily about creating nanoparticles with a particular affinity for
tumor cells and the substances they secrete.
For this reason, cancer nanotechnology is dominated by discourse about "compatibility."
For nanoscientists, nanostructures hold the promise of curing cancer not because they are
stronger or more aggressive than the disease, as is the case with chemotherapy, but because of
the radical compatibility and attraction between cancer cells and nanostructures. As evidenced
by the scientists' narratives, nanotechnology's ability to engineer "affinity" between molecules
previously assumed to be incompatible gave rise to a new logic whereby eliminating malignant
elements does not occur via killing and violence, but through relationships, interactions, affinity,
and compatibility.
“IT LACKS SPECIFICITY”
Chemotherapy works through the logic of incompatibility that, according to Georges
Canguilhem, runs through modern medicine. In Writings on Medicine, Canguilhem stated that
side-effects are an inevitable product of the incompatibility between nature and pharmacology.
Modern pharmaceutical compounds can kill disease because they cannot coexist with nature.
Since the human body also occupies the realm of nature, the price to be paid for killing disease is
subjecting the body to poisoning and violence. Similarly, Michel Foucault once wrote that
Modern medicine cures illness because of its capacity to kill and poison:
One of the capabilities of medicine is killing. Medicine kills, it has always killed, and it
has always been aware of this. What is important, is that until recent times the negative
effects of medicine remained inscribed within the register of medical ignorance.
Medicine killed through the doctor’s ignorance or because medicine itself was ignorant.
It was not a true science, but rather a rhapsody of ill-founded, poorly established and
unverified sets of knowledge. The harmfulness of medicine was judged in proportion to
its non-scientificity […] But what emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century was
the fact that medicine could be dangerous, not through its ignorance and falseness, but
through its knowledge, precisely because it was a science […] The harmful effects of
medication due not to errors of diagnosis or the accidental ingestion of those substances,
but to the action of medical practice itself, in so far as it has a rational basis. At present,
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the instruments that doctors and medicine in general have at their disposal cause certain
effects, precisely because of their efficacy (2004, 9-10).
Being a product of modern medicine, chemotherapy is effective because it is a science.
And it is a science because it has the capacity to kill. The idea that the compound medicine it has
at its disposal is effective because they are poisonous and can therefore kill is a general
characteristic of scientific medicine known as the doctrine of the “pharmakon,” wherein the
remedy and the poison are indistinguishable. According to Foucault, the new sensitivity and
intolerance to medicine’s perceived violence and disavowal of war metaphors in favor of a
gentler, more reconciliatory approach seen in holistic medicine “represent the vague echo in
public awareness of the technical uneasiness that biologists and doctors are beginning to feel
with regards to the effects of their practice and […] knowledge” (12).
Although it operates within the purview of scientific medicine, nano-based targeted
delivery challenges the idea that side effects and damage to healthy tissue are inevitable in
treating disease. Using the rhetoric of "toxicity," nanoscientists "advertise, indeed over
advertise" (Sontag 1986: 87) the potentially life-threatening side-effects associated with current
cancer treatments. Every article in the dataset contained a permutation of the statement "they
kill ‘normal’ cells and cause toxicity to the patient." Many describe radiation as "damaging to
local healthy tissues and organs" (Estanqueiro et al., 2015: 632). The same article called surgery
“disfiguring.” However, another claimed surgery was dangerous and inefficient: “surgery can
induce acceleration of the tumor, and metastatic growth has been concerned, probably due to
inflammatory response during wound healing” (Hu et al. 2016, 19). However, chemotherapy is
their most common target. Researchers legitimate their approach to cancer treatment by
presenting nanotechnology as an antidote to the toxicity associated with systemic treatments.
Chemotherapy kills normal cells, poisons the body, and produces adverse effects on the patients
because it lacks specificity. That is, it is "uncontrollable" (Liu et al., 2012, 181), inefficient, and
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unable to distinguish between cancerous and normal cells. Chemotherapy "harms healthy cells
and causes toxicity to the patient" (ibid). "These drugs... kill other proliferative cells in bone
marrow, the gastrointestinal tract (stomach and intestines), and hair follicles, leading to
common side effects such as compromised immune system, inflammation and ulceration of
mucous membranes in the gastrointestinal tract, and hair loss" (Yingchoncharoen et al.,
2017,702). Chemotherapy is poisonous because only a "small fraction of the administered drugs
reach the site of action, while the rest of the drug is distributed (...) into healthy organs and
tissues. Therefore, large doses are required for it to be effective" (ibid). As the quote above
illustrates, the nanoscientists' issue with chemotherapy is not that it is made of toxic
compounds: the problem is that it "lacks specificity." "Specificity" is what nanotechnology brings
to cancer research. For nanoscientists, "specific" means two things: "targeting" and
"protecting."
By “targeting” cancer cells or delivering drug molecules directly to tumors,
nanostructures are said to protect healthy tissue. For example, in the 2015 article in Colloids
and Surfaces cited earlier, the authors use the notion of “specificity” to draw a sharp distinction
between nanotechnology and its predecessor: “conventional anti-cancer drugs [...] are
distributed non-specifically in the body leading to systemic toxicity… nanocarriers avoid this
because they can reach the tumor through leaky vasculature surrounding the tumor [or by]
targeting the receptors overexpressed by cancer cells” (Estanqueiro et al. 2015, 632). According
to another article, nano-based approaches “reduce the toxic side effects of anticancer drugs in
normal cells and tissues by targeting a cell-surface receptor that will either directly or indirectly
kill cancer cells” (Dawidczyk et al.2014, 37). While "specific" was the most used word across the
dataset, “smart” also permeated the researchers’ discourse on compatibility and incompatibility.
THEY ARE ENGINEERED TO BE SMART
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Nanoscientists believe that surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy are out of date because
they are not “smart.” As one researcher put it, “unprecedented progress of biomedical
nanotechnology during the past few decades... conventional drug delivery systems have been
evolving into smart delivery systems" (Sanna 2014: 1306). The term "smart" describes the
release behavior of drug carriers as "precisely controlled" or refers to the nanocarriers' stimuliresponsive characteristics. Nanocarriers to be "made sensitive or ultra-sensitive to stimuli and
to detect subtle changes in their environment" (Yingchoncharoen et al., 2017: 704). Drugs are
said to "act smart" when stimuli such as Ph variations, hormone levels, enzyme concentration,
or heat can be programmed to act as triggers for releasing their payload. Another team
described recently developed Ph-Sensitive nanoprobes as "smart" because they "stay silent
during the blood circulation, while strongly activated in response to the acidic extracellular pH
in tumors or the neovasculature” (Liu 2016: 1311). One article even referred to nano-based drugs
as "response systems" (Xu 2015, 7). In these narratives, "smart" is closely related to "malleable"
and "controllable," that, along with other characteristics which make nanostructures favorable
drug carriers, are often framed in terms of "biocompatibility" or the ability of nanomaterials to
co-operate with or mimic the body's internal structures.
Nanostructures are not innately smart or sensitive. These qualities must be programmed
or designed into them. Nanostructures are seen as especially valuable in the design of drug
delivery systems because their properties and behavior can be modified and controlled precisely.
Many researchers emphasize their malleable, flexible, or tunable nature. Scientists can engineer
nanostructures to protect the body from poisonous compounds by "revert(ing) unfavorable
physicochemical properties of bioactive molecules to desirable biopharmacologic properties"
(Sanna 2014, 1306). With atom by atom engineering, nanostructures can be designed to be
highly selective for tumors and to interact and respond to conditions within the body”: “The
physical/ chemical properties of polymers can smartly transform in responding to those stimuli.
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The drug release rate can be controlled by the intensity of applied stimuli to the fabricated
carriers" (Liu 2016, 1309). Researchers position nanomedicine as radically different from
current approaches to cancer therapy by using metaphors such as smart, precise, and targeted.
While surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy are bolstered by the logic of waging war on cancer
to save the body from invasion, nanomedicine deals with materials and molecules that are
engineered to be compatible with the body and can enter into complex relationships with the
body's systems and structures. However, these interactions must also be precisely managed and
controlled to treat cancer successfully.
NANOPARTICLE-CELL INTERACTIONS
Nanostructures are said to enter into interactions with the body's interior structures,
"form affinities," and "co-operate with biomolecules" (Invernici et al. 2011: 59). One of the more
significant findings is the prevalence of concepts organized by "relationships" in the scientist's
conceptual universe. The nanoscientist's accounts posit "interaction" as a dominant object of
concern, with researchers using this term to illustrate the compatibility between the nano and
the bio. According to one article, "drug delivery in-vitro is mainly about nanoparticle-cell
interactions" (Polo 2017, 2398). Another stated that shifting the research focus to nano-bio
interactions was a groundbreaking step that resulted in a "rapid expansion" of nanomedicine
platforms (Shi 2017, 21). A frequently used example of cooperation is the nanoparticles' use of
blood for transport. Nanostructures utilize the bloodstream to move around in the body because
they have been engineered to resemble cells and other entities structurally, chemically, and
behaviorally. The nanostructures are (mis)recognized by the body and treated like blood
components. Since nanostructures are interactive entities, the challenge for scientists is to
manage the interactions they enter into by engineering the nanostructures to be selective in the
interactions they pursue. "Managing interactions" involves "predicting multiple biological
interactions, which depend not on the characteristics of the individual nanocarrier but also on
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the biological entities they encounter within the body" (Shi 2007, 1248). Sometimes interactions
need to be strengthened and encouraged, and at other times, they must be limited. For example,
"the charged surface transformation from negative to positive can be utilized to enhance cellular
uptake in virtue of the strengthened interaction between polymer nanocarriers and cellular
membrane" (Liu 2014: 1311). On the other hand, contact between particles and macrophages,
Kupffer cells, and monocytes, which clear them from the body, must be limited. Scientists
prevent such interactions by coating the particles with Polyethene Glycol, a lipid that conceals
them from the immune system.
Nano-bio interactions are often described as mutual: “rather than study nanoparticles
and cells individually, is it is important to study the interface between them" (Polo et al. 2017,
2390). It is not only the nanostructure that affects the body. Sometimes interaction changes the
particle as well. One such interaction is the formation of a "corona," a process where
nanoparticles acquire a "new biological identity" after acquiring molecules from their
surroundings (ibid). The formation of a corona is a significant obstacle to delivery as it may lead
to loss of targeting capacity. Scientists thus believe that to "modulate the properties of
nanoparticles to attain specific [...] cellular interactions" (ibid), they need to understand the
interactions that underlie corona formations.
The “guest-host interaction” is the best-studied of all nano-bio relationships. This is so
because the common use of nanostructures is to encapsulate or "insulate" cancer drugs. In other
words, this refers to sequestering cancer-fighting compounds in nanoshells to ensure they do
not disperse in tissues and cells where they are not needed. The guest-host relationship is based
on the fact that some molecules recognize other molecules in highly selective ways. The two
molecules have a particular affinity for one another. This recognition can be induced by a
stimulus, for example, by light or electricity. In supramolecular chemistry, a guest-host
interaction is about "cooperative binding alliances work in concert to attract then hold guest
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species and release them when needed" (Hornyak 2008 et al., 568). There are several types of
interactions including encapsulation, nesting, perching, and the “wrapping sandwich.” However,
nanoscientists most often use "guest-host interaction" to describe the process of loading,
holding on to, and delivering cargo (Rodell 2015).
The molecules that do the recognizing are called host molecules, and those that are
recognized are the guest molecules (Katsuhiko and Kunitake 2006, 1-7). These recognitions are
based on complementarity or the "lock and key principle" where the two "fit" together
structurally while maintaining their identities and are thus able to couple and uncouple. The
contingency of their relationship results from the molecules not held together by traditional
covalent bonds. These are strong bonds involving sharing electrons between a pair of atoms, but
weak non-covalent bonds, so weak that they are sometimes referred to as interactionsb rather
than, bonds (ibid). Guest-host binding can also be modulated. Its magnitude can be weakened to
achieve competitive binding-triggered cargo release where the cargo has a higher affinity for the
target than the transport molecule. Yang et al. (2016) describe mesoporous silica nanoparticles
as especially favorable for drug delivery because they are good hosts. That is, their pore size can
be finely tuned or engineered to "accommodate guest molecules with different sizes" (245).
A good guest knows when it is time to leave. The "guest host interaction" is predicated on
entities that can couple and uncouple at will, i.e., the cargo or the "guest" must "know" to
disembark or leave the host when it reaches the tumor. Describing a pH-sensitive direct delivery
system for targeted delivery of the drug paclitaxel (PTX) to tumor cells, Yingchecheron and his
team were highly attentive to the particle's ability to shed its shell in response to Ph changes,
allowing the molecule to drop off its cargo upon its "arriving at the tumor site" (2017: 718).
FROM KILLING TO ENGINEERING COMPATIBILITY
Cancer nanomedicine is primarily concerned with drug delivery, so, unsurprisingly,
transportation is another critical category for researchers. The nanostructures themselves are
42

ubiquitously referred to as "carriers" or "vehicles." The pharmaceutical compounds referred to
as "cargo" or "payloads" are said to be "loaded" onto nanoparticles. Similarly, scientists describe
the body as a network of routes or roads. For example, as stated in several articles, "the
intestinal lymphatic transport may be highly efficient, and the predominant route of transport to
the systemic circulation following (...). delivery" (Trevaskis 2015, 785), or "the nanoparticles are
transported along with the endolysosomal network" (Sun 2014, 12360). The metaphors also
often invoked images of driving on a busy highway: "hydrolyses can be used to maneuver the
assembly and disassembly of inorganic nanoparticles, as well as the degradation of a
gatekeeping material that blocks the pores of a carrier" (ibid). Many use the metaphors of
arrivals and departures and other words related to journeys or travel. Nanoscientists
characterize targeting as "arrival at the target site" preceded by a "complex journey," beginning
when the nanostructures are injected into the body. However, this “journey” was not leisurely
travel but a dangerous voyage fraught with obstacles.
Nanostructures protect healthy tissues and cells from the toxicity of chemotherapy
through encapsulation; however, researchers also emphasize the need to protect "delicate" drug
molecules from the biological milieus of the body, which one research team describes as a "harsh
environment" (Sun et al., 2014, 12358). The body's hostility toward the nanoparticles is evident
in the researcher's description of the nanoparticle's journey to their target site. Nano drugs may
be "engulfed and digested" by macrophages, Kupffer cells, and monocytes (ibid), "destabilized"
by interactions with blood proteins (Lammers 2012: 710), or "cleared out of the body" upon
recognition (ibid). To reach the tumor, nanostructures must "evade" or "overcome" the body's
"clearing mechanisms (which) compete with the nanostructures' capacity to reach the tumor or
target site" (ibid). The first "challenge" (Sutadhar et al., 2013, 5) is encountered when
nanoparticles are injected into the bloodstream. The body almost instantly labels them as
"foreign" and binds plasma proteins to the nanoparticles "to mark them for reticuloendothelial
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system (RES) clearance.” If the nanostructures remain in circulation, they risk falling prey to
the body's "biological machinery"; this includes the immune system and other sites of "immune
surveillance" (Trevaskis et al., 2015, 786) as the lymph nodes. If the nanostructures are
"recognized" by the immune system or lymph nodes, they will be "trapped," "captured," and
subsequently expelled from the body.
Another set of what scientists call "resistances to be bypassed" are biological barriers,
that "disrupt their [the nanocarriers'] penetration behavior." Nano-platforms will not succeed in
clinics if the biological barriers faced by the nanoparticles are not "conquered" (ibid),
"overcome" (Dawidczyk et al. 2014, 72), or "tackled at different levels" (Sutdhar et al. 2014,
783). But not by force. Researchers frame overcoming the body's resistance in terms of
"engineering compatibility" between the nanostructures and the biological entities they counter,
or designing a match or at least tolerance between the nanoparticle's chemical and physical
properties, and its behaviors, and processes with the body. Targeted delivery is based on
"creating the "optimal and synergistic combination of physicochemical features, including
polymer type, size, surface charge, hydrophilic/hydrophobic balance, ligand type, and density
[...]" and behaviors such as [...] tissue penetration, navigation across membrane layers and
biological barriers, immune evasion, cellular binding, uptake, and internalization processes"
(Sanna 2014, 1306). A common strategy is mimicking biological entities in the body; this refers
to engineering "sophisticated systems that mimic or integrate into endogenous lymphatic
transport processes" (Trevaskis 2015, 787). Wang et al. 2011 describe a gold nanoparticle which
"acts as bait for circulating tumor cells" and must therefore remain in the bloodstream as long as
possible. It can do so because it was "engineered to behave as a component of the bloodstream"
so that the body would treat it as such. Evasion is another strategy. The ability to achieve
"minimal self-self and self-nonself interaction to escape capture" or evading the body's
protective mechanisms (Kumar et al. 2014: 477) is often referred to as "stealth" or "stealth
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properties for immune evasion." Creating "stealthy" nanostructures usually involves "surface
decoration," i.e., coating the nanostructure with a lipid or other organic substance to make it
"slippery." The third and final protocol for navigating the body and its defense mechanism
consists of "disruptive strategies." Researchers who design nanostructures to treat brain cancer
are forced to take up offensive strategies due to the difficulty of delivering drugs across the
blood-brain barrier to the brain. These include "opening a temporal window" in the blood-brain
barrier (Kumar 2014: 500), "hijacking the transport mechanisms," or other modes of
modulating the protective structures.
Although oncology's ultimate aim is to eradicate cancer tumors, nanoscientists tend to
avoid using the term "killing" explicitly to describe the process of doing so. Ten of the thirty
articles avoid using "killing" altogether. The remainder made a point to distinguish
nanomedicine's approach from older forms of killing. For example, according to Nakamura and
this team at the University of Hong Kong, unlike radiation and chemotherapy, nanoparticles are
involved in "specific cell killing." Alternatives to "killing" are varied. They include: membrane
and vaslature disruption, a process that "initiates a cascade of reactions that can ultimately
trigger apoptosis—cells voluntarily committing suicide for the benefit of the organism (Polo
2017, 2399); preventing the replication of cells through modulating, silencing, arresting cell
cycles (Estanqueiro 2015); or suppressing gene targets (Xu 2015) ; warming-up, starving,
eradicating tumor cells by cutting off their supplies of oxygen and nutrients;); keeping the tumor
from passing on genetic material that confers drug-resistance by inhibiting pathways for
mutations, blocking the transcription and replication process (by, for example causing damage
to cellular membranes, proteins and DNA by inducing oxidative stress). Describing a gold
nanoshell-laser system, Hirsch et al. (2003) reported that "in addition to the loss in viability,
cells receiving nanoshell laser treatments underwent sufficient damage to compromise cell
membrane barriers irreversibly" but were very careful to distinguish "loss of membrane" and
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"killing"; they pointed out that these findings do not show that the laser treatment was "directly
responsible for the death of cells […] the only thing that can be positively attributed to this
therapeutic regime is the "loss in membrane integrity with the loss of cell viability" (13553).
A CULTURAL LOGIC
Given that worldviews inhere in specialized discourses (Wagner-Pacifici 2000, 5), cancer
nanotechnology stands as a unique case study to identify shifts in collective thought and to
interrogate trends within contemporary society. Targeted delivery furnished cancer researchers
with a new vision and a radically different universe of concepts and metaphors to think with and
"live by" (Lakoff and Johnston 1980). However, nanotechnology was always more than a
science. Again, the argument here is that it was a collective vision, a spirit, or, as one scholar put
it, a "nanologic" (Bontems 2011). Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that cancer research is
nanotechnology's most important application. Nano-based targeted delivery exists within a
unique discursive universe, characterized by a specific approach to malignant elements. This, in
turn, is underlined by a theory regarding the nature and desirability of force and destruction. In
concrete terms, nano-based targeted delivery promised that cancer could be treated or
managed—not killed—through engineering rather than through the application of blunt force.
Within nanomedicine's conceptual universe, the category of "interaction" occupies a special
place as a "fulcrum" or "banister" for thought. Of course, nanomedicine is not generally
interested in interactions, but a specific class of interactions based on “biocompatibility.” These
nano-bio interactions are purely positive, mutual, friendly, and cooperative because they arise
from the unique affinities between cancer cells, the body, and nanostructures.
In nanomedicine's lexicon, "interaction" is closely related to "compatibility." Targeted
delivery is based on the logic that disease and its cures are radically compatible. It is important
to note that their compatibility is not natural or innate. Nanoscientists manufacture it atom by
atom in the laboratory. Researchers see their task as engineering compatibility between cancer
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cells and nanoparticles so that they may take part in mutually beneficial interactions. To ensure
that they remain positive and cooperative, such interactions must be managed, planned, and
controlled as precisely as possible. Since nanomaterials are uniquely malleable, they can be
designed to have a strong attraction to specific proteins or conditions associated with cancer's
presence in the body (low Ph, for example). This attraction or "affinity" for certain substances
"overexpressed" by cancer tumors enables them to interact with the cancer cells. Although
nanoscientists avoid the language of war of conflict, conflict creeps into their discourse when
they describe the mutual attraction between cancer cells and nanostructures as a weakness to be
"exploited."
Overall, nanoscientists working in the field of targeted delivery are overly critical of the
force and destruction associated with surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy. Their accounts
went beyond merely “overemphasizing" (Sontag 1978) the side effects and suffering that many
dread more than cancer itself: they framed the violence and destruction of traditional cancer
treatments as an urgent problem and nanotechnology as its solution. At first glance,
"interaction" appears to be an antidote to the militaristic-flavored language associated with "the
war on cancer" and, more generally, an alternative to the use of force, coercion, and domination
to deal with pathological elements within a system. However, rather than categorically rejecting
violence and becoming what pacifism is to war, nanomedicine's discourse took another route—
it refashioned force and coercion into new objects in terms of what they look like and how they
function.
As medical professionals called for oncology's demilitarization (Nie et al. 2016) in the
late 1900s, military strategists recognized that interaction and cooperation often make effective
weapons than violence, force, and coercion. David Petraeus, who specified what such an
approach would look like within the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, described its central
premise as "forming relationships with people on the ground.” Unlike conventional operations,
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counterinsurgency involves communication, connection, tolerance, and cooperation as
necessary to build trust, create alliances, and cultivate personal relationships (2006, 51).
Petraeus’s Counterinsurgency Manual shares generic similarities with nano-based targeted
delivery because they arose from the same logic. Not unlike the nano-bio interactions of interest
to researchers in oncology labs, the “relationships” Petraeus described were utilitarian, strategic,
and contrary to the interest of the “host.” Chemists describe normal relationships between
molecules as "bonds." For them, "interaction" is a statement of magnitude, a downgrade, which
indicates that a relationship is so weak that it cannot be called a "bond." Moreover, the fact that
specific cancer cells are a "perfect molecular match” for the nanoparticle designed to destroy
them means that, from the point of view of the cancer cell, the compatibility nanoscientists
speak of is deadly. For cancer nanomedicine, “interactions” are akin to a weapon of war.
Foregrounding, “interaction” produced a “nano” vision, indeed revealing new aspects of
the world and the things in it. But in so doing, it hid and repressed other things. According to
nanomedicine's supporters, targeted delivery's value lies in that even the most opposites and
incompatible entitles can be engineered to be compatible at the nanoscale. The category of
“compatibility” authorizes the scientist’s claims about nanotechnology’s ability to treat cancer
without side effects, which, in the collective imagination, are far more terrifying than cancer as a
disease. Be that as it may, the discourse around targeted delivery has an unacknowledged dark
side that emerges in full view when read through Petraeus’ text. Under usual circumstances,
cooperation, compatibility, and interaction are not synonymous with conflict, destruction, or
killing. Under normal circumstances, collaboration is said to prevent conflict. For example,
those seeking to make their bond permanent through marriage are often advised to assess their
level of compatibility with the help of a professional to avoid marital strife and eventual divorce.
However, in nanomedicine's discursive universe, binary opposites are no longer antithetical to
one another. Thus, in nanomedicine’s discursive universe, the interaction between diametrical
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entities is not hostile or characterized by conflict. As the remainder of the dissertation shows,
the notion of “interaction” papered over, contradiction, friction, hostility, and other expressions
of incompatibility.
A DISCOURSE ON COMPATIBILITY
Nanoscientists claim that targeted- delivery is a solution to chemotherapy that, often
causes lethal side effects because it is "non-specific." The logic associated with chemotherapy
frames eradicating cancer as a struggle, if not outright war, between pharmaceutical compounds
and cancer cells without regard for the collateral damage to healthy cells and organs. Its mission
is to destroy the enemy, regardless of costs. Chemotherapy has one goal: killing. And one
strategy for fulfilling it: force. Nanomedicine is a promise that another type of solution is
possible. Underneath peer-reviewed descriptions of various nanostructures' modes of action,
there lays a new logic for approaching malignant phenomena that extended beyond the
laboratory. According to this logic, conflicts of interest can be addressed without struggle or
competition; ends when one side acquiesces to another because their opponent's show of force
has overpowered them. By definition, it has a clear winner and a clear loser. Nanotechnology's
alternative, "engineering compatibility," is one of the key concepts in the complicated and
contradictory but largely implicit theory regarding force and its desirability that constitute the
essence of modern nanotechnology. In what follows, I return to nanotechnology's origins to
specify, excavate, and interrogate how the promise of treating cancer without killing or waging
war in the body came together, piece by piece and solidified into a distinct and concrete logic
concerning force, coercion, and domination.
As an investigation of non-material forces that exist over and above individuals and
society (Alexander and Smith 2018) in the Weberian tradition, this account began with an
elucidation of ideas, theories, and concepts deployed by nanoscientists working in the field of
targeted delivery. By examining discourse in scientific peer-reviewed journals, this chapter
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described nanotechnology-based targeted delivery as a consolidated conceptual project and
identified its essential discursive and symbolic features. The project’s next stage involves
"splitting" nanomedicine’s ideology into “parts” and tracing their historical trajectory one by
one.
The theory behind modern cancer nanomedicine—i.e., that, treating cancer by
engineering compatibility between entities previously considered incommensurable rather than
using blunt force—comprises several interconnected intellectual parts or steps. A close reading
of the discipline’s foundational texts and mining them for hidden themes, ideas, and logics, lead
me to identify several “parts.” The dissertation explores three: (i) a downshift in vision and new
ideas about scale; (ii) a new attitude to relationships and relationality that rejected the
part/whole model; and (iii) a meditation on destruction, coercion, and domination. Each of the
three conceptual pieces has its unique history and intellectual significance. These will be
explained by tracing the meaning of each concept back to the origins of nanotechnology and
documenting how this meaning changed over time as nanotechnology evolved. According to
Weber, the final and most crucial component of a sociological account is to theorize the concepts
into a "spirit," logic, or philosophy that defines a historical epoch. To this avail, each of the three
categories will be examined as: (i) as an object imbricated in nanotechnology's discourse, and
(ii) a general object manifested in various domains and contexts, including the social milieu2.
Also, ensuring chapters proceed by asking how cancer nanomedicine acquired its specific
conceptual schema and vision. In concrete terms, I attempt to account for contemporary
nanomedicine’s discursive tendencies identified in this chapter by asking why researchers

A typical project in the historical sociology tradition set down by Weber involves looking at the
gap between concepts and reality. It is often accomplished by comparing the formal definition of
concepts, how people use them, and finally, to objects created in response to these concepts.
However, since cancer nanomedicine has not been successful in clinical trials, this dissertation
focuses on its discursive formations exclusively.
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framed cancer nanomedicine as they did and why targeted delivery acquired the meaning it did.
Chapters that follow place essential writings in the history of nanotechnology alongside
discourses that were circulating in the social sciences, natural science, politics, and popular
culture. While some may object to the eclectic nature of the case studies, which is the result of
assembling a dataset from unrelated domains, the congruity between and across texts in a wide
variety of unrelated disciplines is not treated casually but as a case of "elective affinity.”
According to Weber, the connection between any idea, discourse is imagined or "imputed" by
the sociologist and usually theorized as a "spirit" or another form of general logic.
Methodologically, such a proportion means that a discursive connection via the structure of
language or metaphor is sufficient grounds to treat texts as linked to one another. Put
differently, the absence of material links between any specific bodies of literature or systems of
ideas does not mean that they are not connected. For example, as the next chapter
demonstrates, in the mid-1950s, early nanoscientists and sociologists made certain statements
about how scale works. While there is no evidence to suggest that Richard Feynman's call for
physics to shift its vision "all the way down" influenced C. Wright Mills' discourse about scale in
any way, there is a significant discursive connection between The Sociological Imagination and
There is Plenty of Room at the Bottom. As Feynman described a downshift in scale within
physics, Mills mourned the tendency in sociology that was often expressed as the end of
classical, large-scale approaches which treated society as a ‘whole’ as an object of analysis and
the rise of "microscopic" research that focused on individuals. According to Weber’s
methodological presuppositions, the fact that the two accounts were written during the same
period and share generically similar concerns is enough to render their juxtaposition valid.
Again, for a Weberian historical sociologist, the relationships between texts and other discourse
are imaginary, they must be “imputed.” The historical sociologist's primary task is thus to craft
a convincing theory that brings their connection to life.
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Part I, the historical portion of this dissertation, begins by excavating nanomedicine's
first conceptual strata, the category of "scale." Chapter 3, "A Faulty Tool" is the first of two in
Part I that traces the making and remaking of the notion of scale in collective thought by
attending to Feynman's 1959 speech. Chapter 4, "A New Sense of Proportion," continues the
story and documents a change in nanotechnology's concern with the meaning of scale by
treating Drexler's Engines of Creation as an artifact containing fragments of a broad shift in
collective thought that occurred in the mid-1980s.

52

PART I: SCALE
CHAPTER 3
A “FAULTY TOOL”
Richard Feynman’s “Plenty of Room” Speech and the
Origins of Nanotechnology in the 1950s and 1960s
“A tool only acquires an obstructive status when it refuses to work”
—Martin Heidegger (1962)
In 1978, Susan Sontag may have described cancer as a “ruthless invasion” or an “evil, invincible
predator” (7), but even she knew that cancer’s treatments were often worse than the disease
itself. In the 1940s, chemotherapy was a miraculous cure, a “magic bullet” that promised to end
the “war on cancer” once and for all. However, two decades later, many Americans were
convinced that chemotherapy and medicine’s other offerings were not curing or treating but
mutilating and killing cancer patients. The sense that medicine, in general, was too invasive, too
coercive, and too violent gave rise to a well-organized, and highly litigious social movement
often referred to as “Holistic Medicine.” A 1979 Supreme Court ruling explicitly affirmed a lay
individual’s right to disclaim chemotherapy in favor of non-invasive, non-toxic, and “natural”
remedies that took a kind, gentle, and reconciliatory (Gordon 1982, 542)— but “unproven” and
from a scientific point of view, ineffective approach to cancer. By the 1980s, Americans were free
to treat their cancer by choosing a panoply of “simple, cheap, and painless” options, most
notably, liniments of turpentine, peat moss, or various arrangements of colored flood lamps
(Annas 1989). And millions did. The new attitude toward medicine was only one instance of a
broader shift in collective thought. As this dissertation shows, nanomedicine was another.
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Nano-based targeted delivery concretized the idea that smallness is a solution to conflict,
contradiction, and other frictions typically addressed with force. Richard Feynman felt the
stirring of the new zeitgeist much earlier. Almost all nanotechnology textbooks envision
Feynman as the discipline’s prophet or founder. As is often the case with origin stories, the
nanoscientist’ accounts of the history of their field have been contested by professional
historians. Whether or not his Plenty of Room speech delivered at Cal Tech was indeed the first
vision of nanotechnology, or an artifact retroactively read into the history of the field (Toumey
2004), it contained a solution to medicine’s invasive and destructive tendencies. In 1959, he
asked, what if one could swallow the surgeon instead of being cut open?
As Feynman put it, "Put the mechanical surgeon inside the blood vessel, and it goes into
the heart and "looks around"; he “finds out which valve is the faulty one and takes a little knife
and slices it out […] Other small machines might be permanently incorporated in the body to
assist some inadequately functioning organ" (1959, 5). Feynman’s solution to medicine’s
perceived brutality specifically, and the application of force in a broader sense, was to “reduce
the size of things […] make them as small as possible” (ibid).
Although his Plenty of Room speech is broadly regarded as nanotechnology’s ur-text by
those within the discipline, as this chapter shows, Feynman’s call for science to shift down and
explore the lower limits of matter was not his own. By 1959, the category of “scale” was on its
way toward a general conceptual refurbishment. Drawing on a broad range of case studies that
eloquently speak to the rise of new ideas about scale and scaling practices, I argue that Feynman
did not see anything that others could not and conclude that Feynman was not the Copernicus
but the Henry Ford of matter. Although Ford did not invent the automobile, his ability to
translate what was once a rare luxury item into a ubiquitous entity is what ultimately endowed
the automobile with enough power to profoundly and irreversibly changelandscape of the 20th
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century. Feynman’s meditation on scale may not have been revolutionary, scientifically
speaking. However, by giving "the science of the minute" a specific conceptual and linguistic
substrate, one that linked scale with force, coercion, and destruction, Feynman paved the way
for nanotechnology becoming a legitimate and desirable solution to previously insoluble human
problems including, most notably, cancer.
To illustrate that Feynman’s discourse was a part of a broader cultural “spirit,” this
chapter situates his narrative alongside discourses within the social and expert milieus produced
in the mid-1950s and 1960s. It begins by conceptualizing the idea of scale abstractly and
highlighting the utility theme in Feynman’s discussion. It then examines the invention of the
Geographic Information System and its impact on map making and ideas about space in
general. It traces the same general tendencies in the rise of molecular biology, the scaling
practices of which redefined what evolution is and how it works. By looking at Anne McLaren’s
pioneering work in reproductive technologies, it highlights the ubiquity of smallness and utility,
a key theme in Feynman’s work before turning to sociological theory and then applied sociology
to show how key figures in the discipline were, at the time, evoking the category of scale to
understand social problems. The final case study, an enormous miscalculation responsible for
the high estrogen content in the birth control pill, documents the consequences of scaling down
pregnancy and shows that while a downshift in vision clarified and illuminated many things, as
it did so, it obscured and sidelined others.
SCALE: A WINDOW INTO TO THE WORLD
As the popularity of classics such as Alice in Wonderland or Gulliver's Travels
demonstrates, extremes of scale have a special place in humanity's collective imagination. Scale
is a crucial category of thought, a "window through which we see the world" and understand our
place in it (Marceau 1999, 4). As is the case with most such entities, the meaning of "scale" is
generally apparent, self-evident, and stable enough to be taken for granted. Hobbyists spend
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hours constructing models that shrink or enlarge everyday objects, while engineers and
filmmakers create new technologies to explore matter's tiny realms or survey the cosmos'
vastness. As long as their work occupies them and their activity is not interrupted by damaged
tools or faulty concepts, they are content to treat "scale" as a synonym of "size."
While the notion of "scale" is closely tied to quantity— that is, more or less, bigger or
smaller— "scale" is not a thing or attribute but a mode of grasping phenomena by establishing
relationships between them. Size is relative, meaning that "bigness" or "smallness" cannot be
conceptualized abstractly. An object's size becomes comprehensible only through comparison.
Scale allows us to compare things to one another by providing a sense of proportion when
objects are placed in context, that is, next to one another. Humans have an intuitive
understanding of scale, determined biologically and socially by our size, visual apparati, and
cognitive structures. However, many things in the world exceed the limits of human perception
and cognition. Some are too small (for example, cells, atoms, or molecules), too large (the solar
system, galaxies, or the universe), too fast (light), or too slow (erosion) for humans to observe
directly. Only by scaling these processes up (“upshifting”) or down (“downshifting”) into models
that our minds can hold can we begin to understand their structure and function. The mental
processes involved in establishing the size of things are deeply entrenched within human
cognition to the point where scaling is more-or-less automatic. People often do not realize they
are performing mental upshifts or downshifts in their daily lives. They also forget— or have
never considered— that any apprehension of the world is scale-specific. A process that is
observed and characterized at one scale, may look very different at another. Things invisible at
one scale become enormous at another, just as a shift in vantage point turns contingency and
randomness into determinism and order and cooperation into conflict.
For example, when Talcott Parsons and other structural functionalists gazed at society,
they saw nothing but order, stability, and integration. In their vision, units acted on behalf of the
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whole spontaneously. They did not need poking, prodding, or other forms of coercion to
perform their role in maintaining the system. In 1961, Parsons published his meditations in The
Social System. Nobody expected the "angry backlash" that followed the book's publication. C.
Wright Mills, Parson’s most “aggressive critic” (Owens 2010), was so enraged by the content of
The Social System that he publicly and explicitly instructed sociologists coming of age in the
1960s not to read Parsons. The sheer intensity of Mills’ and others’ polemics against Parsons
was shocking enough in its own time. Still, when situated in the context of the history of
sociology the critical reception of The Social System is even more puzzling and significant
(Owens 2010).
Although Parsons was the immediate target of the discipline-wide outrage, the broader
crisis coincided with the decline of the structural-functionalist perspective. By the time the book
was published, Parsons was widely regarded as a leader in the field. His numerous writings had
earned him a solid reputation among his peers, culminating in his tenure as the president of the
American Sociological Society starting in 1949. Moreover, Parsons’ schema was not unique.
Every principle within his work was consistent with structural-functionalism, a theoretical
framework that measured and comprehended phenomena from the point of view of the system
or society. As George Homans, the founder of behavioral sociology and also past president of
ASA put it, since Durkheim founded the discipline, functionalism was sociology’s “only distinct
school of thought” and all sociologists, past and present, were and remained functionalists in
one way or another. In other words, all sociological analysis is functional analysis (1964, 809).
However, by the 1960s, the general mood in the discipline was that “it [functionalism] has run
its course and now positively gets in the way of understanding social phenomena” (ibid). It had
become a “broken too” (Heidegger 1962).
Mills’ manifest objection to The Social System was Parsons’ refusal to see conflict,
domination, and other forms of power contained a latent concern with the problem of scale.
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While his disavowal of Parsons and his work was grounded in Mills’ adamant refusal to allow
any sociologist to think— even for a minute— that social order is possible without coercion,
force, or other applications of power, as my analysis here demonstrates, visibility, or a lack
thereof, is intimately tied to scale and scaling practices.
Put slightly differently, then structural-functionalism had been sociology’s scaling tool
since time immemorial. It furnished the discipline with rules and conventions for understanding
and comparing phenomena and establishing their relative importance vis-a-vis one another.
Since specific entities, patterns, and processes can only be observed at particular scales, moving
down from the scale of the system as a whole revealed previously invisible phenomena. Parsons,
and functionalism in general, did not or could not see conflict, force, and coercion because these
phenomena did not work at the level of the system as a whole. For this reason, the
incompatibility between the part and the whole and the subsequent conflict inherent in
functioning on behalf of the system that came to occupy sociologists during this period became
visible only when the sociological vision had shifted down to the scale of individuals.
Scale and scaling practices are tools. Like other tools, they are invisible and transparent
until they break or malfunction and interrupt work (Berger and Luckmann 1966). When a
carpenter performs their job, they do not stare at the hammer or consider the activity they
perform with the hammer in a theoretical sense (Heidegger 1962, 98). While engaged in troublefree hammering, the carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the
workbench, in the way that one would if one stood back and thought about them. A tool only
acquires an obstructive status when it "refuses to work" (ibid). As this chapter delineates, the
decline of functionalism in sociology was only one case of a more general rethinking of
previously ironclad assumptions regarding scale. By the mid-1950s, the category of "scale" was
no longer invisible. It was a damaged tool that no longer worked as it should and, as such,
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became the object of intense reflection, contention, and intellectual inquiry in the discipline’s
cultural and expert milieus.
FEYNMAN’S DISCOURSE ON SCALE
The move of scale into the forefront of concern coincided with the origins of
nanotechnology both discursively and historically. Even though few laypersons understand what
nanotechnology is or why it is significant, the prefix “nano” is a generic signifier of extreme
smallness in the collective imagination. Experts in the field also take for granted that
nanotechnology’s critical intervention involved a significant recalibration of scientific vision
toward the minute. This trend began with Feynman’s infamous speech— the first sign that
nanotechnology was about to come.
Nanotechnology’s history was always written in advance. Richard Feynman’s 1959
announcement of a scientific revolution hiding in plain sight, just around the corner but not
quite there yet, was no exception. Unafraid to consider the “final question,” that is, whether
ultimately “we can rearrange atoms the way we want; the very atoms, all the way down” (Rogers
et al. 2011, 10), Feynman had the ideas, models, and a conceptual program for nanotechnology
at his fingertips. He knew that there was “plenty of room” to practically decrease the size of
things. The problem was science could not do it yet. It was 1959, and Feynman was impatient:
“when people look back [...] they will wonder why it was not until the year 1960 that anybody
began seriously to move in this direction” (1). The scanning electron microscope was still thirty
years away, so the reality of Feynman’s “tiny realm below” had to be taken on faith simply
because “it ought to exist based on the laws of physics” (2). Feynman’s invitation to “enter a new
field of physics” was premature in many ways. However, the tendency to cling to what ought to
exist even if it does not and a sense of “it could be done; we are simply not doing it because we
haven’t gotten around to it” (ibid) became permanent features of nanotechnology’s intellectual
substrate, including its application in medicine. In any case, going “down” would have to wait.
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In the history of science, downshifts in scale are nothing new. It could be argued that
since the invention of the microscope in the 17th century, science had been animated by the
desire to move deeper into increasingly smaller realms of matter. Locating nanotechnology in
the story of seeing the previously invisible worlds of bacteria, cells, then atoms for the first time
may seem fitting, but this was not the genealogy Feynman had in mind. Rather, Feynman
insisted that his science about-to-come would be a radical break with anything that came before
it, not simply another episode in the history of microscopy. The history Feynman gave
nanotechnology consisted of two protagonists whose discoveries reorganized scaling practices in
their subsequent fields. The first, Percy Bridgman, modified a malfunctioning pressure
apparatus in 1906 and inadvertently created a device that created pressure exceeding 100,000
kgf2/cm. Given that previous machinery could only achieve pressures up to 3,000 kgf2/cm,
Bridgman's apparatus "opened a new field" devoted to investigating how matter behaves when
subject to extreme pressure. The second figure, Kamerlingh Onnes, achieved the coldest
temperature ever recorded on Earth by reducing Helium to -269C in 1908. In doing so, he
"discovered the realm of low temperature which appears bottomless by showing that it is a field
in which one can go down and down..." (12). Just as Bridgman forced physics to reexamine what
"strong" means vis-à-vis pressure, Onnes altered the meaning of "cold” via a revolution in
scaling practices. Like size, properties such as temperature and strength are relative. The
number corresponding to an object’s property—for example -269C, or 10,000 kg2/cm— is not
absolute. It refers to the object’s position on a continuum with two points of extremes (Jarvis,
1995). By subjecting matter to unparalleled conditions and mapping out the edges of its
behavior, Bridgman and Onnes changed the rules for how these numbers are assigned, and in so
doing, also altered how “temperature” and “force” are conceptualized at a theoretical level. This,
in turn, changed how scientists thought about comparing and ordering real entities in the world
via-a-vis their respective magnitudes. Feynman hoped to insert himself into this story as the
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arbiter of size. However, he did not see his achievement as introducing a new size that was
extreme or revealing of the smallest unit of matter. His contribution was finding the lowest
possible limit for manufacture and then rescaling production according to that limit1.
For Feynman, locating nanotechnology in a narrative about vision practices was
unfitting. According to Feynman, the history that was not nanotechnology’s actually began
earlier, in the 1760s, with Antony van Leewenken, the father of the microscope. Van Leewenken
caught the first-ever glimpse of life beyond human vision and found a world populated with
"animalcules,” which we know as microorganisms. He was a religious man who believed that
God's essence resided in His most miniature creations. Thus, when Von Leewenken looked
through his microscope, he saw nothing less than God's blueprints (Farley 1972). Subsequent
advancements in microscopy allowed scientists to see increasingly smaller things in increasingly
smaller items— from cells to atoms, then to genes and, finally, subatomic particles. Feynman
promised that his science-about-to-come would go beyond vision and, for the first time, allow
scientists and engineers not only to see but create new configurations of matter with absolute
freedom from nature’s laws. In his words:
Up to now, we have been content to dig in the ground to find minerals. We heat them,
and we do things on a large scale with them, and we hope to get a pure substance with
just so much impurity, and so on. But we must always accept some atomic arrangement
that nature gives us. We haven’t got anything, say, with a “checkerboard” arrangement,
with the impurity atoms exactly arranged 1,000 angstroms apart, or in some other
particular pattern. What could we do with layered structures with just the right layers?
What would the properties of materials be if we could arrange the atoms the way we
want them? (Feynman 1959, 6).

Had he known about reification, Feynman may have been more careful about equating force
and temperature with manufacture, but Georg Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness had
not been translated into English yet, and perhaps more pertinently, it was 1959, and no one in
the US was reading Marx.
1
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Feynman’s science-about-to-come was not interested in excavating the smallest building
block of the universe. According to Feynman, “the new field of manipulating things on a small
scale [...] will not tell us much of fundamental physics—in the sense of “what are the strange
particles? Instead, it will deal with ‘strange phenomena that occur in complex situations’ (1).
Feynman’s mission was not to find the smallest entities that occupied the world. He was looking
for a scale most susceptible to manipulation and alteration. Besides, physics was already
familiar with electrons, neutrons, and protons, that made up atoms. These, by definition, occupy
a range that was even smaller than Feynman spoke of. However, the subatomic scale was not
particularly useful as it was too small to become a site of engineering. The link between
smallness, manufacture, and productivity is evident in his description of cells.
Cells are very tiny, but they are very active; they manufacture various substances; they
walk around; they wiggle, and they do all kinds of marvelous things—all on a tiny scale.
Consider the possibility that we too can make a very small thing which does what we
want—that we can manufacture an object that maneuvers at that level! (3)
When viewed through Feynman's eyes, cells do not appear as carriers of God's blueprints
or complex manifestations of nature's inherent order in secular terms. They are miniature
factories. Feynman's science-about-to-come was a solution to steel-based industrial
manufacture, whose tendency towards waste, pollution, and scarcity had emerged as severe
problems right around the time of his speech. Unlike industrial production that functioned via
intensive applications of brute force and crippled, destroyed, and violated humans and nature
alike, the small-scale manufacture Feynman envisioned would occupy a world of “light” and
“soft” machinery (Jones 2004). In this world, the tiny machines would resemble cells. They
would not be made of steel but proteins and therefore would not “run hot.” At Feynman’s scale,
heat dissipates rapidly, and friction does not exist. These organic factories would not consume
humans and their labor the way a furnace consumes wood, nor would they need humans to
“mind,” service, or lubricate them (Marx 1973). Feynman’s promise to free humanity from the
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force, destruction, and domination that underlined steel-based production by moving
production down to the scale of cells (i.e., the nanoscale) created a strange discursive alliance
between smallness, non-violence, and utility that would continue to haunt nanotechnology’s
discourse even after it became a “real” science complete with “real” cancer drugs in “real” labs,
clinical trials, and hospitals. The sense that making things smaller was the solution to
humanity’s problems was not specific to nanotechnology. The desire for smallness reverberated
across the social, cultural, and technical milieus of this time period in many different forms.
EVERY HOUSE, EVERY FENCE, EVERY STREAM: THE INVENTION OF GIS
If any discipline could be described as the science of scale, it would be cartography. Maps
and map-making shape how we think about location and teach us about the size of the world
and the things in it, whether a particular country is big or small, whether a lake is deep or
shallow, or a mountain range high or low. Before the Global Information System (GIS)2
introduced computing into cartography in the 1960s, mapping was simple. Cartographers used
paper to document the location, name, and points of intersection of all types of natural and
artificial phenomena. If a person reading a paper map needed to find a specific street, building,
or another point of interest, it was easy. Scaled-down representations of homes, businesses, and
other prominent landmarks lined either side of each scaled-down street. However, what if they
wanted to know what was under the buildings? Or above them? For example, there are around
2.5 million miles of pipeline in the US. If even a mile of the channel were to be represented on
paper, the resulting map would be too big and cumbersome to be practical. There is also a
wealth of information about each system of pipelines. The lengthy list of addresses, notes, and

Although often regarded as a mapping tool, GIS is perhaps better thought of as a type of
database. The GIS History Project describes GIS as “computerized systems for the storage,
retrieval, manipulation, analysis, and display of geographically referenced data.”
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other forms of identification can be presented in a spreadsheet. However, without visual
representation, such data would be meaningless.
By the time Roger Tomlinson invented GIS in 1963 as part of a response to the Canadian
government’s desire to inventory the country’s land and resources and “map every house, every
fence, and every stream,” paper maps and “sieve mapping” had become “broken tools”
(Heidegger 1962). Indeed, frustrated with the fixed scale and dimensionality of paper maps,
cartographers across the world were ready to go beyond the scale of the landscape.
Imagine a man standing on a road. Asked to describe where he is in the world ,the man
might talk about the slope of the hill he is standing on or the size of the rocks
surrounding him. He might also say he is on the road between a cornfield, an orchard,
and a little village. So, without even mentioning the birds he observed flying overhead,
the direction of the wind, the temperature, or even his latitude and longitude, he has
already got six things describing his world. Human experience of space is too
complicated to be reduced to the peaks and valleys of a landscape (Aguirre 2014).
GIS was a novel visualization tool and innovative framework for gathering, managing,
integrating, and analyzing many different data types by organizing them into layers3.
Traditionally, scale is a relationship based on a linear hierarchy established by identifying two
extremes and arranging objects in ascending or descending order based on their properties.
Rather than fixing things in a predetermined and linear scale based on a magnitude of a specific
quality, GIS turned each object into a layer, and with the click of a mouse, each layer could be
“lifted.” The items in question could be viewed together, separately, or in endless combinations,
which meant that size or any other property did not have to be understood linearly or
hierarchically (i.e., via scale using a range). Thinking about mapping in terms of different

Previous attempts to combine data and locale used a process called “sieve mapping,” which
involved transparent layers on light tables to identify where areas overlap. The problem was that
calculating areas was next to impossible; data was coarse and often inaccurate, and measuring
distances was cumbersome (GISgeography).
3

64

information simultaneously in layers shifted the cartographic gaze away from permanent
physical features to interactions among phenomena.
While layering gave cartographers an unprecedented level of control over visibility,
transforming every data point into a “pixel” allowed mapmakers to not only understand
interactions and relationships between things differently but to create them. Just as physicists
understood matter in terms of atoms, GIS visualized data and physical features as made from
microscopic units known as “pixels.” With every utility, every gas line, every sewer pipe, every
power line, and telephone cable simultaneously absent and present, relationships between
things once understood as fixed and hierarchical became infinitely malleable. Pixel-by-pixel
mapping turned the cartographer into an engineer whose job was creating novel relationships
between place, thing, or data without regard for their material properties (such as size or
location in space)4. GIS was only one concretization of a new sense of scale. This “sense,” a
product of linking smallness and utility via an imperative to manage and modulate properties,
pixel-by-pixel, came to influence spatial understanding in general. It was one facet of the same
“spirit” associated with the rise and development of nanomedicine. The same generic narrative
played out in biology.
BIOLOGY: EXTRACTING EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY FROM MOLECULES
Since Charles Darwin's time, evolutionary biologists have taken for granted that
evolution worked at the scale of the organism. In 1965, a group of scientists proposed that

An upshift or downshift in scale involves changing the size of an object in order to make it
comprehensible to human sensibilities or to compare it to another object. This type of
manipulation allows for considerable changes to the object. However, because it requires
maintaining an object’s proportions intact as it is moved up or down in size, an up or downshift
requires careful thought and planning. Transfer information across scales is a common strategy
used to come to terms with specific qualities. With GIS, the change in size required to compare
phenomena was instant and effortless to the point where it appeared that cartographers were
creating those properties. Like nanotechnology, it uncoupled matter and its properties. GIS
essentially rendered the process of scaling invisible.
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genes— not organism—were the principal entity of evolutionary change. By this point, even the
most ardent defenders of biology’s traditions could not categorically deny that the organism had
acquired at least some characteristics of a “broken tool” (Heidegger 1962). The discovery of
DNA's Triple Helix structure in 1953, subsequent advances in genomics, and the advent of a
molecular understanding of life forced biology to confront its previously unquestioned
assumptions about scale.
As a downshift to the molecular realm clarified the relationship between humans,
chimpanzees, and gorillas, doubts about the organism morphed into objections. By the 1960s,
the organism in general and its function as a scaling device specifically appeared suspect.
Sorting out the taxonomic relationship between the three hominids was no small feat. This
particular knowledge gap has haunted biology for centuries. In solving the riddle through the
use of hemoglobin sequences as measures of relatedness, Pauling and Zuckerkandl not only
concluded that "the species [humans, gorillas, and chimpanzees] form one continuous
population" (1965, 138), but brought much-needed legitimacy to the molecular framework.
Their claim that peptide fingerprints of gorilla, chimpanzee, and human hemoglobin are
indistinguishable came to be enshrined in a now-infamous line: "from the point of view of
hemoglobin, the gorilla is just an abnormal human, or man an abnormal gorilla" (ibid).
According to Ernst Mayr's 1965 Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of Zoologists, molecular thinking had "opened up a new world" and ushered
evolutionary biology into a new (“molecular”) era characterized by a downshift in scale. The
possibility of reconstructing phylogenetic history based on molecules did not simply change how
certain species are classified: it altered the rules and principles of classification. According to
Mayr, biology's taxonomic gaze had been shaped by the notion that living things are ordered
based on their morphological features. Biologists worked under the imperative that evolutionary
relationships between plants and animals be established based on similarities and differences in
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the organism's physical characteristics until the discipline fell under the influence of the
genomic perspective and became possessed by a sense that the "visible phenotype is like the
visible portion of an iceberg" (1965, 170). By this point in time, many biologists were eager to see
underneath the visible characteristics of organisms. To them, the molecular approach appeared
as something akin to "scuba diving equipment with which to study the submerged portion of the
iceberg" (ibid). Specific patterns are only observable at certain scales. Examining the differences
and similarities between species at a molecular level promised a genuinely objective system of
classification that did not rely on human perception. At the level of the organism or its fossilized
remains, two species may not look like they are related, but as the two scientists argued,
molecules tell a different and more objective story. The desire to "spell out principles of how to
extract evolutionary history from molecules..." (Pauling and Zuckerkandl 1965: 361) culminated
in a shift in ideas about what evolution is and how it works. Evolutionary biologists have always
examined fossilized remains of plants and animals to reconstruct an organism's evolutionary
history but following Pauling and Zuckerkandl’s call to “uncover homologies between seemingly
unrelated proteins" (ibid), that the morphological perspective had concealed, the fossil record
became "too big to register evolution's microscopic dynamics" (ibid).
In the new cosmology, evolution was not the “big” entity that works on organisms but a
tiny force whose complex but regular dynamic alter molecules one protein at a time. Treating
evolution as a force that works on organisms foreclosed the possibility of micro-level details
underneath natural selection. By envisioning evolution as a small force that addressed
molecules, the two uncovered something else that had been invisible: rates of evolution. At the
organismal level, mutations and evolutionary changes appear to be random. Tuning biological
vision towards the molecular borough to light regularities and patterns in how evolutionary
changes unfold. This theory, now known as the "molecular clock," maintains that rates of
evolution in a given protein molecule are constant over time and evolutionary lineages.
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Furthermore, it explained these regularities as a function of the law of thermodynamics. A
downshift in scale turned evolution into a microscopic entity whose characteristics were the
same as those of physical forces such as motion or gravity: fixed, determined, and law-bound.
As the decade drew to a close, instructors could boast of teaching a biology course
without mentioning organisms until the second term “and then only as if they were the test
tubes in which chemical reactions take place” (Simpson 1967, 363). The notion of gene and
molecular evolution continued to proliferate. In 1964, two symposia—
“Evolving Genes and Proteins” at the Institute of Microbiology at Rutgers University and the
“Colloquium on the Evolution of Blood Proteins” in Bruges, Belgium—established molecular
biology as a legitimate site of inquiry and in so doing, recalibrated biological vision more
generally.
When confronted with a broken tool that interrupts work, one has two options; find a
new instrument to finish the job or repair and rehabilitate the old one. Not everyone was
convinced of the virtues of moving biology to a molecular scale. In a well-known article
published in The American Scholar, George Gaylord Simpson, a renowned U.S. paleontologist,
described biology as fragmented, disordered, and “monomaniacal” (1967, 363). At first, the
“previously unthinkable” idea that organic compounds can be synthesized outside of organisms
was shocking. However, as molecular biology took on a “missionary fervor” in “establishing itself
as the only real biology,” (ibid) it drew increasingly sharper fault lines between molecular
biology and what they began to call its “organismal” counterpart.
According to Simpson, the excessive magnification associated with treating molecules as
a unit of analysis erased the distinction between molecules and cells and very quickly authorized
biologists to speak of “life without organisms.” The downshift in vision that allowed biologists to
attend to organisms as a collection of molecules was predicated on the idea that life could be
reduced to the physical sciences and the decline of a sense that there is something unique in
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living systems as in Simpson’s formulation, "Molecules are not alive. Biology is the study of life.
Cells have the elusive quality of being alive— acknowledging this quality separates biology from
the other sciences” (365). As Simpson put it, “Unlike molecules, organisms are not types. They
are individual, and no two are alike” (268). In his view, organic life is unique because it is
unpredictable and possesses a quality that escapes control. At the molecular scale, life’s
contingent and historical qualities disappear. They are replaced by repeatability, predictability,
and mechanical adherence to natural laws. This, above all, buttressed his objection to biology’s
desire for smallness.
Simpson, like Feynman, understood that a downshift of vision toward the minute is
linked to an engineering ethos, a desire to alter, make and unmake things according to human
whims. While he shared Feynman's intuitions regarding the intimate relationship between
smallness and malleability, Simpson was deeply troubled by possibilities created through the
connection. He hoped that resisting the downshift and keeping biology's gaze fixed on higherorder phenomena, that is, on individuals and populations (376), would prevent biology from
adopting nanotechnology’s attitude to the world and the things in it.
Simpson concluded his speech by returning to vitalism, a “prehistoric” and “erroneous”
theory whose rejection elevated biology to the status of a “legitimate science” (Schmidt and
Lipson 2009). In his words, “Those who believed in a vital, non-material element particular to
organisms were quite right to an extent" (Simpson, 1967, 376). However, Simpson also believed
this element was not entelechy or spirit but organization— i.e., characterized by hierarchy and
complexity. The vitalists maintained that when physical processes come together in an
organism, they form “something” over and above their sum parts. This “something” is life. Since
life cannot be reduced to the features that make it up, life possesses an "unanalyzable autonomy"
and an "interest for itself" (Driesch 1914, 5). This "interest" is remaining alive or maintaining the
integrity of the whole.
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Simpson’s point was that taking the point of view of molecules rendered organization, a
characteristic specific to life invisible. Thus, by his logic, molecular biology’s scaling practices, as
these had envisioned organisms as a collection of chemical and physical processes, authorized
the same “engineering ethos” that gave rise to nanotechnology’s unprecedented interventions
into matter. At the molecular scale, one cannot see life. Therefore, the imperative to consider an
organism as having an "interest for itself" does make sense. The downshift in scale radically
altered biology's theoretical attitude towards defining life. As Simpson’s narrative illustrates,
this went hand-in-hand with a recalibration of its research agenda towards changing,
reconfiguring, and altering organic processes. As Anne McLaren, the pioneer of In-Vitro
Fertilization (IVF), explicitly stated, embryology could not begin the necessary steps toward the
panoply of reproductive technologies currently available to those who can access them until the
discipline’s vision freed itself from the scale and vision imposed by the maternal body.
RESCALING PREGNANCY
There may have been “plenty of room at the bottom” for atoms. Still, in McLaren’s lab,
mice were suffering from severe cases of “uterine crowding,” an iatrogenic condition created by
an explosion of research aimed at modulating bodies through experiments with sex hormones
(Preciado 2013). A year before Feynman delivered his speech, Nature published McLaren’s first
successful attempt to gestate mammals outside of the maternal body, a project closely related to
a novel set of ideas and practices encompassed within what McLaren labeled “super pregnancy.”
In granting hormones this most crucial causal role in the process of gestation, McLaren not only
discovered that a shift to the molecular level opened up the possibility of controlling pregnancy
from conception to birth, but redefined pregnancy altogether. McLaren attributed her
achievement to embryology, finally overcoming the “inaccessibility” of the mammalian embryo
that had held the discipline back for the last few decades (1958, 877). According to her article,
removing the maternal organism from the center of understanding reproduction enabled
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scientists to visualize pregnancy as a series of small and discrete events. No longer bound by the
scale dictated by the maternal organism, pregnancy became amenable to unprecedented
technological and scientific intervention.
New technologies almost always accompany forays into new and increasingly smaller
nooks and crannies of the world. Growing mice in glass tubes under science’s watchful gaze was
no exception5. Since the end goal of the research was to intervene in pregnancy, as soon as
artificially fertilized pinkies reached a particular stage of development the embryos were
carefully placed back into the uterus to complete their growth. Artificial fertilization freed
scientists from the limits imposed by sexual intercourse-dependent reproduction. It also created
a new problem. There were too many embryos and not enough uteri to put them in. An obvious
solution was to increase the number of embryos placed in each uterus. Uteri can only hold a
predetermined number of young. Once this number is exceeded—a phenomenon McLaren
labeled “uterine crowding"— the length of pregnancy is cut short, resulting in premature birth or
miscarriage. Biologists of McLaren’s era believed that mammalian litter sizes tend to be
confined within a narrow range outside of the laboratory. According to their understanding, the
number of young born in a litter was generally determined by: (i) the size of the uterus and (ii)
the duration of the pregnancy. The two factors were also believed to be inversely proportional to
one another; the larger the litter size, the shorter the pregnancy (Dewar 1967). For example,
mice have a gestational range of 19-32 days depending on the species and give birth to an
average of 6-8 pinkies. In contrast, humans have a gestational period of around 280 days and

Fertilizing eggs and creating embryos “outside of the maternal organism” (McLaren 1958, 877)
was predicated on extracting the tiny and delicate products of conception one at a time. A
scalpel may have been the perfect tool to cut a fetus out of human uteri, but it was far too big to
perform the same procedure on mice. McLaren and her team did not simply create miniature
versions of conventional tools: they were forced to reimagine what surgery is and create novel
tools, techniques, and protocols.
5
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usually give birth to only one baby. McLaren's challenge was rescaling pregnancy so that a
uterus could hold a higher number of pinkies without decreasing the length of pregnancy, thus
avoiding premature birth6.
By turning her gaze downwards, to the hormonal realm, McLaren was able to frame the
problem of increasing litter as modulating the previously ironclad relationship of number,
duration, and size, a task that only became thinkable when contemplated on a hormonal scale.
Although a few scientists suspected that estrogens played a role in regulating the length of
pregnancy, research on pregnancy took for granted that the ovaries, placenta, and other grossscale organs determined the timing of birth. McLaren had a different vision. In her model of
pregnancy, hormones — not organs— were prime movers. Visualizing the uterus as an organ
whose activity is controlled by hormonal-level-events (1963, 125) gave rise to research
experiments, ones that showed estrogen, in concert with other hormones, most-notably
Oxytocin, to be responsible for inducing birth by acting on the uterus. McLaren was able to see
that decreasing estrogen levels by administering progesterone kept pinkies in utero for extended
periods. Her hormonal solution for alleviating the ill effects of artificial uterine crowding (1963,
297)7 merged into a new vision about pregnancy and the forces necessary for it to continue.
McLaren’s research thus paved the way for IVF and other higher-order reproductive
technologies, including surrogacy, not only scientifically but also philosophically. One
implication of this downshift was that pregnancy no longer appeared tied to the maternal
organism—or even the uterus—in a necessary way. As the definition of gestation shifted from a

Today’s biologists accept relations between mammae number and litter size (i.e., the ‘one-half’
and ‘identity’ rules) as canonical; however, this rule is not ironclad. Although evidence shows
that mammae number approximates the maximum reported litter size of a species, other factors
such as mass, gestation length, diet, and seasonality of contemporary geographic distribution
also play a role. Many species break the ‘rules’ of mammary evolution (Stewart et al 2020).
7 While older literature suggested that deficiency of progesterone can cause embryonic death at
some stages of pregnancy, the implication of this finding was largely ignored.
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bulk-scale event imbricated in kinship and located in women’s bodies to a hormonal process, so
did reproductive technologies' moral, political, and social implications. Like pregnancy, ethics
function differently at different scales.
SOCIOLOGY AND ITS “MICROSCOPIC” FINDINGS
The general shift in the meaning of scale and scaling practices had given rise to biology
without organisms, gestation without pregnancy, and cartography without maps. It also
produced sociology without society. Sociology arose from the desire to understand human
behavior vis-a-vis impersonal and large-scale processes. Structural-functionalism theory, as it
treated social facts over and above individual human agents as determining their thought and
actions, had provided sociology with its own scaling tools since the discipline's origins; this
theory hs long been orienting sociological vision and common sense. Like other paradigms,
structural-functionalism freed sociologists from re-establishing what society is and how it works
and allowed them to get on with other intellectual tasks. As long as they accepted that (i) society
was functional since its units acted on behalf of the whole; (ii) the units acted this way because
society disciplined, regulated, and distributed, and shaped them based on its needs; and (iii)
while such “shaping” occurred without the units’ consent or knowledge, each unit was
ameanable to such shaping and accepted society’s needs as its own spontaneously, sociologists
did not tend to or need to think about scale. They were accustomed to focusing on social
systems, not individuals and their psychology. Or as Durkheim, the so-called ‘father’ of
structural-functionalism expressed it, when individuals acted, it was society acting through
them.
By the 1960s, things looked very different. As micro-level cognitive forces that resisted
socialization moved to the forefront of vision, and institutions receded to the background,
statements such as "Durkheim lacked an adequate psychology" (Wrong 1961, 1) became
legitimate criticisms of Durkheim's previously hegemonic perspective. Relatedly, Parsons'
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functionalist vision— itself greatly influenced by Durkheim’s— started to appear too big,
abstract, and totalizing. According to Dennis Wrong, by looking at society from a bird’s eye
perspective, sociologists had turned human beings into disembodied, conscience-driven, statusseeking phantoms (ibid). It was time to turn the sociological lens upside down and examine how
socialization works—at the level of individuals and their inner life. In a seminal essay, The
Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, Wrong argued that accepting
functionalism led sociological theory to grant too much power to institutions and overstress
"social factors." From the structural-functionalist’s viewpoint, Wrong charged, social norms had
appeared constitutive of human nature, leading to the assumption that conformity was ‘natural’
and not worthy of critical investigation. Moreover, at the scale of the system, seeing opposition
between individual and social interests was "unthinkable" (186), rendering as invisible
widespread problems and neurosis suffered that individuals who violated social norms actually
experienced.
Thus, this downshift in vision in the sociological theory sphere, also lead to a disciplinewide re-examination of functionalism. For functionalism, whether or not the units liked society
and what it did to them or not, was irrelevant. To ask how units felt or experienced their
designated roles was unsociological. Suddenly, sociologists were allowed, and even encouraged
to attend to the ‘micro’ level of individuals, and conflicts that functionalists had been
ideologically to deny for their model of society to make any sense emerged in full force. What
Parsons saw as integration, cooperation, and units spontaneously giving up their interests for
the sake of the whole began to appear as endless forms of coercion and force applied at every
scale, to every part, and at every level of the system.
Like many of his contemporaries, George Homans was tired of functionalism. In his 1964
presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Homans explicitly called for a
downshift in scale. According to his newely revised conceptulization, sociology ought not to deal
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with the equilibrium of society but with the behavior of the people in it, "let us put men back in
and let us put some blood in them" (816). From the system's point of view, people appear alike,
however, if one looks at real humans, it becomes clear that myriad individuals find different
things rewarding and have different values. Despite what the functionalists claimed, from the
micro viewpoint of individual actors, society is a "composite"— it can handle heterogeneity in its
units without falling apart! Functionalism missed this insight because it refused to entertain
propositions about the behavior of individuals and contents of their consciousnesses, and had
habitually focused only on the characteristics of ‘society’8.
The idea that social order is not given but created through micro-interactions among
individuals signaled a new attitude towards scale and scaling practices. Taking individual agents
as a unit of analysis caused a significant shift in taken-for-categories of sociological research.
Similarly, attending to the psychology of individuals reframed which questions were worth
asking and the criteria for formulating valid explanations. As notions of order and stability
associated with the ‘macro’ level fell out of favor and were subsequently replaced by conflict and
change, the existence of social order itself appeared curious. The newer generation of
sociologists, “unafraid to state their concerns in social psychological terms,” began to ask how
humans become tractable to social discipline and controls, raising other previously unthinkable
questions as well (Wrong 1961, 3). Unlike their functionalist predecessors, sociologists now
believed that attending to interactions could provide meaningful answers.
Simultanously, it is essential to underscore that Homans did not ask sociologists to go
"all the way down." Like Feynman’s, his was a practical plan. He wanted sociology to move to a
more practical scale, not the smallest one but, a scale in between psychology and sociology— a

According to Homans, sociology needed to understand why flesh and blood people obey norms
and why they perform specific roles in maintaining society. He proposed that it does so through
small-group research that can explain "how a status system—of course on a small scale—
emerges in the course of interaction between the members of a group" (1964, 815).
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level on which sociologists could see how "microscopic variables ignored by sociologists can
explain situations usually ignored by psychologists'' (1964, 815).
If sociology's scaling apparatuses had indeed become faulty tools (Heidegger 1962), it
was time to recalibrate them. Many tried. For Wrong, Homans, and others associated with the
“microsociology” perspective, the solution was simple. functionalism's scale was too big, so “let
us move down and “bring men back in” (816). According to C Wright Mills, sociology had
already made such a move. In fact, it had ventured so far down that it had become a
“microscopic” discipline that produced "microscopic findings" (1959, 48). The third chapter of
Mills’ The Sociological Imagination addressed the downshift in vision by turning to quantitative
research that began to emerge as a dominant trend in the 1960s. Mills argued that this
orientation— i.e., that is surveying individuals, classifying respondents' answers, punching them
on Hollerith cards, and using them to make statistics runs— defined "scaling" as a matter of
organizing data—not moving up and down from one vantage point to another. The issue was not
simply that analyzing social life via the statistical individual made it impossible to see larger
settings and structures which functioned over and above agents so as to determine their destiny.
Instead, Mills lamented that working at such a limited scale pushed theoretical concerns outside
the purview of the discipline. As he put it, theory became centered on choosing which variable to
work with. Society—once understood as a collection of powerful supra-individual forces— had
left history and the field of sociological vision, along with other large-scale and invisible entities.
Just like the rejection of the organism in biology made it possible to study plants,
animals, and other living beings without speaking of life, by giving up history and larger-scale
forces, sociology had lost what had made it distinct— namely, the ability to understand society.
Mills’ solution, however, was not to make sociology “big” again, but to connect the micro to the
macro, and to focus vision on the relationship between individuals and society.
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SMALLNESS AS A SOLUTION TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS
A “theory” is a system of philosophical insights about reality. While sociological theory
deals with questions about reality, even the most abstract models—whether intentionally or
not— are “problem conscious” (Wrong 1961)—they contain answers to a set of problems that
needed to be addressed at a given historical time. To persuade people that a particular issue or
phenomenon is a social problem worthy of intervention and make them care about resolving it,
sociologists package their ideas in metaphors, ideas, and images that are already salient in the
collective imagination. In the 1950s, sociology’s questions centered around the Parsonian
question of integration. By the time Feynman gave his speech, functionalism’s framing was no
longer convincing. By the 1970s, “function” would be replaced by “interaction,” as sociology
shifted its agenda towards other matters of concern. A downshift in scale was the first step in
this move9.
As a close reading of Lewis Mumford’s, The City in History demonstrates, Feynman’s
claim that “smallness” can be a legitimate solution to an array of pathologies was predicated on
understanding problems in terms of “bigness.” Urbanism and its discontents have been a
popular topic for sociologists since the Chicago School became the epicenter of sociological
thought in the first decade of the 20th century. In 1961, Mumford enthroned scale as the
dominant category for understanding the crisis created by modernism’s “grand” approach to
designing cities as utilized by American planner planners during the post-World War II period.
Mumford began his magnum opus with a meditation on scale: "a city [...] was, symbolically a
world: it enclosed the world that has become, in many practical aspects, a city" (1961, 528). The

During the 1950s and 1960s the category of “interaction” had shifted to the forefront of
sociological vision. “Interaction” could only become a legitimate focus point once sociology
moved down the actors' cognition level. As the following chapters will show, such a shift
eventually crystallized into an institutionalized perspective associated with symbolic
interactionism in the late 1970s.
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city shaped not only humanity's historical development but the urban form also became
synonymous with humanity itself. It was a natural habitat for humans qua species. When scaled
correctly, with humans as the fulcrum of proportion,the city was a magnet, container, and a
transformer. It was attractive because of its immensity and retentiveness, density, and depth
(562). In the modern era, the intimate relationship between humans and their form of dwelling
has gone awry. The “excess” of the contemporary "megalopolis" has created the most profound
antagonism between human beings and the world in which they dwell (ix-xi). As cities increased
to a mass scale, the "local, small and autonomous" were replaced by mandatory suppression
(542)10.
If the problem was the city's size, the solution was obvious: make it smaller. In practical
terms, this translated to creating suburbs away from the metropolis. However, according to
Mumford, suburbanization only intensified the problem. It was a cosmetic fix. On the surface,
an individual suburb did indeed decrease the scale of life for its residents. However, when
suburbanization is examined as a large-scale force, it was clear that buiding suburbs away from
the society scattered, disorganized, decentered, and increased the city's size while seemingly
doing the opposite. Just as nanotechnology’s downshift in scale obliterated all sorts of
boundaries in the world of matter, the recalibration of scale between humans and their cities
created a shift in the order of things via a redefinition of the boundaries between the “natural"
and "artificial." In Mumford's account, the city— as typically associated with concrete and steel;
inorganic substances— had become organic. Rather than building new structures, the new
urban form grew by "breaking down old tissue” followed by an “overgrowth of formless new

Mumford was not alone. Others including Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American
Cities (1961) made similar arguments.
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tissue" (522)11. As oncologists know too all too well, removing limits to growth leads to
formlessness. Like cancer, a disease characterized by uncontrollable proliferation of cells and
subsequent invasion of one organ after another until the whole organism becomes a
disorganized mass, the modern city had become a malignant pathology that threatens human
survival. Mumford described the logic of deploying suburbanization to counter the rapid
scaling-up of life as…
A strange kind of medical care and treatment which sought to alleviate the
symptoms, while seductively maintaining all the agonizing conditions that caused
the disease— and actually produced side reactions that were as bad as the disease
(523).
Building suburbs scaled down the urban problem somewhat instead of solving it, and
suburbs became “a reminder of the fallout of the urban explosion and emblems of the
"disappearing city" (503). Mumford’s notion of a “strange kind of medical care” that “cured”
disease by maintained the agonizing conditions proved strangely prophetic. Just as Benjamin
Franklin described the “spirit of capitalism” in his journals long before capitalism became an
economic reality. Analogously, Mumford described something akin to the “spirit of
nanomedicine” that has not yet become a reality and perhaps never will almost seventy years
before nano-based targeted delivery failed to cure cancer.
The same generic logic can be found underneath Erving Goffman's notion of “total
institutions” which built upon and rescaled Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. In his famous
essay, Weber foresaw bureaucracy as the great danger lurking within bureaucracy’s technical
superiority. In Weber’s account, bureaucracy was a "big" instrument akin to the railway system
and the telegraph; it coordinated imperatives on an unprecedented scale by traversing time and

The ordinarily machine-like bureaucracy had become "tentacular," evoking images, not of cogs
in machines but octopi, squid, or other grotesque creatures extending their long, slimy limbs
searching for prey.
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geographical space. Bureaucracy was both large in scale and anonymous. According to Weber, it
functioned “at a distance […] without regard for persons" (2013, 216). The expansive scale of
bureaucracy allowed it to dominate human action without ever encountering those governed in
the flesh— a fact that, for Weber, was both promising and threatening. Weber acknowledged
that by virtue of its natural tendency toward “bigness,” bureaucracy had an inherent tendency to
expand and become an organizing force in realms where it did not belong. However, the tone of
his description left the reader with a sense that bureaucracy was a good way of coordinating an
increasingly complicated society if it could be scaled down and prevented from becoming too
big.
Goffman’s work as a janitor in a psychiatric hospital allowed him to see that bureaucracy
functions even more efficiently when scaled down to a human level. In 1961, he consolidated his
insights into a new theory of social control organized through micro interventions. While
previous sociological accounts envisioned domination as an attribute of “big” institutions
looking over individuals, Goffman understood that when it comes to power, bigger is not always
better. For Weber, efficiency and expediency were a product of immovable rules and rigid
structures. Goffman’s category of “total institutions” showed that at the micro level, bureaucracy
is malleable and flexible; it is such attributes that render it the "technically superior" apparatus
that it is. Unlike its predecessors, the public bureaucracy, total institutions are very interested in
persons; their purpose is to handle human needs. According to Goffman, total institutions work
at the level of the self because this is the level at which human beings are most vulnerable to
engineering. Like Feynman, he understood the link between smallness, malleability, and
efficacy.
For Goffman, total institutions do the work of maintaining social order by “stripping”
individuals of their identity; they curtail, minimize, and scale down the self until individuals can
no longer maintain it (14). Once the self is sufficiently mortified or "curtailed," the individual to
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whom this self belongs, or used to belong, can be "shaped and coded into an object that can be
worked on by the administration" (16). They operate at the micro level and deal with the most
minute aspects of individuals' lives (17-20).
Goffman describes asylums as akin to a microscope. They recalibrate the size of things
through magnification. In concrete terms, total institutions take the tiniest, most insignificant,
and pedestrian details and transform them into enormous proportions. In an asylum, the most
minute aspects of conduct— for instance, dress, comportment, and manners—are amplified and
exaggerated to a scale where they are always available for judgment and correction. Similarly,
activities such as bathing or eating, these being minor and everyday activities generally little
deserving of much thought, are taken away from an individual and shifted up in magnitude so as
ro be unending control, observation, and modification.
Whereas Weber's evaluation of bureaucracy was ambivalent, or according to some
neutral, the downshift in vision had forced Goffman to see conflicts between individuals and
institutions in stark terms. While the order and functionality that characterize society at the
macro level obscures this destruction, a downshift in scale brings it to the forefront. By refusing
functionalism’s scaling practices that always took the system’s point of view, he was able to ask
what the application of such power looks and feels like for the units on the receiving end.
Like other sociologists of his era who refused functionalist scaling practices, Goffman knew that
maintaining social order is impossible without applying coercive force and the destruction it
entails. From the view of the total institution, a deep reach into the human psyche guarantees
social order without the cost of physical violence. If total institutions’ tools and philosophies can
deal with any impediments to social order more efficiently than their older—and much larger—
counterparts for society, they are a net benefit. However, as Goffman pointed out when
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examined from the vantage point of the individuals subjected to them, total institutions become
nothing less than instruments of torture12.
AN APPROPRIATE DOSE
Mumford and Goffman drew on discourses about smallness to frame certain phenomena
associated with urbanization and the expansion of psychiatry as social pathologies. The final
case study speaks to the salience of smallness in collective logic by showing how specific
solutions can be considered convincing even when they "do not work," empirically speaking. By
the time Make Room! Make Room! made its way into bookstores in 1966; it was only one of
many novels, films, and even popular songs in the "too many people/ too few resources" genre.
Although overpopulation experts and the lay public shared similar concerns regarding
overpopulation, they disagreed about what kind of issue it was13.
When framed as a social issue, overpopulation looked like the taxpayer's burden for
excessive reproduction and, as with other social issues, the solution lay in changing longstanding behavioral patterns. Also, when treated as a social issue, overpopulation required
interventions at the social level, necessitating at least some elements of domination, coercion, or
the use of force to get people to do what they do not want to (or to stop doing what they actually
do). Theoretically, addressing social inequalities in one way or another could have worked to
reduce the birth rate but more popular approaches focused on sterilizing, imprisoning, and
surveilling poor (usually) Black women and their pregnancies (Hartmann 1997). Even with these

Goffman and other members of the anti-psychiatry movement campaigned against asylum
psychiatry due to its abuse, violence, and inhumane treatment of patients. They got what they
asked for as the first wave of deinstitutionalization shifted psychiatry's field of operation from
the asylum to the biochemistry of brains, medicinal compounds, and molecules. With the
discovery of the first antipsychotic drug, Thorazine, in 1954, mental illness shifted total
institutions into neurotransmitters bypassing the self as an object of concern altogether.
13 The Population Bomb, written at around the same time by Stanford Biologist Paul R. Ehrlich,
speaks to the expert discourse around the earth becoming "overcrowded."
12

82

and similar strategies in place, in the social realm, overpopulation proved to be an insoluble
problem.
In the scientific milieu, overpopulation looked very different. The issue was the birth rate
and the solution was decreasing it. John Rock who, along with Gregory Pincus, created the first
commercial birth control pill, believed hormones were the answer. One hormone in particular:
norethindrone. According to Rock, the problem of overpopulation was grave enough for the
Catholic Church to rescind its prohibition on birth control and, in 1964, he asked them to do so.
His letter pleaded with the Church’s authorities to downshift their vision: "Procreation is the
union of one of the numberless non-human spermatozoa with the non-human egg. Coitus makes
it possible but does not decree it" (1964: 401-407). When viewed from a micro perspective, the
creation of pregnancy was just a series of countless tiny processes that have little to do with life,
humanity, and even sex.
Rock is regarded as the father of the birth control pill. It was not his invention though;
here again, as is contended here throughout, it was handed to him as Carl Djerassi had
synthesized the critical hormones in 1951. What was not known, though, was the "appropriate"
dose and combination of hormones to be administered. While Rock’s theological argument fell
on deaf ears – namely that when approached from a hormonal perspective, procreation is too
tiny to warrant ethical concern -- Rock remained ideologically wedded to the idea that birth
control was compatible with Catholic doctrine. This commitment played no small part in his
choice to define the "appropriate" dose not as the dose that prevented pregnancy but one that
suppressed ovulation. Since they refused to risk pregnancy in their trials, defining efficacy this
way also freed them from the imperative to establish the dose at which the medication is no
longer effective, i.e., the dose which fails to prevent pregnancy.
To make the ovulation or its absence visible, Rock and Pincus visualized their subjects’
menstrual cycles through daily basal body temperature measurements, endometrial biopsies,
83

daily vaginal smears, and pregnanediol excretion (the latter obtained through an analysis of
urine). It was the biopsy of the uterine lining, though, that was treated as authoritative: “the
observation in gross needed to be confirmed by examination of ovarian tissue under a
microscope” (1956, 892). Rock’s and Pincus’ objects of concern were ovaries, uterine lining, and
vaginal smears –not “gross scale” women. The scale of the uterine lining was a useful scale one
reasons that were as much, if not more, political and ideological than scientific. When
confronted with reports of severe side effects, Rock and Pincus deemed these psychosomatic; in
other words, they shifted them out of the body and into the realm of the mind. Had Rock and
Pincus taken the side effects seriously, they would have been able to trace them back to the
hormonal realm. But by bridging the bulk scale of women’s bodies and the microscopic
hormonal scales, they were able to imagine side effects as a connection between the micro and
macro world. Confining their vision to uterine lining, cells, tissues, and other microscopic
phenomena rendered the suffering experienced by many women in their trials invisible. And not
seeing was the point.
Defining "appropriate" as preventing ovulation, not pregnancy, served a similar function.
Rock’s refusal, or inability, to shift beyond the hormonal level allowed him to remain wedded to
a direct correlation between dose and efficacy. He continued to believe that a bigger dose is
more powerful. However, as Feynman knew in 1959, when matter is scaled down, it behaves in
“strange ways.” Rock eventually saw what Feynman did -- i.e., that matter functions differently
at different levels. At the micro-scale, strength, potency, and efficacy are independent of
quantity. Instead, they are determined by concentration, ratio, and duration. By 1989, he had
learned that contraceptive efficacy is determined by the potency of the hormones, not the
quantity ingested. He found that “no direct relationship exists between the dose of progestogen
[...] and the degree of ovulation suppression” (1989, 13). As is often the case with knowledge of
this type, Rock’s insights arrived too late. By 1988, the dose Rock and Pincus “felt comfortable
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with” had caused enough blood clots, heart attacks, and deaths for the FDA to take it off the
market.
Although Pincus and Rock’s research led to the first birth control pill, the number they
posited as an “appropriate dose” was off by 4000%, equivalent to wanting to walk from Grand
Central to Times Square (a half-mile trip) and ending up instead in Shanghai, 8000 miles away.
The birth control pill appeared as a credible solution to overpopulation due in part to an
excitement about smallness and the possibility the concept opened of addressing hitherto
insolvable problems at the most minute scale conceivable. The same desire for smallness may
have led the two scientists to suspend disciplinary norms and critical thinking, though. As this
dissertation posits, the downshift in scale was one tendency in a new form of collective thought.
A FAULTY TOOL
According to origin stories repeated and transmitted to the subsequent generations of
scientists and researchers through nanotechnology textbooks, the vision spelled out in There is
Plenty of Room at the Bottom was so new and innovative that it warranted a break with all that
came before it. Even for contemporary nanoscientists, Feynman’s genius and originality
legitimated and continues to legitimate, nanotechnology becoming an autonomous discipline.
When placed alongside other developments in the natural and social sciences, Feynman's vision
was neither new nor original. Thus Feynman did not discover nanotechnology: it was handed to
him.
By 1959, scale had become a “faulty tool” in the natural and social sciences. The
downshift in scale Feynman called for was already under way in the lay and expert imagination.
The GIS revolution in mapping changed the meaning and significance of scale and scaling
practices and showed cartographers that when things are small, they are easier to manipulate
and modulate. Similarly, in evolutionary biology, the desire to “spell out principles of how to
extract evolutionary history from molecules...” (1965, 361) remade evolution into a micro force
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of molecules, not organisms, as biologists previously believed. Biologists were aware of the
strange link between smallness, malleability, and intervention before Feynman announced the
coming of nanotechnology at Cal Tech. By the mid-1950s, sociology had abandoned structural
functionalism and sought to bring its vision down, all the way down, to individuals. The same
revolutionary potential of downshifting in scale in Feynman’s speech had congealed into a
general sense that making things smaller and addressing phenomena at the most minute level
possible, was the key to solving previously insoluble problems; this led to the success of the birth
control pill despite seriously flawed scientific research. While the case studies in this chapter
hail from diverse disciplines and addresses very different objects, they all share a generic
structure. In each narrative, the shift in scale led to a new way of seeing the world and the things
in it. Since different things are visible at different scales, shifting vision down showed something
that hitherto remained invisible. The revelation led to widespread questioning of taken-forgranted practices and assumptions about scale.
Whatever its status, Feynman's speech reflects a general sense that something was
coming to an end, and the perception that all solutions and ideas available during his time had
been tried and tested. What was needed was a radically different vision that would enable
science and, by extension, society, to begin anew. In 1959, this science-about-to-come lacked a
name. Tools, laboratory techniques, and even microscopes were needed to verify the existence of
anything more at "the bottom" but Feynman, like today's researchers struggling with the
problem of targeted delivery, knew that it had to come. According to popular lore, Feynman’s
vision lay dormant until Eric Drexler picked it up in the 1980s. Drexler may be best known for
his molecule-sized factories and self-assembling nanobots cruising through blood vessels, but
underneath such sci-fi’esque imagery lay another desire. Drexler longed for a medicine that can
heal without cutting, burning, or killing, and that could restore health without the violence of
surgery or the toxicity of drugs.
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According to the most complete review of nanomedicine ever published, nanomedicine's
arrival was marked by Drexler's paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences USA in 1981. This was the first time anyone suggested that it might be possible to
construct nano-devices that could inspect the cells of a living being and carry out repairs within
them (Doelle et al. 2009, 72). A decade later, Drexler consolidated his vision and published The
Engines of Creation. As the next chapter will show, the discourse around scale associated with
the next episode in nanomedicine's history, Eric Drexler's Engines of Creation, shifted away
from Feynman’s vision. While Feynman was interested in “going all the way down”(1959, 1), the
fulcrum of Drexler’s meditation on scale was a higher-order concept in the science of scaling:
proportion.
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CHAPTER 4
A NEW SENSE OF PROPORTION
Eric Drexler’s Engines of Creation and Nanotechnology
in the 1980s and 1990s
“If technological systems have grown past human scale, our bulk technology and stupid
machines are largely to blame.”
—Eric Drexler (1986)
In the popular imagination, the word "nanotechnology" is almost always associated with selfassembling nanobots, or factories reduced to the size of a fingernail, a vision described by Eric
Drexler in The Engines of Creation in 1986. Reality is much less exciting. When used formally,
"nano" is a unit of measure that stands for one billionth of a meter or 10-9, equal to roughly onetenth thousandth of a strand of hair. As a scientific discipline, nanotechnology emerged out of
the insight that “strange things occur in irregular situations” (Feynman 1959, 1). When matter is
reduced in size from the bulk scale (this being the range visible to the naked human eye) to the
nanoscale, its characteristics and behavior defy bulk-scale physical laws. At the bulk scale, the
properties of materials are a product of the atoms that make it up, how these are atoms are
bonded, and in what ratios. At the nanoscopic dimension, however, a material’s geometry (how
thick or wide it is) plays a determining role in shaping its qualities and behavior. However,
nanotechnology was always more than a science or technology. As the previous chapter started
to show, attending to nanotechnology beyond its significance for science and technology and
treating it as an exemplar of a shift in vision practices can provide a unique window into sociocultural attitudes, values, and ideas.
Richard Feynman set the early tone for nanotechnology’s meditation on scale. However,
in 1959, nanotechnology and its research agenda were still nebulous entities that could be made,
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unmade, and remade again, and, in 1982 Eric Drexler picked up where Feynman left off. From
the excitement of exploring the lowest extreme of scale to his impatience, and finally, his call for
science to shift down, “all the way down” (1959, 1), Feynman’s discourse was organized via the
notion of a “downshift.” Drexler did not share his predecessor’s obsession with the infinitesimal
or desire to “explore the realm below” (ibid). In The Engines of Creation, the nanoscopic scale
was not characterized by “smallness” but proportionality to humans and their needs.
Whereas Feynman legitimated his call for a new science by coupling smallness with
malleability and utility, Drexler's engagement with the notion of "proportionality" thrust
"compatibility" into the center of nanotechnology's cosmology. Drexler believed that modern
technology was the root cause of many human problems, from environmental destruction and
scarcity to war and genocide, precisely because it was too big. In fact, according to his narrative,
as modernism’s configurations grew, humanity came to inhabit a world that had not been built
for them. By forging a conceptual link between "bigness" and force, destruction, and violence,
Drexler characterized atom by atom engineering as a corrective technology that would create
proportionality and compatibility between the world (and the things in it) and human life.
Drexler was the first to articulate nanotechnology's promise to contend with harmful elements
in a system, from poverty and pollution to cancer, by "tuning," altering, and reshaping each
component until the incompatible became compatible. The discursive universe of the Engines of
Creation proved to be an ideal substrate for the rise of an intellectual agenda of "engineering
compatibility" that continues today in nanomedicine. Drexler’s vision of nanotechnology shares
specific generic patterns with specialized discourse written by experts in seemingly unrelated
milieus and general thought that circulated as he penned Engines. This convergence is
especially striking in texts concerned with identifying and addressing social problems.
There are several well-established reasons why turning an analytic lens to social
problems is a particularly fruitful strategy for formulating broad characterizations of cultural
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tendencies. As Susan Markens pointed out in Surrogate Motherhood: The Politics of
Reproduction (2007), social problems are not merely identified but constructed. Broadly
speaking, a social problem is a danger that has been deemed intolerable. While it is true that a
wide range of people, objects, ideas, acts, and other things can be potentially harmful to a wide
range of individuals, communities, and populations in an infinite number of ways, “danger” does
not possess an objective existence. Something only becomes dangerous when it is so designated.
This designation is a product of historically and socially specific conceptualization,
measurement, and classification (Auerhahn 2003, 73). An enormous body of literature written
by sociologists, particularly those of the medical and criminological variety, has established that
danger associated with particular objects and phenomena in the public imagination acquires
intolerable status in a patterned way through more or less predictable discursive formulas
(Cohen 1972). Similarly, according to Markens, all social problems have what she labeled
"discursive frames." These provide a "central organizing idea, or story that provides meaning to
an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection between them" (Gameson and Modigliani
1987, 43 in Markens 2007, 8). This chapter tells the second part of the story of “scale” becoming
one such framing device.
By mirroring Markens' meticulous attention to rhetorical tools used to define and give
meaning to social problems (2007, 8), I continue now to build the dissertation’s central claim—
namely, nanotechnology was not a mere consolidation of novel scientific insights about matter
and the technical application of this new knowledge, but an emblem of new forms of thinking
that emerged at the same time as the discipline itself. To show that nanotechnology’s discourse
provided tools and vision practices for addressing toxic, dangerous, harmful, and destructive
phenomena within a system, this chapter focuses on Drexler’s engagement with the notion of
scale in this account of what nanotechnology was and why it was necessary. While Feynman
envisioned nanotechnology in terms of a “downshift,” Drexler’s account was organized by the
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notion of proportionality by establishing lack of proportionality as a general criterion for what
makes certain dangers so intolerable that they become social problems. By extension, it also
proposed compatibility in scale— i.e., proportionality— as a legitimate solution to said problems.
Following a “thick description” of The Engines of Creation, I proceed to document the
same “style of reasoning” at work in collective thought by using the idea of “proportion” to
weave a thread between readers as diverse as those associated with the broken windows theory
of policing, E. F. Schumacher's The Small is Beautiful, and Norman Cousin's Anatomy of an
Illness. The danger attached to a lack of proportionality is then observed in the natural sciences
starting with the category of "overreaction” as this concept framed expert reflections on the
reactor explosion at Chernobyl. The generic elements of Drexler’s discourse on proportion are
then reconstructed through a series of case studies associated with a shift in thinking about
natural and technological disasters. These include the United Nation's taxonomy of hazards
created for the explicit purpose of comparing one event to another, and discourse that turned
two relatively minor incidents, one involving Tylenol and the other tampons, into matters of
national concern. I offer other examples as well, one involving a tanker that dumped over a
million gallons of oil into a storm sewer in Pennsylvania and another an incident whereby
asbestos killed hundreds of workers in a Maryland mine and caused severe lung damage to over
two thousand more. Finally, the second part of the chapter explores the category of proportion
in the social science
A DIFFERENT STYLE OF TECHNOLOGY
At first, glance, defining the size of a place, object or thing seems straightforward. Some
entities are small, others are large, and the rest are in between. However, there are two
problems with this assumption. First, size is not an absolute value but the outcome of arranging
two or more objects into a set and comparing them. Therefore, and secondly, “bigness” and
“smallness” are not properties of individual things but refer to relationships between them.
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Questions regarding size are typically understood as quantitative. While zooming in or out,
reducing or increasing, ascending, or descending ( and/or other variations of “more or less”) as
fundamental categories for thinking about size, quantity is a rudimentary idea in the science of
scaling. Size can also be measured qualitatively vis-a-vis “magnitude,” broadly defined as the
intensity of quality obtained through an ordering of objects (such as brightness, volume, or
strength) and represented as a position between two points of extreme. For any entities to be
compared in terms of magnitude, they must be understood as being of the same type and
belonging to the same class. Scientists refer to the process of positioning objects next to one
another as establishing a "statement of equality” that often involves changing some or all things
in the set in some way to make comparison permissible.
One of the most common forms of such alteration involves moving models from one
scale to another. For example, ordering a group of entities based on the intensity of their color
involves leveling or disregarding qualities other than color or size – in other words , making
some of them smaller and others larger, physically or conceptually, so that each is equal in terms
of their size. In other words, a successful up or downshift in scale requires that the relationship
between properties at one scale remains “proportional” or constant as the system is translated
from its original size to another. Thus, the notion of “proportion” authorizes scientists and
engineers to make changes based on size and, in so doing , to expand the range of things that
can be positioned next to one another and ordered by magnitude. Put differently, as it is used in
relation to scale, the notion of “proportion” is a tool through which scientists create
compatibility by engineering away differences that would otherwise prevent entities from
entering relationships based on magnitude.
As all sociologists know, whether they are social or scientific in nature, rules and
conventions that govern how difference and similarity function are neither permanent nor
stable. Feynman and Drexler’s visions of nanotechnology speak to two such shifts. As a close
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reading of Drexler’s Engines of Creation shows, a schema for identifying and solving problems
organized around the notion of “proportion” has specific qualities. By attending to “proportion”
as a generic form that structured not only Drexler’s text but expert discourse and collective
thought, this chapter demonstrates how this concept also bolsters one of the dissertation’s
central theoretical claims: ideas, no matter how new and innovative they may seem, do not arise
solely in individual consciousness but rather arrive with their own heritage or intellectual
baggage. Again, they are “handed” to more or less willing recipients, and often without their
knowledge.
Nanotechnology’s first book opened on a dark note. According to Drexler, industrial
technology had exterminated, mutilated, and degraded human beings and destroyed the planet
they inhabit. Although Drexler, like Martin Heidegger, believed the essence of the problem was
not technological at all, The Engines of Creation had little in common with The Question
Concerning Technology (1954). For Heidegger, the death and destruction modern technology
unleashed on the world in the 20th century was not only inevitable but a defining feature of
technology’s very essence. Drexler, on the other hand, believed that industrial technology had
become dangerous not because it was technology but because it functioned at a scale
incompatible with humans: “If technological systems have grown past human scale, our bulk
technology and stupid machines are largely to blame. To make systems complex, we have had to
make them big” (1986, 202).
According to Drexler, the real problem was a lack of proportion. Drexler, unlike
Feynman, did not see nanotechnology primarily in terms of smallness. " As he put it, with this
different emphasis, “[Nanotechnology is] a higher technology on a human scale... a world with
machines that do not clank, chemical plants that do not stink, and production systems that do
not use people as cogs” (214). According to Drexler, technological and social progress had been
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traditionally characterized by "bigness." To "advance" meant to produce increasingly larger
systems:
Many people once feared that ever-larger machines and ever-larger organizations would
dominate our future, crushing diversity and human choice. Indeed, machines can grow
bigger, and some may. Organizations can grow bigger, and some may. But stinking,
clanking machines and huge bureaucracies have already begun to seem old-fashioned
compared to microcircuits, biotechnology, and fluid organizations (232).
In drawing discursive links between “big" and “regressive," "unruly," "slow,"
"unreliable," "crude," and "stupid" (69), Drexler established that the intimate ties between "big"
and "advancement" were scale specific. From the point of view of the nano, the big is an index of
regression. For example, large drug molecules are destructive. They poison the body because
“they work without direction. Once dumped into the body, they tumble and bump around in
solution haphazardly until they stumble into a target molecule” (85). Similarly, large democratic
governments create genocides and other atrocities because they are "big and sloppy" (ibid). If
the problem was “bigness,” the solution was obvious: reduce its size, scale it down, make it as
small as possible, as Feynman proposed. The logic underneath nanotechnology contained
another element that came to light in Drexler’s narrative12
The world at the bulk scale functions via oppositionality and duality. The laws of motion
compete with objects in space by impeding their movement or preventing rest. Being a product

Nanoscientists were never interested in smallness for its own sake. They were not moved by its
beauty, elegance, or goodness. As the structure of metaphor in Engines shows, for
nanoscientists “small” goes hand-in-hand with “precise.” Under normal circumstances, “small”
and “precise” are not synonyms. As physicists and mathematicians know all too well,
smallness— whether it pertains to numbers or things—often presents a challenge to precise
measurement. In nanotechnology’s lexicon, this fact does not stem from a lack of shared
meaning. On the contrary, “smallness” and “precision” are bound together by an affinity whose
depth transcends any definitional rules. As nanotechnology freed matter from gravity, friction,
inertia, and other natural laws, it also released language from the grips of semiology, i.e.,
nanoscientists may use the two terms interchangeably.
1
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of those laws, industrial technology, according to Drexler, is characterized above all by
contradiction. This insight was not his own. As E.F Schumacher put it in The Small is Beautiful,
modern life "constantly requires the living reconciliation of opposites which, in strict logic, are
irreconcilable" (1973, 5). The industrial revolution had bettered humanity and made life
increasingly comfortable, safe, and efficient. As Drexler and his contemporaries discovered,
progress came at a steep price. The same technology that fed, clothed, and improved the quality
of life for millions of people had turned humanity into cogs, created extreme deprivation and
suffering, endless forms of socio-political unrest and, most significantly, destroyed nature.
The environmental crisis brought to light the inherent contradiction between capitalism
and nature. By the 1980s, what started in the 1950s with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring had
migrated to the forefront of the collective consciousness. The environmental movement had
achieved legitimacy and by this point in time, academic ecology had added three fields devoted
to dealing with the “environmental crisis” to its branches of specialized activity. Whether they
were of the political or academic variety, environmentalists, ecologists, and other experts shared
a general sense that nature had been poisoned and polluted through mining, pesticide use,
overfishing, transporting invasive species worldwide, and other practices involved in the mass
production of often toxic, harmful, and wasteful things that characterized the industrial mode of
production. From their point of view, the solution was to reduce, if not outright halt, certain
practices, even if doing so would compromise human comfort and prosperity. Although the lay
public was worried about the natural environment, the prospect of giving up the benefits of
modern technology made environmentalism an unpopular standpoint. As historians of the US
labor movement know and have documented, one of the most effective rhetorical devices against
environmental protection has been the “ecology vs. jobs” argument, framing the interest of the
workers as opposed to that of nature. When workers were confronted with the possibility that
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saving the natural world may jeopardize their jobs, standard of living, or ability to consume
freely, trade unions almost always sided with their bosses against environmentalists.
In Drexler’s schema, “contradiction” was another scale-specific property linked to
largeness. Although the destruction and pollution of the natural environment was one of the
central themes in The Engines of Creation, Drexler's framing of the issue and his solutions had a
very different flavor than those put forward by ecologists and activists. When environmental
degradation is understood at the bulk scale, it almost always looks like a contradiction between
prosperity and conservation, or between good jobs and owl habitats. More generally, it appears
as an incompatibility of humans and their technologies with nature. At the nanoscale, however,
things look very different. Given that for him, the nanoscale was characterized by its
compatibility, Drexler envisioned the environmental problem and its solution via
“proportionality.” As Drexler saw it, the looming environmental threat was a case where "earth's
biological systems had failed to adapt" (265) to the industrial revolution and its machines.
Nature could not adapt to industrial technology because industrial technology was big and rigid
while nature was small. The same discrepancy in size also prevented industrial technology from
adapting to nature. As Drexler put it, “from deforestation to dioxin, we have caused damage
faster than evolution can respond. As we have sought more food, goods, and services, our use of
bulk technology has forced us to continue such damage" (3). The engineers who designed and
built its machines were "forced to handle atoms in unruly herds. They had no choice but to make
them big" (ibid).
At the dawn of the industrial revolution, there were no alternatives. If humanity wanted
the benefits of technology, it had to accept its destructiveness. Nanotechnology opened the
possibility for a different style of technology by granting scientists the ability to handle atoms
individually. According to Drexler, the unprecedented control over matter gave nanotechnology
its defining character that, for him, was working via compatibility rather than contradiction. The
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discourse on compatibility buttressed Drexler’s promises that nanotechnology could enhance
human life and fulfill humanity’s desires without any negative consequences, risks, side effects,
or dangers. Quoting him again:
With future technology, though, we will be able to do more good for ourselves, yet do less
harm to the Earth. Whereas engineers running a chemical plant must work with vats of
reacting chemicals (which often misarrange atoms and make noxious byproducts),
engineers working with bacteria can make them absorb chemicals, carefully rearrange
their atoms (6).
As the above passage illustrates, for Drexler, the ability to intervene in matter’s
structure at the atomic level translated to engineering away all incompatibility, conflict, and
contradiction. This tendency is especially clear in Drexler’s ideas about nanotechnology’s
concrete applications. Many moral philosophers such as, most notably, Peter Singer, have
debated whether eating animal flesh is morally correct. To eat meat, humans must kill animals.
If one believes that doing so is unethical, one ought to forgo eating meat. The logic of giving up
what is convenient and enjoyable for ethical reasons is based on the notion that certain things
and practices are incompatible with morality. In this example, eating meat is antithetical to
moral concern with the well-being of animals. According to Drexler, nanotechnology would
allow people to eat meat without “killing anyone” because when examined at the nano-level,
meat is just the result of “cells growing in certain patterns in animals (…) Cells can be coaxed
[not forced]— to grow in the same patterns elsewhere” (233). Nanotechnology’s promise to
overcome contradiction and conflict extended into the domestic sphere where it would “reduce
the cause of domestic quarrels” by “making everything from dishes, to carpets self-cleaning. For
properly designed nanomachines, dirt would be food” (ibid).
As these examples show, in Drexler’s hands, nanotechnology’s promise was, above all,
that what appears as compatible can be made compatible. Nanotechnology would fix what
feminism, ecology, the animal welfare movements, and other movements that “fought” for ‘this
or that’ right, while framing problems in terms of opposing interests, could not. Underneath
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Drexler’s discourse, perhaps, is a latent explanation for why these movements have failed:
thinking in oppositional terms inevitably leads to potential interlocutors becoming enemies and
turns all interaction into the war (Latour 1991).
In Drexler’s narrative, nanotechnology would allow humans to exploit the world and its
resources at an unprecedented level, but without the consequences of doing so. He was able to
make those claims via a discourse on scale. By scaling technology down, “we can establish an era
of universal wealth, which will be divided in a way that gives everyone a significant share” (223).
With nanotechnology “the earth will be able to support a civilization far larger and wealthier
than any yet seen” (155) yet suffer less harm than we inflict. The advent of nanotechnology
would provide food, health care, shelter, and other necessities “and it will accomplish this
without bureaucracies or large factories [...] Most could sit in a closet (or a thimble, or a
pinhole)” (141). It will not achieve this via centralization, since this is a process associated with
bulk-scale technology, but by producing “small, self-sufficient communities”(202). He
concludes,
Today Earth has begun to seem small, arousing concerns that we may deplete its
resources. Yet the energy we use totals less than 1/10,000 of the solar energy striking
Earth; we worry not about the supply of energy as such, but about the supply of
convenient gas and oil. Our mines barely scratch the surface of the globe; we worry not
about the sheer quantity of resources, but about their convenience and cost (ibid).
From the point of view of the nano, even the most “dangerous substances” are made of
“innocuous atoms.” Thus, when approached at the nanoscale, anything— even the most
contradictory entities— can be made compatible by engineering the differences and
contradictions away. It takes little imagination to see that Drexler’s account laid down a path for
nanomedicine’s promise to treat cancer without any damage, destruction or side effects thirty
years later. Drexler's link between smallness, compatibility, and proportion was not his own. In
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the remainder of this chapter, I trace fragments of Drexler’s logic across discourses in the social
and natural sciences.
A NEW CONCERN WITH PROPORTION
All scientists concerned with scale and scaling know that an up or downshift in scale has
serious consequences for vision practices. What may be invisible at one scale may be enormous
at another. What is relevant at a specific size, time, and energy scale changes as one moves up or
down. As C. Wright Mills stated in The Sociological Imagination, to assign a person, place of
thig the status of "social problem" is to make a statement its scale. Like scale, the category of
“social problems” has a quantitative and qualitative dimension. Quantitatively, “social problem”
has the same relationship to “personal trouble” that “big” has to “small,”—it refers to the
quantity of people affected by a particular phenomenon. On the qualitative side, it is a statement
about danger. Like size, danger is relative. A person, behavior, object, or some other thing is not
dangerous in itself—it is more or less dangerous than other objects, places, or things. Unlike
quantity, qualitative phenomena are much harder to pin down and what counts as a social
problem is as much imaginary as it is real. Problems look very different depending on the scale
at which they have been conceived. Phenomena warranting the label of “social problem” as well
as what counts as an acceptable solution to the said problem change as the collective vision
moves up or down.
For example, by the 1990s, Americans “felt that they were living in a period of cultural
collapse” (ibid), a cultural sentiment characterized by intense anxiety around welfare
dependency, illicit drugs, alcohol abuse, suicide, rape, and robbery. However, as data regarding
these phenomena shows, the level of concern was not based on “accurate depictions” (Ashbee
2002, 192) of reality. According to government data, by the mid-1990s, the number of divorces
had declined. A similar trend was seen in other indexes of family values— there was a fall in
teenage births and the abortion rate to 20 in 1000 women in 1992, one of the lowest on record.
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Drug use was down. Welfare dependency fell by 40% following the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996. In retrospect, the sense of “decay” or
“decline” that structured the discursive landscape characterized by statements like those made
by William J. Bennett, a prominent member of President Bush’s cabinet who claimed that:
“Current trends in out-of-wedlock births, crime, drug use, family decomposition… are
incompatible with American society as we know it… These trends are dangerous, and they are
potentially catastrophic” (Ashbee 2002, 192)— was out of proportion vis-à-vis events and
behaviors in US society. It was an overreaction.
While the sense of decline tended to be more prevalent in conservative narratives, such
as Robert Fogel’s, who described a “Great Awakening,” or Francis Fukuyama’s who framed it as
“remoralization,” those on the opposite side of the political saw something similar in excessive
consumerism, pathological individualism, loss of sociality, or capitalism becoming “out of
control.” Although commentators did not agree on what this change was exactly, or what had
caused it, they shared a sense that something new had emerged. As this chapter argues, a part of
this shift was a downshift in collective scaling practices, which culminated in a new concern
with, and redefinition 0f the category of proportion. As many criminologists and historians have
pointed out, the public mood—which shapes and behavioral shifts as well as the politics of a
given period— was always especially sensitive to discourse on crime. Whether real or perceived,
the “cultural decline” rhetoric of the period fastened the generalized fear, anxiety, and unease
experienced by many Americans onto “crime,” which quickly became a matter of national
concern needing urgent intervention just as the crime— including its violent varieties—
decreased. For this reason, the discourse on crime is especially illuminating of new salience of
“proportion” in the collective imagination. Between 1993 and 1997 felony complaints fell by 44.3
percent, murder and non-negligent homicides by 60.2 percent, robbery by 48.4 percent, and
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burglary by 45.7 percent (ibid). As Ashbee (2002) pointed out, the reduction in crime levels had
been most clearly evident in New York, a city synonymous with criminality in the public mind.
Although criminologists and other experts have repeatedly refuted this idea, New York
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as well as the general public saw—and continue to see— the "zero
tolerance" approach to law enforcement as responsible for the decline in crime. Giuliani's plan
emerged from the so-called "broken windows”' model described by James Q. Wilson and George
L. Kelling in an article published in 1982. The theory's central proposition was that assault,
robbery, and murder can be prevented by addressing “small scale acts of anti-social behavior”—
from broken windows, graffiti, to neglect. This is so, because, as the authors maintained, the
most minute transgressions create an “atmosphere” that encouraged violence to take root. Thus,
if the police treated these low-level problems seriously, they could prevent larger-scale crimes
like murder and armed robbery.
The sense that no actual or potential threat to urban order was too small to warrant
prosecution culminated in policing practices characterized by stopping people for minor
infractions such as jumping turnstiles, littering, or washing cars at red traffic lights in addition
to judicial gaze turning to the minute and focusing resources on away from prosecutions of
felonies towards misdemeanors. The only people more obsessed with “squeegee guys” than
prosecutors and judges were criminologists. To this day, the “squeegee guy” holds a special place
within the criminological imagination precisely because of his imbrication with scaling
practices. Firstly, as a symbol of a new sense of proportion that shaped collective understanding
of social problems, he is an embodiment of a social ontology wherein small actions have grave
consequences and addressing problems at the smallest possible scale has the most impact. And
secondly, as an emblem of a new taxonomy of crime, the “squeegee guy” stands for new rules of
classification governed by a sense of proportion that turned illegitimate or quasi-legitimate
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washing of cars and murder into objects of the same type belonging to the same class to be
distinguished only by their magnitude.
Whether or not it described how crime functioned, the direct link between minor antisocial behavior and “big” crimes like murder embodied in “broken windows theory” was based
on a specific sense of scale. The resulting shift of police and juridical attention from felonies to
the most minute crimes possible was more than a set of policies. It was an ethic and a way of
seeing that speaks to a new sense of proportion. The idea that the small was productive,
powerful, and significant was not limited to understanding crime. It was a part of more general
logic and collective vision. Just a few years earlier, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher famously
declared that the "Small is Beautiful.” According to the economist, American culture had been
inundated with the idea of "bigness.” The public was convinced that for a country to be
prosperous, it had to be big, just as experts armed with their "economies of scale" theory
claimed that industries, firms, and nations must become increasingly larger, as growth was as
inevitable and irreversible as natural laws. As the environmental crisis demonstrated, “nature
can cope with small impositions, but today's technology is too big" (1973, 12). As Schumacher
put it, by the 1980s, this "idolatry of gigantism [...] was "no longer sustainable [...] To go for
gigantism is to go for self-destruction" (116). Thus, it was time for US society and its production
system to return "to the actual size of man… man is small, and, therefore, "small is beautiful''
(117).
On the surface, Schumacher’s exultation of the virtues of smallness was part of an
intervention aimed at combatting the "bigger is better" ideology and its manifestation in what he
saw as “excesses” of the industrial system. However, as the last quote demonstrates, for
Schumacher, the problem was not the “bigness” of the industrial system per se, but its lack of
proportionality to humans. Schumacher did not see the small as beautiful for its own sake, or
because he valued the minute aesthetically. In his narrative, the small was “beautiful,” but
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because it was a scale fitting for humans. During the same time, others came to think of
smallness as "not so much beautiful as pre-eminently dangerous" (Haraway 1991, 18). Like
Schumacher’s, their discourse revolved around the category of “proportion.”
During this period, molecules— toxins, preservatives, and "chemicals" emerged as an
invisible but deadly threat in the public imagination as medicine, which in the infamous words
of Ivan Illich, "induces the organism to interact with molecules or with machines in ways for
which there is no precedent in evolution" (1972, 39o), began to be perceived as a nemesis and
public danger. The discourse that established medicine as a dangerous threat was animated by
the same logic that did the same to crime. Like graffiti, broken windows, and other fragments
indicative of disorder, drug molecules were tiny, but had serious consequences.
Norman Cousins, whose book Anatomy of an Illness, spent a significant period of time
on the New York Time’s bestseller list, declared that the US public had become "saturated with,
and toxified by medications,” whose molecules "alter or rearrange the balances in the
bloodstream" (1955, 39) and then the entire organism's chemical balance and lead to illness
whose effects are so subtle that people do not notice them until it is too late (ibid). As more and
more people ingest tiny, invisible, but very toxic molecules via drugs and food, they become
victims of "subtle poisoning" (20). On the one hand, “bigness" turned the economy into a threat,
and on the other, "smallness" made drug molecules pathological. The problem was bigness or
smallness, but a lack of proportionality.
OVERREACTION
In the 1980s the economy, molecules, and broken windows became social problems via a
discourse about proportion and a lack of compatibility phenomena. A similar concern with
proportion lead scientists to re-examine the significance of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Nuclear
power has always been an object of intense controversy and disagreement between experts and
laypeople. In the collective imagination, atomic energy is inherently unsafe even though study
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after study— including the series of papers written by Zbigniew Jaworowski, a world-renowned
authority on nuclear radiation and vocal global warming denier discredited by mainstream
scientists— has confirmed that nuclear power is safer than any other power source even when
the deaths and injuries associated with incidents at Three Mile Island, Fukushima, and
Chernobyl are factored into the equation.
It’s a question of proportion. Like size, safety is not an absolute value. It can only be
understood via comparison. The meaning of facts and figures depends on the company they
keep. Thus, the most common rhetorical tactic for establishing nuclear power's safety in the
scientific milieu is creating a ratio between a Gigawatt (GW) of power produced and the number
of deaths per year. Nuclear power's 0.86 deaths per GW is much smaller than the 40 deaths per
GW caused by hydroelectric stations, or the 84 deaths per GW in the production of fossil fuels.
No matter how many times it was restated, the ratio between human lives lost and energy
produced over time has failed to convince. And still, scientists continue to believe that repeating
the data will bring the public perception of safety into proportion with reality. In the words of
Marx Weber, even the most transparent facts cannot “speak for themselves” (1949, 27). The
debate around nuclear power is not structured around opposing facts but opposing vision
practices, which shape how facts feel and how they are perceived.
In 2010, Jaworowski characterized the Chernobyl explosion as a "minor event,” and the
“real tragedy” and “real harm” were caused not by radiation but by “overreaction.” According to
the conventional definition of the term, to overreact is to act with unnecessary or inappropriate
force. The silent rhetoric that buttresses charges of “overreaction” by instilling proportionality
as a criterion for judging moral worth. Within the legal arena, the principle of proportionality
dictates that justice occurs when the punishment fits the crime. Human rights laws recently
adopted by the European Union demand that any measure taken by the state must be
“reasonable,” that is, it must consider the competing interests of different groups at hand and
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ensure these interests are given the correct weight in deliberations, just as in war, bomb, missile,
and other strikes must ensure that civilian casualties are “not excessive,” that is the number of
non-combatants killed must be proportionate to the anticipated advantage of carrying out the
strike. “Overreaction” has a gender. It occurs when at an individual level when a woman
mistakes a minor and insignificant phenomenon for something harmful and damaging. Thus,
the purpose of labeling women’s responses “overreactions” is to correct their sense of
proportion. At a collective level, women’s overreactions are organized around feminism, which,
as many people claim, has gone “too far.” For example, Me Too, a mass reckoning with sexual
harassment and assault, is often dismissed as an “overreaction” to individual (and rare) acts of
violence. Similarly, the bundling of rape and assault with “minor” sexual comments, jokes, or
gestures into what is known as “rape culture” is also said to be an “overreaction” born out of a
false sense of proportion. As many men have stated, conflating the two distinct categories of
actions is illegitimate and harmful. Feminists are often labeled as too angry, too argumentative,
too hostile, and too hateful of men. As a well-read entry published on February 1st 2018 on The
Rubicon— a popular blog— titled “A War on Words: Feminism vs. Egalitarianism” put it:
As we close in on that long-awaited moment of harmony, the very word [feminism] is
now standing in the way of total coalescence between genders… It is simply impossible to
achieve complete equality when the very word used to define it is gendered. I hope we
can all agree that men and women deserve the same opportunities. In uncertain times as
these, unity – not division – is what the country needs. It is under this pretense, and out
of no spite for those who identify as feminists, that I encourage the rewording of the
movement to egalitarianism. A word that is all-encompassing will help us see past our
differences and allow us to reach our shared goal of equality.
Perhaps feminists just lack the right tool to understand proportion correctly. After all,
the imperative to hold only the necessary amount of rage, opposition, and anger and expressing
these at reasonable intervals of time—which underlies the above charges of “overreaction”— is
impossible to fulfill without rigorous and accurate measurement. Before one can know what is
proportional to what, the entities in question must be accurately measured. As Jaworowski’s
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narrative regarding the dangers of overreaction will show, good measurement is not about
precision or measuring phenomena at the most minute level possible, but compatibility between
the measurement tool and the entity measured.
In the collective imagination, the explosion of the reactor at Chernobyl is one of the
greatest tragedies in recent history. In terms of human losses, however, it was “unremarkable”
(Jaworowski 2010, 102). Two plant workers died on the night of the incident, another twentyeight people in the next few weeks, and possibly another fifteen from cancers decades later.
According to Health Effects Due to Radiation from the Chernobyl Accident, a report published
in 2009 by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: "there is
no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 20 years after the
accident” (102). The Chernobyl accident certainly had enormous social, economic,
psychological, and political consequences; these were, however, disproportionate to the actual
damage caused by radiation exposure.
In his reflection on what caused the “overblown” response, Jaworowski identified a
scientific theory known as the linear no-threshold hypothesis as the main culprit. Accepted in
1959 by the International Commission on Radiological Protection as a philosophical basis for
radiological protection, the linear no-threshold hypothesis established that ANY level of
exposure to radioactive material is unsafe for humans. As the commission stated: "even the
smallest amounts of radiation are liable to cause deleterious genetic, and perhaps also somatic,
effects" (2010, 104). This sentence has an enormous impact, and upon its countless repetitions
in the scientific literature and popular media, it became cemented in the public mind. Although
many scientists had doubts about the integrity of the hypothesis, they were prepared to accept
linearity because it appealed to their sense of simplicity and the stakes for getting it wrong too
high. The linear no-threshold was more than a scientific theory. Jaworowski described it as "a
psychology" (ibid). The monitoring systems designed to make radiation visible and measure its
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levels are particularly illustrative of how this psychology functioned. The notion that even the
smallest radiation dose is dangerous guided engineers to design mechanisms that responded to
the most minute traces of radiation with intense alarm. With their eyes fixed to the fast-moving
dials and their vision "tuned" (Jawarowski 2010) by the linear no-threshold hypothesis,
scientists created a model that projected that 53,000 people would die of cancer in the next fifty
years.
Where did this number come from? During the explosion, the radiation levels in the
reactor building reached approximately 300mSv/hr. At that dose, exposure leads to death in
just over one minute, but two people were exposed to an amount that high. In terms of longterm exposure, between 1986 and 1995, people living in the most contaminated areas of the
Soviet Union received average annual whole-body radiation doses of 2.4mSv in Belarus, 1.4mSv
in Ukraine, and 1.1mSv in Russia. When calculated as an average over time, the number is
0.0045 mSv over 50 years. Given the absence of data about human exposure associated with low
doses of radiation over time, the effects had to be imagined. To come to terms with the
significance of low-level chronic doses of radiation, researchers compared the Chernobyl
explosion to an equivalent case. The final models used exposure data for 6000 mSv per second,
the dose associated with the detonation of the A-Bomb in Hiroshima. Although the A-Bomb
flashed the Japanese population with radiation levels 50,000 times higher than any dose anyone
in Chernobyl was exposed to, comparing the two cases was permissible under the rubric of
linear no-threshold hypothesis because the theory did not distinguish between single doses and
dose rates associated with long-term exposure3.

Jawarowski added: in 1986 the A-bomb— not natural radiation—appeared as a legitimate point
of comparison primarily because of the “paranoia and fear” that had overtaken Europe and the
world at large (105).
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If Chernobyl was indeed an important event, it was because it brought out the absurdity
of the linear no-threshold hypothesis and forced radiology to rethink its ideas about proportion
works (105). As Jaworowski argued, the clarity that came with abandoning the theory in favor of
what is now called “dose-response” enabled scientists to understand the Chernobyl explosion
differently. No longer bound scaling practices built on the idea that nuclear materials are
entirely and utterly incompatible with human bodies that warranted treating ANY exposure, no
matter how small, as a grave danger, researchers could see that A-bomb was not equivalent to
the explosion at Chernobyl and proposed natural radiation levels as a more appropriate case
study to estimate the health impacts of the incident. In Southwestern France, for example,
people are exposed to 700mSv per year of natural radiation from the sun, and those in Ramsar,
Iran, around 400mSv. For context, these figures are higher than the exposure at Chernobyl. In
today’s radiological imagination, the numbers associated with natural exposure provide "more
realistic" information about the consequences than the detonation of a nuclear bomb (ibid).
A COMPLEX, HAZARDOUS BUT ERROR-FREE SYSTEM
One question remains; what made nuclear material so unequivocally harmful? The
International Committee for Radiological Protection justified using the linear no-threshold
hypothesis as a basis of nuclear protection sans evidence because they understood nuclear
radiation to pose a unique threat to humanity. The "uniqueness" refers to the uncontrollability
of atomic materials. Once unleashed upon the world, radioactive materials resist human
intervention and attempts at containment. The sense that nuclear power is uniquely dangerous
because it eludes human control speaks to the salience of the category of “control” in collective
thought, which in turn reflects feelings of powerlessness vis-a-vis technology. It is important to
remember that Drexler promoted nanotechnology by highlighting its unprecedented capacity to
convert matter’s unfavorable properties into favorable ones by tailoring, “tuning,” and altering
materials atom-by-atom. He promised that nanotechnology would engineer compatibility
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between humans and the world they inhabit. It would allow scientists and engineers to remake
the world and everything in it to human specification. For Drexler, nanotechnology was
characterized above all by proportionality, which in the final analysis referred to unprecedented
levels of control and command. The tendency to link control to the longing for or promises of
complete comfort, complete safety, and complete security was not Drexler’s. Although The
Engines of Creation showcased it with exceptional clarity, it was not the only narrative
organized by this discursive link.
In 1984, Charles Perrow, a sociologist, laid down the foundation of what will later
become "Normal Accident Theory." The basic premise of his model was that the combination of
high complexity and tight coupling of elements within a technological system must lead to
failure. According to Normal Accident Theory, serious mishaps are infrequent, catastrophes are
rare; however, technological accidents are "inevitable and happen all of the time" (Silei 2014, 8).
Thus, humans must learn to live with failure and accept breakdowns as a regular occurrence.
Perrow’s book was centered around Three Mile Island, another nuclear reactor explosion.
Although he characterized nuclear energy as uniquely rife with “catastrophic potential,”
according to Perrow, every system— no matter how well designed and managed— will eventually
fail. In fact, for him, failure was built into technology’s nature, and sooner or later, any complex
system will suffer from a malfunction. “Technological disasters [cannot] be ascribed to isolated
equipment malfunction, operator error, or acts of God […] Every system has catastrophic
potential” (64).
Perrow’s characterization of accidents and failures as normal and inevitable was met
with strong disapproval from his peers. Although the scope of the objections varied, Perrow’s
claim that changing, correcting, or re-designing a technological system will not prevent failure.
Sometimes attempts to ensure safety may backfire and produce less, not more reliability, and
make the system more prone to accidents. Embracing Normal Accident Theor entailed accepting
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two facts. First, that humans do not control technology and never will, and second, that failure is
routine. Neither appealed to the cultural sensibilities and almost as soon as Perror’s book
entered the academic arena, its findings were challenged by High-Reliability Theory.
For sociologists, the problem of control generally takes the form of questions about
structure vs. agency, whether or to what degree humans have power over the world around
them. Most sociologists ultimately take structure’s side. High Reliability Theory was a product of
the imaginations of physicists and organization management experts across the social sciences
who gathered at Berkeley and the University of Michigan in a deliberate effort to shift the
discussion away from failure and breakdown to success. Although organizational sociology
was—and is— one of the few fields with a well-established theoretical foundation and a rich body
of empirical studies dealing with the behavior and management of complex systems, not a single
sociologist was invited to the gathering.
Unlike Perrow, those in attendance were determined to understand why systems
function correctly— and to do so, they shifted their vision practices “all the way down” to the
lowest level of decision implementation. Also, unlike Perrow, whose vision was “big”— historical
and systemic, High-Reliability Theory saw only individuals and their level of competence an
envisioned thus, envisioned individual decision-making processes as responsible for all mishaps
and accidents. The logic of this High Reliability is most clearly illuminated by a technological
accident in 2001 that verified the theory’s conclusions and became its legitimating case study. In
December of 2001, the USS Greenville, a 362-foot US Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine
with a water displacement of 6000 long tons, hit a Japanese fishery high school training ship.
The tiny boat sank in less than ten minutes, killing nine crew members, including four high
school students. With their vision attuned to the smallest unit possible, to experts associated
with High-Reliability Theory, the collision looked like a case of incompetence. It was almost like
they did not see the smallness of the fishing vessels or the largeness of the submarine—both on a
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symbolic or empirical level. At the micro-scale on which they operated, questions such as why
nuclear submarines existed in the first place or why that atomic submarine was in that place at
that time were irrelevant.
According to proponents of the theory, the incident was a mere case of the flight, and
sonar technicians did not perform their jobs correctly; a finding that was accompanied by
another, silent conclusion: the “accident” would not have happened if the technicians had done
their jobs as they ought to have. High-Reliability Theory owes its mass appeal to its promise that
humans can create complex and potentially hazardous systems that work entirely error-free
ways. This claim translated to envisioning every breakdown and malfunction as external to the
system and turning them into phenomena that could be mitigated with correct human action.
The expert discourse on technological disasters contained a barely hidden discourse
about the problem of human agency that had recently come to the forefront of thinking due, in
part, to a sense that humanity’s place in the world had changed. As the wording of questions
regarding agency— how much, or little humans can control, or to what extent they are controlled
by factors outside of themselves— indicates, statements about agency are based around a
specific understanding of proportion. In Michel Foucault's words:
Man was the great fulcrum of proportions [...] his flesh is a globe, his bones are rocks, his
veins great rivers, his bladder is the sea, and his seven principal organs are the metals
hidden in the shafts of mines. Man's body is always the possible half of a universal atlas
(…) a fulcrum on which "all relations are concentrated and from which they are once
again reflected"; a grid through which the world became comprehensible (1971, 26)
As Drexler penned nanotechnology’s first manifesto, the vague notion that humanity had
"disappeared behind structures" (Sartre 1994 in Han-Pile 2010, 70) congealed into a coherent
agenda of "decentering the human" from its former place as the locus concern for thought and
action. As Foucault put it, words, humans once occupied the center of the universe, but by the
1980s, “man's imminent death” (1971, 26) had arrived.
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The logic behind Normal Accident Theory was based on a lack of human control over
technology and a deterministic outlook that privileged fate over human volition, both of which
were consistent with Foucault and Sartre’s diagnosis. High-Reliability Theory, on the other
hand, enthroned the power of human action over pre-determined effects generated by largescale systems. By rendering all disasters preventable through human conduct, High-Reliability
Theory made total security and safety into legitimate, reasonable, and realistic expectations and,
in so doing, decreased the tolerance for failure and negativity that characterized its predecessor.
The vague desire for complex, high-risk, and potentially lethal solutions that are also immune
from the possibility of failure, perfectly safe, and free of any negative consequences manifested
at the cultural level as a new way of thinking about social problems and their solutions. Nanobased targeted delivery concretized this longing into a treatment for cancer
A NEW TAXONOMY OF DISASTER
The same generic features can be observed in discourse that pushed technological
disasters to the front of a long line of social problems requiring urgent solutions. In 1980 a
freight ship collided with a support Column Sunshine Skyway Bridge resulting in six cars, a
truck, and a Greyhound bus falling into the Tampa Bay4. The following year, a hotel walkway
collapse in Missouri killed 114 and injured 216. Those who survived the initial event almost
drowned in a caused by the hotel's ruptured sprinkler system. In 1987, seven people died in a
failed space shuttle launch when the joint seals on the rockets did not react to the force of liftoff
as its engineers had anticipated. In 1988, an oil tanker dumped over a million gallons of oil into
a storm sewer in Pennsylvania. The same year a massive fire and explosion in a chemical plant
in Nevada killed and injured over 300. A year later, Exxon spilled hundreds of thousands of oil
into a waterway in Alaska, and in 1990 a Maryland vermiculite mine responsible for what is

In addition to the thirty-five people who died that day, the bridge is understood as the cause of
approximately fifty-one suicides since it was built in 1954.
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known as the Libby Asbestos Crisis—a slow-motion technological disaster— was finally shut
down. Before its closure, it had killed hundreds of workers and caused another 2000 or more to
suffer from chronic illnesses. When asked to name technological disasters that occurred during
this period, most would not respond with the above cases. The selective amnesia that erased
these events from collective memory was animated by a new sense of proportion wherein the
most minuscule things were also the most consequential.
In 1982, the U.S. was rocked by a crisis of national proportion (Snyder 1983) that most
Americans will recall even today. This one did not involve collapsed structures, industrial
accidents, or automobile crashes, but headache pills. Seven people died from taking Tylenol
after a still un-apprehended offender laced an unknown number of over-the-counter medicines
with cyanide. Eighty thousand newspaper stories and hundreds of national and local coverage
hours gave the event "mammoth" proportions and created enormous public fear. In response,
Johnson and Johnson launched a "giant" public relations campaign, which involved a quick
recall of millions of bottles of Tylenol and investing an enormous amount of money in warning
physicians, hospitals, and distributors of its actions.
Johnson and Johnson insisted that the crisis needed to be addressed at the national level
and worked with officials to develop laws and regulations that forced the entire industry to
change its safety standards almost overnight. By 1989, the FDA established federal guidelines
for manufacturers to make their products tamper-proof and made tampering with consumer
products into a federal crime (Markel 2014). The deliberate efforts to control the scale of the
event was a marketing strategy to ensure that the poisoning appeared as something that could
have happened to any capsule. The campaign convinced the public that the makers of Tylenol
had no control over what happened and thus, were not to blame specifically. Today the “Tylenol
crisis” is a case in all college-level marketing textbooks.
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A similar "technological disaster" (Vostral 2011) created by Proctor and Gamble in 1984
involved a new tampon marketed by the name of “Rely,” which injured 1407 women and killed
forty-two. In the 1980s, manufacturers created a new category of tampons called
"superabsorbent" (ibid) by introducing synthetic materials into their products.
"Superabsorbent" tampons could conform to the unique contours of each vaginal cavity they
entered. Their perfect fit, which prevented "bypass" and the resultant leakage of menstrual
blood, resulted from new lab-made materials whose properties were no longer shackled to
nature. Unlike their cotton counterparts, they could expand lengthwise. The price to be paid for
increased absorbency was a significant increase in size.
In January 1980, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports that
otherwise healthy young women were becoming suddenly sick with toxic shock syndrome, a
recently discovered life-threatening condition caused by a toxin released by the bacteria
Staphylococcus aureus and Streptococcus pyogenes, or staph and strep in colloquial terms.
Between 1979 and 1980, 1,365 American women were diagnosed with TSS (DeVries 2011).
Tampons were regarded as a safe technology, and Toxic Shock Syndrome was not associated
with tampon use. The CDC’s conclusion that something dangerous was happening with tampon
use seemed almost impossible. Although there was no scientifically stable theory about precisely
what this "something" was, the CDC had an urgent imperative to act. In place of evidence,
scientists were forced to use their imagination.
Given that "Rely" tampons stood out due to their large size, they became a natural
culprit. The manufacturers' and retailers' willingness to instantly pull the products from their
shelves appeared to verify their conclusion. As the science became clearer, it turned out that any
superabsorbent tampon posed a risk.
The discourse around Toxic Shock Syndrome was animated by a sense that tampons had
become too big. They were so dangerous that women need to be protected from them. Thus, the
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CDC’s goal was not only scaling down tampons and returning them to a more acceptable size but
establishing an acceptable range within which all tampons must reside. To remedy a lack of
precision in manufacturing tampons and an absence of industry-wide standards (Swankin
2016), in 1982, the Tampon Task Force set out to establish a precise scale for quantifying
absorbency so that every brand of tampon could be compared to one another. Manufacturers
envisioned a scale that went up and down in size and used small, medium, large, and extra-large
categories. The CDC scientists rejected this schema as it contained as it referred to size rather
than absorbency (a magnitude)5. Although the link between tampon use and what is now called
"toxic shock syndrome" is now well-known, the CDC's conclusions were not correct. Further
research revealed that Toxic Shock Syndrome is not caused by tampons themselves— regardless
of their size— but by complex interactions between the microflora of the vagina, which can be
modulated by menstrual fluid, and other bodies within the vaginal cavity (including tampons)6.
To ensure that their legacy is never forgotten, every package of tampons contains a memorial

While tampon size and absorbency do positively correlate, it was imperative for the Tampon
Task Force that the two concepts remain differentiated from one another. The clash between
industry and the CDC is known as the "absorbency wars." Today tampons are organized by how
much fluid they can absorb. The final classification schema contained four categories: regular
(6-9 grams), super (9-12 grams), super-plus (12-15grams), and ultra (15-18 grams).
6 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Toxic Shock Syndrome is most
often found in menstruating women who are using tampons. It can also happen to men and
women who have been exposed to staph bacteria while recovering from surgery, a burn, an open
wound, or the use of a prosthetic device. In some cases, it can result from menstrual sponges,
diaphragms, and cervical caps, the device had been in the vagina for a long time (over 30 hours).
TSS is caused by a poison produced by Staphylococcus aureus bacteria. Staph is normally—and
harmlessly— present in the vagina. Currently, doctors do not know how staph causes toxic shock
syndrome. But two conditions are necessary: First, the bacteria need an environment in which
they can grow rapidly and release poisons. Then the poisons must get into the bloodstream. A
tampon saturated with blood is a supportive place for the rapid growth of bacteria. It also seems
to matter what the tampon is made of. Polyester foam provides a better environment for the
growth of bacteria than cotton or rayon fibers. The way in which bacterial poisons enter the
bloodstream may also be related to tampon use. Sliding a tampon into place could make
microscopic tears in your vaginal walls, rupturing tiny blood vessels. Leaving a super-absorbent
tampon in too long or using it when your flow is light can dry out the vagina. This makes tearing
even more likely (DeVries 2011).
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dedicated to the "absorbency wars" in the form of a strongly worded imperative to use the least
absorbent product possible.
Although the 1980s were full of many large-scale technological disasters, in the collective
memory, these events are overshadowed by the “tampon" disaster that killed 42 women and the
"Tylenol crisis" of 1982, which claimed a total of seven lives. While it is true that tampons killed
eleven more people than the explosion of a reactor at Chernobyl, but seventy-two less than a
hotel walkway collapse that occurred a year later, to state that the “tampon disaster” was more
severe than the explosion of a nuclear reactor seems absurd.
Measuring the magnitude of a technological disaster is complicated. Even Jaworowski
characterized Chernobyl as both a "minor incident" and "the worst possible tragedy" (2010,
105). Before the 1980s, disasters could not be compared to one another in a precise way. There
were no frameworks, schemas, or even clear taxonomies within which to establish their
comparative magnitude. Each accident, mishap, or calamity—whether natural or human-made—
appeared unique and terrible. Those who studied such events were content with general
categories and broad classificatory schemas7. The emergence of kidology— a new discipline
devoted solely to studying hazards of the technological variety— in the mid-1980s marked a shift
in discourse about disasters. Aside from its narrowed agenda, kidology’s vision was distinct to
that of its predecessors in another way; it was oriented towards comparing mishaps, accidents,
and disasters to one another. On a practical level, this meant producing a comprehensive set of

The most common of which was a three-point scale of magnitude risk, disaster, and
catastrophe: “Risk" indicated the mere possibility of suffering an adverse event, loss, or danger
while “disaster” and “catastrophe” were distinguished based on the permanence of the damage
caused. While a disaster’s effects could be extreme and disturb the inner workings of a
community, these disruptions were temporary, unlike a catastrophe, whose consequences were
“irreversible.”
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methods and tools to understand, assess, classify hazards in terms of their magnitude and
represent them as on a continuum from the least to the most destructive8.
For the next decade, kidologists produced more or less meticulous and comprehensive
lists, models, and diagrams of all the things that could possibly go wrong in the world. While
different models— including most notably, the 1998 schema proposed by the International
Society for Environmental Protection (ISEP) or the United Nations International Working
Group’s taxonomy of technological disasters that has been regularly updated since the 1990s—
may have disagreed on the specific categories of classification, or the placement of individual
events therein, their general thinking rested on the same “fulcrum.”
For kinologists, the key to assessing an incident’s magnitude was the degree of human
agency involved. Some referred to this principle as the “continuum of intent” (for example,
Green 1998), however, even if they did not embrace this idea directly, most schemas worked
with intervals that ascended or descended in magnitude based on: (i) the degree of human
intentionality involved in bringing the disaster about; (ii) the extent of human control in
mitigating the consequences of the said events; (iii) the degree to which human action could
have prevented the event from occurring; or a combination of all three. The most dangerous,
threatening, and hazardous disasters were those that eluded human control.

In 1998 The International Society for Environmental Protection (ISEP) sorted technological
hazards according to three categories. “Multiple extreme hazards” were the most severe and
included nuclear war, recombinant DNA, and pesticides. In the second tier were “extreme
hazards” caused by intentional biocides, antibiotics, persistent teratogens (i.e., uranium mining,
rubber manufacture), rare catastrophes (i.e., commercial aviation crashes), common killers (i.e.,
auto crashes, coal-mining diseases such as black lung), diffuse global threats (i.e., fossil fuel and
CO2 release, ozone depletion). The so-called simple technological hazards occupied the third
and final level. In the late 1990s, a United Nations International Working group drafted an even
more fine-grained list with detailed descriptions of different types of actions that can constitute
technological hazards. It proposed a fourteen-point scale to delineate different types of hazards,
distinguished them from one another, and assigned them a rating from least hazardous to the
most to prevent and manage disasters.
8
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NARCISSISM
As discourse around a new understanding of disasters turned human control or its lack
into a central concern, psychologists and historians documented the rise of something similar in
the social realm. According to many accounts, individualism had grown to such excessive levels
that it posed a serious threat to society. “Narcissism" became the metaphor of choice for
describing a panoply of undesirable social tendencies. As the metaphors used by Christopher
Lasch, the author of The Culture of Narcissism, and others indicate, narcissism was a disease
characterized by a faulty sense of proportion. Lasch described the disorder as entailing “the
incorporation of grandiose images” of the self and the diminution of others. The narcissist is so
preoccupied with themselves that they have “only a shadowy sense of the needs of others" (1979,
87). The narcissist mismeasures their importance vis-à-vis those around them and their faulty
sense of proportion leads them to think that they are bigger than the other. Similarly, his
characterization of narcissism as turning away from public life to personal preoccupation, or a
turning inward to escape politics; “a pathology wherein collective grievances are translated to
personal problems amenable to personal intervention” (14)— i.e., treating phenomena of
different sizes as equivalent— suggests that the root of the disorder lies in scaling practices.
Where psychologists and historians saw individualism becoming a matter of selfabsorption and the quest for self-development overtaking responsibilities to others, sociologists
saw a shift in the scale of life. Some sociologists also saw narcissism as a (new) part of everyday
life. However, for those sociologists, the distortion of proportion psychologists described did not
function at the level of the self and others. As Anthony Giddens explained in Modernity and Self
Identity, late Modernism's scaling project had altered the relationships between people and
things so rapidly that many became chronically unable to understand themselves vis-a-vis larger
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structures. Others described a “new order” characterized by loss of a social space9 “governed by
forces that make the self subservient to the group and the transition to a culture that places
“individuals at the center of the universe" (Bellah 1985, 45910).
Giddens theorized narcissism as a shift in orientation in response to individuals'
inability to come to terms with, or find their bearings in, the new order of things. In sociological
accounts, narcissism was a stand-in for the collective difficulties of locating oneself in time and
space, a concept that spoke to the contradictions in spatial bearings that individuals used to
locate themselves" (458). The Culture of Narcissism became a bestseller because it captured the
new social landscape and the reorganization and rescaling of social forces that push, pull, and
shape individual and shape collective life. World Systems Theory deployed a different
vocabulary to describe something similar.
WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY
In the 1970s, social scientists envisioned the world as made from clearly defined nationstates that could be compared to one another based on certain self-explanatory and transparent
factors, such as geographic size, population, or gross national product. However, by the end of
the decade, this vision was no longer persuasive. Wallerstein argued that the scale of the world
had changed so much that sociology needed new tools to measure, quantify, and understand the
activities of the people living on it. Wallerstein urged scholars to "unthink social science" and its
taken-for-granted models.

This included a deterioration of the public, articulated most forcefully by Jurgen Habermas,
“disassociated” individualism or a loss of collectivity resulting in the shift into lifestyle or
individual impulses and away from stable social structures (Bellah 1985).
9
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World-Systems Theory emerged as a dominant perspective as a corrective to the old
vision. Wallerstein was one of the first to imagine capitalism's various groupings (such as
economies or empires) as entities that functioned over and above the nation-state. Although
"the world capitalist system" was a higher-order unit than the nation-state, World Systems
Theory was not about an upshift in vision per se. While it was obvious that capitalism expanded
and entered a stage of "super-exploitation," this growth also entailed a scaling-down or
"downsizing” (Bellah 1983). These changes were eventually discursively stabilized with the
language of "economic restructuring" and "de-industrialization.
While World Systems Theory involved an upshift of sorts. As the social sciences underwent an
"epochal shift” that turned the self and everyday life into legitimate objects of analysis
(Featherstone 1995), uncoupling capitalism from the nation-state and making it available for
sociologists to examine as an autonomous force and recalibrated vision practices were towards
seeing and making connections across scales. Approaching capitalism at this scale allowed
Wallerstein and others to that capitalism worked at many different scales as it created and
shaped institutions of various sizes. While it effortlessly traversed space and time, capitalism's
power lay in its ability to cross and connect everything from markets, firms, classes, and status
groups to households. As World Systems Theory sought to come to terms with the growing
interdependence of the world at a cultural and economic level, it moved vision from nationstates and their economies to connections between them. The language of relationality will
become even more important in the next chapter of nanomedicine’s history11.

Sociology's sense of scale had shifted in another way. With the rise of discourse that
emphasized a new interconnectedness of the "far" and the "near" and the increased dominance
of multinational corporations, the social sciences were forced to create new tools and concepts
to come to terms with the world's new proportions. Attending connections between entities
produced a discourse that spoke to certain irregularities in scale and scaling practices.
Sociology’s discourse on scale during this period was framed around relationality.
11
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CONCLUSION: ENGINEERING COMPATIBILITY:
A NEW SENSE OF PROPORTION AS MEANS FOR COMING TO TERMS WITH
SOCIAL CONTRADICTION
In 1980, Carl Sagan wrote Cosmos, a popular book that continues to occupy best-seller
lists and coffee tables. In this book, Sagan showed the universe and the things in it go far beyond
the fragments of it that humans can experience and opened up the possibility for thinking about
scale in a new way. Big structures, such as mountain ranges, survive tens of millions of years;
smaller impact craters, perhaps a hundred thousand; and large-scale human artifacts only some
thousands. The world is nothing but destruction— from catastrophes large and small to slow
and stable erosion, which escapes human vision. Mountain ranges seem stable only because our
senses are not built to perceive change at the geologic scale. The constant erosion which
characterizes mountain ranges is thus inaccessible to us. From the points of view of the millions
of grains of sand and silt that will eventually make their way from the mountain to the bottom of
the sea, where they once again become solid rock, the mountain is constantly changing. Sagan's
meditation was a reminder that the world does not function on a human scale and that our sense
of duration is one of the humans. It is not too hard to imagine that a similar narrative could be
written about the nano. Just as Sagan described the change from the point of view of mountains,
Drexler could have asked what scale looks like and how it functions from the perspective of
nanoparticles. But this was not his project. While Sagan pointed out the incompatibility between
humans and mountain rangers Drexler did the opposite.
According to a popular narrative, the work of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud challenged
human narcissism by establishing a new sense of proportion between humans and the world at
large. The discovery that the Sun—not the Earth— occupies the center of the solar system was
the first of several that chipped away at the idea that the universe was made for us. Darwin, "the
Copernicus of the natural world," continued this "chipping away" when he determined that
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humans were not created by God but evolved like all other animals (Horgan 1995). Freud, "the
Copernicus of the mind," rescaled human volition with his invention of psychoanalysis, which
revealed that "each of us is not even a master in our own house, but that he must remain content
with the verist scraps of information about what is going on unconsciously in his mind" (Freud
1943, 45). Drexler was no “Copernicus." Nanotechnology’s agenda was not to “humiliate men”
but to restore the compatibility between humans and their world.
According to Marxist principles, science and technology have little to do with producing
objective knowledge about the world or indulging curiosity. They are a means to solve obstacles
encountered by the system of production, which often manifest as human or social problems.
Although scientists believe they provide technical solutions to specialized issues, their work
addresses social contradictions by another means when stripped of its ideological cloak. What
counts as a legitimate problem and what an acceptable solution looks like are not only technical
questions but socio-historical ones. STS scholars have also begun writing Drexler and Feynman
out of history to the point where these two texts are forbidden. Nanotechnology was more than a
scientific or technical endeavor. The discipline’s first theoretical program, underneath the
technical veneer of their texts lay a description of new vision practices that congealed into a
distinct style of thought. This chapter digs underneath Drexler's formal agenda and treats The
Engines of Creation as akin to a barometer— a tool with which to measure, specify, and make
sense of a "spirit of the times." Even if Feynman and Drexler's vision did not lead directly to the
discipline as it is known today, their discourse speaks to the shift of the category of "scale" to the
center of the social and scientific imagination and shows how "proportion" became that
connector. Thus, nanotechnology's discourse on the scale is a unique lens through which to
understand broader shifts in socio-cultural configurations that, like the discipline itself, began in
the mid-1950s. When situated in the discursive landscape of its time, it is clear that Drexler's
meditation on scale shares an array of generic patterns (Zerubavel 2007) with texts published
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within the . social, scientific, and technological realms. Examining Drexler's Engines of Creation
alongside contemporaneous accounts associated with social issues and mining these texts for
deep logic underneath lurking underneath the formal accounts, shows the significance of
"proportion" in naming, framing, and solving the dominant issues of the time. Looking
underneath the surface of texts produced during this period brings to light a specific but general
logic operating via language and metaphor to identify, make sense of, and then deal with
noxious elements in a system, whether the pathology in question is biological, social, or medical
in nature.
IF NANOTECHNOLOGY WAS A SOLUTION, WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM?
When Feynman gave his speech in 1959, he sensed something had gone awry within
industrial civilization, and by 1986, Structural changes brought certain contradictions gave this
"something" a specific form. The environmental crisis, coupled with the numerous
technological disasters that marked the 1980s and 1990s, as well as new social conditions,
created severe doubts about humanity's central place in the order of things and brought to the
foreground the possibility of the end of human sovereignty (Badmington 2000, 8). Drexler’s
narrative was an attempt to make sense of this shift.
The Engines of Creation was published in 1986, the same year as the nuclear reactor
explosion at Chernobyl. A year earlier scientists caught their first glimpse of the ozone hole in
1985. At that time, they did not know they were about to see the enormous scale of industrial
civilization's damage to the natural world. From that point onwards, humanity would have a
giant, gaping, and permanent reminder of the steep price nature paid for their efficiency and
convenience. When scientists examined the hole in the ozone layer at the level of chemical
processes, Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) emerged as the unequivocal culprit. CFCs, lab-made
chemical substances consisting of carbon, chlorine, and fluorine, were invented in 1928. CFCs
were safe, stable, weightless, and odorless, and unlike any substance found in nature. By the
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1960s, CFCs were massively produced and consumed in the form of refrigerators, automobiles,
and air conditioners, foaming agents for insulating materials and packing cushions, propellants
for aerosol sprays, and even fire extinguishing systems. From the perspective of humans, the
extreme weightlessness and stability of CFCs were desirable properties. But the same properties
that enhanced safety, wellbeing, and efficiency enabled CFCs to reach the stratosphere and
deplete the ozone layer. From the point of view of nature, weightlessness is deadly. The needs of
humans and nature were incompatible.
At this time, social problems and what is dangerous began to be framed in terms of
proportions. As Schumacher put it, the management of modern society requires very large and
very small-scale processes. Those who reside in such societies must navigate opposites, which,
in strict logic, are irreconcilable" (1973, 5). The scaling-up of production from the nation-state to
the world system created a situation wherein people were trapped within capitalism's giant
bureaucratic apparatuses. At the same time, a downshift associated with excessive individuation
and the decline of society left people "atomized" and alienated. While “big” systems were
dangerous because by virtue of their large size they stripped humans of power, "tiny" objects
such as tampons, headache tablets, and hairspray, which usually fade into the background of
everyday life, became dangerous and threatening. They were not dangerous because they were
big or small, but because they were not proportional to humans and their needs.
The profound sense of profound danger lurking behind even the most banal things and
actions went hand-in-hand with the assurance that life could be completely safe, free of error,
and immune to breakdown. High reliability also speaks to a decreased tolerance. This way of
thinking rendered the expectation of perfect safety, complete order, and eternal harmony into
legitimate desires. It also reduced, if not eliminated, tolerance for contradiction, disorder,
conflict, and negativity in general. For example, according to Norbert Cousins, the new
availability of over-the-counter painkillers has made Americans "the most pain conscious"
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people on the face of the earth, who "had it hammered into them that any hint of pain is to be
banished as if it was the ultimate evil” (1955, 39). The sentiment captured by Cousin’s passage
went hand in hand with intolerance of side effects. By 2021, “side effects” become a national
obsession. The same intolerance for contradiction and longing for a purely positive social
existence ran underneath the desire to eliminate all crime and prosecute the minor offenses
against the social order, which ultimately gave rise to a "zero-tolerance" policing.
ENGINEERING COMPATIBILITY
According to Drexler, the problems of his time were caused by a lack of compatibility
between humans, technology, and nature, but the essence of humanity’s ills was not
technological in nature. According to Drexler humanity found itself living in a world that
functioned at a scale that was too large for them. Nanotechnology became a solution because,
according to Drexler, it was "a higher technology on a human scale" (87). By engineering
matter, atom-by-atom, (nano) science and (nano) technology would create compatibility
between humans, technology, and nature by rescaling the world according to humans and their
needs. Unlike For Drexler, the nanoscale was the most fitting and appropriate size for humans.
Drexler’s narrative combined three positions: (i) the incompatibility between humans,
technology, industrial society, and nature, (ii) the incompatibility is a function of size (iii)
nanotechnology can restore this compatibility through control.
The same framing made interventions that promised solutions without any negativity,
side effects, or downsides became convincing. Drexler’s discourse project linked smallness,
control, and compatibility and in his hands, nanotechnology would give humanity back the
control it had lost to technology, the environmental crisis, or social structures. If the issue was a
lack of compatibility, the solution, then is to remove the source of mismatch. That is, eliminate
conflict and friction. Unlike its bulk counterpart, the nanoscale is characterized by affinity,
interaction, and general relationality in Drexler's account. With the rise of nanotechnology,
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people would be able to live their lives without conflict, opposition, and contradiction, Drexler's
vision will become nanotechnology's fulcrum or its organizing logic, which can be summed up as
"engineering compatibility." The notion that even the most hostile and contradictory entities can
be altered in a manner whereby their properties change their relationship from conflict to
cooperation coupled with the desire for an utterly conflict-free and frictionless existence speaks
to a new way of thinking about problems and longing for solutions that bypass the need to
adjudicate between dichotomous positions, interests, and needs.
FROM PROPORTIONALITY TO COMPATIBILITY TO INTERACTION
During the 1980s and 1990, what counted as an adequate solution thinking in terms of
establishing relationships between things. Scale was only one “strata” of nanotechnology’s
ideological program. When approached as artifacts to be mined for fragments of a collective
shift in thought at a discursive level, Plenty of Room and Engines of Creation also speak to
another change in the order of things. With a downshift in scale, and a new sense of proportion,
what used to appear as parts coming together to form a whole was no longer so straightforward.
When the world and the things in it are viewed from a nano vantage point relationships between
things began to look very different.
For contemporary researchers involved in bringing nano-based targeted delivery into the
clinic “interaction” is a key category of thought and an organizing concept for nanomedicine in
general. Today’s researchers see nanoparticle-cell interactions as their primary objects of
concern. They see their goal as managing these intersections. In fact, according to a researcher
“shifting the research focus to nano-bio interactions was a groundbreaking step that resulted in
a "rapid expansion" of nanomedicine platforms (Shi 2017, 21). The idea of “managing
interactions” that characterizes nano-based targeted delivery did not arise from the work of
contemporary scientists and engineers, therefore the blind spot at the heart of nano-based
targeted delivery in cancer was not their own. It was handed to them. The repression that
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prevented Drexler from seeing the contradictions inherent in “engineering compatibility” also
organized the ideas and practices that resulted in the rise and possible failure of cancer
nanomedicine.
To explain how and why “interaction” become the “fulcrum” of cancer nanomedicine,
the next section of this dissertation explores the category of “structure.” Beginning with
Feynman’s era and then moving to Drexler’s, the following two chapter theorize the rise of
nanotechnology as a contribution to, and a reflection of a general shift around ideas regarding
parts and wholes, which in turn lead to new ways of thinking about how things are put together.
By tracing the decline of the part-whole model across a broad range of milieus, it shows how the
category of “compatibility” became imbricated in a mass disavowal of the polarity of the wholepart model by providing a new way of thinking about structure in terms of relationality via the
notion of “interaction” not only in medicine, or the natural sciences, but in collective social
thought. Nanomedicine’s vision will give rise to collective thinking, whose fragments can be seen
in the lab, the academy, politics, and culture.
The same intolerance of conflict and aggression that turned targeted delivery into a
desirable solution to cancer, was concretized in new ideas about how to solve racism, which
entered the collective consciousness as a social problem during the Civil Rights era. The “spirit”
that target targeted delivery made flesh also ran under public’s rejection of allocating federal
subsidies to communities disadvantaged by racism as “too aggressive” and embrace of an
agenda of replacing entities— buildings, people, or communities—perceived as lacking the
characteristics required to coexist within the system, with new, compatible elements.
A MINOR FIGURE IN THE APPENDIX OF HISTORY
As Drexler predicted, nanotechnology matured into a legitimate discipline, and in the
early 2000s, nanomedicine became a cutting-edge approach in cancer research. What he did not
anticipate, however, is that the entry of nano-based products into hospitals, pharmacies, clinical
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trials, and research laboratories would put his contributions to the field at risk of erasure. While
Drexler’s representations of nanotechnology are widely embraced by the lay public and science
fiction writers, scientists and engineers are still unsure what to make of them. Until recently,
however, most were prepared to, at the very least, credit Drexler with popularizing, promoting,
or advertising nanotechnology, even if they believed that Engines had bypassed science and
veered straight into the realm of fantasy or madness. Today, “real" nanoscientists doing "real”
work in "real" laboratories report a lack of time and patience for Drexler's vision and actively
push against any rhetoric around the revolutionary potential of nano (Selin 2010). Drexler is on
his way to becoming “a minor figure in the appendix" of nanotechnology's history (199) as "real"
scientists doing "real" scientific work in "real" oncology laboratories justify their "real"—and
peer-reviewed—research with the promise that nanotechnology will effortlessly, painlessly, and
non-invasively cure the most “dreaded disease to ever haunt the human imagination" (Stacey
1996, 5) without “slaughtering” cells. Just as Drexler did in 1986.
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PART II: STRUCTURE
CHAPTER 5
WHAT IF IT DOESN’T WANT TO?
The Whole at War with Its Parts
“The postulate of functional unity demands that the unit be subsumed
by its imputed function”
— Robert Merton (1949)
But what if it doesn’t want to be subsumed?

This dissertation’s immediate object of concern is the origin of targeted delivery in cancer
nanomedicine. However, its ultimate purpose is not empirical. The work as a whole is animated
by a larger and more abstract agenda guided by a classical question that has haunted scholars of
science and technology since time immemorial. Its title, It Was Handed to Them, a line stolen
from Jacques Derrida’s famous appendix to Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, is a statement about the meaning and causes of scientific and
technical innovation.
Historians of science and technology often treat geometry as a stand-in for modern
science in general. Most recognize Euclid—a Greek mathematician active approximately 300
years before the Common Era— as geometry’s founder. By conventional accounts, Euclid’s
genius culminated in the first-ever attempt to lay down a system of rigorous mathematical
proofs that remain the basis of mathematics twenty-three centuries later (Fowler 1999). In The
Origins of Geometry, Jacques Derrida penned a different narrative. According to Derrida,
“Euclid did not discover geometry… it was revealed” (1978: 41) or “handed” (86) to him. The
notion of Euclid being handed the scaffolding for modern science is as evocative as it is puzzling.
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Thus, before adding another chapter to nanotechnology’s still-fragile intellectual scaffolding, it
is essential to pause and consider who or what “gave” geometry to Euclid, or more generally,
what it means for scientific ideas to be passively “handed” to more or less willing recipients.
In February 2019, Ivanka Trump’s controversial comments concerning The New Green
Deal of 2019—a bill containing a provision that guaranteed a “job with family-sustaining” wages
for most Americans— put her at the center of the nation’s political consciousness. Her words, “I
don’t think most Americans, in their heart, want to be given something [...] People want to work
for what they get,” drew intense criticism. The hundreds of commentaries, such as, notably, Bess
Levin’s widely read Vanity Fair article, ensured they would not be forgotten. According to Levin,
the possibility that “an heiress... who has literally been handed everything her entire life thanks
to the federal housing subsidies her grandfather received from the government” could even
think that people do not want to be given anything was as much “tragic” as it was ironic: “It’s a
rich observation from a woman who has quite literally been given not just “something,” but
much, much more wealth and privilege than most Americans will ever see… Ivanka Trump
comes from a line of assholes who confuse inheriting money with hard work.”
Ivanka Trump’s thesis and Bess Levin’s antithesis have more in common than their
political veneer suggests. Both are grounded by the same silent but salient rhetoric against
passivity. To be of value, things cannot be merely given or handed to passive recipients. They
must be earned. Whether it’s a job, wealth, or the right to comment on federal legislation,
“being handed” something renders the acquired object undesirable. Put slightly differently, to be
legitimate, the acquisition must be an active process that involves “doing,” not merely receiving.
1904, Max Weber saw similar enshrinement of hard work and ceaseless activity in the ethic he
believed responsible for the rise of capitalism. In contemporary US society, the maxim against
passive receiving is a ubiquitous element of the cultural fabric and informs everything from
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collective pre-theoretical thinking to specialized discourses written by experts, including those
in science and technology studies.
For scholars concerned with such matters, understanding the origin of new ideas in the
scientific and technological arena is often a means to address another theoretical problem,
namely the relationship between science, technology, and society. Science and technology
studies have an impressive collection of models that have failed to either withstand the test of
time or maintain scholars’ interests, today, however, Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which treats
science, technology, and society as a unified entity, enjoys a special status in the field’s collective
imagination. While it is true that not all scholars accept ANT methodologically speaking, ANT’s
attitude towards general theories of scientific and technological development is ubiquitous.
ANT and its associated mode of reasoning have a long and complicated history. Still,
even Bruno Latour, ANT’s founder, touted the framework as an answer to the real and
imaginary shortcomings of the Marxist model (Winner 2005). These shortcomings included
Marxism’s “paranoia,” reductionism, and, most importantly, technological determinism (Latour
2005), which authorized a vision of cultures, societies, and other groups as acquiescing to—
rather than creating, resisting, or shaping technology. Just as people do not want to be handed
jobs—as Ivanka Trump claimed— the passivity that grounded determinist accounts aroused—
and continues to arouse— immense hostility among STS scholars. As Latour explicitly stated,
the “networks” in ANT ought to be thought of as “work nets” due, in part, to the level of effort
and work required to keep the connections between human and non-human actors that make
up the nodes in the network intact. Thus, in STS’s current intellectual climate, technological
determinism is treated with so much disdain that it is an “insult” (Darfoe 2002), and Marxism is
viewed as not only regressive but outright “irrelevant” (Winner 2005).
While Marxism’s legacy was, and perhaps still is, a problem in its own right, ANT’s active
opposition to historical materialist accounts of scientific and technological development is an
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index of another tendency, an explicit shift away from theoretical concerns to concrete case
studies. As Latour put it, contemporary scholars of science and technology must avoid any
generalizations and abstractions. Instead of wrestling with social theory or building theoretical
models as their predecessors did, they ought to confine their intellectual activity to the
description of concrete case studies in as much empirical detail as possible. They must focus on
“connecting elements circulating inside tiny conduits” into networks to describe how substantial
actants— human and non-human— act in concrete situations1 (2007, 51). But what if I don’t
want to?
THE MARXIST MODEL
One possibility is to go back— if not to retrieve, to at least account for what has been lost.
In The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia—one of the most convincing accounts
associated with the Marxist school— Boris Hessen theorized the relationship between technical
and scientific innovation and society via an inquiry into the origin of scientific ideas. As per
Marx’s prescription laid out in the German Ideology, Hessen accepted that all ideas—without
exception— are to be attributed to the material forces of production. Hessen’s inquiry into what
determined the content and the direction of Newton’s activities (1971, 151) rejected “kindness of
divine providence” or the “mighty impulse of Newton’s creative genius” (ibid) as legitimate
explanations a priori.
According to Hessen, the Marxist approach is synonymous with categorical refusal to
locate the origin of scientific ideas consciousness, but in the “sum of contradictory tendencies

According to Latour, classical sociological approaches understand social ties in three ways— as
‘material infrastructure’ that would ‘determine’ social relations like in the Marxian types of
materialism; as a ‘mirror’ simply ‘reflecting’ social distinctions like in the critical sociologies of
Pierre Bourdieu; or as a backdrop for the stage on which human social actors play the main roles
like in Erving Goffman’s interactionist accounts. None of those entries of objects in the collective
are wrong, naturally, but they are only primitive ways of packaging the bundle of ties that make
up the collective. None of them are sufficient to describe the many entanglements of humans
and non-humans (Latour 2005, 84).
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residing in the conditions of existence” (153). Hessen thus concluded that when scientists pose
and solve intellectual puzzles, they address social and economic issues—even if they are unaware
of doing so. When stripped of their cloak, questions about nature and the physical world are
obstacles and contradictions encountered by the production system, many of which are social
(157). Scientists and engineers do not discover or invent what they wish; they are handed socioeconomic problems.
Like Euclid, Isaac Newton is widely recognized as having played a fundamental role in
what historians describe as a turning point in the history of science. According to Hessen,
Newton believed that his discovery of a set of natural laws solved the puzzle of how and why
objects move through space. However, when considered vis-a-vis the economic “infrastructure,”
of his time, it is apparent that Newton’s laws of motion did not arise out of the desire to learn
about movement. The search for regularities in the physical world and framing them as natural
laws that govern how objects behave was a necessary response to capital’s need for machinery,
navigation instruments, and maritime vessels required to move goods across the world’s
oceans—capital’s frontier at the time— in a regular, calculable, and efficient manner.
Hessen illustrated the same pattern in Galileo’s discovery of the heliocentric universe.
He claimed that Galileo’s ideas about the orbital trajectory of round bodies through space did
not originate in the need to correct the Church’s erroneous geocentric model but from
architectural problems created by the invention and widespread use of cannons. According to
Hessen, Galileo was mistaken about the actual object of his reasoning, he confused heavenly
bodies with cannonballs. What Galileo experienced as scientific curiosity was a need for effective
fortification architecture, a need generated by problems encountered by the production system
in its concrete activities. To design structures that could withstand the impact of cannonballs,
engineers needed principles that govern cannonballs’ movement. Like the planets he believed he
was observing, cannonballs are round and rely on a configuration of geospatial forces to make
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their way through space. What came to Newton and Galileo as intellectual endeavors and
curiosity about the world and its things were thinly veiled social or economic problems that
required a technical solution. Hessen arrived at this insight by taking the economic substrate
(“ruling class, ruling ideas”) laid out by Marx in 1845-1846 as a maxim.
For Marxists, changes in thinking are a result— not cause—of changes in material life. Of
course, “material life” referred to production exclusively. As per The German Ideology: “The
content of consciousness is nothing but the aggregation of productive forces […] Real, flesh and
blood men produce ideas, but they produce them under circumstances that are not their own
[…] Their ideas are conditioned by the means of production, which in turn determines the
organization of social relations” (1970, 53-64). When applied to questions concerning science
and technology, Marx’s dismissal of any attempts to grant explanatory power to thought as
naïve, child-like, reckless, or outright criminal gave rise to a theory of innovation that envisioned
the advancement of scientific ideas and their technical application as determined in advance by
the needs of the production system.
While avoiding treating individual consciousness as an object of analysis is the
foundation of sociological thinking, the extreme aversion to a serious examination of ideas, and
thought in general that ran underneath The German Ideology, has created certain blind spots in
Marxist thinking about science and technology. For example, Hessen’s account cannot explain
how Newton and Galileo came to be mistaken about the object of their research. It lacks a
mechanism for understanding how navigation instruments and the physics of cannonballs were
transformed into the laws of motion or the trajectory of heavenly bodies. While Marxist analysis
prohibits inquiring how this occurred in Newton and Galileo’s minds, the question of why a
specific way of understanding specific phenomena is seductive, convincing, or “makes sense” at
a given time does not necessarily concern individual consciousness. As Hessen’s own argument
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illustrated, the process of identifying problems in need of technical and scientific attention is not
only a scientific but a social, historical, and economic project.
This dissertation thus examines nanotechnology as a “spirit,” a broad ideological
program or “explanatory project,” a consolidation of concepts, metaphors, and other discursive
strategies that provide categories and vantage points to make sense of the world. By turning an
analytical lens to “explanatory projects” involved in turning particular phenomena into “social
problems” and setting criteria for what an acceptable solution looks like, it attempts to take up
the “spirit” of Marxist analysis without accepting its foundational presupposition. In concrete
terms, this means granting scientific and technical innovation the power to create social
conditions as Marxists did without treating the production system as the only possible origin of
scientific and technological change or reducing science and technology— or society—to “mirrors
of production,” or mere commentaries on social relations. To this avail, it engages in building a
model to explain the relationship between science, technology, and society that: (i) retains
Marxism’s general large-scale approach that foregrounds the general dynamics that drive
technical and scientific innovation, (ii) privileges conflict and contradiction, and treats science
and technology as a means of addressing social discord; and finally (iii) accepts that particular
technical solution to social problems as well as the particular phenomena that become social
problems are “overdetermined.” Put explicitly, it embraces the perceived or actual technological
determinism in Marxist analysis.
THE PART-WHOLE MODEL: A PARTITIONING FRAME
Like Newton’s laws of motion, Richard Feynman’s ideas did not originate in the divine
providence of his genius. Feynman’s insights regarding matter’s “strange” behavior may or may
not have founded nanotechnology as a discipline, but they were undoubtedly not his own. The
previous section began documenting the formation of a distinct “spirit” associated with the rise
of nanotechnology by attending to a shift in discourse about the scale and scaling practices.
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While Feynman called for science to shift “all the way down” (1959,1), nanotechnology was (and
is) not just about extreme smallness. The scientists and engineers who consolidated Feynman’s
ideas into a legitimate field were not excited by nano’s smallness per se. They were attracted to
nanotechnology because at the nanoscopic scale, matter behaves in unexpected ways—form does
not always follow function, and parts do not make wholes. As this chapter will show, shifting
down and viewing the world from a “nano” vantage point challenged deeply sedimented ideas
concretized in the habit of thinking about structure via the whole-part model.
As I have argued, nanotechnology was above all an “explanatory project,” which
authorized particular “partitioning” frames which furnish the rules for selecting which
properties, processes, or relationships will occupy the center of thought and, by default,
determine which of these will recede into the background or become invisible altogether
(Winther 2019). Although scientists and laypeople commit to “explanatory projects” that furnish
them with categories to do classification work, they rarely accept the same explanatory project
as legitimate. There is often significant incongruity between “portioning frames” that structure
lay and expert vision practices2. Nanotechnology is a unique lens into changes in collective
thought due, in part, to the convergence between the social and technical vision practices and
the metaphors, imagery, and “style” of reasoning underneath them.
Any “explanatory project” and its “partitioning frames” must “make sense” to be
legitimate. Since things “make sense” for reasons that are as much epistemic as they are
historical, economic, or cultural, “explanatory projects” are contingent. Until the mid-1950s, the
part-whole model provided a stable foundation for understanding what things are made of and

Scientists build abstract and theoretical models of the world as part of their vocation; however,
these do not always match general, commonsense ideas about reality. As Berger and Luckmann
and their followers have shown, the official (i.e., scientific) explanation does not exhaust the
range of possible ways of coming to terms with reality. To find a satisfactory way of
understanding their day-to-day existence, ordinary people often develop frameworks that have
little to do with experts’ creations.
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how they are put together for scientists and laypeople alike. Whether they concerned cells,
societies, buildings, languages, or other items, questions about structure were readily answered
with one version of the part-whole model or another. Historically speaking, the rise of
nanotechnology coincided with the general feeling that thinking in terms of parts nested in
wholes no longer made sense. This chapter begins by discussing Feynman’s vision of
nanotechnology as furnishing a “partitioning frame” to replace the part-whole model, then
documents the process of the whole-part explanation falling out of favor in the social and
natural science. FROM SCALE TO STRUCTURE
Feynman’s challenge, to transcribe all twenty-four volumes of the Encyclopedia
Britannica, then all the books in the world, onto the head of a pin may not have been
consciously thought and planned, but it was not arbitrary. Feynman may or may not have
understood the implication of the “pinhead” narrative, however before physics claimed such
matters of concern for itself, the problem of what the world was made of was a theological one.
Thomas Aquinas’s famous inquiry into the maximum number of dancing angels that fit on a
pinhead was a question about the “fundamental unit” from which all things are constructed.
Aquinas concluded that the number was infinite—since angels were not “matter” but
“substance.” Feynman’s pinhead also contained the “building blocks of the universe.” Feynman’s
answer to “substance” was information. “All the information mankind had accumulated
transcribed using dots and dashes” (3). Feynman hoped that making and unmaking each letter
in the Encyclopedia Britannica and translating its contents to the nanoscale would force
scientists and engineers to think about structure differently. Not in terms of parts and their
integration into wholes— categories that dominated thinking about matter at a bulk scale—but
as information and its organization. He was priming their vision for the coming of
nanotechnology.
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When earlier generations of biologists observed the growth of embryos into fully-fledged
organisms, they wondered why development always unfolded according to a plan. They could
not understand how all parts came together into a coherent whole when each piece seemed to
develop autonomously3. Modern biologists no longer need to ask such questions. With the rise
of genomics, they know that DNA is a repository of instructions. What was previously perceived
as a whole made of parts coming together as if guided by an invisible hand turned out to be
pieces of information assembled according to an organizational blueprint hidden within genetic
material. Biologists hoped that learning about DNA would lead to “genetic engineering,” which
would allow them to modulate structure and function by addressing biological phenomena at
their most fundamental level. A close examination of the library metaphor in Feynman’s speech
reveals a similar logic and desire lurking just underneath the surface of his discourse.
A book, such as a volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica, is an object made of pages.
Each page is created of text, which is made of sentences. Each sentence is made of words,
collections of letters, and punctuation marks. As a downshift in scale, nanotechnology unlocked
the “tiny realm below” and revealed that letters and punctuation marks are made of even
smaller units— “bits” of information. Feynman described letters as made of “dots and dashes
[…]. “Each letter is 6 or 7 “bits” of information—each dash or dot being one bit” (3). While it may
be argued that books conform to the part-whole model, i.e., of dots and dashes—the parts—
come together to form a letter and letters come together to form a sentence, etc., a book is not
merely a collection of words, letters, dots, and dashes. At each level, the letters, words, and
sentences must come together in an organized, rule-governed way to produce meaning when
they are read. This chapter will return to Feynman’s interest in the rules of governing coding

They mistakenly concluded that a supernatural force or “vital substance” guides the
organization of an organism and accounts for the deterministic nature of its development
(Haraway 1976).
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and decoding information momentarily; for now, it is essential to note that Feynman avoided
the part-whole logic by adding a library, a higher-order unit into his reasoning.
All the information which all humanity has ever recorded in books can be carried around
in a pamphlet in your hand—and not written in code (...) What would our librarian at
Caltech say, as she runs all over from one building to another, if I tell her that, ten years
from now, all of the information that she is struggling to keep track of— 120,000
volumes, stacked from the floor to the ceiling, drawers full of cards, storage rooms full of
the older books—can be kept on just one library card! When the University of Brazil, for
example, finds that their library is burned, we can send them a copy of every book in our
library by striking a copy from the master plate in a few hours and mailing it in an
envelope no bigger or heavier than any other ordinary air mail letter (ibid).
The relationships between the texts in a library are based on retrievability and
searchability. For a library, database, or any collection of information to be usable, it must be
organized and searchable. Each book must be carefully placed so that its location is exact,
recognizable, and calculable. Although books do not have a necessary connection to one another
or libraries, each book has a guaranteed place in the totality via a number assigned at
publication. Most research and academic libraries in the US use the Library of Congress
Classification (LCC) to order and classify their connections based on topic. However, there are
many other cataloging systems. Books can exist without libraries, but every book is linked to
every other book through cataloging and classification systems through these numbers. Thus, a
library is a mechanism, a technology through which relationships are established, and it is
through these relationships the information in texts becomes searchable. It is not the
information itself but its organization— storage and retrieval—that interested Feynman.
For Feynman, searchability, retrievability, and cataloging—forms of organization in a
library— are, above all, modes of relationality. Whether these relationships are between books in
a library or nerves and bones in an embryo— organization is the fulcrum on which his system of
metaphor pivots. Just as libraries organize books, DNA or deoxyribonucleic acid is a central
information storage system that organizes nucleosomes and proteins into a triple-helix (Austin
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2020), as Watson and Crick discovered shortly before his Caltech speech. As a library, DNA is a
repository of information, a set of instructions that determines how an embryo will develop.
Even in 1959, Feynman saw the intimate relationship between nanotechnology and genomics.
He would not be shocked that in 2021, nanotechnology succeeded by creating a vaccine for a
deadly epidemic by coming together with genomics.
All this information—whether we have brown eyes, or whether we think at all, or that in
the embryo, the jawbone should first develop with a little hole in the side so that later a
nerve can grow through it—all this information is contained in a very tiny fraction of the
cell in the form of long-chain DNA molecules in which approximately 50 atoms are used
for one bit of information about the cell (7).
As the above passage illustrates, for Feynman, “information” is the answer to the
mysteries “which existed before we understood all this [genomics] clearly, of how it could be
that, in the tiniest cell, all of the information for the organization of a complex creature such as
ourselves can be stored” (ibid). At the nanoscopic scale, everything is “made of the same stuff:
bits of information” (8). Since everything from books to embryos is comprised of the same units,
what distinguishes one thing from another is how this information is organized.
The fact that Feynman articulated his vision for his science-about-to-come by evoking
the metaphor of a library is significant at the level of meaning. A library is not characterized by
the integration and unity of its parts, who surrender their autonomy for the sake of maintaining
the integrity of the whole. It is not an organism, a hierarchical and tightly integrated system,
wherein each part performs a distinct and vital function in maintaining a whole. An organism is
dependent on its parts. If an organ ceases to fulfill its role, the system cannot retain its
integration and falls apart. A library was designed for its components to circulate in and out and
for new components to enter its classification system with no disruption. Put differently; books
are not integrated into a library. A library is a mediator, a technology that creates relationships
between the texts by organizing them into a coherent but contingent totality.
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BRINGING RELATIONALITY TO THE FOREFRONT
Feynman’s concern with the category of the organization was grounded by an ontology
based on relationality. Modern science has made significant progress solely because of its ability
to envision nature as made of parts like a machine (see, for example, Husserl 1970). It creates
knowledge by breaking its objects of concern into units and examining each piece by piece. Such
disassembly can be done theoretically through mathematics or physically by fragmenting matter
by “dividing, subdividing and re-subdividing again” (Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers 1996, 104).
Feynman envisioned nanotechnology as a break from modern science and shifting its emphasis
to relationality. The same desire for relationality grounds Feynman’s call for improvements in
microscopy.
Like the library, the new, higher-resolution microscope will be a mediator. Feynman’s
new science is a promise of eliminating the need to take things apart, a science that will no
longer fragment. With a microscope and other technologies, “it is easy to answer these
fundamental biological questions: you just look at the thing! You will see the order of basis in a
chain; you will see the structure under the microscope...” (8). Access to higher-order
magnification will enable scientists to establish relationships within a totality without tearing
them into parts because the structure will be revealed by merely looking at them. According to
Feynman, nanotechnology and its magnification tools would usher in a mode of establishing
relationality and understanding the complex interactions between atoms and molecules without
doing violence to matter. Since it was not concerned with taking things apart, Feynman’s
science-about-to-come did not need a part whole-part relation at all.
The totalities he described were not integrated but “organized” (again, for Feynman,
organization concerns establishing or maintaining relationships). Unlike the part-whole model,
which insisted that it was not an abstract explanatory device but an entity found in nature,
Feynman emphasized the artificial nature of totalities. In Plenty of Room, Feynman described a
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whole that is a technological artifact that is assembled or kept together by technology. In this
account, matter—whether it’s books, molecules, or bodies—is highly organized information put
together and maintained through complex sets of instructions. This organization acquires
stability through the organization— whose concrete form is the product of technology— whether
it is DNA or a cataloging system in a library. Just as microscopes keep existing totalities together
and protect molecules from being torn apart by chemists, the technology that will be uncovered
by transcribing the Encyclopedia Britannica onto a pinhead will create totalities that are
entirely artificial. In its natural state, the Encyclopedia Britannica consists of twenty-four
volumes, or parts if we will. To transcribe them on the head of a pin is to impose a new structure
on the encyclopedias, which were designed and created to function as parts, a series of separate
books coming together to form a set or whole.
Chemists and material engineers typically deal with “bonds”— strong, permanent, and
rigid relationships; however, as nanotechnology revealed, at the molecular scale, relationality
functions via “interactions”— which scientists define as weak, contingent, and temporary
relationships that can be altered. The ability to make and unmake totalities, which was bolstered
by the insight that matter’s structure is arbitrary, malleable, and independent of its function,
will become critical in nanotechnology’s project. In nanotechnology’s terms, conflict occurs
when parties to a relationship encounter a disagreement or incompatibility, and neither of them
can or is willing to shift their position or alter the relationship itself. This permanence comes
from ironclad structures and rigid conformity to conventions, resulting in solid and stable
bonds. Unlike bonds, “interactions” can be tweaked, modified, and “tuned” since they are weak,
temporary relationships that lack strict rules for behavior and interaction. By such logic, when
these relationships are “interactions,” the differences between the parties and their roles can be
resolved through change instead of conflict. The possibility of creating new relationships also
opened the door for replacing the conflict that characterizes whole-part relationships with
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compatibility by engineering the contradictory elements away. The next section will show how
this notion played out in cancer nanomedicine. The remainder of this chapter documents the
same shift in thinking about structure beyond the part/ whole model that animated Feynman’s
text within the natural and social sciences and US society. It begins by showing how a downshift
in vision engendered by new visualization tools caused a shift from integration to fragmentation
in sleep science.
THE BODY THAT DOES NOT SLEEP
In 1965 Giuseppe Moruzzi, a world-famous neurologist whose work redefined the
meaning of sleep, declared that “the body does not sleep. Only the neural structures” sleep (241).
In 1965, the idea that sleep occurs only in the brain was not controversial, but this was not
always so. Physiologists once understood sleep as a continuous state; the period when the brain
“turned off” as darkness and silence of night rendered sensory stimulation bombarding it during
the day insufficient to maintain wakefulness” (Dement 1998, 2). Starting from 1953, however,
the field became possessed by a sense that all generalizations about sleep based upon earlier
investigations must be reexamined” (Snyder et al. 1963, 417). The zeal to carry out these
reexaminations came from the discovery of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep.
Eugene Aserinsky and Nathaniel Kleitman’s groundbreaking discovery emerged as part
of their research on dreams. Unlike previous studies, which relied on subject-reported data, the
researchers were determined to make dreaming “real,” or at least empirical. Doing so required
localizing sleep in a particular place (1955). Conventi0nal approaches, which envisioned sleep at
the level of the body as a whole, treated movement as the most significant variable. Although
they recorded motility via a device attached to bedsprings and motion pictures of the sleeping
subjects, Aserinsky and Kleitman regarded eyeballs—not motility— as primary indicators of
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nervous system activity in the sleep-wake cycle4. In addition to attaching an electrooculogram
(EOG) to their subjects’ eyelids, they also added an electroencephalogram (EEG) to record brain
activity, a pneumograph to capture respiration, and an electrocardiogram to measure heart rate.
Out of the mass of information generated, data associated with eye movement instantly caught
the researcher’s attention. They noted two eye movements: one slow and lateral, the other jerky.
Since these movements lacked nomenclature, Aserinsky and Kleitman coined “slow eye
movement” and “rapid eye movement.” Once collated, the output from their machines showed a
correlation between detailed dream recall, rapid eye movement, fast and irregular fluctuations
of heart rate and respiration, and a pattern of low-voltage brainwaves. Aserinsky and Kleitman’s
innovative experimental method, which used technology to capture data below the threshold of
human vision for the first time, led to the discovery of REM sleep. However, its impact went
beyond that. The possibility of applying a system of surveillance machinery to eye movement,
heart rate, brain activity, body temperature, and blood pressure not only enabled researchers to
capture the most minute changes and identify and measure individual events that constituted
sleep. It reshaped the visual practices of the field as a whole.
The downshift in a vision coincided with REM sleep’s discovery replaced integration and
unity with fragmentation. It turned eye movement, brain activity, respiration, and other
processes previously regarded as individual stages or parts within larger processes or entities
into autonomous processes and discrete phenomena. Although Aserinsky and Kleitman hoped
that assembling data from their devices would yield even more significant insights, reading the
data in terms of parts and wholes was “impossible” (1955, 2). The information was too unruly
and confusing for all variables to be correlated. Once separated via technology and made visible

By this point in time, it was an established fact that eyeballs behave differently from other
muscles during sleep; when other muscles relax, the orbicularis oculi (the muscle that closes the
eyelids) tenses.
145
4

as output data, the sleeping body could not be put back together because, as Aserinsky and
Kleitman discovered, not all parts involved in sleep work in concert.
The further down sleep researchers looked, the less regularity, integration, and
coordination they found. In 1957, Kleitman partnered with William Dement to focus on eye
movements and their relationships to brain activity. Using a similar methodology, they found
that during REM periods, eye movement was not constant but occurred in “bursts” of one or
two, up to fifty or a hundred movements. Their more significant finding was that eye movement
is autonomous vis-à-vis brain activity. While the pattern, size, amount, and duration of
movements varied irregularly from period to period, brainwave activity remained stable.
Downshifting down to the micro-level also led researchers to view sleep as having a fragmentary
effect on the body, challenging the discipline’s general assumption about integration and
stability. As the two researchers put it: “In the absence of the supra-nuclear control necessary
for extremely fine integration of neural activity, the muscular tone of antagonist’s muscles waxes
and wanes inordinately [...] These “rapid eye movements may be symptomatic of depression of
one of the highest levels of integration” (8).
By subjecting the body and its functions to unprecedented surveillance at the microscale, researchers no longer envisioned sleep as a unified vegetative state but as active, complex,
and most importantly, a fragmented process made of rhythms, cycles, and autonomous events.
The new understanding of sleep had little in common with the parts-whole model and its
metaphors. Shifting down to the scale of minute bodily processes revealed that sleep is a series
of chaotic, disorganized, irregular, and unstable episodes. With the absence of correlation
between physical movements, ocular activity, and neurological processes made visible through
micro-surveillance technologies, the body became a collection of parts and functions whose
relationship to each other, much less anything resembling a whole, was dubious at best. The
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tendency to move away from the whole-part idea was even more pronounced in biology as
molecular biology challenged the scaling practices of its organismal counterpart.
THE HOSTILE WHOLE: FROM ORGANISMS TO ORGANS
Before the 1960s, biology was the study of life, whose lowest form was cells. The
difference between biological systems and other systems was believed to reside in the latter’s
level of complexity. Thus, biology’s objects of study were complexity, organization, and
hierarchy, objects that could only be seen at the scale of the ecosystem or the organism. As
Gaylord Simpson—one of the most prolific paleontologists of the 20th century put it—biology is,
by definition, the science of the whole. To know a TV set, we need to know its structure: the
wires, transistors, and other components. However, according to him, the real question was how
they are connected and how they interact to create the system’s result (or function). The rise of
molecular biology, which promised to reconstruct phylogenetic history from a single molecule
(Pauling and Zuckerkandl 1965), challenged the status of the whole as biology’s only legitimate
object of concern. By the time Simpson delivered his speech, the idea that knowledge about
interactions and connections within an organic system could not “possibly be inferred from any
amount of knowledge of separate parts” (1962, 367) was beginning to look regressive.
The proliferation of biotechnology that originated in the same period as molecular
biology was perhaps even more indicative of the decline of the part-whole model. The image of
pregnancy as a fetus gestating in its mother’s uterus was once an ideal model of a part nested in
and protected by a larger whole. Within such a vision of reproduction, the embryo appeared as a
dependent part of the larger maternal organism. Anne McLaren’s groundbreaking research
paved the way for IVF and other reproductive technologies by examining pregnancy at the most
minute scale possible. However, the new understanding of pregnancy and embryonic
development cannot be attributed solely to a downshift in scale. Understanding pregnancy from
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the hormonal viewpoint allowed McLaren and others to uncouple pregnancy from the maternal
body, which paved the way for an understanding structure beyond the part-whole model.
In her Nature publication, which described fertilizing mouse embryos outside of the
maternal body and gestating them in glass tubes under the watchful eye of science for the first
time, McLaren attributed her success to embryology “overcoming” the maternal organism. As
McLaren’s language suggests, thinking about pregnancy in parts and wholes had become a
barrier to knowledge and an impediment to progress. The idea that any function directly results
from the connections and interactions between units entailed assumptions about determinism
and necessity. Working and thinking at the level of the unit without considering its role in the
whole and addressing the embryo as an entity in its own right turned previously inalterable
natural facts— such as the secure connection between the length of pregnancy and the number
of young in a litter— into arbitrary variables that depend on the researcher’s whims.
With the whole and the necessity, purpose, and determinism needed to keep it from
falling apart out of the way, previously solid relationships that governed the order of things had
“melted into air.” McLaren’s activities in the lab speak to a new social and scientific ontology.
For McLaren, the whole-part model did to embryology what Catholicism did capitalism. Weber’s
“spirit of capitalism” was accompanied by collective vision practices characterized by
“rationalism,” an attitude that sees the world only in terms of the interests of the world ego.
McLaren’s thinking was animated by a nascent— albeit undeniably present—ethos not unlike
Weber’s. The philosophy of contingency, flexibility, control, and corresponding attitude that
would characterize nanotechnology in general and nanomedicine, in particular, envisioned the
world and its things in terms of loosely bound interactions. Disavowing determinism, necessity,
and compulsion, it imagined that all entities, processes, and relationships could be made and
unmade at will. Although McLaren’s stance towards the part-whole model entailed a vague
sense of antagonism, discourse associated with the first successful organ transplantation
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performed in 1964 illustrates how the integrated whole became outright hostile and dangerous
in the lay and expert imaginations.
THE GRAFT VS. THE HOST
The idea that body parts could be replaced when injured or worn out has a long
genealogy that can be traced back to Ancient Greece and perhaps beyond. Although removing
the faulty element and putting a new one in its place is an elegant and intuitive solution to
localized dysfunction in an otherwise integrated body, organ transplantation did not become a
reality until the mid-1960s. When Feynman delivered his speech, the best medical research
could offer only moderately successful skin grafts. Starting in 1940, surgeons performed
countless kidney transplants on dogs. While such experiments improved their surgical and
infection-management skills to the point where they performed near-perfect procedures, one
experiment after another ended in abject failure.
Just as freedom from the organism allowed embryology to unlock the mechanisms
underneath pregnancy, organ transplantation became a reality when researchers recognized the
integration of the body as their fundamental problem and the weakening of the immune system
as a solution. In the 1950s, researchers realized that the obstacle to transplantation was the
immune system. Immunologists and the lay public understood that the immune system
protected the organism. It maintained the organism’s integrity and defended its boundaries by
distinguishing between the self and the non-self (Cohen 2009; Haraway 1991; Martin 1993). As
the judge of what to incorporate and reject, the immune system’s reaction to the new organ
appeared not as protective but as aggressive and hostile.
The discovery and naming of “graft-versus-host disease (GVHD) spelled out a new
vision. This way of seeing the body was based on understanding interaction as a pathology.
Henceforth, researchers imagined organ rejection as a battle between the new organ and the
body. The object of their work became protecting the new part’s place in the organism. While the
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immune system addressed the transplanted organ as an enemy to be conquered, the researchers
took the organ’s side. Their enemy, however, was not the organism itself but the integration it
produced. When Joan Main and Richmond Prehn discovered that the immune system could be
suppressed with radiation in 1955, their research objective congealed, weakening the body’s
power’s defense mechanisms. Researchers built on this insight and found that
immunosuppressant medication could perform that task even better than radiation, which
according to historians breakthrough equivalent to “letting the genie out of the bottle” (Tilney
2003, 35). In 1964 Thomas Starzl, the “father of modern organ transplantation,” announced
that adding prednisone, a steroid, to azathioprine, an immunosuppressant, prevented and
reversed rejection. The discovery of this drug cocktail allowed genuine transplantation research
to begin.
That weakening the immune system became a viable solution reveals something about
science’s attitude towards the whole and its relationship to parts. Although organ
transplantation put the whole back together—literally, it was not the whole functionalism
envisioned. This whole was made by science and technology, not by nature. As such, it was
assembled from different parts that were held together by complex pharmacological
interactions. It was neither self-maintaining nor homeostatic. Ensuring that the new organs
remain a part of the system required active and constant outside intervention and supervision.
Without a continuous supply of drugs, the immune system would target the organ as foreign and
reject it even if it would result in the organism’s death. From the part’s point of view, the
processes that create and maintain connections between the part and the whole are nothing like
the frictionless and spontaneous ones described by functionalists. Although integration is
advantageous for the body as a whole, from the perspective of a new organ, integration was
hostile, aggressive, war-like, and in the final analysis, deadly.
THE WHOLE THAT SCIENCE HAD BUILT
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For a chemist, to know once meant to take things apart. The first modern chemist,
Antoine Lavoisier, once wrote that in chemistry, the science of “dividing, subdividing, and resubdividing again,” submitting natural bodies to experiment means decomposing them
(Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers 1996: 91). Chemists satisfied their curiosity by “elucidating
structure,” that is, understanding what things are made of and how they are built. They did so
through “synthesis,” a process that took substances found in nature, subjected them to various
chemical reactions to deconstruct each molecule, then putting the same substance back together
in the laboratory using heating, cooling, changing the temperature, the PH, the speed of the
mixing process and other manipulations (Hoffman 1995, 105)5.
In 1944 Robert Woodward produced the first “total” synthesis of quinine, and what
used to be known simply as “synthesis” became “partial synthesis.” Woodward’s was a total”
“synthesis because he created a product de novo. That is, he built quinine atom-by-atom and
took nothing from nature. His quinine was not a “reassembly” from the simple analysis
products; everything about it was artificial. In 1965, Woodward’s efforts were recognized with a
Nobel Prize. By that time, he had performed several other total syntheses, including the first
total synthesis of Cephalosporine C, which led to cephalosporins’ (a class of antibiotics for those
allergic to penicillin) becoming widely available via mass production. Total synthesis not only
opened the possibility of having total control of structure or “bond and cleavage” within
molecules but caused a shift in vision. Chemists following Woodward no longer believed that

For example, in the 1930s, it has been rumored that bark from a cinchona tree, a tree native to
Peru’s mountains, could cure malaria. Chemists know that if this were the case, it would not be
the bark as a whole that treats disease but a specific part or molecule contained in it. To find that
molecule, scientists took the bark to the lab, decomposed it into its constituent parts, and
isolated the specific properties responsible for its ability to fight malaria. By 1932, chemists in
Germany had used synthesis to make chloroquine and thousands of new compounds similar but
not identical to those found in the bark. These new compounds were made from a combination
of natural atoms and molecules that were found in the molecule and purified elements created
by scientists in a laboratory.
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structure was tied to function in a necessary way. Chemical structures now confronted chemists
as arbitrary flexible, and malleable. Molecules could now be “designed” free from nature’s limits.
Chemists could substitute one part for another “or making a bond here or breaking a bond
there” (ibid). Total synthesis entails a specific way of thinking about structure.
A shift in thought always accompanies a change in visualization technologies.
Although Woodward performed his total synthesis meticulously and painstakingly using
traditional techniques, historians of science emphasize his role in chemistry’s “instrumental
revolution,” characterized by high-tech visualization technologies and laboratory tools replacing
older bench practices (Slater 2004, 8). The presence of high-powered microscopes and other
imaging apparatuses at the bench also changed the “ontological status of chemical structures” by
giving organic chemists a new way of thinking about molecules and their reactivity as
determined by their “stereochemistry”— that is, shape and structure (7). This three-dimensional
awareness of molecules distinguishes modern chemists from their predecessors of 50 years ago,
who believed the combined properties of atoms within a molecule give rise to the properties and
behavior of the substance as a totality. From the 1960s onwards, chemists no longer saw a
substance as a whole as an effect of its parts.
Before total synthesis entered chemistry, scientists believed that only nature could
create organic substances de novo. Making substances in the laboratory turned chemists into
architects of matter. It marked the rise of industrial chemistry, which would later lead to the
unprecedented destruction of individual ecosystems and the planet. However, during Feynman’s
era, the contradiction between humans, technology, and nature was still too small to be
registered in the collective vision. The general attitude towards scientific progress was excited
optimism. 1962, just three years after Feynman’s speech, marks the first publication of Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring. As is often the case with such things, it was simultaneously too early to
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be credible (since the disaster had not happened yet) and too late to prevent the disaster from
happening.
Carson claimed that the natural world is divided into relatively autonomous parts—
niches and ecosystems— and the plant and animal life specific to each ecosystem does not
interact with species outside of it due to geographical barriers and distance. International trade
had disrupted natural boundaries on a scale that had never been seen and turned the previously
autonomous ecosystems into a synthetic whole. When the foreign plants that arrive on ships or
vehicles in international trade enter ecosystems, they reproduce uncontrollably as their host
ecosystems lack organisms that can control them. They eventually replace other species. The
invasion often leads to the collapse of ecosystems and the destruction of entire species, which
became a problem for agriculture and human activities.
With the expansion of industrial chemistry, science had a new means to address
unwanted elements in a whole: pesticides. With pesticides, fertilizers, and other new
technologies, ecosystems, like Woodward’s molecules, could now be put together and taken
apart species-by-species. The logic behind pesticides did not see ecosystems as an integrated
whole with complex interaction, but as a series of autonomous species without any necessary
relationship to one another “the way that potatoes in a sack make a sack of potatoes” (Marx
1852, 152). Any given plant, insect, or animal could be taken away or added depending on the
whims of the ecosystem’s designer with no consequences. Like nanoscientists who promised
that nanoparticles that target cells, manufacturers of pesticides claimed that pesticides targeted
a specific species for control and eradication. Like cancer nanomedicine, theirs was a case of
wishful thinking.
As Carson pointed out, petrochemicals designed to kill “pests”—the species of unwanted
weeds and insects considered undesirable by humans whose numbers needed to be controlled—
are deadly because they are systemic while promising not to be. Pesticides cannot single out a
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specific plant species. They penetrate every level in an ecosystem infiltrate all tissues and organs
in all species and render them toxic. When a herbivore consumes a herbicide-infused plant, the
poison runs through its body and is then passed to insects that feed on the herbivore’s blood and
juices. If the pesticides do not kill them right away, the animal carries the poison out of one
biome to the rest of nature. The rise of the environmental movement was two decades away, and
professional biologists had the luxury of seeing Silent Spring as unscientific, romantic,
hysterical, delusional, alarmist, and lacking in evidence. By the time Drexler completed The
Engines of Creation, the conflict between the well-being of the environment and the desire to
manipulate matter and create substances that behave precisely as humans want them to be, was
a widely recognized social problem. Before we return to Drexler, the next section will show how
the part-whole model became unconvincing in the social sciences, and unity integration ceased
to be credible explanations.
THE ETHNIC GROUP THAT WILL NOT ASSIMILATE
The same story in the natural sciences played out in the social sciences. The “melting
pot” has proven to be one of the most evocative and popular metaphors used to describe ethnic
relations in the US. The logic underneath the concept characterizes integration: people from
different cultures come together to form a “people” into a seamless and friction-free whole. It
was a good metaphor that had captured the public imagination. By the time Feynman
announced the coming of nanotechnology, it had run its course. As sociologists discovered, some
units “don’t want to” come together and form a whole. Not everyone wanted to be a part of
society.
As one writer put it, the development of a single American nationality, “the smelting of
the different ingredients into a seamless web” (Glazer and Moynihan 1963, 291), was never a
description of reality. The integration and unity that the “melting pot” promised was a
frustrating process that was continuously deferred. Their insight came through a new social
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form, the “ethnic group that will not assimilate” (100), the part that refuses to join the whole
and “transcend” its ethnic life (216). In 1954, Will Herberg characterized integration as a
“partial” process at best. According to him, the conventional narrative described immigrants
giving up everything they had brought from their “old country”—language, nationality, and
manner of life as they adapted to their new home. Herberg, however, argued that immigrants
were expected to retain their old religion... “as this religion would give their children and
grandchildren an indefinable place in US society” (28). Religion, the part that will not
assimilate, provided a means for immigrants to become a part of the whole. Herberg posted
contradiction— not integration— as the defining feature of the US and US society’s religious
landscape in general.
In Beyond the Melting Pot, which according to the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for
Urban Studies, was “one of the most influential books published in the 1960s” (2020), Glazer
and Moynihan argued that the US has “too few elements to bind people” (1963, 63). Even as the
US allowed more and more people with diverse ethnicities to migrate, no one seriously thought
about what an integrated community would look like (1963, 60). As the authors observed, when
differences are left unchecked, the part will not act on behalf of the whole. People will keep
themselves segregated in ethnic groups resulting in “ugliness and complacency” (23). The notion
that communities do not form organically or spontaneously, but need to be created and
maintained challenged the assimilating power of society and enthroned the ethnic group as an
autonomous social form6.

Downshifting their vision to the ethnic group changed how social problems are understood.
Taking the ethnic group as an object of analysis also informed the authors’ specific style
understanding and framing of social problems. “The current theory (...) explains society is at
fault for poverty, but groups are made of individuals that also contributes to poverty” (158). The
“quality” they refer to is bestowed upon individuals by their membership in an ethnic group.
Each ethnic group has its distinct set of issues and difficulties. While Glazer and Moynihan did
not deny the existence of society as a whole, they spatialized social processes at the level of the
6
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Examining society from the point of view of ethnic groups showed the fragmentation and
lack of cohesion in US society that was hidden by the melting pot metaphor. Despite what the
functionalists may have said, the process of different elements coming together to act on behalf
of a whole was not spontaneous. It would require a coherent model of what such a whole would
look like and intervention, management, and engineering to ensure that it is correctly
assembled. Drexler came to the same conclusion about matter. In any event, the foregrounding
of the unit that “doesn’t want to” integrate was only one case of a broader shift in sociological
vision.
THE SYSTEMS WE LOVED
In 1958 Gaylord Simpson lamented the opening of something akin to a “biology without
organisms.” A year later, C.Wright Mills reacted to the possibility of a “sociology without
society” with the same horror. Until the mid-1950s, the two disciplines have operated with
similar presuppositions about scale and structure derived from functionalism. The category
of “function” has a long history within biological sciences, where it is understood as a “vital or
organic processes considered in the respects with which they contribute to the maintenance of
the organism” (Merton 1959, 21). Sociology borrowed the functional model to understand
human affairs without resorting to individuals as a unit of analysis. As it is often called,
structural-functionalism formulates explanations for questions concerning complexity, order,
integration, and stability. Like its biological counterpart, it “interprets data by establishing their
consequences for larger structures in which they are implicated” (Merton 1959, 46).

ethnic group. Their conclusion, i.e., that the cause of problems resides at the level of an ethnic
group’s habits and culture, shaped what they perceived to be suitable solutions for said
problems. They thus argued that each group ought to take responsibility for their kind” (178).
That is, the upper-class members of each community should take on the plight of those in the
lower classes.
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In 1951, Talcott Parsons described society as a complex system wherein countless parts
come together to work on behalf of the whole. In his vision, each part performed a specific
function that contributed to maintaining stability, homeostasis, and integration. From the
system’s point of view, the most critical functional problem is minimizing conflict and
disruption. Parsons understood this problem in terms of the integration of units into an ordered
system. In order to prevent the whole from falling apart, units must be motivated to act on
behalf of the system. There are many ways to go about ensuring the desired level of cooperation.
Unlike competing accounts, which were compelled to introduce some notion of coercive force to
achieve a stable social order, functionalism maintained that parts act on behalf of the whole
spontaneously. According to Parsons, shared values served the integrative function by
connecting various parts of the system. Socialization, the process of building a “functional
personality” that matches the cultural and functional systems, instills the desirable values into
each unit. “Social order is possible because these general values bind social actors together into
social systems in such a way as to permit (without guaranteeing) a peaceful resolution of social
conflicts” (Merton 1959, 62).
Structural functionalism operates within specific presuppositions about scale. One
cannot see “function” from the vantage point of the participants in the system. “Function” is a
macro-level concept that emerges from the observer’s standpoint, which coincides with that of
the system. Functionalist’s vision is not concerned with the needs of individual units but those of
society as a whole. A system must remain whole, and the sole purpose of the units is to do
whatever is required for the system to persist. At functionalism’s scale, all standardized social
activities and cultural items serve positive functions for the entire social system (25).
Robert Merton—who identified as a structural-functionalist— had doubts about the
degree of integration required for Parson’s theory to work. The sense that Parson’s model
obscured the “disintegrative consequences of certain social structures” and well as deep conflict
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(29) lead him to unequivocally state “The complete functional unity of human society is
repeatedly contrary to fact (...) If society is indeed an integrated system, the degree of
integration needs to be empirically tested” (26-27). To overcome the limits of the functionalist
model, Merton proposed that sociological vision move down to the “middle-range,” that is, to a
midpoint between the “grand” scale of theory and empirical facts, which occupied the microlevel. That Merton conceived a downshift in scale as a corrective implies a newfound awareness
that Parson’s vision of society as a tightly integrated conflict-free system created by units coming
together to share and perform cooperative activities was scale-specific. Society only looks
conflict-free and positive when examined from the level of the whole. Society looks like a series
of stable, necessary, and eternal institutions only when the needs, interests, feelings, and
thoughts of units are invisible. From the system’s point of view, units subordinating themselves
to the system’s needs appear spontaneous. When vision is fixed to the systems that organize
interactions—not the actions themselves— interactions of individual actors appear predetermined and regular. At the scale of the system, the identity of the units is invisible. The only
thing that can be seen is their service to the whole. Units being engulfed by the system is a
regular and expected occurrence only because autonomy, agency, and other individual and nonstandardized phenomena are too small to register.
Parson’s work was undoubtedly architectonic, a grand vision of pure theory and
conceptual clarity. However, the idea of parts being entirely subserved by their function in the
service of the whole no longer made sense7. As sociology “brought men [sic] back in” (Homans

There were, so to speak, three waves of critical opposition to Parsonian sociology, or more
specifically what had become known as “structural-functionalism.” There was the
ethnomethodological critique of the followers of Harold Garfinkel, who argued that social order
was grounded in the taken-for-granted practical rules over everyday life which was sustained by
the ongoing practices of knowledgeable members. Second, symbolic interactionists, following
the work of Erving Goffman, also argued against what they took to be Parsons’ functionalist
account of social order. For symbolic interactionists, order was an emergent property of micro7
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1962) and attended to face-to-face interactions, integration, stability, and unity were replaced
with the strain and stress of living in a society. By the 1960s, the president of the American
Sociological Association demanded that the discipline shift down from the system as a whole to
the consciousness of individuals. The downshift in collective vision authorized a series of new
questions, unthinkable at the system level. Merton put it, “the postulate of functional unity
demands that the unit be subsumed by its imputed function” (1959, 65). Sociologists once
accepted this as a maxim, but now, the question on their collective minds was something akin to
“but what if the unit doesn’t want to be subsumed?”
BUT WHAT IF IT DOESN’T WANT TO?
As metaphors that structured vision, “unity” and “integration” made certain
relationships and interactions visible while obscuring others. They also shaped how researchers
understood how such interactions and relationships affected the entities that were engaged in
them. Relations look different at different scales. With a downshift in scale, where the Parsonian
vision saw interaction and co-operation, was replaced by conflict, animosity, and a lack of unity.
The following cases document the shift away from categories like “unity” “integration” and
“unity” in empirical studies in sociology In Caste, Class, and Race, one of the first attempts to
think about race as a category of capitalist labor divisions, Oliver Cox, envisioned US society not
as integrated, but as deeply stratified and characterized by conflict. Cox’s approach to the race
was a corrective to structural-functionalism’s assumptions about integration and unity as well as
the Chicago School’s paradigm of “acculturation,” which was functionalism with a few extra

social interaction, which could only be sustained by cooperative negotiation between social
actors. The point was that social stability was inherently precarious. It was, however, the
criticisms of what can be broadly called conflict theory which proved in the long term to be the
most troublesome and thorough-going critique of Parsons (Alexander 1987).
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steps. “Acculturation” was said to proceed through phases of contact, conflict, accommodation,
and assimilation that dominated sociological thinking.
Whereas functionalism envisioned integration and stability as society’s normal state,
Cox’s model thrust stratification and inequality to the forefront of thought, arguingthat “society
rests on group inequity” (1959, 24). Thus, the stability and equilibrium that attracted so much
attention from functionalists were only temporary states and the result of the subordinate group
failing to challenge the social order (ibid). Cox saw integration as akin to peace following a war.
The basic premise of his social ontology was that if society appears whole, this wholeness is
predicated on violence and successful suppression of the rebellion. Similarly, bringing units into
society’s fold and motivating them to act on its behalf required force. According to Cox, since he
envisioned hierarchy as society’s dominant feature, force was “the glue that holds social orders
together” (26). Unlike Parson’s system, which was the pinnacle of stability, Cox’s whole was
precarious. From the vantage point of the unit or units resisting or rebelling against the system,
hierarchy is neither ironclad nor absolutely binding but contingent. It changes historically.
While the categories by which hierarchy functions, such as class, and race appear immovable,
their relationship to one another cannot be conceived abstractly. Historically, capitalism has
composed and recomposed them individually and reconfigured their relationship to one another
depending on its needs at a particular time.
Cox’s vision of society was a part of a broader shift away from integration towards
division and conflict. The possibility that the whole and its parts can have opposing interests
lead Cox see that from the unit’s point of view, integration— which he labelled “subordination”—
always entails the application of coercion and force. According to Cox, Whether it was actual or a
threat, force, “the glue” that held society together permeated every nook and cranny of every
level of every system. When one attends to the point of view of the oppressed units, things look
different; what appears peaceful and functional from above can be a battlefield from below.
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THE COST OF INTERGATION
Whereas the older understanding of society saw parts becoming subsumed by their roles
in the system as expected and routine, the possibility that the whole and the part may have
divergent interests compelled the analytic gaze to examine what acting on behalf of the system
looks like and what it means. In 1963, Betty Friedan described US society as an integrated whole
in which the needs of the totality are not only incompatible with but outright damaging to the
parts that make it up. In an attempt to concretize and give form to a new problem that did not
yet have a name, Friedan described a new spirit or “mystique that fastened itself on a whole
nation” (122). The spirit was a response to women’s entry into the workforce during the Second
World War. It promised women fulfillment and satisfaction in their feminine role of child
reading and housework (26) to push them back into the domestic sphere. Many women,
however, found “a baked potato is not as big as the world, and vacuuming the living room floor—
is not enough” to challenge their full capacity” (ibid). For these women, work in the home was
“monstrous dullness,” and being confined to the domestic sphere led to an epidemic of isolation,
emptiness, frustration, incompleteness, and unhappiness.
The “crisis of identity” was not personal but a symanptom of newfound awareness of
the conflict between women’s role in maintaining social cohesion and their desires as human
beings. Women’s nurturing and labor in the home were required to maintain the “togetherness”
that kept the family and society functional. This role was vital socially, but at an individual level,
fulfilling it was stifling and repressive. “Togetherness” and functionality came at a price.
Integration cost women their selfhood. It was akin to “chains that bind her mind and spirit” (31).
Friedan’s “problem with no name” brought the previously invisible contradictions and outright
incompatibility between the whole and its parts to the center of collective consciousness. From a
functional perspective, a woman’s role in the home, as a housewife, mother, and companion,
was necessary for the system. For Friedan, integration, stability, and harmony—which are good
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for the whole—were the source of the most profound anguish for over half of its units. According
to Parsons himself, who saw some strain between the sexes, equality between the sexes would
not be functional for maintaining the status quo. And thus, even if a role seems oppressive to an
individual unit, it ought to be tolerated for the good of the system. For Friedan, the functional
and integrated whole in which the needs of the parts work spontaneously on behalf of the whole
was nothing short of a lie. Friedan and others saw that in whole that Parsons built, functionality
came at a cost. The system’s stability, integration, and endurance over time were not
spontaneous or neutral outcomes, but the result of women making themselves—their desires,
ambitions, and capacities— as small as possible. Friedan and other writers and activists primed
a generation of women to refuse collective vision practices, which painted the system and its
needs as mere inconveniences or “minor strains” to be endured. With the new vocabulary,
buttressed by its rejection of the part-whole explanation, the feminist movement labelled the
whole as tyrannical, integration as harmful to units, and the needs of the system as large-case
problems that required urgent solutions. The postulate of functional unity demanded that units
be subsumed by their functions for the system. By the time Feynman gave his speech, the fate of
the unit— not the whole— took center stage in the collective imagination and as a result, the
discursive landscape echoed with various permutations of: “what if it doesn’t want to?”
FROM INTEGRATION TO ORGANIZATION
If nanotechnology was the solution, what was the problem?
If the natural sciences are indeed thinly-veiled solutions to social problems disguised as
new insights about the natural world (Hessen 1971)—then Feynman’s desire to found a new
science that would explore the “tiny real below” may be understood as a clearing; a taking-stock,
and any attempt to formulate a new model of reality that lined up with a new “spirit of the
times.” Just like Hessen documented in Newton and Galileo’s intellectual projects, Feynman’s
vision was a response to new contradictions that had surfaced in the social milieu. These
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contradictions closely resembled those in the part-whole explanation. There are certain
contradictions in the part-model that came into vision as vision downshifted.
The most important category of the part-whole framework is “integration.” Regardless of
its specific form, or application, any part-model takes an integrative vision of a system to explain
why a system works the way it does. It assumes that the activities, relationships, and properties
of units give rise to effects at the level of the system and is concerned with providing answers to
questions about unity, that is, what keeps a system together. That is, it is concerned with
“purpose.” The part-whole model under the premise that a single causal theory—strong relations
among parts produce emergent (i.e., non-aggregative) higher-level properties. To explain how
the parts came together, and how they produced higher-order properties, it addresses questions
about behavior and development, or the mechanisms or principles underlying behavior and
development.
It became clear that “integration” papered over some contradictions at the heart of the
whole-part model. Although “unity” is its key category, methodologically, the part-whole
explanation is based on deconstruction. Its underlying logic dictates that a system can only be
explained and understood by “it into parts and subsequently investigating the properties and
relations to those parts” (Goodwin 1994, 87). Systematic biology, for example, requires
“decomposition of the organism into parts, or “characters,” which can then be used in the
reconstruction of phylogenetic relationships. Understanding how things come together takes
things apart is a contradiction.
There is tension between the part and the whole. All models associated with this
framework share an assumption regarding the ontological status of parts as “elements unitary
variables that are the “atoms” of the system” (Levins and Lewontin 1985). Whether it takes the
whole as a unit of investigation and explains how it came together and why it remains that way
(as structuralism does) and focuses on strong relationships and higher-level properties, or its
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frames explanations at the scale of lower-order parts and treats each part as an autonomous
entity (mechanism), there is a tension between the autonomy of the parts vs. their subordination
to the whole. This contradiction is manifested in the fact that for the part-whole explanation, the
central theoretical question is what constitutes a part. Depending on the scale, a “part” could be
a process such as digestion, an object such as wings, or a bone, or an individual within a group.
It could be an organism, species, lineage, or a higher-order taxonomic rank in biology. By
assigning certain phenomena or objects’ status of “parts,” That purpose is to stay together. The
assumption that a system has a purpose—integration—or remaining whole, om this vantage
point, all interactions between parts are invariant, pre-determined, and rule-governed. This
approach assumes that the system’s behavior is a product of the properties of the individual
parts. These properties, in turn, structure the interactions between parts. If the system’s
properties are phenomena that exceed the total of the parts and emerge from the process of the
whole coming together, how can this be the behavior of the parts? Why do the parts come
together in the first place? In one way or another, the part-whole explanation assumed that each
part would subsume its function and existence to maintain the whole. But what if it doesn’t
want to?
The part-whole model took the whole’s point of view even as it assigned units foundational
status. When understood from the vantage point of the units, however, the interactions and
relationships between units and the whole in itself look very different. The part-whole model
had plenty to say what the activities of the units did for the whole; however, it did not consider
the other side of the equation. What about the units? How does the interaction affect them?
What is a whole from the point of view of the unit? What does being a part of a whole entail?
What may appear to be “organization” at one level becomes “competition” or “cooperation” at
others. Scale and scaling practices also determine the type of relationships or interaction among
parts that will be seen, and which types will remain invisible. By the mid-1950s, the whole began
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to take on a hostile and oppressive character vis-a-vis its units, and tight integration between
parts turned into an obstacle to be overcome. Depending on the scale at which it is addressed,
the same system may be characterized in various ways. By 1959, the whole no longer looked like
a harmonious entity that gave units their purpose and guaranteed their unique place in the
totality, but a dictator and a tyrant, who oppressed and coerced the parts to the point where
their existence became unbearable.
The hostility assigned to the whole can be most clearly seen in The Feminine Mystique,
Friedan’s groundbreaking book and precursor to the feminist movement described a whole at
war with its parts. In the whole that patriarchy built, the interests of the units were radically
different from that of society as a whole. When considered at the micro-level, the cost of
integration and functionality for society was women’s dissatisfaction, depression, emptiness,
and unhappiness. What is “functional” at the level of the whole is unbearable for the part. From
the perspective of the whole, the family unit is necessary for society to function. As a vehicle of
socialization, the family guarantees social integration and cohesion by instilling respect for order
in society’s youngest members. However, when Friedan examined what the family looks like for
women, whose labor in the home produced the “togetherness” within the family unit, the
previously harmonious whole began to look outright tyrannical and antithetical to their needs.
Women remaining confined to the private sphere and staying at home was beneficial to society,
however as Friedan discovered, for this whole to function as it does, women must make
themselves—their desires, ambitions, and capacities— as small as possible.
By moving down to units, Friedan and her contemporaries saw that interactions and
relationships that appear spontaneous and free of coercion are, in fact, oppressive and
damaging. With integration, unity, and stability at the center of social reasoning, the idea that
society requires each part to subordinate itself to the whole and that the parts do so willingly, if
not happily, was an axiom. As a downshift in a vision revealed that a system’s needs could be
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stifling and unbearable for the units, a previously unthinkable proposition made its way to the
foreground of thought: what if the part doesn’t want to? Permutations of this question
reverberated from physics to biology, to sociology.
A WHOLE WITHOUT INTEGRATION
Feynman’s vision for nanotechnology was not his own, it was handed to him.
Underneath Feynman’s speech is a discourse that addresses questions about the part and whole,
which in turn, were questions about society.” Seeing the world from the nanoscale revealed that
the part-whole model, which had shaped vision practices hitherto, was not a part of the natural
order of things but a mental habit formed within a bulk-scale cosmology. The mode of vision
engendered by the part-whole model examined entities from the vantage point of the whole.
With the part-whole vision, there was only one answer: the part of the whole. Feynman’s
metaphor of the library as a mode of ordering information grounded a different view of
relationality. In 1959, Feynman described a different type of totality, a totality held together
without integration that did not demand that the unit subordinate itself to a whole.
At the level of meaning, Feynman’s structure of metaphor rested in the distinction
between organization and integration. While the two terms appear equivalent at the surface
level, a closer reflection brings to light the subtle, albeit significant, distinctions between them.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “integration” refers to making a composite whole by
adding together or combining distinct elements. While the origins of this term lay in biology,
“integration” is widely used across a range of disciplines. Regardless of the context, the antonym
of “integration” is individuation. In psychology, “integration” means the harmonious
combination of different elements into one personality or adjusting individual behaviors to the
rules and conventions of the society around them; similarly, in business, it is the combination or
acquisition of different economic activities or processes under the same control; the
amalgamation of two or more companies; a merger or acquisition. In the last two decades,
166

“integration” has also been used as a frontier in race relations to refer to bringing into “equal
membership” of common society people or groups previously discriminated against on racial or
ethnic grounds.
Sociologically, “organization” refers to being ordered or placed into a systematic
arrangement. Similarly, in biology, “organization” describes the structure of any part of an
organism. It is about how a structure is developed and coordinated in order to carry out certain
vital functions. To be “organized” generally means to be formed into a structured whole or to be
systemically ordered and arranged. The organization is a formal structure that enables activities
to be carried out in a rule-ordered way. Unlike interaction, “organization” does not always refer
to a part-whole model. To be organized can also mean to be efficient and effective in the carrying
out of one’s affairs, and “organization” can be defined as the process of becoming “concrete.” An
example from physiology may be instructive. To become organized is to form fibrous tissue.
When a blood clot becomes “organized,” it changes from a liquid to a solid-state. A blood clot
begins when platelets aggregate and stick to one another with molecular glue, forming a “plug.”
In most cases, the purpose of a clot is to stop bleeding; however, the same process can also
produce an embolism, a solid blood clot, which obstructs arteries as it moves around the body.
Whatever its purpose, a blood clot seeks to be “organized,” that is, to become solid and stable,
even if doing so is harmful to the body as a whole.
Integration entails giving up, surrendering, or conceding. For one group of people to
become equal members of society, another group must give up the privileges and advantages
that the previous state of inequality entailed. Although structural functionalists minimized this
aspect of integration, to be integrated meant to give up differences, to put aside one’s interests
for the sake of belonging. Unlike integration, “organization” does not necessarily imply acting on
behalf of the system; it is about coordination rather than merging distinct elements together,
which implies compromise and change to at least one unit. A blood clot becoming “organized”
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can be deadly for the system. Most of the time, a blood clot stops blood loss, but it can also travel
to the brain and cause a stroke. “Organization” is agnostic as to the whole. As a synonym of
becoming concrete, “organization” refers to the process of becoming structured and ordered. As
the example of the blood clot illustrates, such concretization can be a means for matter to begin
acting “for itself” and acquiring an interest that is independent of both the totality and other
units that inhabit the system. While “integration” is always good for the larger whole formed
when units come together, “organization” can grant individual “parts” at least one autonomy,
even if endowing them with freedom is detrimental to anything outside of itself. “Organization”
entails certain freedom, contingency, malleability, and indeterminacy that “integration”
forecloses.
IT’S ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS
On a discursive level, nanotechnology is an index of freedom from rigid ideas about
relationality. At the nanoscale, the determinism, necessity, and assumptions about stability that
came with relationships within the whole-part model, melt into thin air. Nanotechnology
envisioned once ironclad and immutable relationships as flexible and malleable entities that can
be made and unmade by engineering one atom at a time. Whereas the part-whole model saw
each part playing a specific role and being in a specific place, for nanotechnology relationships
can be planned, designed, and engineered at will. This type of thinking was nascent in
Feynman’s work.
Feynman described the totalities structured not through integration, which demands
that units be modified to fit into the whole, but organization, which in essence is simply a mode
of establishing or maintaining relationships. The notion of the library captures Feynman’s
concern with information and its role in creating structures. Books are not integrated into a
library; a library is a mediator, a technology that creates relationships between the texts by
organizing them into a coherent but loosely bound totality. It makes the books useful as
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information by making them retrievable through cataloging. The totality created through the
organization of information —whether it was a library, a strand of DNA, or a microscope did
need integration to work. The lack of integration had another implication. A totality
characterized by organization without integration means that the arrangement of matter is
contingent, malleable, flexible, and subject to engineering.
As Robert Bellah put it, in any functional system, relationships are predetermined both
in terms of their typology and functions. They are the results of a structured system of
obligations, commitments, and imperatives. Their form and function is ordered by larger
structures, which govern what types of relationships are possible and determine the behavior of
individuals within such relationships. The relationships nanotechnology was concerned with
were not functional. The presupposition that relationships are predetermined in particular
posed a problem. It turns out that many things, including books in a library, interact without
bonding. Contemporary cancer nanotechnology will specify “interaction” as the type of
relationship that characterizes nanoscience and nanotechnology. It is crucial to remember that
nanoscientists use “interaction” as an antonym to “bond.” To label a particular relationship an
“interaction” is to indicate that the ties between atoms in a molecule are not solid, stable, or
permanent enough to deserve the title of “bond.” Nanotechnology and new developments in
chemistry were predicated on a new vision of matter, which foregrounded relationships. At the
nano level, properties do not emerge from interactions between parts. They are indeterminate
and malleable, and scientists can engineer them to their liking. Nanomedicine’s discursive
landscape placed relationality at the center of its reasoning, a tendency that was made manifest
in Drexler’s work, was just starting to crystalize when Feynman gave his speech.
A DISCOURSE ON FORCE AND DESTRUCTION
Nanotechnology’s early discourse on relationships went together with a mediation on
force and destruction. As Woodward and others reflected on chemistry’s practices, past
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approaches appeared more and more war-like. The emphasis on the structure coincided with
chemists seeing bonds in themselves for the first time. In contrast to their predecessors, for
whom relationships between atoms were only visible after being destroyed, they could now see
chemical bonds as they exist in a structure. New visualization technologies turned synthesis into
a “slow and destructive” (Woodward 1954, 474) process that tore apart molecules to understand
their chemical properties. Before the era of light spectroscopy, ultraviolet and infrared
absorption, mass spectrometry, or nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, a chemist would
“attack” a substance. Substances “resisted his attempts to decompose it into its parts and wanted
to protect its grouping at all costs,” so chemists had to “bring many weapons [emphasis mine] to
decompose and recompose them” (ibid). In the past, these relationships appeared so solid,
stable, and strong that considerable force was needed to undo them.
As a downshift in scale revealed the hidden brutality of a panoply of practices involved in
maintaining the integrity of the whole, interactions and relationships that were once considered
non-destructive, neutral elements unworthy of consideration emerged as objects of profound
concern. A passage from the Engines of Creation introduced earlier illuminates this tendency
with particular clarity.
Consider “delicate” surgery from a cell’s perspective: a huge blade sweeps down, chopping blindly
past and through the molecular machinery of a crowd of cells, slaughtering thousands. Later, a
great obelisk plunges through the divided crowd, dragging a cable as wide as a freight train
behind it to rope the crowd together again. From a cell’s perspective, even the most delicate
surgery, performed with exquisite knives and great skill, is still a butcher job. Only the ability of
cells to abandon their dead, regroup, and multiply makes healing possible (85).

The promise of an alternative to “slaughter” and other newly visible forms of harm will
become the fulcrum of nanomedicine’s ideological project. Today, affinity, interaction,
relationality, and other close relatives of “compatibility” inform nanomedicine's agenda of
treating cancer without any destruction, damage, or side effects. In 1986, Drexler asked his
readers to conconsiderrgery from a cells’ point of view. In doing so, revealed that what may
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seem like a force-free process from one vantage point, is near-genocidal from another. Drexler
also had a solution to the “slaughter.” He pledged that nanotechnology would create a world
where humans, technology, and nature work in concert with one another (1986, 23). A “purely
positive existence” without killing, cutting, and other uses of destructive force (ibid). He claimed
nanotechnology would through this by engineering compatibility— designing, planning, and
managing interactions one atom at a time.
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CHAPTER 6
FROM FUNCTION TO INTERACTION
Building a Friction-Free System One Interaction at a
Time
“Drug delivery is primarily about managing nano-bio interactions.”
— Jinjun Shi et al. (2017)
Most, if not all Americans, are familiar with aluminum. Whether it’s in the smooth and
sleek form like a soda can, or crinkled rolled up in a ball, such as in the wrapping used to heat
food, they encounter the lightweight, silvery metal daily and thus believe they know what it is.
Material scientists understand aluminum as the second most ductile and the sixth most
malleable metal. It is non-toxic, has a low density, high thermal conductivity, excellent corrosion
resistance, and can be cast, machined, and molded quickly. Although most elements catch fire at
some point, aluminum is not considered flammable nor combustible; it remains solid at
temperatures up to and including 199.4 degrees Fahrenheit or 93 degrees Celsius. It is a flame
retardant as, in many cases, aluminum does not catch fire when temperatures surpass its
melting point. Because of its specific properties, aluminum is utilized in an enormous
assortment of items from jars, foils, kitchen utensils, window outlines and larger barrels, to
airplane and rocket parts. As nanoscientists discovered, these properties are scale dependent.
When scaled down and approached at the nanoscopic scale, what appeared to be one of the most
stable materials known to humankind is highly flammable, explosive, and so combustible that it
became the basis of bombs and other “nanoweapons” (Del Monte 2017).
According to textbooks, nanotechnology is different from older technologies because of the
unusual physical, chemical, and biological properties that manifest when matter’s size is
reduced to the nanoscopic scale. Although Feynman is regarded a s the founder of
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nanotechnology by most internal accounts, the discipline could have started three years earlier.
In 1956, Arthur Von Hippel described a “molecular portrait” of matter (12) and coined the term
“molecular engineering” thirty years before Drexler claimed it. In Molecular Science and
Molecular Engineering – a work that documented his and others’ attempt to interrogate the
meaning of physical properties of materials and the matter from which they are constructed—
Von Hippel announced that “nature is not what we think it is”:
Up to this point, engineering was oblivious to the laws that exist at the macroscopic level and
organized its worldview based on those […] the laws describing the world of our daily
experience, where the yardsticks are the meter, kilogram, and second cannot a priori be
expected to hold when applied to the tremendous expanse and time scale of the universe
onto the minute world of atoms and molecules (12).
Inspired by his success in the laboratory, Von Hippel announced a break in the order of
things and proposed a new molecular approach to understanding the world and the things in it.
As Von Hippel argued, older methods quantified the characteristics of a material by assigning it
a place in a range with numerical coefficients based on macroscopic laws. When a new material
was found, physicists and chemists evaluated its visible characteristics and analyzed its chemical
constituents. Its potential was decided based on their findings. Rather than rely on the
properties nature had assigned certain times of matter the new approach, molecular
engineering, would, in his words, “build materials to order” (v):
We can design materials with properties prescribed for the purpose in hand; we can
understand by observing molecular phenomena, why materials fail; we can build into
materials safeguards and get true criterial for ultimate performance by addressing
materials, at the level of their atoms, the fundamental building blocks (4).
Numerous cases in the history of science and technology have shown that recalibrations
of measurement practices are always accompanied by new ways of seeing and new metaphors to
describe phenomena that enter the field of vision. As Von Hippel put it, “intelligent construction
of the next set of building blocks [molecules], requires insight into the interaction between
atoms” (24).
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INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ATOMS
Aluminum is an element that, for chemists, means it is “pure”— i.e., made of identical
atoms organized regularly and rationally. From a nanoscopic viewpoint, aluminum is functional
in that all the elements come together to form a relatively stable and durable substance but its
arrangement leaves much to be desired. Nanotechnology began with the insight that things
around us look and behave the way they do because of how their molecules behave. This is itself
determined by structure, by how the molecules are put together, and by the bonds between
atoms. For example, copper holds its shape because its atoms stick in a regular pattern; we can
bend and hammer it because its atoms can slip over one another while remaining bound
together. Glass, on the other hand, shatters when subjected to force because its atoms are put
together in configurations that cause them to separate when they slip.
Although metal is stronger and more durable than glass, we do not make windows out of
copper. Windows need to be transparent and conduct light, but the price to be paid for
transparency is a reduction in strength. Glass is transparent and serves its function as a
conductor of light. However, it is fragile and shatters when hit by bricks and stones. Being a
metal, copper is strong but also massive, dense, and opaque. While the transparency of the glass
is a net positive vis-a-vis its tendency to shatter, at the bulk scale, matter and its properties are
organized in such a way that there is an equally disadvantageous one for every advantageous
property. Until the rise of nanotechnology, these imperfections were tolerated and accepted as
an unfortunate but unchangeable fact about the world and its things. From a nano point of view,
materials at our current disposal are functional, not optimal. They do the job they need to do but
nothing beyond that. Robert Merton once described society as an entity made of positive
processes that encourage integration and negative ones that impede it. As his account illustrates,
in a functional system, the level of integration is minimal. The whole remains in working order
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because the net sum of functions is positive. But what if engineers could create a totality with no
negative qualities? A material that is both transparent and resists force?
For Drexler, at the practical level, nanotechnology would allow scientists and engineers
to create things according to precise specifications by constructing them one atom at a time.
This translated to a shift in thinking beyond functionality and a desire for perfectly harmonious
relationships between entities previously understood as incompatible with one another at the
ideological level. As this chapter shows, the capacity, or perceived capacity, for nanotechnology
to turn any negative quality into a positive one and to fix every incompatibility made these
previously invisible flaws into unbearable errors that required intervention. At the same time,
this apparent capacity went hand in hand with something akin to a radical intolerance for
incompatibility.
In addition, I argue here that nano perspectives are above all rooted in relationality and
interaction. Before the rise of nanotechnology, scientists and engineers assumed that properties
of matter were necessary, stable, and permanent. When understood according to its
macroscopic characteristics, a material's properties – for example strength, brittleness, and
color - are derived from the total of its parts. These parts appear to be bonded into a predetermined, unalterable, and permanent whole, and thus from a macro point of view, properties
are wedded to matter. From a nanoscopic point of view, the arrangement of atoms gives a
material its character and makes one material different from another. Thus, nanotechnology’s
treatise on the essence of matter is based on two related insights. The first is that a material's
characteristics are not derived from the properties of the atoms that make it up but from
relationships within the molecules that make up the material and the interactions between
molecules. Secondly, these relationships can be designed since the engineered properties of
matter are contingent, incidental, and malleable. Nanotechnology gave scientists the power to
create materials atom by atom, and to refashion chemical bonds and affinities as they saw fit.
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Nanotechnology’s emphasis on relationality and its corresponding lexicon of affinity,
interaction, and cooperatframed the newly acquired power to refashion chemical bonds that
create materials atoby atom in terms of designing, planning, and managing relationships.
What nanotechnology did to matter arguably played out in the social world as follows.
Until the mid-1950s, the vision practices and measurement tools associated with functionalism
and other versions of the whole/part model were invisible. As shown in Chapter 5, a new
cultural sense had risen such that wholes - whether evoking society, the nation-state, or the
body— began to be perceived as oppressive and hostile to the parts that make them up. The
general strategy to deal with a glaring contradiction in the part-whole model, one that was
observed across the social milieu and in technical fields from sociology to biology, was to
bracket, deconstruct, and set the whole aside while attending to the parts. Moving down to the
viewpoint of the units was a natural reaction to the discovery that treating the system's vantage
point as the only possible position for knowledge, as all versions of the whole/part model
demanded, was not a maxim or necessity but a bias. However, moving down did not address the
fundamental antagonism between parts and wholes: it merely took the side of the parts.
incompatibility.
By the 1980s, the US experienced another shift in its collective “mood.” Consequently,
this chapter returns to The Engines of Creation to trace to the origin of another stratum in the
“spirit” or zeitgeist associated with the rise of nanomedicine. I begin by attending to the
language associated with interactions related to care, affinity, and mutual aid in Drexler’s text as
an instance of a generic structure that played out across the social and natural sciences, politics,
culture, and collective thinking in the 1980s and 1990s. By documenting a general aversion to
conflict, contradiction, as well as desire for an alternative to framing issues in terms of “us vs.
them” in expert and lay discourse during that period, it shows that Drexler’s vision of
nanotechnology as a means of addressing the pathological element in a system without the use
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of blunt force, but “engineering compatibility” between previously incompatible elements was
not his own. It argues that Drexler’s characterization of atom by atom engineering as a means
for planning, designing, and managing interactions, affinities, and other relationships at the
smallest level possible was a part of a new cultural zeitgeist that Alan Bloo described as “a
longing for the overcoming of all necessity and tension,” as encapsulated by the phrase: “we
should all get along. Why fight?” (1967, 1o).
BUILDING A FRICTION-FREE SYSTEM
In Drexel’s hands, nanotechnology’s promise entailed the possibility of risk-free systems,
technologies that do not fail, and forms of production that were perfectly compatible not only
with humans but also with the environment – in other words, a “completely positive experience
of life on Earth” (1986, 156). For Drexler, nanotechnology was a corrective to the unruliness and
unpredictability of “bulk technology.” Most bulk technology has been constructed from steel, a
functional but imperfect substance. Engineers cannot make metal strong, light, and limber, nor
prevent tiny cracks from weakening the metal (80). This is because they cannot alter how the
atoms in each molecule are joined together (1986, 6). Currently, scientists and engineers are
forced to accept steel and its imperfections as inevitable, a part of the unalterable order of things
because they cannot intervene at the level of its fundamental structure, i.e., they cannot change
the relationship between its component units. Nanotechnology promised something different.
As Drexler explained, when understood at the molecular level, malfunctions or accidents
result from the nature of the relationships within materials. Bridges, for example, are made from
steel cables and fail because the atoms within steel molecules are "bonded together in an
imprecise way" (87). Nature cannot exert the precise control needed to produce a substance
whose components are bound together without any flaw or exception. Since steel is a natural
material, it is composed of many different atoms and various bonds. Although these elements
coalesce into a totality, their relationships are such that they will inevitably erode or fall apart.
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Nature, and humans, whose technology can only work with structures that nature had given
them, cannot make fail-proof materials because they "handle atoms in herds." When wholes
form spontaneously, like metals, societies, or biological ecosystems, they tend to be
"uncontrollable," "irregular," and lacking in resiliency. Bulk technology is "unruly" as well as
unpredictable, and cannot produce stable structures just as natur e cannot give rise to resilient
and well-organized communities of plants and animals. In Drexler’s hands, nanotechnology
became a solution to conflict, contradiction, and other forms of discord. While functional
systems, reliant on integration to ensure that each component will act on behalf of the whole to
maintain its integrity, presumed that at least some conflict between the part and whole is
inevitable, nanotechnology promised to “engineering compatibility” between all elements down
to every molecule.
Drexler's gaze was constituted by a sense of the world as made from malleable and
flexible matter that could be not only altered but redesigned, restructured, and built anew from
the ground up if addressed at a sufficiently small scale. This gaze, attuned to the most minute
flaws, no longer saw metals as strong, stable, durable, and dense, but as materials that can and
ought to be engineered to be even stronger, even more stable, and even more durable: "If
bonded correctly, atoms can build a substance that is fine and flexible and fifty times stronger
than diamonds" (Drexler 1986, 12). At the nanoscale, engineers could make a material that is
stronger than steel and lighter than wood, and which could change shape like a muscle. With
this material, they could make an engine that would "expand, contract, and bend at the base to
provide the desired thrust in the desired direction under varying conditions" (ibid). In the nano
realm, rigid and flexible, brittle and flexible, stable and changing, and hard and soft are no
longer antonyms nor contradictory pairs of concepts and properties.
Nanotechnology and atom by atom engineering are based on the idea that creating a
perfectly working and unified system – such as, for example,buildings, spaceships, or societies—
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means controlling all relationships at the most minute level. As per Drexler’s vision,
nanotechnology held the key to a "friction-free," durable, and stable system as nano assemblers
would not construct houses brick by brick the way humans do but "by gluing together individual
grains of sand" (52). Atom by atom assembly would allow scientists to “engineer compatibility”
as building matter; this may allow for complete control over relationships between elements. As
per The Engines of Creation, nanotechnology was a viable solution to humanity’s problems— at
least ideologically—because its tools, capacities, and insights would give scientists and engineers
the power to construct more robust, stable, and "reasonable" totalities in which all relationships
are planned and controlled in every way "all the way down" (Feynman 1959, 1).
AN EVOLUTIONARY DEAD END
Drexler’s philosophical attitude is seen most clearly in his practical solution to the
environmental crisis. Although Drexler acknowledged that humans and their industrial
technologies have polluted, poisoned, and mutilated Earth and its ecosystems, he believed that
nature is also a part of the problem. Nature builds haphazardly; by the time a whole has been
assembled, it is too late to go back and remake it into what it ought to have been. According to
Drexler, this lack of precision and control over matter was a factor in making the current
environmental crisis, that, perhaps unsurprisingly, he framed as nature's "failure to adapt to
industrial civilization" (265). According to his logic, if ecosystems were better constructed, they
would have endured human activity. If plants, animals, insects, and other organisms had been
built better, they would have been adapted and become compatible with mass production. If
nature could plan its relationships instead of relying on chance (associated with natural
selection), its ecosystems would have been able to “accommodate” and “adapt” to pesticides,
fossil fuels, toxic waste, and other byproducts of capitalism's newly opened "chemical
wonderland" (Woodward 1962).
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Since Drexler was neither an ecologist nor an environmentalist— and perhaps not even a
scientist, but a madman or charlatan— his conclusion that saving ecosystems was a useless
endeavor did not contravene any disciplinary norms or violate any standards. Drexler was free
to think “nature has tried and failed" (119) and that instead of preserving what is left of it,
science and technology ought to "ask something different: what improvements can be made?"
(119). Its first step consisted of replacing trees with solar-powered nano-machines, "tree-like
devices," that "like trees (...) will be able to extract carbon dioxide from the air and split it into
oxygen. Unlike trees, though, they will be able to grow deep storage roots and place carbon into
coal seams and oil fields from which it came (121)." Fire will be next. While natural forest fires
are necessary for clearing effects, they also generate "danger and devastation" (ibid). In
Drexler's nano-logic, the risks associated with fire are intolerably high. Therefore, fire will be
replaced by “robots that will simulate the effects of forest fires, but without the negative
consequences” (ibid). Drexler was an engineer and held efficiency, economy, and rationality
near and dear to his heart. This is why he also made plans for squirrels. It is evident that in the
world without trees, the rodents will be useless, so they too will be replaced with "devices with a
taste for old trash," which, unlike squirrels, will clean forests and "mend the planet and correct
the damage" (121). Even if the laws of efficiency could justify their existence, perhaps to serve as
an additional layer of redundancy should other components fail, squirrels are a product of
nature, thus are “programmed to die" and are essentially made from cells and genes whose selfrepairs are "shoddy" at best (ibid). Drexler said they are an evolutionary dead end and harbor
enough design flaws to put them outside the reasonable tolerance threshold for such things. And
even if they do not, keeping them around is pointless given that nanotechnology has betterdesigned, safer, and more reliable alternatives. This time around, plants, animals, and the
"natural" world would be engineered atom-by-atom. Unlike the ones that currently inhabit the
Earth, they will be compatible with life in the world that the Industrial Revolution had built.
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Such a system would not need diversity or complexity to be stable. Its endurance over time
would be guaranteed through the most meticulous planning, engineering, and management of
every component and every relationship therein.
The remainder of the chapter documents a similar logic at work in the social sciences as
in the natural sciences. I show how this new way of thinking culminated in novel approaches to
understanding and solving of a myriad of otherwise divergent seeming social problems so as to
amount to yet another dimension of an unfolding spirit, as I argue, of nanotechnology.
FROM STRUCTURE VS AGENCY TO INTERACTION
The publication of Anthony Giddens' chapter in Problems in Social Theory was a
groundbreaking event in the history of sociology primarily because it marked the beginning of a
new way of thinking about the structure/ agency problem. The notions of structure and agency
have always been central to sociological theory. In Durkheim’s model which those in the
functionalist tradition took up, structures were fixed and enduring entities (Stones 2017).
Functionalists insisted that society - the structure -acts on individuals as an external constraint.
Thus, they envisioned feelings, thoughts, and actions as products of culture, not individuals.
Individuals were not “doers of actions” in the functionalist ontology; they do not take active
roles in actions or their consequences1. Functionalism, like all sociological traditions up to this
point, reasoned in terms of structures versus individuals. For sociologists, structure and agency
were dualities, incompatible with one another, and any interaction between them was a struggle.
Agents may want to act whereas, by contrast, structures prevented them from doing so.
Unlike its predecessors, “contemporary sociology, beginning with Giddens’
“structuration theory” has generally aimed at a conceptual reconciliation of structure and
agency (Bryant and Jary 2001, 14). As Drexler penned nanotechnology’s first manifesto, the

The structural functionalism associated with the work of Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton
captured this aspect of the structure under the rubric of “social institutions.” Others focused on
general cultural patterns.
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“structure versus agency” framing became unconvincing. Many social theorists were dissatisfied
with the rigidity and contradictions in the polarized terms of the structure/ agency debate.
Instead, they longed for a flexible, nuanced, and complex conceptual framework that did not
treat individuals and society as oppositional forces. Some, notably including Norbert Elias,
argued (as Elias did in Society of Individuals) that taking the point of view of society to look at
individuals had been exhausted. Rather, they sought to recalibrate sociological vision away from
the binaries of structure versus agency toward "carving out a tension-filled space where
contradictions can meet and come together" (Chauvin 2003, 1998)2. The same novel mode of
seeing and thinking can be found in Gidden's treatment of self-identity and the near-universal
economic system as a dialectic between the global and local (1991) or in Pierre Bourdieu's notion
of "habitus" that connected capitalism to individual bodies through a collection of symbolic
elements like skills, tastes, posture, mannerisms, clothing, and other material artifacts.
Sociology's new understanding of scale allowed scholars to capture the smallest entities, such as
the self, while also attending to global processes.
Through a constellation of metaphors that connected binaries and attended to the
ambiguous spaces in-between what used to be opposites, sociology's new scaling practices were
based on compatibility—not conflict. Unlike the structure/agency model, which granted
structures power over individuals and their agency and treated the two as competing forces,
thinking in terms of the notion of relationships and interactions allowed sociologists to hold
individuals and society, and the near and far, the global and every day together without treating
them as contradictory. The result was a model that visualized the world as a series of fluid and
flexible entities working in concert. Giddens solidified the desire to move beyond the duality of

In a very well-cited paper, William Sewel criticized the notion of “structure” for being too rigid.
According to Sewel, structures are not solid but flexible because they are always mediated by
agency just as Mark Granovetter coined the term “embeddedness” to point to the fact that
interpersonal relations are the core of large-scale economic behavior.
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structure and agency in what is known as “structuration theory,” which captured an agent’s
everyday interaction with structure as a system of norms and treated the social structure as both
the medium and the outcome of social action.
Many sociologists and other social theorists abandoned the term “structure” in favor of
analyzing relational connections between interactants; that is, webs or networks of relations and
interdependencies, both interpersonal and impersonal, in which interactants and their joint
actions are embedded. Whereas structure/ agency was based on rigid and binary categories
such as up and down, more or less, the new way of thinking was flexible, nuanced, and
relational. This relational social ontology treated individuals as “interactants” rather than
singular agents or actors. Instead of asking about prime movers or coming to terms with largescale and permanent power relations, it attended to society as a space in which people produce
effects in the world and on each other through their relational connections and joint actions.
THE INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Drexler's promise of going beyond “functionality” and “engineering compatibility” was
bolstered with the category of relationships and other metaphors having to do with connection
and mutual affectivity. Twenty years after the publication of his book, cancer nanomedicine took
up “interaction” as its central category. There is no more explicit evidence of the obsession with
relationships than the rise and legitimation of symbolic interaction in the 1980s3. Although
sociologists have always attended to “relationships,” the scope of their interest was typically
limited to inquiries regarding structures that governed interactions through norms at the
collective level. Normal sociology studied the systems—not the interactions themselves.
As the last chapter showed, Feynman’s era marked the end of the functionalist
perspective, which was replaced by conflict theory. However, most sociology textbooks divide

Although symbolic interactionism dates to Mead, Cooley, Goffman, Garfinkel, and the Chicago
School, it became a mainstream perspective in the 1980s and 1990s.
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US sociology into three parts. Sociology’s conventional view— whether it was structuralist,
Marxist, or institutionalist— had always been macro. That is, it rested on a vision of macro-level
institutions and social structures that imposed on, constrained, and grounded the actions of
individuals. The rise of Symbolic Interactionism and its new vision was initially a home for
“sociological malcontents” who were frustrated by orthodoxy that ran under functionalism and
conflict theory. At the surface level, conflict theory seemed to remedy functionalism’s emphasis
on order and stability, which had become excessive for theoretical tastes. Still, the underlying
vision associated with the two was not so different. Images of large and abstract structures
populated both theories, both emphasized the systemic nature of society, and both assumed that
organization worked on a metalevel in a determined and deliberate fashion. While they varied in
terms of what held it together: conflict or shared values, they were both part-whole explanations
that treated social structure as primary. While structural-functionalism and conflict theory are
understood as oppositional vis-a-vis one another, the interactionist perspective is often thought
of as a “middle way” between the two.
Rather than addressing how common social institutions define and impact individuals,
symbolic interactionists shift their attention to the interpretation of subjective viewpoints and
how individuals make sense of their world from their unique perspective and understand the
operation of society from the “bottom-up,” shifting the focus to micro-level processes that
emerge during face-to-face encounters to account for the operation of society. Central to
symbolic interactionist thought is the idea that individuals use language and significant symbols
in their communication with others. Whether it was a feature or a fault, symbolic
interactionism’s key question revolved around how society is “created and maintained through
repeated actions among individuals” (ibid).
With the “incorporation” (Fine 1993) of the Symbolic Interactionist perspective within
mainstream sociology, it was clear that “society” had lost its place as an object of analysis and
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had become a “background” for something else, face-to-face interaction (Carter and Fuller
2015)4. In other words, symbolic interactionists replaced objective structure, which had been the
discipline’s traditional concern, with subjective meaning. They conceived the individual as
agentic, autonomous, and integral in creating their social world and turned an analytic lens to
the self, affect, emotions, and issues such as self-feeling, self-esteem, identity work, and selfpresentation.
By the time Erving Goffman delivered his ASA presidential address in 1983, the
theoretical agenda shifted to specify the relationship between society and the individual.
Goffman’s The Interaction Order provided an interactionist roadmap for confronting sociology’s
traditional concern with the macro-level social order. One of the more notable examples is the
concept of "interaction ritual chains," which was an attempt to argue that micro-interaction
preceded structure (Collins 1981) and harkened back to Blumer's (1969) emphasis on “knitting
together lines of action.” Here the structure is “mediated” through individual actions,
“coordinated” by patterns and expectations (see Levy 1982; Kleinman 1982; Pestello and
Voydanoff 1991). Other interactionists have attempted to link the macro-micro levels by
postulating a middle level: the meso-structure.

IT’S ABOUT MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS
Symbolic interactionism encapsulated a vision wherein one does not have to decide
between the part or the whole, structure or agency, or the individual or society. The insight that

In the 1970s, symbolic interactionism was subversive and rebellious. By the end of the decade,
it was a legitimate discipline with its own journal. By the 1990s, most mainstream sociologists
had accepted the construction and negotiation of meaning, impression management, and
labeling as legitimate components of their discipline. It was a slow process. Many were initially
hostile to the new perspective. Symbolic interactionism has been described as a social
psychological, subjectivist, (...) qualitative, but most importantly, micro stance (Fine 1993, 62).
Due to its irregular scaling practices, the framework attracted severe criticism for a “multitude
of alleged and real sins'' (ibid). By turning away from society to individuals, the perspective was
said to be apolitical, supportive of the status quo, unscientific, journalistic, and above all,
“astructural and hostile to the classical questions of macro sociology” (ibid).
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humans interact with each other in meaningful ways, coupled with a call to attend to that
meaning, opened the door to treating the interaction as the unit of analysis. The same pattern
can be observed in other sociological texts of the period, most notably Habits of the Heart, a
widely celebrated national bestseller published in 1985 that documented the shift of
“relationships” into the center of collective thought.
According to Robert Bellah and his co-authors, something had changed in US culture.
Before the 1980s, society and its institutions guaranteed social coherence. By restraining and
regulating individuals and instilling the same set of moral norms in each unit, institutions
created highly structured relationships between individuals and the society they inhabited. As
the decade ended, society no longer has the significance it once did, culminating in what he
characterized as a "crisis of civic membership” and “mass disengagement” from society.
In Bellah’s words “civic consciousness" was replaced by personal identity and personal
relationships in collective thought5. As therapy6 became the cultural lens of the age, "personal
relationships" became the dominant category for making sense of the world. As Americans
became increasingly preoccupied with personal relationships, society ceased to be the epicenter,
the fulcrum of people's attention, thought, and activities. Thinking through the category of
“relationships” produced a specific way of understanding problems and dysfunction. According
to Bellah, Americans could not see structural factors such as widening wealth disparities,
deindustrialization and move of blue-collar jobs outside of cities and the country, the new
pressures of a global economy, a decline of institutional support as in any way responsible for
the mass anxiety and uncertainty experienced by an increasing number of people. In this vision,

As people lost their sense of social responsibility and connection to society, anything more
significant than their immediate circle was unthinkable. The large-scale abdication of interest in
the fate of the whole manifested in countless forms, including withdrawal into gated
communities, erosion of public trust in government, disinterest in voting, and disengagement
with politics in general.
6
According to Bellah, this new discursive landscape included a "therapeutic ethos," a style of
thought that put the autonomous individual at the center of all reasoning.
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the instability arising from mass economic restructuring looked like the decline of family values
just as the poverty created by the withdrawal of government support appeared as originating
from personal failures. A decade of cuts to public services and the ideology that justified them
convinced the US public "that governmental social programs have been failures" (1985, 215) and
that interventions at the level of society did not work. As more and more Americans sought
personal improvement whether through self-help books or therapy, they became convinced that
society could not be changed, but individuals and their relationships could be, and thus were the
only legitimate points of interventions.
The “new style of thought” with relationships at the center. However, relationships had a
different quality to those of the past. In the past, relationships were once ordered as roles. They
entailed obligations and imperatives that were pre-determined and unchanging. Traditionally,
structures over and above the individual, most notably, religion, governed the type of
relationships people entered into and people's behavior in said relationships. Individuals
thought about commitments such as marriage, work, political and religious commitments as
broader moral imperatives or social norms. As obligations to society, they bound individuals to
their role in maintaining the system. As society and "social consciousness" fell to the wayside,
the purpose of relationships appeared as enhancement of the sense of individual rather than
fulfilling moral imperatives (47). Relationships were no longer justified by binding obligations to
broader societal traditions and conventions but created by a "full sharing of spontaneous
feelings" (58).
Freed from the rigid structures of the past, everything—from the length, the extent of
obligations, and degree of closeness— becomes subject to personal choice. Relationships became
flexible and malleable entities that could be created at will. According to Bellah, Americans felt
that they could only make a genuine connection to their relationship if the relationship were
voluntary: "such relationships exist as the expression of the choices of free selves that make it
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up, and if the relationship no longer meets individual needs, it ends" (107). These new social
forms were justified by "how it makes me feel." As a result, feelings and their management
became a new imperative. In Bellah’s vision, once eternal relationships could now be made and
unmade, engineered. No longer bound by stable and permanent norms, relationships now had
to be managed. This form of life and style of reasoning was best exemplified by the manager and
the therapist, whose roles became indistinguishable. Just as managers made decisions about
resource allocation for corporations, therapists helped people do the same for their emotions.
However, the manager-therapist's fundamental function was to manage. That is, help their
clients plan, design, create, maintain, or end relationships.
GLOBALIZATION AND MULTICULTURALISM
As Bellah was careful to point out, this new form of life entailed a deep, albeit concealed
contradiction: the new and seemingly bottomless control of micro phenomena such as
relationships was tied to the complete loss of control of any large-scale processes. While the
manager-therapist allowed individuals to relish the exercise of personal choice in private areas
of their lives, in doing so, they obscured the virtually complete turning over of public decisions
to bureaucratic managers that characterized the cultural climate. The desire to avoid
contradiction, in addition to the sense that relationships were malleable played out in discourse
around globalization and multiculturalism.
In 1990 Charles Krauthammer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning political columnist proclaimed
that the “wish and work” of the United States should be to “integrate” with Europe and Japan.
This, according to the author, would usher in a new universalism that would “depreciate” the
notion of sovereignty7. Krauthammer was among the many commentators who saw
“globalization” as characteristic of the end of sovereignty.

Sovereignty was a theory of wholes and parts. This was something different, a new way of
seeing things. By the early 1990s, the Cold War and colonization had run their course. With the
7
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Sovereignty was an organization of the world through rigid territorial norms, which were
the result of and cause of past and present conflict up to and including world wars. Globalization
theory spoke to a sense that attending to relations between things is key to making sense of
them. The “opening up” of previously “closed” countries, the proliferation of a cosmopolitan
human rights agenda, the rise of new information technologies that was believed to have
followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the spread of economic liberalism around the
world signaled the end of conflict and a new understanding and image of the globe as
interconnected via complex and multidimensional networks.
Multiculturalism and globalization were powerful framing devices and suggestive ways of
thinking primarily because they envisioned the world in terms of networks and interactions. In
this new world order, the political questions were not about maintaining national power but
about managing relations and maintaining the systems of global entanglement. Nation-states
were dependent on one another and connected in such complex ways that “relationships”
became the unit of analysis in understanding how the globe works.
In the social sciences, “globalization” was a claim that deepened interconnectedness was
fundamentally transforming the nature of society and that the sovereign state had been replaced
with a multi-layered, multilateral system of global governance (Rosenberg 2005, 2). The new
global system was a new relational form of society— relationships between nation-states had
deepened to the point where it no longer made sense to think of nations as autonomous “parts”
but as nodes in a network. There was a sense that we had relationships to nations, to things, and

end of the various communist experiments in Eastern Europe and decolonization replacing
colonial workings with nation’s systems of power, sociologists shared the sense that nationstates and the constellation of the world that envisioned power as located at the national level
had been swept away. They began to understand power very differently. “Power” was no longer
about military might and the subordination of others via war and conquest, but something that
was distributed and circulated in complex, multi-level, and ambiguous ways. This new vision of
power was described in spatial terms: “becoming worldwide,” a “compression of time and
space.” The collapse of distinctions between the “far and near”; the “local and the global.”
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events that were far away. These relationships were no longer organized by space and time, but
by the awareness that there is a profound interconnectedness, a hidden network underneath
that joined previously hostile or contradictory things together.
WE SHOULD GET ALONG. WHY FIGHT?
The world picture associated with globalization envisioned the globe as made of
contingent and fast-moving ties and networks. “Multiculturalism,” an idea that emerged at the
same time foregrounded relationships in a similar way. As the previous chapter showed, the
notion of the US as a “melting pot” had become suspicious and in the 1980s, “multiculturalism”
became the dominant metaphor for the structure of US society. Unlike the melting pot, which
assumed homogeneity, integration, and parts coming together to form a whole,
“multiculturalism” was a discourse about the compatibility or incompatibility of different groups
at a local and global level and questions about the meaning of national identity and its power to
mediate differences.
In the popular imagination multiculturalism is often understood the outcome of the
struggle of minorities for recognition. Today many scholars see it as a “veneer or cosmetic fix” to
the conflicts in US society, which shifted the analytical lens away from structural racism to the
importance of cultural identity (Lentin 2005). As a tool of managing difference through policy, it
is based on a logic that categorizes and classifies human differences in terms of “culture” by
placing ethnicity and “identity” at the forefront of understanding how and why human groups
are distinct from another (a tendency that can be traced back to the 1959 UNESCO statement on
race, which declared that race is not a biological reality and stated that culture was the only
acceptable category for coming to terms with a difference).
Unlike thinking of difference in terms of race, which implied conflict and deep division,
an “us” vs “them” mentality, multiculturalism celebrated difference and diversity. The language
of cultural relativism was adopted on the right as an overt effort to shun blatant racism in favor
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of a softer discourse on discourse on cultural compatibility and incompatibility. According to
critics, “multiculturalism” was as much of a celebration of difference as it was a form of
“diversity management” and a way of thinking about how to address “difference and the
problems it may lead to” (Lentin 2005, 394).
Others on the conservative side of the political spectrum such as Arthur Schlesinger
(1992), Dinesh D’Souza (1991), EB Hirsch (1987), Allan Bloom, and Rush Lemberg reacted to
discourse on multiculturalism with extreme hostility. Regardless of the political veracity of their
critique, they saw what their more progressive counterparts did: the erosion of boundaries and
abandonment of norms and a new way of thinking in terms of compatibility between what were
previously incompatible elements. In his The Closing of the American Mind, a still-popular
account, for example, Bloom saw multiculturalism as emblematic of a new way of thinking that
was “open to everything” (i.e. malleable) and “unable to recognize any contradiction.” Bloom
described the political situation of his day as a case of “inflamed sensitivity” where students are
free from constraints... where religion and national origin have left almost no effect on them and
where any limit seemed “arbitrary and tyrannical.” He claimed with the embrace of the rhetoric
of multiculturalism, US culture had become too tolerant or “open” to difference and this
tolerance has led to giving up the previously clear distinction between truth, and ideology,
nature and culture, and the inside and outside. According to Bloom, the problem of getting
along with outsiders had become secondary to having an inside, a people, a way of life, and a
sense that any contradiction and any limit is oppressive. “Since ethnocentrism or the desire to
belong is no longer binding, students think that we should all get along. Why fight?” (85).
For Bloom, multiculturalism went hand in hand with a loss of tolerance for conflict and
other forms of contradiction. Conflict was a natural state (thus, the desire to “all get along” is
artificial), it has been a permanent part of the US history: “there have always been frictions
between the remains of puritan ideology and continuous secular development towards equality
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of rights… The refusal to accept this, that the US was never melting pot and the resulting
complaint about racism is a symptom of this pathological aversion to conflict” (ibid).
The similarities between Bloom’s critique of feminism and Drexler’s characterization of
nanotechnology are uncanny:
Feminism challenged a permanent human inclination. As such, it ends up forgetting
nature and using force to refashion human beings to secure abstract justice. Feminism
and other “liberations” denied that there may be a feminine nature and “shook it loose
from its teleological moorings; a dangerous move that caused reproduction without the
family and damaged nature; the souls of men—their ambitious, warlike, protective,
possessive character must be dismantled to liberate women from their domination.
Machismo was a natural passion in man’s psychology. Men must be reeducated and must
accept the feminine nature. It is possible to “soften” them but to make them “care” is
another and this project must inevitably fail (75).
Unlike Drexler, who believed “engineering compatibility” held the key to solving
humanity’s problems once and for all, Bloom envisioned feminism’s attempt to improve upon
nature as not only violent and destructive, but impossible: “we must not cloud our vision to an
extent that we believe there are variable structures just because we need or want them” (ibid).
FROM AUTHORITY TO COLLABORATION, COMPROMISE, AND SHARED
DECISION MAKING
Through a constellation of metaphors that connected such binaries and highlighted the
ambiguous spaces in between what used to be opposites, sociology's new scaling practices were
based on compatibility –not, most definitely, on conflict. Unlike the structure/agency model
that granted structures power over individual agents and treated the two as competing forces,
thinking in terms of the notion of relationships and interactions allowed sociologists to hold
individuals and society, and the near and far, the global and every day, together without treating
them as contradictory. The result was a model that visualized the world as a series of fluid and
flexible entities working in concert. Giddens solidified the desire to move beyond the duality of
structure and agency in what is known as “structuration theory.” This captured an agent’s
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everyday interaction with structure as a system of norms and treated the social structure as both
the medium and the outcome of social action.
Many sociologists and other social theorists abandoned the term “structure” in favor of
analyzing relational connections between people as individual agents in the form of webs or
networks of relations and interdependencies, both interpersonal and impersonal, in which their
joint actions are embedded. Whereas the structure versus agency binary was based on rigid and
categories such as up and down, or more and less, the new way of thinking was flexible,
nuanced, and relational. This relational social ontology treated individuals as “interactants”
rather than singular agents or actors. Instead of asking about prime movers or coming to terms
with large-scale and permanent power relations, it attended to society as a space in which people
produce effects in the world and on each other through their relational connections and joint
actions.
THE INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Drexler's promise of going beyond “functionality” and “engineering compatibility” was
bolstered by growing interest in the category of ‘relationships’ and in other metaphors having to
do with connection and mutual affectivity. Twenty years after the publication of his book, cancer
nanomedicine took up “interaction” as its central category. There is no more explicit evidence of
the obsession with relationships than the rise and legitimation of symbolic interaction in the
1980s8. Although sociologists have always attended to “relationships,” the scope of their interest
was typically limited to inquiries regarding structures that governed interactions through norms
at the collective level. Normal sociology studied the systems - not the interactions themselves.
As Chapter 5 detailed, Feynman’s era marked the end of the functionalist perspective
and its replacement by conflict theory. However, most sociology textbooks divide US sociology

Although symbolic interactionism dates to Mead, Cooley, Goffman, Garfinkel, and the Chicago
School, it became a mainstream perspective in the 1980s and 1990s.
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into three parts, not two. One was sociology’s conventional view of ‘macro’ processes, whether
structuralist, Marxist, or institutionalist; this is the vision of large scale, or ‘macro’ processes
deferring to structures that impose, constrain and/or ground the actions of individuals. The rise
of a perspective critical of this conventional view, namely conflict theory, initially
attracted“sociological malcontents” frustrated by theinstitutionalist orthodoxy that had long
undergirded functionalism. At a surface level, conflict theory seemed to remedy functionalism’s
emphasis on order and stability that had become excessive for many sociological theorists’
tastes. Still, the underlying vision associated with functionalism and conflict theory was not so
different: images of large and abstract structures pervaded both and emphasized the systemic
nature of society; moreover, both assumed that organization worked on a metalevel in a
determined and deliberate fashion. Finally, both functionalism and conflict theory were still
part/whole explanations that treated social structure as primary. While at first glance they
seemed opposed to one another, the rise of a third perspective as textbooks often label it – i.e.,
interactionism – can be conceived as a “middle way” between the problems of the previous
functionalism and conflict perspectives.
For, rather than addressing how social institutions define and impact individuals,
symbolic interactionists shift their attention to the interpretation of subjective viewpoints and to
how individuals make sense of their world from their unique perspective. Interactionism began
to explore the operations of society from the “bottom-up” insofar as it shifted the focus of
cuoltural ideas to micro-level processes that emerge during face-to-face encounters. Central to
symbolic interactionist thought, then, is the idea that individuals use language and significant
symbols in their communication with others. Whether simply a feature or its own pitfall/fault,
symbolic interactionism’s key question now came to revolve around how society is “created and
maintained through repeated actions among individuals” (ibid).
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With the “incorporation” (Fine 1993) of the symbolic interactionist perspective within
mainstream sociology, it was clear that “society” had lost its place as an object of analysis and
had become a “background” for something else, i.e. face-to-face interactions (Carter and Fuller
2015)9. In other words, symbolic interactionists replaced objective structures that had been the
discipline’s traditional concern, with subjective meanings. They conceived the individual as
agentic, autonomous, and integral in creating their social world and turned an analytic lens
toward the self, affect, emotions, and issues such as self-feeling, self-esteem, identity work, and
self-presentation.
By the time Erving Goffman delivered his ASA presidential address in 1983, the
theoretical agenda had already shifted to specify the relationship between society and the
individual. Goffman’s The Interaction Order provided an interactionist roadmap for confronting
sociology’s traditional concern with the macro-level social order. One of the more notable
concepts reflective of the new concept was Randall Collins’ notion of "interaction ritual chains"
(an attempt to argue that micro-interaction preceded structure; Collins 1981) that harkened
back to Blumer's (1969) emphasis on “knitting together lines of action.” Here, structure is
“mediated” through individual actions, “coordinated” by patterns and expectations (see Levy
1982; Kleinman 1982; Pestello and Voydanoff 1991). .Other interactionists have also attempted
to link the macro-micro levels by postulating a middle level: meso-structures.

IT’S ABOUT MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS

In the 1970s, symbolic interactionism was subversive and rebellious. By the end of the decade,
it was a legitimate discipline with its own journal. By the 1990s, most mainstream sociologists
had accepted the construction and negotiation of meaning, impression management, and
labeling as legitimate components of their discipline. It was a slow process. Many were initially
hostile to the new perspective. Symbolic interactionism has been described as a social
psychological, subjectivist, (...) qualitative, but most importantly, micro stance (Fine 1993, 62).
Due to its irregular scaling practices, the framework attracted severe criticism for a “multitude
of alleged and real sins'' (ibid). By turning away from society to individuals, the perspective was
said to be apolitical, supportive of the status quo, unscientific, journalistic, and above all,
“astructural and hostile to the classical questions of macro sociology” (ibid).
- 196 9

Symbolic interactionism encapsulated a vision wherein one does not have to decide
between the part or the whole, structure or agency, or the individual or society. The insight that
humans interact with each other in meaningful ways, coupled with a call to attend to that
meaning, opened the door to treating the interaction as the unit of analysis. The same pattern
can be observed in other sociological texts of the period as exemplified, among other writings, in
Habits of the Heart, a widely celebrated national bestseller published in 1985 that attests to the
shift of “relationships” into the center of collective thought.
According to Robert Bellah and his co-authors, something had changed in US culture.
Before the 1980s, society and its institutions guaranteed social coherence. By restraining and
regulating individuals and instilling the same set of moral norms in each unit, institutions
created highly structured relationships between individuals and the society they inhabited. As
the decade ended, society no longer had the significance it once did, culminating in what he
characterized as a "crisis of civic membership” and “mass disengagement” from society.
In Bellah’s words,“civic consciousness" was replaced by personal identity and personal
relationships in collective thought10. As therapy11 became the cultural lens of the age, "personal
relationships" became the dominant category for making sense of the world. As Americans
became increasingly preoccupied with personal relationships, society ceased to be the epicenter
and fulcrum of people's attention, thought, and activities. Thinking through the category of
“relationships” produced a specific way of understanding problems and dysfunction. According
to Bellah, Americans could not see structural factors – from widening health disparities,
deindustrialization and the new pressures of a gobal economy to the movement of blue collar

As people lost their sense of social responsibility and connection to society, anything more
significant than their immediate circle was unthinkable. The large-scale abdication of interest in
the fate of the whole manifested in countless forms, including withdrawal into gated
communities, erosion of public trust in government, disinterest in voting, and disengagement
with politics in general.
11
According to Bellah, this new discursive landscape included a "therapeutic ethos," a style of
thought that put the autonomous individual at the center of all reasoning.
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jobs beyond cities and increasingly even outside the United States -- as in any way responsible
for mass anxieties experienced by an increasing number of people such as widening wealth
disparities, deindustrialization and the movement of blue-collar jobs outside of cities and the
country. Instead, in the new and shifting cultural vision, instability arising from mass economic
restructuring seemed correlated with the decline of family values just as alleged ‘culture of
poverty’ problems evident alongside diminishing government supports appeared as though
originating from personal failures. Indeed, a decade of cuts to public services and the ideology
that justified them convinced the US public "that governmental social programs have been
failures" (1985, 215) and that interventions at the level of society did not work. As more and
more Americans sought personal improvement, whether through self-help books or varied kinds
of therapy, they became convinced that while society could not be changed, but individuals and
their relationships -- and thus were now the only legitimate points of interventions.
Again, the “new style of thought” put relationships at its cultural center. However,
relationships themselveswere perceived as of a different quality than those of the past.
Previously, relationships and roles were seen as though close to synonomous: both entailed
obligations and imperatives that were pre-determined and unchanging. Also, in the past,
structures over and above the individual -most notably religion - had governed the type of
relationships people entered into and their behavior in said relationships; individuals thought
about commitments like marriage, work, political and religious commitments as broader moral
imperatives or social norms. As obligations to society, they bound individuals to their role in
maintaining the system. Consequently, as society and "social consciousness" fell to the wayside,
the purpose of relationships appeared as though enhancement of an individual’s existence
rather than asthough fulfilling broader and societal moral imperatives (47). Relationships were
no longer justified by their connections with traditions and conventions, but began to be

- 198 -

imagined as their creating a "full sharing of spontaneous feelings" on the part of and for the
benefit of individuals (58).
Thus, freed from the rigid structures of the past, everything from the length and extent of
obligations to degree of closeness, became perceived as subject to personal choice.
Relationships became flexible and malleable entities that could be created at will. According to
Bellah, Americans felt that they could only make a genuine connection to their relationships if
they were voluntary: in his words, "such relationships exist as the expression of the choices of
free selves that make it up, and if the relationship no longer meets individual needs, it ends"
(107). These new social forms were justified by "how it makes me feel" and, as a result, feelings
and their management became a new imperative. In Bellah’s vision, once eternal relationships
could now be made and unmade; they could be engineered and managed now that they were no
longer bound by stable and permanent norms. This form of life and style of reasoning was best
exemplified by the manager and the therapist whose roles became indistinguishable. Just as
managers made decisions about resource allocation for corporations, therapists helped people
do the same for their emotions. However, the manager-therapist's funoverweening function-incommon was to manage, i.e., to help their clients plan, design, create, maintain, or end
relationships.
GLOBALIZATION AND MULTICULTURALISM
As Bellah was careful to point out, this new form of life entailed a deep albeit concealed
contradiction: the new and seemingly bottomless control of micro phenomena such as
relationships was tied to the complete loss of control of any large-scale processes. While the
manager-therapist allowed individuals to relish the exercise of personal choice in private areas
of their lives, they, in so doing, obscured the virtually complete turning over of public decisions
to bureaucratic managers that characterized the cultural climate. As I now turn toward
exemplifying even further, what surfaced as part of the new cultural spirit was-- in addition to
- 199 -

the sense that relationships were malleable as played out in discourses around globalization and
multiculturalism -- an intense desire to avoid contradictions.
In 1990 Charles Krauthammer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning political columnist, proclaimed
that the “wish and work” of the United States should be to “integrate” with Europe and Japan.
According to the author, this would usher in a new universalism that could “depreciate” the
notion of sovereignty12. Krauthammer was among the many commentators who saw
“globalization” as characteristic of the end of sovereignty.
Sovereignty itself meant organizing the world through rigid territorial norms that were
the result of and cause of past and present conflict up to and including world wars. Globalization
theory spoke to a sense that attending to relations between things is key to making sense of
them. The “opening up” of previously “closed” countries, the proliferation of a cosmopolitan
human rights agenda, the rise of new information technologies believed to have followed the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the spread of economic liberalism around the world: all
signaled the end of conflict and a new understanding and image of the globe as interconnected
via complex and multidimensional networks.
Multiculturalism and globalization were powerful framing devices and suggestive ways of
thinking, primarily because they envisioned the world in terms of networks and interactions. In
this new world order, the political questions were not about maintaining national power but
about managing relations and maintaining the systems of global entanglement. Nation-states

Sovereignty was a theory of wholes and parts. This was something different, a new way of
seeing things. By the early 1990s, the Cold War and colonization had run their course. With the
end of the various communist experiments in Eastern Europe and decolonization replacing
colonial workings with nation’s systems of power, sociologists shared the sense that nationstates and the constellation of the world that envisioned power as located at the national level
had been swept away. They began to understand power very differently. “Power” was no longer
about military might and the subordination of others via war and conquest, but something that
was distributed and circulated in complex, multi-level, and ambiguous ways. This new vision of
power was described in spatial terms: “becoming worldwide,” a “compression of time and
space.” The collapse of distinctions between the “far and near”; the “local and the global.”
12

- 200 -

were dependent on one another and connected in such complex ways that “relationships”
became the unit of analysis in understanding how the globe works.
In the social sciences, “globalization” was a claim associated with the belief that
deepened interconnectedness was transforming the nature of society and that the sovereign
state had been replaced with a multi-layered, multilateral system of global governance
(Rosenberg 2005, 2). The new global system was a relational form of society, and relationships
between nation-states had deepened to the point where it no longer made sense to think of them
as autonomous “parts” rather than as nodes in a network. There was a sense that we had
relationships to nations, to things, and events that were far away. These relationships were no
longer organized by space and time but bythe awareness of profound interconnectedness, i.e. of
a hidden network that ran below and interwove previously hostile or contradictory things
together.
WE SHOULD GET ALONG. WHY FIGHT?
The world picture associated with globalization envisioned the globe as made of
contingent and fast-moving ties and networks. “Multiculturalism,” an idea that emerged at the
same time. foregrounded relationships in a similar way. As Chapter 5 detailed, the notion of the
US as a “melting pot” had become suspicious and in the 1980s as “multiculturalism” became the
dominant metaphor for the structure of US society. Unlike the melting pot idea that assumed
homogeneity, integration, and parts coming together to form a whole, “multiculturalism” was a
discourse centered on the compatibility or incompatibility of different groups at a local and
global level; it raised questions about the meaning of national identity and its power to mediate
differences.
In the popular imagination, multiculturalism is often understood the outcome of the
struggle of minorities for recognition. Contemporary scholars see it as a “veneer”or “cosmetic
fix” to the conflicts in US society that have shifted analytical lenses away from structural racism
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to the importance of cultural identities (Lentin 2005). As a tool of managing difference through
policy, it is based on a logic that categorizes and classifies human differences in terms of
“culture” by placing ethnicity and “identity” at the forefront of understanding how and why
human groups are distinct from another. This is a tendency that can be traced back to the 1959
UNESCO statement on race that declare race not a biological reality but, rather, that culture
was the only acceptable category for coming to terms with differences.
Unlike thinking of difference in terms of race, which implies conflict and deep division as
well as an “us” vs “them” mentality, multiculturalism started to celebrate difference and
diversity. The language of cultural relativism was adopted on the right side of the political
spectrum as an overt effort to shun the recognition blatant racism in favor of softer discourses
on discourse on cultural compatibility and incompatibility. According to critics,
“multiculturalism” was as much of a celebration of difference as it was a form of “diversity
management” and a way of thinking about how to address “difference and the problems it may
lead to” (Lentin 2005, 394).
Others on the conservative side of the political spectrum such as Arthur Schlesinger
(1992), Dinesh D’Souza (1991), EB Hirsch (1987), Allan Bloom, and Rush Lemberg reacted to
discourse on multiculturalism with extreme hostility. Regardless of the political veracity of their
critiques, they saw what their more progressive counterparts were focusing upon as an erosion
of boundaries, an abandonment of norms, and a new way of thinking in terms of compatibility
between what were previously considered incompatible elements. For example, in a still popular
account, The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom depicted multiculturalism as emblematic of
a new way of thinking that was “open to everything” (i.e. malleable) and “unable to recognize
any contradiction.” Bloom described the political situation of his day as a case of “inflamed
sensitivity” where students are free from constraints... where religion and national origin have
left almost no effect on them and where any limit seemed arbitrary and tyrannical.” He claimed
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that with the embrace of the rhetoric of multiculturalism, US culture had become too tolerant or
“open” to difference, and that such tolerance was blurring previously clear distinctions between
truth, and ideology, nature and culture, and the inside and outside. According to Bloom, the
problem of getting along with outsiders had become secondary to having an inside, a people, a
way of life, and to the sense that any contradictions or limits were oppressive. “Since
ethnocentrism or the desire to belong is no longer binding, students think that we should all get
along. Why fight?” (85).
For Bloom, multiculturalism went hand in hand with a loss of tolerance for conflict and
other forms of contradiction. Conflict was a natural state (thus, the desire to “all get along” is
artificial), and it has been a permanent part of the US history: “there have always been frictions
between the remains of Puritan ideology and continuous secular development towards equality
of rights… The refusal to accept this, that the US was never melting pot and the resulting
complaint about racism is a symptom of this pathological aversion to conflict” (ibid).
The similarities between Bloom’s critique of feminism and Drexler’s characterization of
nanotechnology are uncanny:
Feminism challenged a permanent human inclination. As such, it ends up forgetting
nature and using force to refashion human beings to secure abstract justice. Feminism
and other “liberations” denied that there may be a feminine nature and “shook it loose
from its teleological moorings; a dangerous move that caused reproduction without the
family and damaged nature; the souls of men—their ambitious, warlike, protective,
possessive character must be dismantled to liberate women from their domination.
Machismo was a natural passion in man’s psychology. Men must be reeducated and must
accept the feminine nature. It is possible to “soften’ them but to make them ‘care’ is
another and this project must inevitably fail (75).
Unlike Drexler, who believed “engineering compatibility” held the key to solving
humanity’s problems once and for all, Bloom envisioned feminism’s attempts to improve upon
nature as not only violent and destructive but impossible: “we must not cloud our vision to an
extent that we believe there are variable structures just because we need or want them” (ibid).
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FROM AUTHORITY TO COLLABORATION, COMPROMISE, AND SHARED
DECISION MAKING
In 1974, Ivan Illich wrote Medical Nemesis, where he argued that medicine had become
an “aggressor” and a threat to society. Illich’s treatise was treated as a fringe ideology in his own
time; however, by the 1990s, medicine was routinely described as violent, invasive, and toxic. By
1997, 32.7 million Americans disavowed conventional treatments in favor of what is often
referred to as "natural" or "holistic" medicine.
Although the specific types of therapies associated with "holistic" medicine are diverse
and include homeopathy, chiropractic, spiritual healing, acupuncture, or meditation, they share
an antagonism toward modern medicine's “technological bias and view of the body as a machine
where the malfunctioning parts can be diagnosed and fixed with correct technologies”
(Guttmacher 1979, 15). According to Andrew Weil, a spokesperson of the movement,
“Medicine’s chemicals drugs are violent and an assault on nature" (1986, 102). They poison the
body and produce side effects. On the other hand, “natural drugs are inherently safe because the
whole plant has in-built safety mechanisms that are lost when the substance is refined in pure
form” (102-105). Unlike the toxic chemicals associated with scientific medicine that weaken the
body, “holistic” medicine promised to eradicate illness while strengthening the body and its
natural defenses. Unlike scientific medicine, which saw disease caused by pathogens or illfunctioning organs, holistic medicine took a "multidimensional" approach to health. In this
model, disease was not a dysfunction but an "imbalance," lack of wholeness, connection, and
harmony manifested in a highly unique way depending on the individual. A lack of health was
caused by the interaction of physical, mental, emotional, spiritual, and environmental factors
(Williams 2000, 1195) such as bad relationships, negative thinking, and “toxins” that
accumulate from food, air, pollution, nuclear radiation, and technologies compelling humans to
live unnatural “lifestyles.” Thus, the cure involved restoring wholeness and connection. Also,
unlike its scientific counterpart, "holistic" medicine was not satisfied with eradicating disease or
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returning pathological organs to normality/ functionality. In this new discursive landscape,
"health" became “vitality,” a sense of well-being, an "integration of the body, mind, and spirit,” a
"radiance," and perfect balance (ibid).
Medical authority traditionally relies on the doctor's expertise: doctors understand the
patient's body and illness better than patients because they possess specialized knowledge and
skills. By the 1990s, people longed for a genuine relationship between doctor and patient and
were dissatisfied with what they now saw as an impersonal technical encounter (Siahpush
1998). Although people complained that doctors had "lost their human touch" and spent too
little time with patients, a latent question lurked underneath these complaints about the status
of “rational” scientific expert authority.
The widespread desire to participate in their own healing processes was a barely hidden
disavowal of the inherent conflict between the doctor and patient that was traditionally settled
via recourse to a hierarchy based on knowledge. The doctor had expertise that the patient
lacked, and thus, had the power to declare what was deemed best even if the patient disagreed.
By the 1990s, though, Americans were no longer willing to accept power differentials of this kind
between doctors and patients, preferring instead to commence conceiving of medical encounters
as mutual interactions. "Holistic medicine" promised an antidote to medicine’s supposed
impersonality by claiming that therapeutic relationships are the key to healing. Since holistic
medicine viewed health as coming from within, and not from technology or drugs, doctors
redefined the medical practitioner’s role as akin to that of a psychoanalyst – i.e., as based on
relationality and personal connection. Indeed, many claimed that the interaction between
doctor and patient was wholly determinative of whether a patient would achieve health. In so
doing, they elevated the management of clinical relationships above knowledge and technical
competence. Ultimately, scientific medicine came to accept this view.
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Historically, medicine had always responded to challenges to its authority by asserting
its boundaries and declaring its opponents illegitimate and dangerous to society. However, in
the 1980s, the American Medical Association declared that holistic medicine must be
"accommodated" and unverified treatments became "complementary" to medical treatment.
Oncologists worried about this development as cancer patients were uniquely vulnerable to
promises of therapies that would cure their illness without side effects. This was so because
firstly, cancer treatments were and still are extraordinarily aggressive while often unable to cure
the disease. But also, and secondly, oncologists feared that side effects equal or worse than the
disease itself would cause people to turn to kinder but ineffective therapies.
By the late 1980s, medical researchers evaluated the efficacy of one complementary
treatment after another and found none. However, medicine elevated "compromise" into an
imperative and demanded that doctors take a “complex” approach to decision-making and
abstain from condemning their patients' use of unproven therapies. For example, in an article in
the ultra-prestigious Journal of Clinical Oncology, doctors were instructed to be "open-minded"
and "non-judgmental" and to recognize that patients have the right to forgo conventional
therapy" (Bernstein 2016, 85). As medical textbooks now regularly remind aspiring physicians,
the key to clinical success is not knowledge or technical expertise but “communication skills,
sensitivity, empathy, and ability to offer patients emotional support” (ibid). The rhetoric of
collaboration, compromise, and mutual decision-making almost, but not quite, conceals the
power differential, authority, and inherent conflicts of interests that are built into medical
encounters by design. Like nanoscientists and researchers in contemporary oncology labs who
spend their time “managing nano-bio interactions” (Shi 2017, 21) by creating affinities,
attractions, and other cooperative relationships, now doctors sought to create positive
relationships with “clients” and to manage clinical interactions.
VACCINES
- 206 -

The development of vaccines was once considered one of the most significant strides ever
made in the history of medicine. By the 1980s, however, the US public no longer understood
vaccination as unequivocally beneficial. Although Andrew Wakefield’s fraudulent study linking
the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR) vaccine to autism is often blamed for the advent of
the anti-vaccine movement, his now-infamous 1980 Lancet article was a symptom of the rise of
the new cultural spirit. The sense that vaccines are dangerous had little to do with the evidence.
Wakefield's ideas about vaccination may have been accepted, though, because they fit squarely
with a new attitude about what it meant to be a part of society.
The new attitude was bttressed by the logic of “herd immunity.” This occurs when a large
portion of a community (the herd) becomes immune to a disease, making the spread of disease
from person to person unlikely. Such immunity means that a whole community becomes
protected, not just those individuals who are immune, making immunization science an ‘of the
whole’ approach par excellence. Like functionalism, the notion accepts that what is good for the
whole may be harmful to some parts. From a bioethics perspective, achieving herd immunity
and minimizing the amount of “freeloaders" is in the best interest of society. Thus, health care
providers operated under the assumption that while they had a moral duty to treat everyone
with non-maleficence, avoiding harm to society at all costs outweighed their obligation to
individuals. Thus, even if vaccines did come with side effects or disadvantages to a few
individuals, the net benefit to society took precedence over individual harm. Approximately 1 in
every 100,000 vaccines will result in an injury: these are good risk odds from the point of view
of the “herd.”
As society and the notion of the whole, in general, fell out of favor conceptually, though,
epidemiological and population-level risk arguments for vaccinations were likewise stripped to
some extent of their former power. Many felt that such statistics do not consider individuals’
specific experiences, ideologies, and health histories, and that the small risk associated with
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vaccines was too great to tolerate. Moreover, some mothers considered their own child’s
immune system as unique and therefore as not appropriate for the recommended vaccination
schedule.
The centrality of the category of relationships was eventually embraced by medicine and
manifested as the idea that a good doctor was one who maintained positive clinical interactions.
This and similar ideas were concrete manifestations of a desire to maintain good relationships
with all in the community, including those who actively rejected medicine. Rather than fighting
against the new ideology, they compromised with it. Since the 1980s, an increasing number of
Americans became convinced that the minute traces of mercury (much less than in a can of
tuna) contained in the MMR vaccine caused autism and/or other disorders, and started to reject
the idea of vaccinations. Consequently, and by way of example of the spirit of compromise that
thereafter emerged, manufacturers removed Thimerosal, a mercury compound that is used as a
preservative from vaccines, from their list of products. There was no evidence to suggest that it
was harmful; still, scientists and doctors hopedtheir willingness to make concessions to people’s
fears by removing a product simply because people did not like it, would build trust, and return
medicine’s lost authority.
Merely five years later, 667 people across 23 states, most intentionally unvaccinated,
contracted measles. This outbreak of measles in 2019 led New York City to declare a public
health emergency. Purposely unvaccinated children under three made up an overwhelming
number of cases and the total number of cases, according to the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, exceeded 1200 and spanned 13 states. New York City alone spent over $6 million
dollars containing the crisis. In 2020, the same compromise rendered a vaccine that could have
ended a global pandemic ineffective. Although the vaccine “worked” from a medical and
scientific point of view, the public’s refusal to utilize it not only foreclosed the possibility of the
vaccine becoming a solution to the pandemic but also gave rise to a new set of problems.
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ON THINGS THAT DO NOT BELONG TOGETHER
The same emphasis on relationality in conjunction with an “engineering” ethos can be
seen in the natural sciences of that period. Cultivating cells in Petri dishes for the first time not
only opened the possibility of controlling biological matter to an unprecedented degree but
grounded a new mode of seeing. Biological processes no longer appeared as inevitable, fixed in
duration, or impenetrable but as flexible objects whose form, function, and development
depended on the whims of scientists and engineers (Landecker, 2007: 228). It created a sense
that relationships are contingent and can be assembled and disassembled at will.
One of the strongest examples of this new attitude can be observed in Biosphere 2, a
three acre glass-and-steel terrarium in the Arizona desert, that featured 3800 species of plants
and animals. Constructed between 1987 and 1991, Biosphere 2 was designed to test human
capacity for living in isolation, and was an attempt to solve the environmental crisis. By this
point, it was clear that humans had devastated the earth with their activities. While ecologists
focused on preserving nature by addressing factors that had led to the current crisis, Biosphere 2
posited migration to space as an answer. Its official purpose was to research and develop
autonomous space colonization technologies, and the hope was that people sealed inside the
biome would be entirely self sufficient and able to live independently of the outside world. They
would grow their food and recycle all air, water, and waste.
The 14 acres sealed warehouse contained a microcosm of the Earth’s biomes, a miniature
rain forest, a desert, a little ocean, a mangrove swamp, a savanna, and a small farm. In 1991, a
crew of eight sealed themselves inside. Over the next two years, they grew 80 percent of their
food, recycled their sewage and effluent, and drank the same water (totally purified by their
plants, soil, atmosphere, and machines) countless times. Biosphere 2’s creators described its
aim as learning about what happens when “the totality of living beings, together with air,
minerals, and water are controlled through biochemical cycles” (Reider 2009, 69). Earth
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became Biosphere 1, and Biosphere 2 would be a glasshouse, not a whole planet, but it would
become like a whole world to its inhabitants (70). Its designers did not discover a new world but
built one in which they could control and manipulate every variable. Media reports labeled it a
“planet in a bottle.” Its makers proclaimed that it stood to “prove that humans, technology, and
wild nature could co-exist harmoniously under the same roof” (3). Creating an entirely enclosed
world spoke to the desire for a completely controlled and perfectly designed environment.
Biosphere 2's project managers hired ecologists to design nature and "integrate organisms
under one roof" (ibid). The "eco-technicians," as they referred to themselves, understood that
building a "stable and complex" system from scratch entailed addressing the classical
contradiction between complexity and control. They also knew that they were expected to design
a system that delivered both. In an attempt to build a "whole" world that was perfectly managed
and controlled but also complex, ecologists planned and argued over every species that was to be
put into the terrarium. Selecting the plants and animals entailed careful considerations of every
possible relationship and interaction as well as calculating its likely consequence.
The assumption underlying the project consisted of the idea that all life forms can be
made compatible. Anything can fit together according to this ideology of no limits or necessity
regarding how relationships are organized. The scientist's task was essentially to incorporate
species into an ecosystem that did not belong together. Outside of the domed glass walls, the
plants, animals, and insects would never interact. Thus, every relationship and every interaction
was open to engineering. The scientist's overwhelming concern that even the smallest element in
the equation could lead to the entire ecosystem becoming undone meant that every possible
interaction and relationship between species had to be accounted for and planned. Like Drexler,
scientists were possessed with the sense that anything can be put together and that anything can
be made compatible if the things in question are carefully engineered and controlled at the
deepest level.
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What was supposed to be a glass-enclosed, pristine and smoothly functioning Earth
became a place choked with carbon dioxide and nitrogen, uncontrollable weedy vines, wildly
proliferating populations of cockroaches and ants, and dying birds. As David Tilman put it, the
reason for the lack of success was science's lack of knowledge and tools required to "manage"
ecosystems or "make better" biomes (2006, 18). In the end, things did not go as planned and the
project was deemed a failure - one of “science’s worst failures” and yet, like nanomedicine, it
continues to go on.
FROM ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION TO TISSUE ENGINEERING
Like Drexler’s nanotechnology, Biosphere 2 spoke to an ethos of managing relationships
and designing a perfectly organized system from its fundamental elements. Undergirding this
ambition is the belief that the natural world is infinitely malleable as was becoming a general
trend in biology. At the beginning of the 20th century, biology became obsessed with the notion
of "plasticity." Imbued with the desire to exploit the malleability of living things, scientists
started to see matter comprising everything from brains and bodies to human society envisioned
as open, contingent, and ever-changing (Landecker 2010, 8). Stem cells harbor the capacity to
"differentiate into any cell of an organism and have the ability of self-renewal" (Zakrzewski
2019, 23) and can be used medically to replace other cells that have been lost through illness or
wear and tear. In mammals, around 50 to 150 cells make up the inner cell mass during the
blastocyst stage of embryonic development of around 5 to 14 days. These cells have stem-cell
capacity. If they are kept inside the body, they eventually differentiate. However, if they are
isolated, they can be kept in the stem-cell stage. There is typically a minimal number of adult
stem cells in each tissue and, once removed from the body, their capacity to divide is limited,
making the generation of large quantities of adult stem cells for therapies difficult.
Although scientists first discovered a way to derive stem cells from mouse embryos in
1981, regenerative medicine only emerged as potential when they learned how to extract stem
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cells from human embryos and grow them outside of the body in a laboratory. In 1998, Science
reported the development of the "first embryonic stem cell lines" (Thomson et al. 1998, 5) by a
team from the University of Wisconsin who successfully isolated cells from the inner cell mass of
early embryos. Historians of medicine see the article as the beginning of regenerative medicine
that, like nanotechnology, is still a science-about-to-come. Nevertheless, the technical advances
described by the authors sparked "new possibilities" such as explaining how specific congenital
disabilities and cancer come about, revolutionizing drug screening and development, and
unlocking new knowledge about human development (Eguizabal 2019). The "holy grail" of stem
cell technology was always the ability to make "spare parts" to replace diseased or damaged cells
and tissue associated with degenerative conditions like Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease,
spinal cord injury, heart disease, diabetes, and arthritis. Researchers were attracted to stem cells
because of their flexibility and malleability. This took several forms. First, human embryonic
stem cells are "pluripotent," which means that they can divide infinitely into daughter cells and
retain the capacity to differentiate into any cell into the body. Second, stem cells act as "internal
repair systems" of the body, but they do not have a fixed place in the organism; with the right
prompting, they can become anything. In addition, they are nomadic and can be routinely
maintained alive in a laboratory setting in a culture dish that contains a nutrient broth. Finally,
the original cells can yield millions of stem cells, and batches of cells can be frozen and shipped
to other laboratories for further culture and experimentation.
The ability to generate large numbers of specialized cells from stem cells has led to their
use for testing the safety of new medicines, thereby reducing the need for animal testing. For
example, cancer stem cells are often used to screen potential anti-tumor drugs. Scientists and
engineers, however, believe that stem cells have much more potential. Research is still exploring
the possibility of "tissue engineering" as an alternative to organ transplantation. Currently, the
need for transplantable tissues and organs far outweighs the available supply, and stem cells
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may offer a possible renewable source of "spare parts." Organ transplantation operated under
the logic of "self and non-self" in that the new addition to the body enabled the body to continue
working; however, the new part was always treated as foreign. Following a transplant, the new
body-as-a-whole was functional in that the new organ did its job. However, rejection was always
a concern, and the immune system had to be suppressed with daily anti-rejection drugs. Unlike
transplantation, tissue engineering would create a brand new organ that is functional and
perfectly compatible with the rest of the body. Therefore, replacing a body part via tissue
engineering would not involve a foreign being introduced into a whole. Furthermore, since the
new organ was grown from the recipient's body, rejection would not be a problem.
Instead of suppressing the immune system, to ensure compatibility between the
organs inside the body and those grown and harvested in the lab, scientists would "administer
cell populations" via a series of processes designed to manage and manipulate cells to bring
about the properties and behaviors needed for successful differentiation, transplantation, and
engraftment. Like genetic testing, assisted reproductive technologies and other artifacts of the
budding biotech industry, stem cell engineering ushered in a reorganization and
reconceptualization of boundaries within the human body.
The discourse and images associated with stem cells in particular capture the hope of
developing new kinds of "separable, exchangeable and re-incorporable body parts" (Rabinow,
1999, 95). They also changed the ontological status of the body-as-organism. In the functionalist
body, every organ, tissue, and cell played a distinct role in maintaining the integrity and
homeostasis of the organism. Stem cell technology was an antithesis to such a vision. Before
discovering stem cells, physiologists believed that all cells are specialized; they had a fixed and
predetermined function. Unlike regular cells, however, stem cells lack a stable and essential
identity. Their form and function depend on the organ they end up or are placed in. They are
malleable, plastic and can be engineered to be compatible with any bodily system. Of course, like
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cancer nanomedicine, tissue engineering is just around the corner, almost, but not quite there
yet.
ENGINEERING THE FAMILY
The discovery of stem cells created the possibility of "administering" and controlling
populations of cells to create "spare parts," organs, and tissues that can replace damaged or
diseased counterparts .The last case study presented here shows how the same engineering
approach culminated in an attempt to come to terms with what many described as the “crisis of
the family” by translating the notion of “engineering compatibility” from the biological to the
social realms.
Although the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to a broad range of bioengineering projects,
reproductive technologies occupy a special place in public discourse. The debate around
gestational surrogacy is exemplary in this regard. Unlike what became "partial" or "traditional"
surrogacy, wherein a pregnancy is conceived via artificial insemination and the woman who
carries the child is the biological mother of the child, gestational surrogacy involved a host
carrying a child that was completely unrelated to her (Brinden, 2003). Gestational surrogacy is
predicated on in vitro fertilization (IVF), which involves fertilizing an egg with sperm outside of
the body in a laboratory setting, growing the products of conception in a Petri dish, and
implanting them in the uterus. Scientifically, the rise of gestational surrogacy was not a huge
step forward. However, as many scholars including Markens (2007), point out, the rise of
gestational surrogacy had an enormous impact on a cultural level. It became a stand-in for social
concerns because it encapsulated and gave concrete form to certain tendencies in the collective
imagination.
As Markens' narrative demonstrated, gestational surrogacy attracted a public outcry
following a case known as "Baby M," where a surrogate fought for the legal custody of the child
she had gestated, culminating in a special task force and a slew of legislative responses. While
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critics and supporters advocated for different causes, the logic underneath their rhetoric is
indistinguishable. Both sides relied on the same ideas and rhetoric about the family, namely,
that the natural concept of the family flows from biology. Implicit in this assumption is that the
family consists of two heterosexual parents and their children (Markens 2007). The language
and metaphors used to frame surrogacy as a social issue congeal around the meaning of family,
motherhood, and family- relationships previously understood as permanent, unalterable, and as
constitutive of all other social relationships.
Gestational surrogacy became an urgent issue because of its potential to alter the
meaning of family. According to critics, gestational surrogacy eliminated the biological
connection between the mother and child. Its widespread use would decompose and tear apart
hitherto permanent relationships, paving the way for science and technology to recreate the
family and turn it into an artificial and engineered entity. By deconstructing parenthood into its
component parts," reproductive technologies have rendered family ties "contingent and
revocable" (Rao, 2016, 952). They created a "world wherein families can be ordered by
individuals and their choices, not by biology or society" (ibid). In this “technologically mediated
family," the commitment and obligation of one family member to another would be voluntary,
and "family rel’ationships can be freely exited, accepted, or rejected" (965).
The money exchange between the surrogate and the parents attracted the most critical
attention. Concerns about commercialization and commodification rested on the category of
"relationships.” The notion of the traditional family relies on the separation between the family
and the market. The nuclear family was a private "haven in a heartless world" primarily because
family ties were radically different and in opposition to economic ones. Family relationships are
close, based on love and affection but, most importantly, ironclad and inevitable because alleged
to flow from biology. On the other hand, market-based relations are typically characterized by
voluntary and temporary associations. According to critics, the rise of gestational surrogacy
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would dissolve the barrier between the family and the market and eliminate the distinction
between the two types of relationships. According to one account, surrogacy "moves us closer
toward a world of "private ordering" (ibid) wherein the nature and scope of obligations to others
are the product of individual choices. Discourse around gestational surrogacy captures the
conceptual reshuffling of the categories of relationships and connections generally. The idea that
technology has the power to make unmake and remake previously permanent relationships,
such as the family, or to altogether previously thought-to-be fixed boundaries such as those that
separated the private from the public, speaks to a sense that relationships are malleable, elastic,
and open to engineering. Be that as it may, the notion of the family as a site or product of
engineering relationships was not limited to the realm of biotechnology. Intensive mothering
did at the social level what IVF did at the biological level.
INTENSIVE PARENTING
At present, children tend to be seen as more vulnerable to risks impacting physical and
emotional development than at prior historical moments. As a corollary, parents are understood
by policymakers, parenting experts, and parents themselves as having a hugely determining role
in an individual child's development and future. The origins of discourse that granted parenting
and the parental role social importance can be traced back to the crystallization of discourse
around "intensive parenting" in the 1990s. Although the precise definition of this term is
controversial, in general, it describes an ideology that urges mothers to spend a tremendous
amount of time, energy, and money raising their children” (Hays 1996, 8). It entails a sense that
parents, mothers especially, are responsible for all aspects of their children's lives. Thus, every
factor in an infant's life must be carefully managed if their children are to become educationally
and socially successful. The Continuum Concept is widely credited with laying down the
foundation for the shift in the meaning of parenting. After a year of fieldwork among a native
tribe, Jean Leidoff the book's author, concluded that modern society and life are contrary to
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human needs and proposed that mothering, when done correctly, can offset the consequences of
this incompatibility.
Leidoff envisioned modern society as destructive and unequivocally harmful to
individuals. She also believed that as a whole, society cannot be changed: "If we had the
opportunity to live the sort of life for which we have evolved, the conflict [between the individual
and society] would be resolved, but it is sadly impractical, unrealistic, utopian, to describe a
culture to which ours could be changed." (1975, 12). However, "even in a culture like ours,
developed without taking the real needs of its people into account... there is room to improve
our chances and reduce our errors in every small way that presents itself from day to day [...]
Without waiting to change society at all, behaving correctly towards our infants—instead of
depriving them -will make their life in a culture that does not consider the needs of its people,
easier” (ibid).
According to Leidoff, an infant cared for as nature prescribed is "innately social" (1975,
47). When natural, the relationship between an infant and its mother is "harmonious and
peaceful" (ibid). This harmony is then reflected in social harmony, where adherence to social
order comes naturally and does not need to be imposed. In modern society, such "innate
sociality" has eroded and, as a result, people lack "strong proclivity for behaving as people feel
they are expected to" (53). She contends further that modern society has destroyed motherchild relationships, resulting in dysregulated behavior and "damaged personalities.” Thus, it was
only logical that the mother-infant bond became key to restoring the sociality that had been lost.
Despite its obsession with "returning to nature" or living as nature intended, discourse
around intensive parenting is organized via an engineering ethos. According to its rhetoric,
parenting ought to be guided by experts and conducted according to manuals that flooded the
marketplace. Although the specific protocols vary among the hundreds of such publications, the
logic is the same: every detail of an infant’s life must be carefully planned and controlled. They
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define good mothering as behavior that reduces even the most minuscule risks to offspring by
treating an infant's every need, no matter how small, as a matter of urgency and grave
importance. Failing to hold a baby, leaving it to cry for too long, or ignoring its needs "can
potentially lead to antisocial personalities and other signs of nonconformity (13)
In retrospect, it is obvious that the national obsession with parenting was a response to
collective anxieties around the changing role of women in society and concerns about the
changing form and function of the family. Intensive parenting was also a framework for
understanding social problems and contradictions. Modern culture is characterized by
oppositions and binaries. One set of normative opposites is the private and public. As women
entered the workforce, they experienced the pain of balancing the contradictory demands of
professional work and home life. Intensive parenting addressed the problem of living between
the private and public by framing motherhood as a professional activity that requires specialized
skills and knowledge (for example, Sears 2011).
The shift in the meaning of parenting rendered the mother-child relationship—
not poverty, class, or differential access to social and cultural capital--responsible for social
order or disorder. Its central idea that creating positive parent-child relationships can solve
large-scale structural problems such as poverty, addiction, or crime speaks to a new way of
identifying and dealing with pathological elements. Just as Drexler's narrative promised
nanotechnology would solve large-scale problems without political action, social change, or
addressing the source or causes of the issue, the logic of intensive parenting contains a desire to
transform the world into one that is conducive to human life without large-scale change. The
vision of practices underneath the rhetoric around parenting that emerged in the 1980s viewed
society and culture as entities that are profoundly incompatible with human needs but cannot be
changed. In this framework, dysfunction and dysregulation can only be prevented at the microlevel through small everyday practices associated with parenting. In this context, "parenting"
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becomes something akin to engineering— i.e., planning, management, and control over the most
minute details of an infant's life. Underlined by a logic that places relationships at the front and
center of reasoning, intensive parenting entails a promise that treating child rearing the way a
nano-scientist would approach the matter, i.e., by engineering compatibility and controlling
relationships at the most fundamental level, is a guarantee of perfect order and perfect
harmony. Intensive parenting created an ideological space whereby previously incompatible
phenomena became compatible. The new vision, of which new ideas about parenting are only
one concretization, used the rhetoric of relationality to paper over contradictions.
THE PROBLEM IS CONFLICT, AND THE SOLUTION IS MANAGING
RELATIONSHIPS
In the functionalist model, parts worked spontaneously on behalf of the whole: the very
structured nature of the relationships guaranteed this. A functionalist system works the way it
does because its parts are ordered into a stable and permanent arrangement. The types of
possible connections and what these relationships entailed were highly ordered, and the
ironclad structure that assigns each unit a specific role and place in the integrated totality
guarantees stability.
To be "functional" is to meet the minimum, not the optimal, requirements of a system. In
the biological world, survival and reproduction are markers of functionality. Similarly, and
sociologically, community life is a testament to the "functioning" of the social structure. The
notion of "functional unity" only refers to a sufficient degree of harmony or integration.
Functionalism framed the cooperation and activity within systems in terms of the "minimum"
(Merton 1957) required. The minimal number of units, the minimum level of cooperation and
motivation were each deemed "sufficient" if the system continued to function.
For a functionalist system, disorder, chaos, and anomie were severe threats. However, it
could be tolerated as long as a particular dysfunction was not permanent or powerful enough to
cause system-wide failure. In such a system, it is enough that the parts do not engage in
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persistent conflict that cannot be resolved or regulated. Whereas functionalism assumed at least
some friction even for Parsons (for whom conflict was barely visible), the purpose of the system
was to keep deviance down to a minimum. “Integration” responded to the constant possibility of
the entire system falling apart. The need for integration speaks to a profound knowledge that the
interests of the system and its units are, by definition, divergent.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the minimum was no longer enough. In 1984, "Normal Accident
Theory," which treated accidents, disasters, and malfunctions as inevitable, was a widely
accepted framework for coming to terms with living in a technologically complex society,
However, in 1989, the idea that malfunction and other types of negativities must be accepted as
a routine part of life was no longer compatible with the socio-cultural climate. Unlike its
predecessor, High-Reliability Theory focused on complex organizations that operated in an
utterly error-free manner (Silei 2014). It was animated by a promise that even the most
extensive and most complicated systems can be designed to be perfectly reliable. By extension,
the idea is that all failures can be prevented with enough planning, control, and foresight. HighReliability Theory made total safety, security, and accuracy into realistic expectations. This
concern with even the most minute risks can be seen in the rejection of vaccination and hyper
concern with side effects and toxins underneath resistance to vaccination.
On a cultural level, the same type of desires manifested as a wanting to “get along.” One
commentator described this period as defined by freedom from any natural constraints, a sense
that any differences can be erased, and a longing for the overcoming of all necessity, tension,
and conflict (Bloom 1987). Whether or not these accounts accurately describe culture of the
1980s and 1900s, they capture the logic of nanotechnology and promise to overcome all
incompatibility. Globalization and multiculturalism promised to forge a civic culture where
differences can exist harmoniously side-by-side without conflict. Or, as in the intensive
parenting example above, mothering is conceived as a solution to the contradictions in modern
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society. In biology, stem cells held the promise of retaining the benefits of organ transplantation
without the problem of rejection. Common across discourse in all these areas recurs a cultural
inability, or lack of desire, to see conflict. As the entry of symbolic interaction into sociology
shows, turning to “interaction” allowed sociologists not to take a side, or to think in terms of
“and” rather than “either/ or.”
Symbolic Interaction gave sociologists the tools to see beyond the dichotomy of the
structure/agency binary. As symbolic interaction became a mainstream approach within the
discipline, the terms of the discussion shifted from the conflict between structure and agency to
"interaction." With meaning and interpersonal face-to-face interactions coming to take center
stage in the sociological imagination, the binary relationship between structure and agency was
no longer the default.

TO HAVE ONE’S CAKE AND EAT IT TOO
What if you could have organization and without an ironclad structure? Stability without
determinism? Drexler’s vision of nanotechnology promised a friction-free world created by
engineering compatibility between previously incompatible parts. Combined with the new
emphasis on interaction, it appeared that if relationships are planned and built carefully, society
could be a purely positive entity, utterly free of negativity. The desire for total positivity was
predicated on a new understanding of relationships as malleable and open to alteration. With
the advent of nanotechnology, whether at the level of reality or of discourse, every substance in
the world— and the world itself— became malleable, changeable, and open to infinite
engineering. From nanotechnology’s viewpoint, any material that nature created can be made
better by altering its structure atom by atom.
While Drexler's new ideas about the behavior and properties of materials thrust
relationality in the center of gravity within the natural sciences, "relationships" became the
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dominant category of understanding across a broad range of areas. If nanotechnology was a
solution, what was the problem? Conflict! Drexler promised that conflict could be engineered
away by planning, controlling, and overseeing how totalities are put together starting from their
most minute elements. Given that relations between things— relationships that create materials
like steel, the family, organs in the body, or society— could, and indeed needed to be engineered,
the key was creating compatibility between elements considered previously incompatible.
Relationships were key in this new ontology, but they were not of the structural-functionalism
kind. Just as Drexler described science's newfound ability to engineer and change matter's
behaviors and properties at unprecedented levels, the discourse around gestational surrogacy
pointed to a sense that relationships that had seemed permanent, including the family, had
newly acquired senses of flexibility and contingency surrounding them.

“CHEMICAL WAR IS NEVER WON”: NANOMEDICINE AS A
WAR ON THE WAR OF CANCER
In 1959, chemists became the masters of matter. Utterly free from nature's limits, they
were free to create materials with any properties they could imagine. So, they did. The invention
of polymers, plastics, and other substances including, most notably, pesticides, paved the way
for industrial chemistry, which made a panoply of chemicals available to every American. By the
1960s, pesticides and herbicides were applied almost universally to farms, gardens, forests, and
homes. The American public, reassured by scientists who also believed the claims themselves,
were convinced that pesticides and herbicides would indeed produce “better living” and make
the world safer, more comfortable, and convenient for humans at no cost and without any
consequences at all. In the collective consciousness, there was no contradiction between
industrial chemistry and nature. They were as compatible as two peas in a pod. This was the soil
in which the seeds of nanotechnology were planted. Yet, by the time they germinated, pesticides
and other forms of pollution had turned into threats of the highest order.
In 1962, Rachel Carson saw something that others did not.
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How can anyone believe it is possible to lay down such a barrage of poison on the surface
of the earth without making it unfit for all life? Pesticides, the non-selective chemicals,
have the power to kill every insect, the good and the bad, to still the song of birds and the
leaping of fish in the streams—to coat the leaves with a deadly film and to linger on in
soil—all this, though the intended target may be only a few weeds or insects. Thus, they
should not be called “insecticides” but “biocides (1962, 87)13.
To manufacturers, toxicologists, and biologists, Carson’s claims were "obviously absurd."
According to an industry spokesperson, the compounds in pesticides were “selective… They
target one species and leave the rest of the ecosystem untouched” (Haberman 2017, 9). Carson
did not believe them. She saw something that others did not because she understood pesticides
from the vantage point of the “noxious weeds” and the "hordes of insects” which, according to
toxicologists, were the real threat to the survival of mankind. As Carson wrote Silent Spring,
radiation therapy bombarded her with toxic rays in the hope of winning the war against cancer
that raged inside her body.
Like pesticides, the non-selective chemicals that kill every insect, the “good and the bad,”
radiation does not distinguish between normal and diseased tissue and thus eradicates both
cancerous and healthy cells. Like many others who handed their bodies over to oncology’s newly
opened “chemical wonderland,” Carson did not die from cancer but from medicine’s “cures.”
Weakened by severe anemia and other common side effects of radiation, she became ill with a
respiratory virus and suffered a fatal heart attack a few days later.
In 2010, the Center for Nanomedicine at Johns Hopkins described chemotherapy as
“spraying an entire rose garden with poison in order to kill a single weed” (2019) without a hint
of irony. Like the pesticide manufacturers, for whom “selectivity” and “targeting” nullified
Carson’s claim that their products were destroying life, nanoscientists promised to eliminate the

Carson’s discourse also shares a concern with relationality and interaction. For example: "The
history of life on earth has been a history of interaction between living things and their
surroundings […] By their very nature, chemical controls are self-defeating, for they have been
devised and applied without taking into account the complex biological systems against which
they have been blindly hurled (1962, 105-7)
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toxic side effects of chemotherapy and protect healthy tissue by targeting specific cells and
delivering drug molecules directly to tumors. Before her death, Carson warned the US public
that chemical war was never won. But unlike pesticides and chemotherapy drugs, nanomedicine
did not want to wage war. It envisioned itself as an antidote to force and destruction.
A PREVIEW OF THE NEXT CHAPTER
Drexler’s vision of nanotechnology combined: (i) the desire for a contradiction-free
existence; (ii) a shift of vision away from society vs. individual structure vs. agency to the
relationships and interactions between them; and (iii) a sense that all permanent arrangements
can be engineered, which culminated in an attitude of “engineering compatibility.”
Although nanomedicine was still two decades away when he wrote The Engines of
Creation, Drexler’s discourse on engineering compatibility and intensely focusing on
relationships significantly impacted the discursive landscape associated with nano-based
targeted delivery. While many object to including Drexler in nanomedicine’s history, just twenty
years after the publication of Drexler's book, scientists and engineers promised—and continue to
promise— to cure cancer without the suffering and destruction associated with chemotherapy,
radiation, and surgery. Cancer nanomedicine’s pledge to eradicate tumors without any side
effects is grounded by an ideology I have labeled “engineering compatibility,” one that frames
designing, engineering, and managing nano-bio interactions as an alternative to killing cancer
using "crude tools" that burn, cut, destroy, and wage war.
As Chapter 7 discusses next, contemporary nano-based targeted delivery was a
“concretization” of that very ethos. I turn now to the category of “destruction” so as to document
how “interaction” became an alternative to “conflict” for contemporary nanomedicine. Nanobased targeted delivery translated this abstract agenda into laboratory practices aimed at
creating structures that can form cooperative relationships with the body's cells, tissues, and
organs as well as with the cancer cells they are designed to eradicate. The following section also
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chronicles nanotechnology’s move into pharmaceutical research. It traces the consolidation of
nanomedicine’s discourse on “targeting” through an examination of nanomedicine’s treatment
of the category of “destruction.”
For nanomedicine, both in cancer and immunology, “targeting” means “engineering
compatibility” through creating affinities between nanoparticles and their “targets.” The
possibility for understanding cancer and its treatments not in terms of oppositionality but
relationality as phenomena belonging to the same type and class justified nano-based targeted
delivery in the oncological imagination. Cancer nanomedicine did not and could not produce the
total peace of mind it promised. The newness of nanotechnology and the excitement around
“smallness,” coupled with the sense that making things smaller could pave the way to solving
addressing problems without force of destruction, obscured targeted delivery’s lack of clinical
success. The cacophony of endless permutations of statements about chemotherapy’s lack of
“specificity,” toxicity, poisoning, and cell-killing turned nano-based targeted delivery into a
viable treatment for cancer by making chemotherapy a problem.
A FINAL NOTE
Drexler’s plan to solve the environmental crisis was as comical and stupid as it was
tragic. His promise that nanotechnology will create compatibility between humans, nature, and
technology is arguably based on a certain repression - a refusal to see the level of destruction
necessary to purge the world of destruction. I often wonder whether Drexler had plans for what
to do with the specimens unfortunate enough to have made it to the age of nanotechnology. Did
he think squirrels would not just wither away and die? Unless humanity was willing to wait for
the last one to die off naturally, they would need to be slaughtered (or euthanized) either en
masse or gradually, one scurry at a time. to think of it, trees may be an even bigger problem in
this regard. Unlike squirrels, they do not readily die, so waiting for the last of its kind to rot or
wither away is not an option. Did Drexler expect us to rip out entire forests? Perhaps he
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preferred that we poison or kill each one individually? Either way, what would we do with all
that wood? Under normal circumstances, we could burn it, but by that time fire would be gone
too, replaced by robots that simulate its effects but without the negative consequences. As
Drexler put it, nature has “tried and failed.” Nano-based targeting will too. Every nanoparticle
that failed clinical trials brought the contradiction in nanomedicine’s foundation closer and
closer to the surface. Of course, this contradiction was not produced by nanoscientists in
oncology labs. It was handed to them..
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PART III: DESTRUCTION
CHAPTER 7
DISSOLVING THE INSOLUBLE
The Discovery of Microencapsulation and the Birth of
Nanomedicine
/inˈsälyəb(ə)l/
adjective
insoluble
(i) (of a substance) incapable of being dissolved
synonyms: not soluble, indissoluble, incapable of dissolving
“Some oils are water-insoluble. Polar liquids, like water, do not dissolve nonpolar
liquids like oil.”
(ii) impossible to solve
synonyms: unsolvable, insolvable, unable to be solved, without a solution,
unanswerable, unresolvable; unfathomable, impenetrable, unexplainable, inscrutable;
baffling, puzzling, perplexing, enigmatic, obscure, arcane, mysterious,
inexplicable
“We must face the fact that some problems are insoluble."
To ask how to combine oil and water once defied common sense. Chemists— the arbiters
of bonds, interactions, and other relationships between atoms in molecules— who determine
what types of substances can be put together and what it takes to do so, group “insoluble”
substances into a distinct category because of their extreme incompatibility with water, a
property they call “hydrophobia.” The incompatibility of water and oil was a cultural and
scientific fact supported by an abundance of evidence from the shiny pools of oil floating on the
surface of puddles following heavy rainfall to the famous phrase “like mixing oil and water,”
which describes people so different from one another that they cannot get along. However,
common sense and scientific knowledge are rarely as stable and enduring as we may expect.
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With the discovery of microencapsulation, combining water with oil became a routine part of
chemistry’s laboratory practices.
Before the advent of microencapsulation, dissolution was the only avenue for bringing
different forms of matter together; thus, only compatible things could be combined. Dissolution
reactions are an everyday part of life and, as such, rarely warrant any concern. When we stir
sugar into a cup of coffee or add salt to a pot of boiling water, we rarely think about what we are
doing to matter. However, suppose we are willing to downshift our thinking and consider the
world from the point of view of the atoms and molecules involved in such reactions. In that case,
it becomes evident that dissolution is incredibly destructive as it consists of creating covalent
bonds formed when one of the reactants surrenders its ions to another. Since all substances
strive to maintain their structural integrity and individual identity, they do not give up their ions
easily. Thus, ions must be pried away from them by force through a series of processes that
“smash their stereochemical organization” and destroy their structural integrity (Gray 2014,
247).
The discovery of microencapsulation revolutionized pharmaceutical research materially
and ideologically, and more importantly for this dissertation, created the conditions for the birth
of nanomedicine. Unlike dissolution, a destructive process that uses physical power to push and
pull substances until they give up their ions, microencapsulation combines different types of
matter without collateral damage. Rather than stripping molecules of their identities,
microencapsulation deals with incompatibility by enclosing one of the substances in a shell.
Instead of mediating between oil and water's contradictory properties or addressing their
aversion to one another, it works by hiding, masking, and burying facts that got in the way of
what is best described as "coexistence,"—defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as peaceful
existence side by the side of conflicting systems— a term that entered common usage during the
Cold War, the same period that microencapsulation entered nanotechnology. Unlike integration,
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which describes elements merging into a whole, coexistence is a state in which two or more
groups live together and maintain their differences while respecting and resolving their conflicts
nonviolently. Microencapsulation is based on a logic that accepted that water and oil molecules
could not be integrated; however, in this way of thinking, this did not mean that the two could
not be combined. As a laboratory practice, microencapsulation does not aim to resolve
differences or conflicts or even understand why certain things did not want to, or could not,
come together. Since only the outer shell partakes in the interaction, all reactants can coexist
and co-operate even if their properties render them incompatible.
At a conceptual level, the notion of microencapsulation rested on a shift away from the
category of “bonds” and a move toward thinking in terms of “interactions.” Unlike “bonds,”
which hold groups of atoms together strongly enough that the grouping does not dissociate or
lose its structure when it encounters other substances in the environment, for chemists,
“interactions” are non-binding associations (i.e., not linked by bonds) between molecules or
atoms. While dissolution, integration, and bonds are associated with close, deep, and permanent
relationships, microencapsulation, coexistence, and interactions are concerned with superficial,
surface-level, and temporary relationships1.
At first glance, labeling dissolving sugar in a cup of coffee as an example of destruction
resulting from the use of physical force may seem absurd. However, to conceptualize a man
striking his wife or breaking his children’s bones in the home as a destructive use of force was
once equally ridiculous. This is because what is categorized as “destructive” depends on the
prevailing vision practices, which magnify certain entities while rendering others so small that
they become invisible. The same tendency that gave rise to a reorganization of matter in the

The relation between microencapsulation and dissolution is akin to that between integration
and coexistence, or bond to interaction, where the second term represents a greater degree of
freedom, contingency, and indeterminacy vis-a-vis the first.
1
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laboratory also permeated the social sphere, where it manifested as generic structures of
collective thought. As microencapsulation became standard practice for solving problems of
compatibility at the molecular level, a careful analysis of cultural texts published in the same
period illustrates the rise of an analogous approach to understanding and dealing with social
issues.
MICROENCAPSULATION AND THE HISTORY OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
According to Weber’s account, the “spirit of capitalism” came together conceptually piece
by piece before capitalism became an economic reality. As this chapter shows, nanomedicine
picked up distinct ideas or "strata" that defined its project and gave it a clear, unique, and
recognizable intellectual character in the same way. The previous chapters documented how
early attempts to describe and consolidate nanotechnology’s theoretical culminated in an ethos
of “engineering compatibility,” which promised an alternative to viewing problems in terms of
conflict and solutions to those problems as adjudicating between competing interests. The
notion of “engineering compatibility” was based on several interrelated propositions:

1. A downshift in scale that linked smallness with endless malleability, and utility
2. A discourse about proportionality that linked the nanoscale to compatibility
3.

A new approach to structure that offered an alternative to the part-whole model
based on replacing integration with the organization

4.

A shift of focus away from the whole and the part to the relationships between
elements

5. A sense that relationships that appeared permanent, natural, and necessary at the
bulk scale are contingent, flexible, and malleable at the nanoscale, coupled with
an assumption these relationships can be planned, designed, and managed
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While the sections concerning “scale” and “structure” examined nanotechnology’s
conceptual framework historically, this chapter is the first part of a narrative that tells the story
of nanotechnology’s entry into the oncology lab. By tracing the sedimentation of two concepts:
(i) microencapsulation and (ii) the Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect into
“targeting”— nanomedicine’s leitmotif— the two following chapters turn to the category of
“destruction” to explain how and why “targeted delivery” concretized the intellectual agenda laid
down by nanotechnology’s founders.
Atom-by-atom engineering began as a solution without a problem, “a laboratory without
science” (Rich 1999). In 1959, Feynman addressed the question of nanotechnology’s utility with
a quip: "What would be the point of such machines? To make automobiles for ants to drive
around in?” (19589, 4). Feynman and Drexler may have been the first to consider the possibility
of atom-by-atom engineering in the abstract. However, Peter Paul Speiser is officially recognized
as the "father” of nanoparticles. Speiser was neither a physicist nor an engineer but a
pharmacological researcher (and former Lieutenant Colonel in the Swiss Army). Since he did
not share Feynman and Drexler's preoccupation with the mechanical, for Speiser,
nanotechnology was not a means to manufacture tiny machines, nanobots, or factories reduced
to the size of a fingernail but a unique platform for treating disease. Also, unlike Feynman and
Drexler, whose narratives described nano's revolutionary potential in broad brushstrokes,
Speiser had a concrete problem for nanotechnology to solve.
By the early 2000s, the conceptual scaffolding laid down by its founders congealed into a
distinct “spirit” “concertized” in cancer nanomedicine under the rubric of “targeted delivery.”
This chapter will add a third element to nanotechnology's "spirit" that had been lurking
underneath the discourse concerning scale and structure by telling the story of the invention of
"microencapsulation.” While the idea of enclosing substances in tiny shells generated enormous
excitement within pharmaceutical research, scientists lacked a clear sense of exactly how to
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apply it to drug delivery. The discovery that nano-sized particles appeared to be an ideal fit for
the role of “shells” — unlike larger molecules, nano-scale particles could freely cross the body’s
barriers, unlike macromolecules, which were so small that they fell out of the bloodstream—
authorized nanotechnology’s entry into cancer research. Aside from practical considerations, the
logic of microencapsulation was uniquely compatible with nanotechnology’s theoretical
character and discursive substrate laid down by its foundational thinkers.
"Microencapsulation" was Speiser's, then nanomedicine's, attempt to address a classical
problem that originated in 1911, when Paul Ehrlich, the "father” of chemotherapy," discovered
that pathogenic organisms have selective affinities for specific chemical compounds. This vision
culminated in Ehrlich’s notion of the “magic bullet,” a drug selectively attaches to diseased cells
while avoiding healthy organs, tissues, and cells (Lewis 2006). Although the concept has proved
evocative and seductive to researchers in diverse fields, the reality of a "magic bullet" is yet to be
verified. “Microencapsulation” gave nanomedicine a chance to take up Ehrlich’s puzzle in
oncology. By the early 2000s, cancer research had become nanomedicine's primary application
and so-called "targeted delivery" systems—that promise to treat cancer without the destruction,
injury, and loss resulting from side effects associated with "aggressive" therapies such as
chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery by targeting tumors directly and bypassing healthy
tissue— had captured an overwhelming share of interest and research funding.
The notion of “targeting” was not nanomedicine’s: it was “handed” to nanoscientists.
Today “targeting” is most often associated with “targeted chemotherapy,” which revolutionized
pharmacological approaches to cancer in the early 1990s. However, nanomedicine’s definition of
the term has little in common with its conventional usage. By attending to the meaning of
targeting in cancer nanotechnology, it shows that the language, metaphors, and conceptual
framework associated with “microencapsulation” provided a unique scaffolding for
nanomedicine to construct its own version of “targeting.”
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THE HISTORY OF MICROENCAPSULATION
To appreciate the significance of microencapsulation for pharmacology and beyond, one
must understand the psychology associated with its invention. The discovery of Human Necrosis
Factor-alpha is particularly illustrative in that regard. In the 1960s, cancer was terrifying and
hopeless, a death sentence. With chemotherapy and other treatment modalities still in their
nascent phases, medicine had little to offer, and doctors often avoided sharing the diagnosis
with their patients. When researchers learned of the body’s in-built mechanisms for resisting
cancer and subsequently identified and synthesized Tumor Necrosis Factor-alpha, a protein
produced by the immune system which instructs abnormal cells to die or "commit suicide” in
1965 spontaneously, oncologists believed they had seen the light at the end of the tunnel.
Experiment after experiment confirmed that the Human Tumor Necrosis factor's ability to kill
cancer cells was nothing short of miraculous. Many researchers were convinced that its
introduction into the clinic would revolutionize oncology, like aerial bombing had revolutionized
warfare. There was only one problem; the pharmaceutical form of Human Tumor Necrosis
Factor-alpha was too toxic and could not be administered into the body. The cure for the most
feared and dreaded disease known to humanity was at hand, but it could not reach the tumor.
The "delivery problem" is all that stood in the way of science's victory in the war on cancer, and
microencapsulation seemed to be the answer.
The discovery of Human Tumor Necrosis Factor-alpha was one part of a massive shift in
pharmaceutical research. Whereas previous generations of scientists saw the body’s
immunological reaction to proteins as an insurmountable obstacle and thus, accepted that
making drugs out of proteins was an impossible goal, pharmaceutical researchers in the mid1960s believed that bioactive proteins had massive potential in drug therapy. During this era,
finding a means to deliver protein-based formulas became pharmacology’s primary goal. As it
turned out, the solution was already at hand. Microencapsulation was first introduced in 1943 in
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the printing industry as an alternative to carbon paper2. A product of colloid chemistry — the
chemistry of substances suspended rather than dissolved in a solution— microencapsulation
was a technique based on a relatively simple idea of placing a membrane around a tiny particle,
liquid, or solid and hiding the active ingredients in the core.
In 1962, Frank F. Davis, the inventor of the Covid 19 vaccine, translated
microencapsulation from industry into medicine through PEGylation, i.e., conjugating
polyethylene glycol (PEG) to drug carriers. The idea of using PEG this way appeared absurd at
first. Polymers were traditionally understood as commercial materials that belonged in paint
and textile manufacturing. To utilize them for medical purposes was unthinkable. By the 1960s,
however, the boundary between the natural and artificial had shifted to the point where cells
could be legitimately described as “molecular machines” (Feynman 1959, 3). PEG appealed to
Davis because it was “non-toxic," “flexible,” and made of components that were “awaiting
attachment” and “readily linked” to proteins (Davis 2002, 457). Davis described the process of
coating molecules with PEG as “protecting fragile drug molecules.” He hoped that doing so
would make the drugs appear "non-threatening" to the immune system so that they may "slip
into the body unnoticed" (ibid)3. Subsequent research confirmed that when coated in PEG, all
sorts of substances that were previously off-limits due to their irritating nature could be made to

Barrett Green first introduced the idea in 1943 as an alternative to carbon paper. While carbon
paper allowed for instant duplication of documents, it was messy, imprecise, and difficult to
handle. Green's new method for making duplicate copies involved oil-based capsules that would
contain, then release ink when triggered to do so. Green's first patent for the technology
describes water-based ink encapsulated in a pocket of gelatin. When activated by the pressure of
the writing instrument, the gelatin capsules released the ink to give a color impression on paper
coated with acidic clay. Green's discovery opened the door for scientists and engineers to change
the "apparent properties" of the core material and "protect fragile substances from their
environment." With this process, "toxic substances could be made safe to store" (Fanger 1974,
87) Green and his ink capsules may not belong in traditional accounts of the history of
nanotechnology —but without his discovery, nanomedicine would not be possible.
3 Davis and Abe Abuchowski (his graduate student) described the first successful application of
this technology in a joint paper published in 1977. The former founded a company that supplied
PEG to scientists.
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cross cell membranes (Damodaran 2010). In the industrial realm, microencapsulation was
initially understood as a means of protecting the material in the inner core to control the release
of a substance; however, PEGylation altered the discourse and meaning of microencapsulation.
As the notion entered drug delivery, it became associated with “stealth,” “shielding apparent
surfaces,” and other means of hiding, concealing, and “masking” proteins from the immune
system and preventing the body’s defense apparatuses from “recognizing them as foreign
particles" (Hoffman 2016, 1).
While PEGylation solved part of the protein delivery issue, the problem of which proteins
to coat and HOW to coat them remained. By the mid-1960s, the idea of coating protein-based
substances with lipids was understood to be the most effective way of concealing them from the
immune system. Speiser envisioned this knowledge becoming “concretized” in delivery systems
based on placing harmful substances in something akin to “envelopes” or shells. His initial
attempts to use microparticles—typically between 800 and 900 nanometers in size— as possible
carriers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in the 1960s led him to a discovery that
proved instrumental for nanomedicine.
Speiser was the first to understand that the shape, surface, and size of particles play a
determining role in whether a drug will reach the desired site in the body. Speiser eventually
reduced his microparticles to the 100-nanometer range (the nanoscopic scale) to optimize these
properties. Doing so revealed that microparticles and nanoparticles have size-specific behavior.
Although these particles were not labeled so at the time, they were the first nanoparticles
(Alyautdin 2014, 13). Speiser saw the link between smallness and malleability that Feynman
and Drexler had described theoretically. The unique possibilities of drug forms based on
nanoscale properties solidified nanotechnology’s place in drug delivery. As Speiser continued his
research at the nanoscopic scale, it became clear that nanotechnology's most significant
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potential was in medicine, where it would be used to create particles that encapsulate proteins,
and other substances researchers desperately longed to add to pharmacology’s library.
Speiser’s discovery of nanoparticles was informed by his prolific work on vaccines. His
famous 1973 patent not only described “polymerization”—a novel nano-scale technique for
conjugating the active parts of vaccines to benign substances by combining hundreds of
different molecules into a chain-like network— but also marked the first application of nanoengineering in medicine and the first use of microencapsulation in a drug delivery system. As
per the patent, Speiser’s particles were composed of a “biologically active material coated by an
outer layer of polymeric material ideal for enclosing delicate or fragile substances" (1973, 2). The
solid layer that “protected” the pharmaceuticals tucked away inside its core and “shielded” them
from the immune system’s “inevitable attacks” (3). Polymerization paved the way for
nanotechnology’s entry into the oncology lab. Along with other nano-scale techniques, it would
be used to create structures that encapsulate particles made from proteins, hormones, enzymes,
and other “irritating” substances. Speiser continued his exploration of microencapsulation at the
nanoscale, and by the time he passed the torch to his graduate students, the birth of cancer
nanomedicine seemed inevitable.
THE LOGIC OF MICROENCAPSULATION: A SUBSTRATE IN THE “SPIRIT OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY”
Before the rise of microencapsulation, pharmaceutical researchers understood drug
delivery via the category of "incompatibility.” In thinking this way, they took for granted that
medicine was destructive. Not all this destruction was harmful. Although harming healthy tissue
was disadvantageous, other forms of destruction, such as eradicating pathogens and killing
disease, were highly desirable. In any case, the logic of “incompatibility” authorized a vision of
drug delivery as a violent conflict akin to war, wherein pharmaceuticals eradicated dysfunction
by exposing the body to new forms of attack. According to the Law of Armed Conflict, soldiers
are deployed to kill enemy combatants and— not civilians; however, civilian deaths are
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“inevitable side-effects, not war crimes […] As long as the unintended destruction is
proportional to the intended destruction, it is tolerated” (Epps 2011, 12). Similarly, destroying
healthy tissue is not the purpose of pharmaceuticals. Still, it is inevitable, and patients agree to
subject their bodies to the destruction caused by drugs (experienced as side-effects) because
they and their doctors perceive the disease as worse than the treatment.
Scientific medicine works by treating healing as a conflict between the body, the disease,
and pharmaceutical compounds. As Michel Foucault put it, modern medicine is effective
because it kills (2004, 7). The end of a conflict is typically characterized by one set of competing
values being generalized to the system as a whole, and the opposing values eliminated and
exterminated. This cannot be achieved without at least some coercion, domination, and
destruction. As a primary example, war—which from time immemorial had been the “final
arbiter in international disputes” (Arendt 1970, 72) and a means of resolving irreconcilable
interests— ends when one party has prevailed over another when one enemy has been defeated.
This event is typically marked by a ceremonious treaty, which stipulates which party must
succeed to the other’s values, agendas, and interests. Microencapsulation offered another
possibility: what if we hide incompatibilities and address problems without seeing them in
terms of conflict?
Microencapsulation—materially and philosophically— not only refused to accept
collateral damage as inevitable but took up avoiding destruction as an organizing principle. It
did so by masking incompatibility. Its plan of preventing destruction went together with the
desire to mask, hide, and conceal contradiction, incongruity, or differences that may result in
conflict. Microencapsulation covered up any conflicts between elements that may not fit
together rather than adjudicating between the contradictory interest of a medicinal compound,
the healthy organs and tissues in the body, and the disease it sought to treat. It did not eliminate
the noxious element, but tucked it away, hid it inside a friendly exterior. In admitting previously
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undeliverable compounds such as Human Necrosis Factor-alpha, which pharmacology had
deemed too dangerous to human tissue to be of pharmaceutical use, into the body,
microencapsulation allowed for medicine to increase its toxicity under the banner of
condemning poisoning. On an ideological level, it protected medicine’s right to kill through
rhetoric against war, force, and destruction.
Davis and Speiser did not invent microencapsulation. It was handed to them. The logic,
or “style” of thought that authorized microencapsulation to define a “good” pharmaceutical as
one that does not cause destruction, conflict, or damage, was not confined to the laboratory.
This chapter continues to build the dissertation’s theoretical claims by arguing that
microencapsulation specifically and cancer nanomedicine broadly concretized certain general
tendencies into a general framework for defining and contending with the toxic element—from
race to elk, bombs, blight, to cancer. It shows that the same shift in thought that made
microencapsulation necessary in pharmaceutical research also gave rise to the backlash against
civil rights and opposition to nuclear weapons in the social sphere, the construction of the
national highway system, and new management practices in national parks in the scientific and
technical milieu. As a “thick description” and analysis of discourse associated with these case
studies shows, the framework for understanding problems and what counts as their solution
that characterizes nanomedicine’s approach to cancer was—and is— a generic feature of US
culture. It begins by discussing the backlash against the civil rights movement by focusing an
analytic lens on “non-violence,” morphing into a general strategy for addressing problems in
terms of “coexistence,” which like its counterpart in the pharmaceutical lab, worked by hiding,
masking, and concealing— “encapsulating”— contradiction.
A CHANGE OF HEART RATHER THAN A CAPITULATION TO A SUPERIOR
FORCE
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The popular imagination and middle-school history books typically characterize The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a legislative response to “non-violent action” and a historical solution
to racial inequality in the US. While it is true that “non-violence” came to be linked to the
Montgomery Bus Boycott and similar actions between 1955-1957 and the “sit-in” period in 19601965, it was more than a political strategy. “Non-violence” moved out of the sphere of social
movements and became an expression of thought that— like microencapsulation—defined
problems in terms of mismanaged interactions rather than conflict between opposing interests.
According to sociologists, the aim of social movements that espouse “non-violence” is to
address social ills through a “change of heart, communication, and mutual understanding,
rather than capitulation to a superior force” (Oppenheimer 1965, 133). The same scholars also
point out that non-violence is often strategic rather than moral, a tactic to persuade those who
occupy neutral positions on the issue. According to sociological accounts, the Civil Rights
Movement took up "non-violence" under the assumption that it would be an effective framing
for racial-based inequality as it matched general sensibilities within US society. They were right.
The white middle class embraced civil rights, at least initially.
By the 1960s, “non-violence,” which entered the cultural imagination through images
and reports of marches, protests, and sit-ins, that flooded US homes, streets, and college
campuses, had become ubiquitous, “a fact of social life” (Oppenheimer 1969, 128). In the
popular imagination, "non-violence" was easy to grasp and even easier to think with. On the
surface, it spoke to a desire to address problems by changing public values through education,
persuasion, and negotiation. However, as this case study reveals, “non-violence" made sense for
another reason: “it allowed blacks to make political progress without being perceived as a
threat" (ibid). As the term took root in the collective (white) consciousness, “non-violence”
morphed into rhetoric against “aggressive” approaches to civil rights reform.
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In 1964, the US government signed the Civil Rights Act into law. 1964 also marked the
beginning of the so-called "race riots" in New York, Angeles, and many other cities across the
country. Unlike their “non-violent” counterparts, these protestors clashed with police, broke
windows, overturned automobiles, burned buildings, and looted stores—causing over a million
dollars in damage. In the eyes of the US public, the riots were incomprehensible. The
destruction and violence that swept the country did not make sense given that the government
has just passed the nation's premier civil rights legislation, which ended segregation in public
places, outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, required
equal access to public areas and employment, enforced desegregation of schools, and granted
African Americans the right to vote.
By 1967, the situation had reached a critical point, leaving President Johnson little choice
but to take the radical step of assembling a commission tasked with producing a report that
would make sense of the violence, looting, and destruction. The Kerner Commission Report
became a national bestseller almost as soon as it was completed in 1968. The New York Times
and other media outlets devoted countless pages discussing the committee's findings.
Newsweek even published parts of it under the title of "The Negro in America: What Must Be
Done." Almost overnight, the support and sympathy that characterized the white middle-class
response to civil rights reform transformed into opposition and hostility (Pretzer in George
2001, 1)4. The reasons for the backlash against civil rights are complex. While the report is not
the only cause, the hostility to its findings leaves little doubt its framing devices and discursive
strategy did not resonate with public sentiment. Martin Luther King's "non-violent" political

This was not the first report. In 1965, following six-day riots in Los Angeles, the US
government ordered a commission, which resulted in the McCone Commission Report, which
was ultimately labeled as "a political placebo designed to appease the black community without
providing real answers to its problems." The report did not lead to lasting changes, but it
highlighted the white fear that was produced by the riots.
4
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action enjoyed widespread support from middle-class whites, who "make or break politics"'
because the vision he communicated to the public— which emphasized the imperative to "join
hands" and reconcile— framed equality as something that benefitted everyone. In this rhetorical
universe, the passage of civil rights laws offered a solution to racism wherein "everyone would
win."
The Kerner commission understood the problem of racism differently. Rather than
focusing on the various incidents associated with the riots, as its readers expected, the
committee explained the "disturbances" as a rational response to racism, a general expression
of grievances about lack of employment, housing, inequitable law enforcement, and other forms
of racially motivated coercion deployed by white society. However, its most controversial
argument, the item that may have tipped the scales against civil rights reform, was the claim
that racial discrimination limited African-Americans' ability to escape economic deprivation.
Framing the problem in this way inextricably tied racism to poverty and foreclosed all but one
solution: aggressive government spending to provide economic opportunities hitherto denied to
African Americans. The suggestion of allocating money based on race caused a massive
controversy. As poll after poll revealed, the white middle class felt civil rights reforms that
government spending was "too aggressive," unlike the “non-violent” approach associated with
protests led by Rosa Parks or Martin Luther King (which made the Civil Rights Movement
successful because it promised that racial equality could be achieved without black progress
becoming a “threat" to white society). An overwhelming majority of respondents expressed
concern that initiatives that focused on racial inequality would “push other imperatives aside”
and “give to one group at the expense of others” (ibid).
In the collective imagination, “non-violence” was not only a political strategy associated
with a specific political movement. As it took on a life of its own, the category of “non-violence”
spawned a discursive formation wherein “common interests” overshadowed asymmetries,
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contradictions, and conflict, which in turn gave rise to ideas about what counts as an acceptable
approach to social problems. The repudiation of conflict and incompatibility, bolstered by a
categorical disavowal of aggression, congealed into a vision that did not leave room for
destruction. Thus, Americans saw the “race riots” as “senseless acts of violence” because they
had nowhere to put them. The widespread rejection of the report's finding that large-scale
racism was primarily responsible for the turmoil across US cities rested on an inability or refusal
to consider the events not as “riots” but as "political acts of self-defense and racial liberation on
a mass, public scale" (Pretzer in George 2001, 1). These vision practices rested on another blind
spot: a denial of the fact that the legislative successes of the Civil Rights Act were not reflected in
the daily lives of African Americans, who continued to face police misconduct, economic
inequality, segregated housing, and inferior education (Eagles 2000).
This new “style” of thinking and reasoning was based on not seeing inequality as creating
the asymmetry necessary for one group to become the beneficiary of the others’ oppression. By
asking for public money to remedy the disadvantages and lack of opportunity experienced by
African Americans, the Kerner Report pointed to the contradictions underneath the expectation
that racial equality could be achieved without whites making concessions or giving up the
advantages afforded to them via-a-vis the same racial hierarchy that had caused massive
damage to African Americans. The Civil Rights Act was understood as an adequate solution to
racial inequality even if it did not improve material life for African Americans because it met the
collective criteria for what constitutes a good solution.
As the phrase “giving to one group at the expense of the other” indicated, the white
middle class understood the contradictions between their interests and that of African
Americans. When civil rights are framed as an economic issue, this conflict of interest is
obvious. It cannot be masked, hidden, or denied. The US was prosperous enough to spend
billions of dollars to go to the moon, but the "aggression" that underlined the link between
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racism and poverty turned federal spending into state violence also made genuine civil rights
reforms impossible. The same ethos made it possible to envision nanoparticles as the basis of a
cure for cancer.
CONNECTING FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS
According to urban planners, the fear and panic generated by the “race riots” led to
"white flight" to the suburbs, which caused cities to fall into ruins. Many described the urban
landscape as filled with "roach-infested apartments in crumbling buildings whose utilities were
in disrepair” (Dwyer 2011, 887). Following the publication of The Concept and Causes of Urban
Blight in 1967, experts began to label the epidemic of decaying and abandoned architecture as
“blight.” By the late-1960s, blight not only made cities “odious” to their inhabitants (Breger
1967, 369) but became a significant threat to social order.
In the post-war era, urban disrepair was solved through "slum clearance," a strategy that
dealt with one property at a time by demolishing structures deemed especially hazardous.
However, the passing of The Housing Act of 1954 signaled a radically new approach. “Slum
clearance” became “urban renewal.” “Urban renewal” enlarged the "area of attack from block
projects to the neighborhood, to the city" (Berger 1967, 371). Rather than simply destroying
undesirable properties, the new philosophy transformed neighborhoods by uniting the
community. It sought to turn occupants of crack houses, illegal brothels, and the families with
young children who moved into newly renovated homes into “friendly neighbors.” Of course,
doing so often involved tearing down the said crack house or brothel. While the result (i.e.,
destroying properties) was not so different, with the entry of “urban renewal” into planners’
lexicons, the meaning of the destruction went a significant transformation. In this new
discursive landscape, "urban renewal" to "slum clearance" was what "construction" is to
"demolition.”
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In 1954, the “blight problem” became imbricated in the construction of the national
highway system. This was the year the federal government approved funding for Dwight
Eisenhower’s proposal to construct a national highway system to address the country’s
dangerous and unsafe roads, which by that point in time, had killed nearly 40,000 people and
injured over 1.3 million. The official ideological justification for building a uniform network of
roads centered around "enhancing connectivity across the country,” “uniting the nation," and
joining "friendly neighbors” (Weingroff 1996, 5). However, with the federal government offering
money to states to build roads, planners realized that if they "put the highway in just the right
place," highway building could serve another purpose. As a renowned city planner stated,
highways are "the greatest element in the cure of city ills" (Rose 1979, 25). Highway building
became the key to eradicating slums without spending a dime of the city’s money (ibid) and
getting rid of African Americans from their communities without violating the principles of
racial equality as enshrined in the Civil Rights Act. It is no coincidence that highway
redevelopment popped up simultaneously as integration in housing was set to become a reality.
The idea of using highway building as a solution to urban problems to reconstruct American
cities emerged just as courts made racial zoning illegal and the Civil Rights Act struct down
other traditional tools of racial segregation (Kaczynski 2000, 35).
Many white middle-class Americans were afraid and uncertain about what the largescale reforms would mean for US society, but since the Civil Rights Act foreclosed the usual
avenues for expressing these feelings, they had to find something new. “Blight” provided a new
language for Americans to express their anxiety regarding racial integration and set the stage for
a new approach for addressing their concerns. Since African Americans often populated
"blighted” neighborhoods, "blight" became a stand-in for race and turned racial inequality into
an architectural problem. “Blight” was an easy—and legal— idea to think with as it described the
conditions of buildings, neighborhoods, and cities—not the people who live in them. Buildings—
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not people—were unsafe, dirty, dangerous, and subject to poverty. Framing the issue as “blight”
also made it amenable to the types of solutions that highway building offered.
Robert Moses was one of the first to propose using highways to “restore health” to the
city. Although he and other planners saw African Americans as "unhealthy organs that needed
to be removed” (Kaczynski 2000, 35), the logic running underneath the category of “blight”
couched their removal differently. By focusing on the built environment, not the individuals
inhabiting it, “blight” furnished an air of neutrality to racially motivated destruction. Unlike
racism, whose solution would involve profound social changes, which for most Americans was
akin to performing open-heart surgery— a risky, invasive, and potentially dangerous procedure,
“blight" was something that could be fixed concretely and tangibly. Unlike the “aggressive”
spending on civil rights reform, which would take from one group to another, highway
construction allowed cities to “get rid of their blight at no cost” (ibid)—since the federal
government would pay for it.
Unlike the destruction inherent in the notion of "slum clearance,” the idea of “urban
renewal” functioned via a logic of replacing, removing, redeeming, clearing— not "tearing
down." Highway construction promised to "replace undesirable slum areas with pristine ribbons
of concrete" (Rose 1979, 18), "remove urban decay and promote prosperity'' and “clear and
redevelop" neighborhoods (ibid). As road building "displaced people from their homes, sliced
communities in half and led to abandonment and decay in one city after another (ibid), it did so
under the rubric of "connecting friendly neighbors'' and "joining people across the country."
Bulldozers transformed "blight into prosperity" by leveling poor racially segregated
neighborhoods to make room for new roads, and when cement mixers poured concrete and
turning "thriving ethnically diverse communities" into parking lots, they "were rebuilding city
centers” (ibid).
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Bulldozing, demolishing, and destroying work by making people and infrastructure "go
away." At a material level, highway construction “fixed the urban core” via the same form of
making people “go away.” The urban planners saw the demolition of the homes clearly;
however, they did not see it as destructive. By building something on top of the old structure,
they maintained that it was something different. The distinction between clearing, removing,
replacing associated with “urban renewal” and "tearing down” characterized “slum removal”
framed the demolition in such a way that it did not appear destructive but as constructive. When
subsumed under the banner of highway building, it was a different object5.
To believe in the difference between “slum” clearance” and “urban renewal” requires a
certain refusal. The structure of metaphor that authorized an absolute distinction between the
two terms works on a logic based on masking, hiding, and concealing the destruction inherent in
such a project. The rhetoric of "urban renewal" concealed the level of destruction required for
highway construction masked the fact that roadbuilding was a "large-scale implementation of a
policy of displacement and demolition" (Bullard 2004, 15). The same rhetoric rendered invisible
to those whose homes and communities were destroyed in the process of "connecting friendly
neighbors” by papering over that destruction with the language of relationality. The vision
practices associated with this logic were attuned to seeing only compatibility. They required not
asking: What about those whose homes were destroyed?6

The 40th anniversary of the Act's passage was commemorated with a report that heralded the
National Highway System as "the best investment ever made… a significant factor in making the
United States the homogenous nation it has become” primarily because it “enriched the quality
of life for virtually every American" (Cox 2016, 2). The idea that making the US homogenous
enriched the quality of life for virtually every American speaks to new types of vision practices
that emerged alongside highway construction. The belief that cities could eradicate "blight" at no
cost, or the claim that the building of the National Highway enhanced the quality of life for
“every American” share a certain logic.
6 The National Highway system was destructive in another way. As the new uniform network of
roads made every part of the country accessible, interstate travel, whether it was for the purpose
of responding to a nuclear bomb attack, hauling commercial goods, or a family vacation was
easy, quick, and efficient (Weingroff 1996) The highway system "sounded the death knell for
5
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NONPROLIFERATION
In the pharmaceutical arena, microencapsulation worked by concealing drugs' toxicity
and poisonous nature from the immune system by coating the active components in a shell in
the same way that “urban renewal” hid the destruction of building a national highway system
entailed. The third case, the passage of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shows how the same logic
structured the discourse around nuclear weapons.
In 1949 the Soviets successfully built and tested an A-bomb. President Truman
responded to the news by ordering scientists and engineers to design and develop the "Super," a
nuclear weapon with no limit to its explosive power. The president's decision was controversial.
Many officials were concerned about its "unfathomable" destructive potential. According to the
General Advisory Committee, the "Super" was "an evil thing... a weapon of genocide." James B.
Conant, a prominent science administrator, added that such a weapon would be made "over my
dead body" (Blades 2014, 85). The bomb Truman demanded was not built in the strict sense of
the term because its denomination mechanism did not work.
The fix for the faulty mechanism arrived in 1951 when Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam
found a new way to initiate a thermonuclear explosion by utilizing x-rays to fuse an isotope of
hydrogen, which paved the path for creating a scaled-down model of the "Super" known as the
Hydrogen Bomb. Compared to the infinite destructive power of its predecessor, the hydrogen
bomb was exponentially smaller. Since it “only” (!) could destroy New York City, its proponents
argued that the Hydrogen Bomb was "very different from the genocidal weapon of infinite size
that the General Advisory Committee had advised against" (87).

short-haul train travel" (Kaszynski 2000, 15) and its construction is widely recognized as a
direct cause of a systemic lack of investment in public transit in the US. The same project that
connected every road in the country also left a large portion of the population without any
transportation at all.
- 247 -

The downshift in scale brought little comfort to scientists, who reacted to the possibility
of further nuclear weapons research by building on the legacy of the Emergency Committee of
Atomic Scientists— which, before its disbanding in 1951, sought to educate scientists and the
public on the dangers to humanity of the nuclear weapons used to destroy two Japanese cities 7—
and forming The Committee for Nuclear Information (CNI) in 1958 to provide the public with
apolitical information about, and evidence of fallout risks. Its members, many of whom were
leading figures in their fields, believed that once made aware of fallout risks, the public would
oppose further nuclear weapons research. They were mistaken8.
Popular discourse reflected general suspicions that the scientists' concerns were not
about public health and the environment but a tacit desire for nuclear disarmament or arms
control (Rubinson 2018). The scientist’s objections to the nuclear weapons program fell on deaf
ears. In 1954 the US tested the Hydrogen Bomb for the first time on the Bikini Atoll in the South
Pacific. Although successful, the test “accidentally triggered a health crisis” (Palafox 2010). The
blast covered a much larger area than anticipated and poisoned the nearby Marshall Islands’
inhabitants. The US moved the testing site back home to Nevada to avoid international conflict,
just a "downwind" from Utah. After only a few years of testing, the region experienced a massive
increase in cases of acute leukemia. Scientists hoped that the rising cancer rates would become

Linus Pauling, a Nobel Prize-winning chemist, wrote numerous articles, gave talks,
participated in debates, circulated petitions, and even sued the president. Geneticist Ralph Lapp
chronicled the danger fallout posed to humans in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
8 Historically, public sentiment concerning atomic weapons reflected widespread ambivalence.
Although the A-bomb was heralded as the weapon that won the Second World War, opinion
polls conducted immediately after the bombings reflected more fear than triumph. After Japan's
surrender, however, Americans became prouder of the A-bomb, seeing it as, among other
things, proper vengeance for Japan's Pearl Harbor attack. By the mid-1950s, the solid anticommunist consensus turned nuclear deterrence into a relatively inexpensive and seemingly
effective counter to the menacing Soviet Union in the collective imagination. The prevailing
sense was that giving up the prospect of nuclear weapons would have meant redefining national
security, and the lay public and experts alike were not ready to do so.
7
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concrete proof to convince people about the danger of nuclear weapons testing. They did not.
The public, as well as those affected, remained hostile to the scientist’s anti-nuclear positions9.
Convincing Americans of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons by foregrounding
the large-scale consequences, including nuclear “fallout,” had proved impossible. As long as
scientists emphasized the big, abstract, and unimaginable damage the atomic bomb would do to
society or the environment, the public was prepared to tolerate the expansion of nuclear power
in exchange for security. In 1961 the Institute for Nuclear Information took a different approach.
Researchers suspected that the nuclear isotopes they found in milk consumed by those
inhabiting regions adjacent to the test sites would make their way into children’s bodies and
become bonded to young bones still in the process of formation. Thus, to concretize the danger
of nuclear weapons, they asked parents for their children’s baby teeth. As they expected, testing
revealed the presence of isotopes Sr90 and C14 in virtually every sample received. Sharing their
results marked a shift in public opinion. There was something uniquely horrifying about seeing
radioactive particles in children's teeth and suddenly the burden of nuclear weapons too big for
Americans to continue bearing. In 1961—at the height of the Cold War— 50,000 women came
together in the march of peace against nuclear weapons, giving birth to the mass public
movement against nuclear weapons. The anti-nuclear movement grew to the point where the
numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations forced a legislative response from the US government.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1961 by the United States and then prominent
members of the international community in 1963, was hailed as a great victory. The treaty
effectively prohibited testing above ground and in space, not only in the US but across the globe,
and in so doing, assuaged the public’s anger and fear regarding nuclear arms. The nuclear

The so-called "downwinder’s" fierce patriotism coupled with their faith in the U.S. government
shaped their pride in their proximity to the testing site. The sense that they were a part of a
"larger cause" blinded them to the rising cancer rates in their community and by proxy the link
between cancer and nuclear weapons testing (Rubinson 2018, 87).
- 249 9

weapons issue no longer seemed so urgent in the collective imagination. According to the US
government’s official account, the treaty effectively ended the first great era of nuclear protest.
By the 1970s, anti-nuclear protests moved on to mobilizing against the Vietnam War10.
The ban on nuclear weapons testing stipulated by the document was a strange solution
to the destruction entailed in nuclear weapons technology. On the one hand, it addressed the
fears and concerns of those who opposed testing. On the other, the terms of the ban allowed
nuclear weapons technology to progress faster than ever. Banning testing above ground and in
space left ample room for doing so under the earth's surface. Shifting nuclear underground also
effectively buried the fear and panic around atomic fallout in the collective imagination. The
treaty "solved" the problem by putting it "out of sight and out of mind," a logic that animated
approaches to many other public issues during this time. Just like microencapsulation, which
delivered drugs by hiding irritating and poisonous substances from the immune system in drug
delivery, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prevented open conflict that had led to protests
and other public displays of discontent with and opposition to the government's agenda by
concealing and burying contradiction. It essentially encapsulated the incompatibility between
the interests of the protesters, who wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons, and the desire of
nations and their governments to continue the research and testing necessary to possess the
most potent nuclear devices possible.
MANAGE EXTENSIVELY BUT CONCEAL SIGNS OF MANAGEMENT
The anti-nuclear movement accepted the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a legitimate
solution that speaks a general acceptance of, if not desire, addressing social issues by burying,

In 1982, over a million protestors, gathered in New York to protest nuclear weapons. By this
point, the Cold War brought nuclear weapons back into the collective consciousness, however
during the period discussed in this chapter, the general perception of the nuclear threat lost its
immediacy.
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hiding, and containing conflict and contradiction that emerged within collective thought. The
fourth and final case illustrates the same tendency in a different arena.
Between 1961 and 1963, Yellowstone National Park rangers culled approximately 2000
elk. As this fact reached the public via countless hours of television coverage and numerous
newspaper articles, what was once a routine part of stewardship became "slaughter of elk by
hired killers" (Pritchard 1999, 10). The mass outrage that followed the reports was
unprecedented and, at first glance, confusing11. In the collective imagination, elk may have been
"friendly creatures," however, as their numbers exploded, the animals' voracious appetites
became a severe threat to the park's plant life. The solution was as obvious as it was urgent:
reduce the population before they "eat the park out" (ibid). So, they did. Just as they had done
many, many times before.
Unbeknown to Yellowstone's management, something had shifted culturally, and
Americans were no longer willing to tolerate the destruction of "innocent animals." The
"slaughter" became so harmful and inhumane in the US’ collective imagination that it became
an issue of national concern. The Senate hearings that resulted forced the National Parks to
rethink their management practices and the visual practices that underlined them. The Leopold
Report (1963), officially known as Wildlife Management in the National Parks, reflected the
new way of thinking about caring for plants and animals in national parks. This new logic
placed relationships between plants and animals into the center of reasoning.
The official mission of the National Park Service was, and still is, "conserving
unimpaired the natural and cultural resources and values of the National Park System for the
enjoyment, education, and inspiration of this and future generations" (NPS official website).
Before the Leopold Report shaped discourse in this arena, management operated under the

Yellowstone's rangers had always culled wildlife. Maximizing the number of "friendly" animals
for the public to feed, pet, and "enjoy" entailed shooting wolves, cougars, and other top
predators.
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rubric of "stewardship," an approach that emphasized visitors’ "enjoyment" over the
"preservation" of nature. It tolerated people intentionally feeding friendly bears and other
"friendly" wildlife from their car windows or unintentionally with the garbage they left behind
because people enjoyed interacting with the animals this way. Rather than moving the scope of
management towards "preservation," the report endowed the Parks Service with a new
"scientific" ethos and a new mission. Henceforth, the role of National Parks shifted to
"representing a vignette of primitive America." This translated to “preserving nature as it was
before human contact” under the rubric of “rational planning” (Leopold et al. 1963 in Dilsaver
2016, 3-4).
“Rational planning” was a set of practices as well as a new rhetorical strategy that
justified and made destruction palpable by emphasizing that the object of "management" was
not elk or any other individual species but the "biotic associations" (ibid) in the park12. To
represent how the ecosystem functioned "naturally," scientists became managers of
relationships. If the associations between plants and animals were as they should be (i.e., as they
were before human contact), they would be maintained as such. If not, the ecosystem would
need to be recreated artificially. This form of management called for "active" manipulation,
extensive regulation, and intense intervention across every level of every ecosystem. However,
since Yellowstone was "not a zoo," preservation had to take place "within nature," which meant
that the unprecedented levels of design, research, and planning required to reconstruct
Yellowstone's plant and wildlife populations as they existed before human intervention, were to

The same tendency can be seen underneath "stewardship" becoming eclipsed by "rational
planning." Unlike its "stewardship," which was associated with notions of "care" and treated
"looking after" as a duty arising from ethical obligations, "rational planning" operated via the
logic of management, research, planning, and regulation. It drew the justification for its actions
from science. The same tendency can be seen underneath "stewardship" becoming eclipsed by
"rational planning." Unlike its "stewardship," which was associated with notions of "care" and
treated "looking after" as a duty arising from ethical obligations, "rational planning" operated
via the logic of management, research, planning, and regulation. It drew the justification for its
actions from science.
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be invisible. "Rational planning” functioned via an imperative to "manage extensively but
conceal signs of management" (Leopald et al. 1963 in Dilsaver 2016 9-11). The policy authorized
the use of not only rifles but heavy machinery such as chainsaws and flamethrowers— all of
which were previously off-limits— as long as “the sound of such activity should be hidden from
visitors (6).
Given the public nature of the issue, the report writers were explicitly stated that the
methods of managing elk would reflect the new meaning of National Parks. According to the
new policy, elk would no longer be "killed or shot" Their numbers would be "managed
artificially" to "restore natural balance" (5). The individuals responsible for the "management"
would not be hunters but "professionals" subject to strict selection, training, and oversight
protocols. Thus, according to the report, elk would not be "hunted" but "euthanized.”
The older management ethos was based on adjudicating between inherently
contradictory values. "Preserving nature" was understood to be incompatible with maximizing
tourists' "enjoyment" as the parks' visitors had distinct interests from the ecosystems in the
park. Feeding and petting elk in the park was "enjoyable" for tourists; however, maximizing the
number of elk and allowing visitors to interact with wildlife in this manner was detrimental to
the interests of the plants and animals in the park. The incompatibility between the two values
means that any decision would favor one side at the expense of the other. Thus, rangers did not
conceal the culling from the public and justified their actions based on the contradiction
between the elk and the plants they destroyed.
Framing the issue in terms of competing interests led to a public outcry. It created space
for objections and arguments as to whether the Parks Service had taken the right side, whether
putting "preserving nature" above "public enjoyment" was legitimate, or if the interests of the
plants were more indeed crucial than that of the elk. “Rational Planning” was radically different.
Like "microencapsulation," which functions by hiding contradiction and making conflict
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invisible, the imperative to recreate biotic relationships as they existed before human contact
was based on disavowing the opposition between "created" and "natural."
"Rational planning" allowed scientists to utilize the capacities of rifles, chainsaws, and
flamethrowers to plan, design, and create ecosystems and concealing the destruction that doing
so entailed. It also silenced, put aside, and ignored any objections by denying, masking, and
hiding contradictions. This new strategy rendered objection impossible by actively hiding signs
of their intervention, and secondly, turning culling and similar measures into a defensive
mechanism mandated by science. As per the new language, "direct removal by killing" was
necessary as elk destroyed plant life, threatening the integrity of natural interactions between
the biotas. Since the object of management was the ecosystem as a whole, not a single species,
"culling" was not an attack on the elk but a defensive measure taken on behalf of the ecosystem,
a means of protecting the park from destructive elements.
“Rational planning" did for wildlife management in National Parks what
microencapsulation did for drug delivery; it addressed public demands to “cease the slaughter of
innocent animals” by masking, hiding, and covering up contradiction and conflict. The Leopold
Report came about to solve a widespread sense that killing elk was destructive. Just as the rise of
"nuclear non-proliferation" discourse addressed public concern about nuclear weapons and
allowed governments to carry out more atomic weapons testing, the new wildlife management
policy that went on to become the standard for all National Parks across the nation legitimated
even more killing. As it ended hunting and shooting—the slaughter of innocent animals—it
extended "euthanasia" to all species across the Yellowstone. Centering the web of relationships
between flora and fauna that made up the ecosystems revealed that the reproduction rate of
other animals was higher than optimal and thus, needed to be “managed.”
THE LOGIC OF ENCAPSULATION AND THE SPIRIT OF NANOMEDICINE
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Microencapsulation is a drug delivery strategy based on hiding poisons and other
irritants in soft compounds and coating, covering, and overlapping surfaces (as opposed to
conjoining molecules to one another). As the case studies have shown, it was also an ideology, a
logic of holding incompatible things together without combining them or even coming to terms
with that which makes them incompatible. For clarity, in the social realm, the logic of
microencapsulation can be summed up by four related ideas:
1. Solving problems without having to adjudicate between competing
interests or to use force. A sense that it is possible to solve problems in a
manner where “everyone wins.”
Yellowstone Park was once managed with the value of “enjoyment of visitors.” Such a
management policy contradicted with the imperative to preserve. The new management strategy
entailed the values of visitors enjoying nature AND conserving the environment. It refused to
acknowledge that these two values are contradictory. It also did not see the inherent
contradiction in the imperative to create natural interactions. Generally, a biotic relationship is
natural because it has not been created; however, the imperative to manage extensively and hide
all signs of management papered over these and other contradictions. The backlash that
followed suggestions that solving inequality would cost money clearly shows the logic of
encapsulation at work. The logic of "non-violence," which became associated with the civil rights
movement, operates under the assumption that while the system is violent and morally wrong,
the most effective way to deal with injustice is by refusing to use the same coercion and force.
While the repudiation of violence may have been strategic, it was successful is because it was a
call for change "without being threatening." The white middle class supported civil rights as long
racial inequality was framed in a way where its solution would benefit everyone and serve the
interests of all Americans. They saw the Civil Rights Act as a successful solution because it did
not jeopardize the status quo. It allowed people to think about solving racial inequality without
considering that racism has a function. By definition, whites benefit enormously from racism. To
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acknowledge this fact also means seeing that, as a group, they are interested in maintaining the
system, an interest opposed to that of groups who are harmed and oppressed by the same
system. Unlike the agenda for all races to "join hands" and reconcile that underlined the Civil
Rights Act, the call for government funding brought to the forefront that ending racial inequality
would mean that those who benefitted from racism would lose those benefits.
2. Examining problems without attempting to locate their cause. A logic of
“management”— Enclosing, tucking away, hiding, controlling, and
administering problems instead of eradicating them.
The refusal to acknowledge conflict dovetails into the logic of “management.” Just as
pharmaceutical encapsulation enclosed toxic and harmful substances in an outer membrane,
Yellowstone’s management policy reacted to the unprecedented destruction of nature by
enclosing a small part of it, fencing it off, and creating a geographical domain where biotic
relationships could be managed and controlled. It addressed the mass environmental crisis the
same way that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty solved the “nuclear weapons” problem by
moving testing underground. When US society confronted the dangers of nuclear weapons, the
anti-nuclear movement demanded that nuclear testing be stopped. The government/ defense
force wanted the experiments to continue. The Non-Proliferation Act did not acknowledge the
inherent conflict between the two positions. Shifting testing underground and promising that no
more tests would be conducted in space or on earth satisfied both sides of the conflict.
3. Understanding problems at the smallest level possible. A logic of “not the
whole thing” that addresses problems by isolating them into the smallest
unit possible
The “micro” part of “microencapsulation” gives the ideology a unique orientation vis-avis scale. With the whole eradicated from the collective imagination, problems were viewed
differently.

When scientists realized just how dangerous nuclear weapons were and

campaigned against them, the public refused to believe them. The image of nuclear fallout was
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too abstract and too big for the public to imagine. The problem only became legitimate,/ nuclear
power was framed as a problem only when the public saw traces of radiation in children’s teeth.
By denying the scale of the problem and repackaging nuclear power as harming individual
children instead of the abstract risk of atomic weapons, scientists convinced the public that
nuclear arms and nuclear power, in general, were not desirable.
4. There Is confusion between problems and solutions, seeing solutions as
successful even when they do not solve them.
This new way of thinking what it means to address pathological elements within a system
and the criteria for what it means to have “addressed” them While the rhetoric of “nonviolence”
entered the collective imagination, a lot of the most provocative images were of the violence
perpetrated on civil rights. In the public imagination, Yellowstone rangers had slaughtered
thousands of “innocent elk.” In the final analysis, the solution to the “slaughter” was killing
more elk and many other animals. The imperative to recreate "natural interactions" also meant
that in addition to "euthanasia," elk would be subject to "natural killing" by wolves which would
be introduced back into the park. Similarly, the national highway system promised to solve
blight at “no cost.” For example, the Cross-Bronx expressway in New York City contributed to
the “blight” it was supposed to eliminate by tearing down blocks of homes and destroying entire
neighborhoods.
The next chapter will show how analogous principles became “concretized” in nanobased “targeted delivery” both in a material and discursive sense. A logic akin to
microencapsulation treated nano-based targeted delivery as a success. Even drugs developed
under this rubric did not benefit patients. Nanomedicine solved cancer through “targeting” with
pharmaceuticals formulas that are significantly less effective at targeting cancer cells than
systemic drugs that do not target.
FROM MICROENCAPSULATION TO TARGETING
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To understand the meaning of nanomedicine, one must begin with the notion of
"targeting." Just as rationalism consolidated and stabilized a nebulous collection of ideas,
feelings, and sensibilities into a distinct ethic that Max Weber labeled the "spirit of capitalism,"
"targeting" organized nanotechnology's ideological program into a distinct entity and research
program. Put slightly differently, ‘targeted delivery” was, and is, a concretization of
nanotechnology's discursive substrate. This concept gave flesh to a "spirit" of nanotechnology.
As the notion of a “magic bullet”— a drug that bypasses all healthy cells, tissues, and organs and
is delivered only to diseased cells— demonstrates, typically, targeting is understood as an
antonym of blanketing. However, for nanomedicine, “targeting” conjoins non-destruction with a
discourse about relationality. Although researchers in the field frequently speak of preserving
normal cells, tissues, and organs, cancer nanomedicine's promises center around the category of
destruction, that is, treating the disease without coercion, force, or conflict, but through
"relationships" and "interactions." For nanoscientists, "targeting" is about creating, designing,
and managing interactions. Microencapsulation authorized the birth of nanomedicine primarily
because it created a pathway for using nanostructures to "target" cancer. It is doing so shaped
the meaning of targeting in nanomedicine's lexicon.
Microencapsulation was a solution to what chemists labeled the "moiety" problem, which
they defined as the tendency for foreign proteins to trigger allergic/ immunological reactions in
the body when injected. Before “moiety” entered chemistry, anthropologists used the concept to
refer to kinship structures of Australian Aboriginals and North American Indians. "Moiety"
described the social or ritual groups that divided people based on kinship and heritage. One's
"moiety" determines the types of interactions that are fitting and those that are prohibited. It
also specifies which exchanges will be hostile and which will be cooperative. Whether applied to
people, cells, or particles, the "moiety" problem is about overcoming the predetermined rules
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that govern interaction. The pharmaceutical realm referred to overcoming the hostility between
the immune systems and foreign proteins.
The same foregrounding of the category of relationships and interactions shaped cancer
nanomedicine’s rhetorical strategies in several important ways. Unlike chemotherapy and
radiation, which fight cancer via what has been described as is "poisoning" or "chemical
warfare"— strategies underlined by force, coercion, and conflict between cancer, the body, and
its treatment— and produce traumatic, disfiguring, or even lethal side-effects, nano-based
targeting promised to address cancer via interaction and co-operation. According to researchers,
even if a single nanotechnology-based targeted delivery platform can pass human clinical trials,
oncology's current paradigms will be turned on their head; cancer will become a chronic disease
(Schneider, 2009) easily managed— not killed, not slaughtered, not eliminated— by
pharmaceuticals that peacefully coexist and co-operate with the body's molecules and cells.
According to Lawrence Tamarkin—a leader in the field and inventor of Aurimune, a gold
nanoparticle that was once regarded as the most likely to become nanomedicine’s first
successful cancer treatment— nano-based targeted delivery would turn cancer into “a chronic
illness, not a death sentence” (Schneider 2009, 20).
As the case studies in this chapter have shown, microencapsulation was more than an
idea or innovative strategy within pharmacological research technology. In both the
pharmaceutical lab and society, it spoke to a desire to solve problems without force or
destruction and framed problems in a way that made them amenable to such solutions. Since
contemporary nano-based targeted delivery arose from microencapsulation, it inherited its
intellectual baggage. Thus, cancer nanomedicine is haunted by a certain contradiction. In the
scientist's narratives, targeted delivery was an alternative to chemotherapy, which, according to
them, was not an acceptable treatment for cancer because it was toxic and poisonous. However,
their nanoparticles still deliver the same cancer medicine. In fact, nano-based
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microencapsulation allowed even more poisonous and toxic molecules to make their way into
the body. The idea that nanomedicine-based “targeting” would remake cancer into chronic
disease rested on envisioning cancer as an entity capable of coexisting with healthy cells. Most, if
not all, cancer biologists agree that such coexistence is impossible primary because cancer’s
agenda—uncontrolled growth— is inherently opposed to the interests of the organism. Most, if
not all, models of the disease envision cancer cells as aggressive and invasive. These models
predict that cancer cells will inevitably colonize one organ after another until they kill their host
if allowed to remain in the body. But not nanoscientists. For nano-based targeted delivery to
become an effective cure for cancer, cancer had to be understood differently.
Microencapsulation provided only one-half of the symbolic capital that gave nano-based
“targeting” its unique meaning. The next chapter continues telling the story of the birth of
nanomedicine by tracing the origins of “targeting” to the discovery of the Enhanced Permeability
and Retention Effect in the 1980s. It will show how the Enhanced Permeability and Retention
Effect furnished a gentler, friendlier, and less destructive vision of cancer and, in doing so,
shaped the discourse around “targeting” for nanoscientists.
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CHAPTER 8
DIRE CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT MAKE
FOR GOOD BUILDINGS
The Enhanced Permeability Effect and
Nanmedicine’s Architectural Vision of Cancer
In the last decade, oncology had been forced to confront something that was not entirely new.
Although this “something” was not always as visible as it is now, its ghostly presence in the clinic
could never be denied entirely. Today the 9% of cancer patients who refuse medical treatment
are a serious problem for clinicians and researchers. This 9% are not people who forego
intervention because their prognosis is hopeless. With appropriate treatment, they have a good
chance of complete remission or, at the very least considerable gains in quality and length of life.
Be that as it may, experts are even more concerned about another, significantly larger group of
deviants. Although there are no reliable numbers to gauge the magnitude of the problem, these
patients— who usually have breast cancer— accept radiation, surgery, and other treatments but
categorically exclude chemotherapy from their regime. Ironically, they are the same population
that stands to benefit from (adjuvant) chemotherapy treatment more than those with any other
cancers.
Medical researchers often blame the culture of fear and dread for what they see as their
patient's increasing resistance towards chemotherapy. As a well-cited review explained, lay
knowledge about how chemotherapy is a "construction laid atop the world of experience" (Bell
2009, 167). We collectively "know" that chemotherapy induces considerable suffering. The
pervasiveness of this cultural "fact” that chemotherapy is a terrible experience, as bad – worse
even – than the disease itself leads to patients radically overestimating the impact of
chemotherapy on quality of life. However, those who have experienced chemotherapy often find
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that it is not as bad as they had been led to believe. Almost all patients report less suffering and
side effects than expected (Lindley et al. 1999, 63).
Given the harm of narratives that emphasize pain, disfigurement, hair loss, nausea, and
other abject side effects, including death from declining life-saving treatment, doctors and other
experts have made combating the endless representations of chemotherapy in television, films,
print media, and other cultural products an urgent imperative. As oncologists joined forces with
sociologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and other socio-cultural experts to develop
strategies to counter the prevailing "facts" and feelings about chemotherapy as worse than the
disease itself, starting from the mid-2020s, a group of scientists and engineers organized under
the banner of nanotechnology-based targeted delivery—a paradigm based on administering
pharmaceuticals directly to the cancer tumor and bypassing healthy cells and tissues—began to
center the "potentially life-threatening" side-effects associated with current cancer treatments
(Kanamala 2016).
In a sample of 40 articles published in top oncology journals between 2010 and 2016,
every article contained a permutation of the phrase: "it kills healthy cells and causes toxicity to
the patient" (Sun et al. 2014, 12322). “Chemotherapy damages local healthy tissues and organs"
(Estanqueiro et al., 2015: 632). "Chemotherapeutic compounds attack indiscriminately" (Greish
2010). Chemotherapy causes "toxic effects in normal cells and tissues" (Dawidczyk et al., 2014).
It "poisons healthy cells and causes toxicity to the patient" (Liu et al., 2016, 632). In cancer
nanomedicine, chemotherapy's harm and toxicity occupy the forefront of research and funding
agendas. According to scientists and engineers, this toxicity and harm were consequences of
chemotherapy’s systemic nature. "Only a small fraction of the administered drugs reach the site
of action, while the rest of the drug is distributed (...) into healthy organs and tissues” (633).
Since the problem was a “lack of specificity,” nanomedicine’s solution, directness of delivery—
i.e., “targeting”— was as logical as it was elegant and evocative.
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AN ARCHITECTURAL DISEASE
Nanotechnology began in the late 1950s as a nebulous logic, a new way of thinking about
the world and its things. By the mid-1980s, it evolved into a "laboratory without science" (Rich
1974, 87) or a solution without a problem. In Richard Feynman and Eric Drexler's hands,
nanotechnology offered world-changing, revolutionary, but abstract possibilities for humanity.
The discovery of microencapsulation in the 1960s enabled nanotechnology to test its ideas in the
pharmaceutical realm. However, "targeting” became nanomedicine’s emblematic paradigm. The
notion of “targeting” emerged from the discovery of the Enhanced Permeability and Retention
Effect in 1986. According to those in the field, [the Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect]
is the main reason behind the high enthusiasm for developing nanoparticle therapeutics as
cancer therapies" (Wang 2015, 25).
As this dissertation has shown, at every stage of its development, nanotechnology was
more than a technical or scientific endeavor, but a cultural mood, style of thought, or “spirit.”
This chapter continues the project’s broader aims by interrogating the meaning of “targeting” in
nanomedicine. By examining nanoscientists' themes, metaphors, and other discursive strategies
to justify “targeted delivery” in the oncological arena vis-a-vis concurrent discourse circulating
in other realms, it seeks to bring to light a deep generic tendency that operated not only in the
medical arena but in the collective imagination. It argues that the general but highly specific
logic hiding underneath the surface of discourse functioned to identify, make sense of, then deal
with noxious elements in a system, whether the pathology in question is biological, social, or
medical in nature. While previous sociological work has given rise to a body of literature focused
on how particular social problems are constructed, this chapter interrogates targeted delivery
and its universe of discourse by turning an analytic lens to what makes a good solution for a
particular problem. Although it may appear to the contrary, the relationship between a problem
and its resolution is neither stable nor self-evident. The discursive strategies used to deem a
- 263 -

particular solution fitting and adequate are just as significant as those that demarcated the
problem, to begin with. Thus, in addition to examining the construction of social problems, this
chapter seeks to excavate and specify the logic underneath rules that govern the relationship
between a problem and solution. Through a careful examination of discursive formations in
texts associated with the beginnings of targeted delivery in nanomedicine and those in the
broader cultural realm, this chapter brings to light the significance of the notion of
"compatibility"— which emerged from a conceptual universe populated by ideas about fluidity,
malleability, and interaction. It shows how this discursive universe envisioned the relationships
between problems and their solution in terms of “compatibility.” It begins by describing a new
vision of cancer ushered in by the Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect.

AN ARCHITECTURAL DISEASE
In their groundbreaking 1986 article, Hiroshi Maeda and Yasuhiro Matsumura described
the “Enhanced Permeability and Retention (EPR) effect” for the first time. According to
contemporary commentaries, the Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect is the “leitmotiv
for the efficient delivery of anticancer nanoparticle-based drugs to tumors" (Bertrand 2014, 2)
referred to as “targeted delivery.”
"Targeting,” or delivering pharmaceuticals to cancer tumors while avoiding healthy
tissue, is not new nor specific to nanomedicine. Delivering drugs to tumors and tumors only has
been the "holy grail" of researchers since Paul Ehrlich laid down chemotherapy's foundation in
the 1900s with his "magic bullet" paradigm. Nanomedicine's contribution to what is still a
scientific puzzle lies in the unique affinity between nanoparticles and cancer. Although they did
not see nanotechnology as a solution to cancer, its early founders laid down the foundation for
nano-based “targeting” by pushing “compatibility" and “relationality” to the forefront of its
discursive universe. The invention of microencapsulation and the Enhanced Permeability and
Retention Effect built on their collection of images, metaphors, and symbols and consolidated
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nano-based targeting into a cancer treatment that addressed the disease through
“interactions.” The Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect envisioned cancer as an
architectural disease characterized by “abnormal” or “unique” zones" or “microenvironments”
comprised of “heterogeneous and diverse" structures" (Greisch 2010, 25). As per the story
endlessly repeated by nanoscientists, when tumors get to a specific size, they can no longer rely
on the body's circulatory system for nutrients and waste disposal. Cancer cells reproduce very
quickly, and the tumor struggles to keep them alive. At some point, the tumor can longer meet
the needs of its increasing population, and many of the cells die due to a lack of resources. The
tumor builds its own network of veins and arteries to prevent more deaths. As software
engineers know all too well, the imperative to build quickly is incompatible with high-quality
work. As they often say to their clients: "Fast, good, or cheap – pick two." The tumor is not a
master builder; or a "builder" at all, really. It lacks the time and expertise required to plan the
network of vessels, it has no materials with which to complete the project, or workers to perform
the labor. Driven by desperation to save its budding population of cells, it builds quickly and
"haphazardly." The resulting structure is an “aberrant," network of “irregular,” “discontinuous,”
and "deregulated” components” (ibid). Dire circumstances do not make for good buildings.
The tumor's "architectural uniqueness" is the cause of frequent cell deaths from
poisoning, starvation, or hypoxia (lack of oxygen) and elevated interstitial fluid pressure. The
purpose of any vasculature is to deliver oxygen and nutrients to cells, clear away waste, and
regulate fluid dynamics to maintain normal pressure within structures in the body. Normal
blood vessels are fit to perform these functions. Vascular tissue comprises a tightly woven
network of junctions that prevent cargo from leaking out and keep unwanted elements from
entering the bloodstream. Its distinct components are organized in a hierarchy to ensure
optimal delivery to all cells, tissues, and organs. On the other hand, Tumors are full of
"fenestrations" (holes), reaching sizes ranging from 200 to 2,000 nm. In a tumor, the vascular
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tissue is an assemblage of random items only somewhat fit for the job they were expected to
perform. Unsurprisingly, tumor infrastructure is prone to breakdowns. Even when working at
its optimum, it often fails to perform its functions.
NEW IDEAS ABOUT WHAT COUNTS AS A SOLUTION: TREATING CANCER
THROUGH NANO-BIO INTERACTION
Maeda and Matsumara's groundbreaking article gave researchers a new narrative about
what cancer is and how it works. Their central claim, however, concerned the unique affinity
between nanoparticles and cancer tumors. Due to the poor drainage and lack of lymphatic
clearance—effects of the tumors' poor construction practices—tumor tissue is "leaky." Whereas
normal blood vessels consist of tightly woven tissues, which prevent substances from entering
and leaving the bloodstream, tumor vessels are full of holes. Maeda and Matsumara noticed that
these holes can be penetrated particles of a specific size.
They proposed that nano-sized were ideal candidates for cancer therapies because their
qualities were compatible with tumor tissue. Particles larger than nano-size were too big to
bypass the body's barriers. While those smaller than nanoparticles could do so, they were too
small and fell out of circulation. Nanoparticles not only matched the size of the fenestrations in
the tumor, but they were "biocompatible." The biocompatibility between nanoparticles and
blood cells enabled them to turn the body's circulatory system into a transport route and avoid
clearing mechanisms. They could stay in the bloodstream undetected for an extended period
until the bloodstream delivered them to the tumor, where they fell through the tumor’s holes
and became trapped or "retained" there due to the high pressure. The Enhanced Permeability
and Retention Effect was built on the idea that particles of a specific size and shape accumulate
in tumor tissue more than in normal tissue. For nanoscientists, this translated to the insight that
the "aberrant" vasculature system could be "exploited" for targeting," a process some refer to as
"site-specific drug delivery" (Shukla et al. 2019). Thus, contemporary nanoscientists refer to
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Maeda and Matsumara’s work as "opening a privileged gate"(Salvioni 2019, 21) for
nanoparticles to enter the tumor tissues, which in turn authorized nanotechnology to enter the
oncology lab. Foregrounding the fluid dynamics and the mechanical fit between tumor tissue
and nano-drugs gave rise to a line of first-generation treatments that worked—or failed to
work—via “passive targeting.” In the 2000s, nanomedicine would make claims about being able
to “actively" target.”
AN ALTERNATIVE TO CHEMOTHERAPY
The new image of cancer, which imagines tumors are "vulnerable"— poorly built
structures ill-equipped to provide nourishment to its destitute population of dependent cells
coincided with a specific attitude about chemotherapy. According to the Johns Hopkins
Nanomedicine Group, one of the nanomedicine’s premier institutions, chemotherapy "kills a
weed by poisoning the whole garden.” The Toxicity of Chemotherapy, published in 1996, put it
another way: “By its very nature, anticancer chemotherapy is cytotoxic; that is, it is designed to
damage human cells […] the administration of chemotherapy to cancer patients will inevitably
cause damage to noncancerous, normal cells (Lowenthal et al. 1996, 967). Even chemotherapy’s
biggest proponents recognized that chemotherapy is “one of the most toxic drugs known to
humans” (Pratt 1994, 18).
Although different types of chemotherapy have different goals (curative, adjuvant,
neoadjuvant, and palliative), all chemotherapy shares a common goal: to "destroy all cancer
cells" (Greish 2010, 202). “The sole purpose of chemotherapy is cell killing, which is usually
achieved with high efficacy but little precision” (ibid). Regardless of the specific mechanisms,
the cell-killing drugs must be administered at the highest possible dose. Most will not reach the
tumor site and instead accumulate in healthy tissue. Thus, in chemotherapy, the only question
regarding dose is how much poison a host can tolerate without dying. The more, the better.
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While harming healthy tissue was never chemotherapy’s aim, as the above accounts
make crystal clear, collateral damage is an inevitable part of this treatment modality. The harm
to normal cells, tissues, and organs is the cause of often-life-threatening side effects. Patients
endure these because cancer's potential harm is understood as being so great that its every trace
must be eliminated at all costs. To justify the aggressiveness of chemotherapy and help patients
make sense of their suffering, which is often more significant than that associated with the
disease itself, chemotherapy envisioned and continues to envision cancer as a threat, a
dangerous “other”; an enemy, or foreign invader. As Sontag put it, when cancer is an enemy, the
only solution is war. As one researcher put it: "chemotherapy is one of the major weapons we
have in the ill-equipped battle against this threat" (Putz 2015).
“Chemotherapeutic” vision saw cancer as categorically distinct from normal tissue. It
emphasized cancer’s dangerous nature and absolute incompatibility with a normally functioning
organism. While the “molecularization” (Rose 2006) that accompanied the rise of genomics
gave rise to new insights about the biology of cancer as well as significant advancements in
cancer treatments, the structure of metaphor associated with genetics remained wedded to
violence and destruction. Robert Weinberg— a leading cancer researcher whose work focused on
understating the genetic substrate of the disease— described cancer as “selfish” cells that had
received the “wrong moral blueprint” and had no interest in the tissue of the organism around
them (1998, 3). They have one program in mind: growth— more replicas of themselves and
unlimited expansion. Like others in his field, Weinberg’s vision of cancer was based around
incompatibility, asociality, and a lack of relationality. The cancer cell’s absolute lack of morality
left only one option: kill it.
Nanotechnology's alternative to chemotherapy was based on the notion of "targeting,"
which in its lexicon is structured around the category of “compatibility,” which authorized
discourse about relationality, interaction, and affinity. Although nanomedicine has drawn on
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genomics, in its symbolic universe, cancer is not the "evil invincible predator" (Sontag 1978, 55)
or a “selfish” immoral part, that categorically refuses to function on behalf of the whole, but a
struggling caretaker in desperate need of resources. Thus, its treatment does not need to entail
an all-out war. The Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect revealed that a cancer tumor's
unique traits could be "exploited" for targeting. This is so because nanoparticles have a
particular affinity for the tumor’s “aberrant structures.” By virtue of their specific shape, size,
and other unique properties, nanostructures and cancer tumors go together like a lock and key.
Only a specifically shaped key can unlock a particular lock. Thus, for researchers in a
nano oncology lab, "targeting" is about engineering this fit. In the scientist’s accounts,
“targeting” treated cancer by "engineering compatibility” between the body, the tumor, and the
nanostructures designed to eradicate it. Unlike chemotherapy, whose vision practices rested on
launching the strongest and deadliest attack possible and destroying every cancer cell from the
organism, nanotechnology-based treatments were said to "interact," "co-operate," and "form
affinities" with the various populations of cells.
According to researchers, nanoparticles are amenable to forming relationships with the
body’s structures and cancer cells because they have a high level of "biocompatibility,” a
function of their smallness. Firstly, nano-sized pharmaceuticals “work at the same scale as
cellular processes in the body and, thus, they can interact with biological systems'' (Soares 2018,
2). But more importantly, as all matter approached at the nanoscopic scale, nanoparticles are
flexible, malleable, and "tunable," which means that their size, shape, and surface can be
engineered to be compatible with the physical structures and the chemical interactions in the
body. The structural flexibility of nanomaterials allows engineers to design them to take part in
specific "interactions optimally” (ibid). This means designing a perfect fit between the tumor
and the nanostructure by using the tumor's qualities as a guide for decisions regarding the
particle's biophysical properties, such as binding affinity, reactivity, or shape.
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This new image of cancer as an aberrant structure constructed without the oversight of a
master builder went together with a novel approach to its treatment. Unlike chemotherapy,
nanoparticles do not wage war, attack, or fight cancer; they form relationships. Nano-based
targeted delivery promised to treat cancer through “interaction.” The next section turns to
analogous tendencies in social theory to perform an “immanent critique”—that is, spell out the
latent tendencies in nanomedicine’s rhetoric and illustrate the not so readily accessible
consequences of replacing war metaphors with the discourse of relationality.

FROM “THEM” AND “US” TO RELATIONALITY
Patricia Clough once argued that sociological models of society are technical agendas
continued by other means (2009). Sociologists and others who contend with matters of
collective life often draw from cutting-edge inventions and discoveries to construct their models
of society and how it works without realizing they are doing so. Although the examples in her
text are sparse, even a cursory glance at sociology’s history speaks to the technical substrate of
its thought. Spencer and then Durkheim’s society-as-organism came from biology. Simmel’s
conceptualization of social life as “interaction among atoms” (1971, 52) shares its historical
origins with a conceptual reshuffling in physics following the introduction of relativity theory;
just the “network” metaphor still popular with science and technology scholars entered social
theory as computers made their way into private homes.
Nanomedicine arose alongside developments in social theory known as Post-Modernism
and Post-Structuralism. The homologies between the metaphors, concepts, and language
associated with the Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect and social thinkers in the late
1980s and early 1990s are undeniable. However, placing the two sets of discourses side-by-side
speaks to an even more profound, albeit hidden, affinity. According to Bruno Latour,
Modernism, which functioned based on irreconcilable opposites, turned every relationship into
a “fight, a quarrel where there are winners and losers” (1991, 10). By the 1980s, scholars became
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increasingly aware that when duality is allowed to structure collective understanding of social
reality, "conflict" becomes the only possible way of understanding relationships. As a result, all
potential “interlocutors” become enemies.
Derrida's famous analysis of Europe's “refugee crisis” is especially instructive in this
regard. Reflecting on the notion of “hospitality”— Derrida concluded that the denial of asylum to
thousands of refugees was a product of understanding relationships through the grid of binary
terms such as "self" and "other"/ "guest" and "hostile stranger." According to Derrida, the
oppositionality imbricated in binary thought turned all difference into a threat, and in turn
authorized exclusion, force, and death via the rhetoric of opposing interests. As social scientists
began to see boundary creation as implicated in maintaining hierarchy and scholars in other
fields picked up similar arguments en masse, binary, “us” and “them” thinking came to
represent oppression, marginalization, and exclusion.
In feminist thought, the imperative to avoid binary thinking shifted the theoretical focus
away from "patriarchy" to the category of "gender." What used to be the "woman problem"— i.e.,
hierarchy, oppression, and subordination manifested as violence and/or other applications of
force used by institutions and/or individual men on behalf of patriarchy to maintain an
imbalance of power that favored men at the expense of women—became the dualistic
organization of bodies. Judith Butler, the patron saint of American Poststructuralism, described
gender as a “trauma” (2004, 18). For Butler, the binary structure of gender, a mechanism that
“deployed pain and prohibition to force subjects to take up one of the two possible subject
positions” (ibid), was not only a source of suffering but a “form of violence” (ibid).
Whereas earlier thinkers fought to carve out a gap between "sex" and "gender"—the
former referring to social roles and the latter, unchangeable facts rooted in bodies—
Poststructuralism ushered in a new wave of scholarship that refused to treat "sex" as an
immutable biological reality with rigid boundaries, but as "slippery and amorphous" (Grosz
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2004, viii). As previously rigid sex differences became "fluid, mobile, volatile, and open to
negotiation." As did bodies. This new cultural image of the body was characterized by "organic
openness.” It was not an object made of qualities and pairs, but a discontinuous entity made of
processes, organs, flows of energy, speeds, durations, intensities, planes, flows, or linkages
(Grosz 1994, 161). Other feminist scholars sought to eradicate oppositional thinking that
traditionally organized relationships between the mind and the body, the inside and outside,
reason and passion, and depth and surface by replacing binaries with metaphors drawn from
fluid dynamics. Just as “trickle-down economics,” which emerged at around the same time
argued that wealth is distributed most fairly and efficiently when allowed to flow freely, within
the realm of theory "fluidity" turned bodies into leaky, porous entities (Shildrik 2015).
THE SPIRIT OF RELATIONALITY: A NEW THEORY OF POWER
The recognition that binary thinking and conceptual schemas populated with ironclad
boundaries and rigid categories were inherently harmful and dangerous led to a new vision of
how power operates. Social theorists began to see the “self” and “other” binary as destructive, in
that it inherently— albeit unconsciously—treats the “other” as a threat to the “self’”; an enemy to
be vanquished. For Marx, power functioned through the exploitation of one class by another.
The bourgeoisie and proletariat held opposing and inherently incompatible interests that could
not be reconciled. Thus, the only solution was a class war, which would eradicate the
bourgeoisie. However, as Foucault’s devastating critique delivered in Society Must Be Defended
revealed, Marxism and other theories that foreground militant struggle between enemies were
inherently racist and eugenicist. “Socialism has been forced to stress the problem of class
struggle, the struggle against the enemy, the elimination of the enemy within capitalist society
itself, and when, therefore, it had to think about the physical confrontation with the class enemy
in capitalist society. [In doing so it had to] rationalize the murder of its enemies” (1997, 262).
Unlike the Marxist model, which demanded some form of direct collective action and
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confrontation, the new way of thinking about power and oppression promised “resistance”
through subverting gender norms, finding unknown pleasures, or other “lifestyle” choices,
rather than mass violence, revolution, or war. As Foucault put it, all power contains, within it,
resistance. For Butler, this insight translated into the idea that the rigidity of the binary
structure of gender includes the mechanisms for its “subversion,” or the seeds of its own
“undoing.” In Butler’s words, the fact that the prohibition (against homosexuality and gender
nonconformity) is so absolute and ironclad “guarantees errors and other failures to internalize
and perform gender norms correctly” (2002, 42). Poststructuralism made visible the taken-forgranted binaries that have permeated common-sense understanding of the world, but it went
beyond that. It contended that the habit of thinking in oppositions made hierarchy, identity, and
other manifestations of power permanent— eternal and irreversible (Cixous and Derrida 2001).
In the political realm, these insights culminated in a sense that prejudice, discrimination, and
other oppressive practices toward the less favored group are products of binary classification
practices. Within this framing, finding an alternative to binary thinking became not only an
intellectual endeavor but a solution to prejudice, discrimination, and inequality.
A DESIRE FOR NON-VIOLENT RELATIONSHIPS
In nanomedicine's metaphorical universe, cancer operates via a Foucauldian— not
Marxist model of power. The tumor was not the center of a "coherent system of oppression and
control" (Foucault 1980), just as cancer's progression as a disease had little to do with class war
characterized by a struggle between clearly demarcated groups with distinct and irreconcilable
interests. Cancer was not an aggressive, calculating colonizer that methodically took over the
body organ by organ. Its domination was not planned or conscious but an unintended effect of
everyday, local actions, and interactions. Like Butler’s gender norms, the construction errors
that lead to disorganization and faulty architecture that according to nanoscientists
characterized tumor vascular tissue provided an opportunity for nanoparticles to eradicate it.
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Underneath discourse associated with Post-Modernism and Post-structuralism lay the
assumption that the most undesirable and dangerous elements of social life were binaries, which
worked via solidity, hardness, and durability, which authorized thinking in terms of
incompatibilities, and contradictions.
Post-structuralism did not only expose the binary nature of everyday thought. It came
with the idea that oppression— whether based on race, gender, sexuality, or other categories was
a product of binary thought and classification practices that draw stark boundaries between
groups. According to Derrida, dualistic thinking affirmed, reified, and ossified asymmetrical
power relations, and enabled the corresponding hierarchies to continue to operate as if they
were eternal. Thus, the imperative to avoid conceptual rigidity in favor of "a series of escapes, of
small slides, of flights that open another, slippery, understanding" (Cixious and Derrida 2001
15), and the celebration of difference, indistinction, disorder, non-identity, lack of consensus,
indeterminacy, and contingency became not only an intellectual endeavor but a political project.
Within this framing, leaving questions about differences remain unknown and
unanswered by endlessly deferring them folds into his centering of the category of relationality.
As critics pointed out, the imperative to do away with the “self” and “other'' framing and
replacing it with an ontology based on interconnectivity, intersubjectivity, and interdependence
(Ajana 208, 24) speaks to deconstruction’s not-so-latent aspiration towards "non-violent
relationships'' (Hagglund 2004). The new sensibility replaced ironclad boundaries, and clear,
absolute, and distinctions in favor of fluidity, malleable, reversibility, undecidability shifted
discourse away from “self” and other to thinking about interaction, intersubjectivity, and
relationality. Traces of a similar ethos can be found in both the social and scientific milieus
where it manifested as a new way of identifying and describing social problems, and a logic that
structured what counts as a valid solution and the relationship between problems and solutions
in general.
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The following section documents how this logic framed discourse concerning two
pathological entities. It begins with (i) showing how understanding terrorism as “conflict”— not
war— gave rise to a “hybrid” management strategy that dissolves the boundary between war and
peace as a solution, and (ii) how the harm caused by the welfare recipient was remedied by
forgoing the boundaries between poverty and crime, which congealed into “selective
incapacitation” becoming a solution.
TARGETED STRIKES
As Marx knew all too well, humanity only takes up problems that it can solve. For
centuries, "most of the things shot by military men at their enemies missed their target" (Digby
1975, 1). However, the Department of Defense did not become convinced that it had a "targeting
problem" (ibid) until 1973, when a practical demonstration of laser-guided bombs in the
October War signaled that a solution was on the horizon. Even then, it was clear that what the
Air Force initially called "smart bombs," were the first of a new generation of military technology
that would change the "posture and tactic of every military power” and even redefine the very
meaning of war (2)13.
Much to the Pentagon's "shock and dismay" (ibid), adapting the Air Force’s
nomenclature almost immediately led to unguided bombs being referred to as "dumb.” Their
alternative, "precision-guided munitions" was a broad category that encompassed “any”
weapons which detonated upon impact and "whose probability of making a direct hit on its
target at full range (when unopposed) was greater than a half" (3). Officially, “precision-guided
munitions” referred to “any weapon,” but in reality, only missiles satisfied the Pentagon’s
criteria. Thus, the first true "precision weapons” were introduced ten years later by Raytheon,

Although a variety of weapons, including the SA-7, an anti-aircraft missile fired from the shoulder; the
SA- 6 (Gainful), a larger, vehicle-mounted Soviet anti-aircraft missile guided by a dual-frequency radar; or
the Sagger AT-3, an anti-tank missile launched from the ground, meet the Pentagon’s criteria for PGMs,
they were classified that way retroactively.
13
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who not only addressed the "targeting problem," but shaped the general meaning of "targeting"
in a military context. According to promotional materials on their website: “Precision targeting
systems incorporate satellite navigation, laser guidance, high-definition radars, advanced
seekers, and other technologies, which "allow customers to carry out discriminating strikes on
individual bona fide targets with unprecedented effectiveness" and at the same time, “avoid
casualties and minimize collateral damage." However, “targeting" is not just technology, or a
system of technologies, but a conceptual "fulcrum" that organizes these and other tendencies
and legitimizes contemporary uses of force by a promise to replace the bunt force and violence
of warfare with engineering.
The rise of "targeting" discourse corresponds to a new way of thinking about conflict.
According to a 2017 RAND Corporation report, which is particularly illustrative of this new
vision, the world has become less violent. States enjoy a more peaceful relationship with one
another as the hegemony of humanitarianism norms and values of civilization combined with
stabilization of territory and power on a global scale has created a situation where "there is no
need for war" (108). Mature democracies abstain from using repression as a tool and experience
less internal conflict. However, the openness and responsiveness to public opinions that
characterize such societies have made democracies vulnerable to a new type of threat (189):
terrorism.
A new type of conflict requires new weapons. In the military arena, “targeting” is an
index of the shift from conventional warfare to irregular conflicts that speaks to a new way of
identifying and dealing with threats such as terrorism. By the time Obama came into office,
drones had become a favorite counter-terrorism measure under the rhetoric of “targeted
killing,” which introduced the possibility of “tailoring force more creatively to achieve limited
ends […] when conducted with due care, drone strikes cause less collateral damage than
conventional wartime tactics” (Buley 2008, 2).
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As per the language used by military strategists, terrorism is not war but a pocket of
violence in an increasingly peaceful world. War is an "instrument of policy" that uses military
means (i.e., violence) to settle a conflict between two sovereign states decisively. However,
according to military officials, today the "greatest threat, the most significant enemies the
United States are not nation-states but a small cell within a state" (Petraeus 2006, xviii). Thus,
today's military does not wage war but intervenes in disputes between populations. It does so
through hybrid," "gray-zone operations," counterinsurgency, and other "asymmetric," or
"irregular tactics aimed at "regulating the behaviors of states' territorial and extraterritorial
response" (ibid). “Targeted strikes” are among the most prolific strategies associated with the
new order of things. Still, they are just one part of a broader strategy to “diversify the overall
approach,” to conflict, a “flexible response,” to a graduated area in between war and peace
(Mazarr 2015, p. 132–134). Unlike war, “non-international armed conflict are complex
environments where the relationship between various actors is traditionally malleable” (RAND
Corp, 2017, 259).
EXPERTS ON RELATIONSHIPS—NOT FORCE
As is the case with most forms of targeting, the question is the right person, the right
place, and the right time. In wartime, armies are authorized to attack and kill enemy combatants
in ways that may cause harm or death to civilians as long as the anticipated harm to civilians is
not disproportionate” in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated. But
they are prohibited from striking civilians directly. International humanitarian law operates on
ironclad boundaries between combatants and civilians. However, when dealing with terrorist
groups, proper identification is difficult. The combatant/civilian binary does not make sense.
Like cancers tumors, armed groups are not homogenous entities. In some organizations, the
distinction between the political and military wings is not so apparent. For “targeted strikes,”
the key problem is distinguishing enemy combatants from the regular population. As David
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Petraeus, the author of the official manual on counterinsurgency put it “targeting” depends on
identifying the target— i.e., intelligence, a task that involves “forming and managing
relationships” (2006. 14) Soldiers must become experts in social network analysis wherein the
focus is not conventional enemy units, but a personality-based understanding of specific
individuals, or groups of individuals within a population. This is the basis of “counterinsurgency” (ibid).
Counterinsurgency requires that “soldiers become a different type of expert. An expert
on relationships […] While firepower is the determinant of success in conventional warfare, the
key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence on the location and identity of the insurgent
enemy derived from a supportive population…” (42). Counterinsurgency involves making
forming close relationships with people. “In fact, according to Petraeus, “some of the best
weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot […] sometimes the more force is used the less
effective it is. The more successful counterinsurgency, the less force can be used” (48). Thus, the
key strategy involves creating and maintaining, “connections with the populate that establish
real legitimacy” (48). Unlike conventional warfare, activities that have the most meaning do not
involve killing insurgents (4). The key to managing irregular conflict is minimizing violence even
if abstaining from using force means that soldiers “may have to accept more risk to maintain
involvement with the people […] An elevated level of violence benefits insurgents, so controlling
the level of violence is a key part of the “struggle” (49-54).
TARGETED INCAPACITATION
According to criminologists, "no other fact seems as defining for the current moment as
the massive increase in the level of incarceration undertaken over the past decade and a half"
(Simon 1992, 450-451). Most, if not all, experts trace the origins of the genealogy of so-called
“mass incarceration” to the "hard on crime" approach, which justified minimum sentences and
long prison terms for all offenders through the theory of "incapacitation," which assumed that
- 278 -

the only way to reduce crime is to prevent people from committing the by physically stopping
them from doing so. As many have noted, the 1990s ushered in a new tendency in penological
thought. According to Hope and Sparks (2000), the most visible sign of this new way of thinking
is the trend towards “selective incapacitation.”
The logic behind incapacitation is undeniable; if the offender is isolated from society,
they can no longer commit crimes within society (Auerhahn, 2003, 631). While there is
significant debate as to whether or not incapacitation can reduce the overall crime rate, if it
could, many people need to be locked up for extended periods. Even if incapacitation reduced
the crime rate, it was expensive. As the number of inmates rose, prisons became overcrowded.
In the collective imagination, prisons were perceived as a significant financial burden. The
solution had become a problem. As the contradiction between reducing crime and the expense
of doing so migrated to the center of public concern, it was time to decide between reducing
crime and the cost of doing so. By the late 1980s, there was a general sense that there had to be
"more efficient use of prison space" and state money (Gottfredson et al. 1994, 137).
The idea of "selective incapacitation" is often traced back to a 1982 RAND corporation
report, which described "targeting" as a solution to problems created by what became "general
incapacitation." Selective incapacitation promised that "targeting" specific offenders for longer
sentences would reduce crime without the cost and crowding associated with its mass “mass”
counterpart. The associated policies were based on preventing crime in the future by "targeting"
those who had committed multiple crimes, "career criminals" for extended incarceration. It was
based on the philosophy that past criminal activity makes individuals more likely to commit
crimes in the future (Vollaard 2013, 262). As with all forms of "targeting," the problem is
identifying the target object with precision and accuracy. For “selective incapacitation,”
predicting dangerousness is a question of distinguishing between the “career” (ibid) and
ordinary criminal.
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FROM FORCE TO MANAGING INTERACTIONS
The philosophy regarding the purpose and functions of prisons has been organized
around four broad ideas: rehabilitation, punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.
Rehabilitation and have traditionally been regarded as to ends on a spectrum. As Michel
Foucault famously argued in Discipline and Punish, rehabilitation is often just as coercive as
punishment in that it seeks to change and “normalize.” The rise of selective incapacitation is a
concretization of a new logic in thought and discourse about crime and punishment that is not
about punishing or rehabilitating individuals but about “managing unruly groups” (Feeley and
Simon 1992, 455). The logic behind incapacitation is that nothing can change individual
behavior. Rather than correcting criminal impulses, or intervening in the bodies and minds of
inmates in order to discipline them, it aims to control and manage select individuals that pose a
specific danger to society. Selective incapacitation does not promise to reduce crime. On the
contrary, it is about coupling “societal accommodation of high volumes of crime” with
“refinement of professional crime management and increased control” (Hope and Sparks 2000,
85).
In the past, one of the indications that a particular form of handling crime was effective
was the recidivism rate. This form of thinking was based on understanding the problem of crime
in terms of the criminal versus society. However, selective incapacitation is based on a logic
where the traditional objectives of rehabilitation and crime control have been displaced by
efficient management of internal system processes. Its primary concern is managerial processes:
Penal managers strive to manage populations of marginal citizens with no concomitant
effort toward integration into mainstream society […] The success of correctional
programs is judged in terms of aggregate control and system management rather than
individual success and failure— a criminal returning to prison is not a failure, but a
success" (ibid)14.
Selective incapacitation is based on a doctrine that "rest upon actuarial ways of thinking about
how to "manage" accidents and public safety. With new, high-tech modeling tools the question
was not about explaining the etiology of crime but figuring out who will commit them in the
14
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TARGETED WELFARE POLICY
The same logic can be seen in the discourse around “targeted welfare. What many
perceive as the current erosion of the legitimacy of the state has given rise to doubts regarding
the role of government and its responsibility to its citizens in the UK and elsewhere. One of the
clearest pieces of evidence of the general skepticism is the pushback against welfare and other
entitlements. While arguments regarding welfare tend to focus on the cost of benefit provision,
the debate is about more than economics. Questions about who should get what and why
concretize the abstract concept of public provision, a notion closely tied to the meaning of
sociality, i.e., what it means to be a part of society.
Area experts agree the public legitimacy of the welfare state depends on the ability of the
state to justify entitlements in a way that is acceptable to its citizens. In the past, these
justifications were universal. Benefits were available to people because they were citizens. In the
last two decades, commentators have noted the rise of a new grammar and “style” of thinking
about what makes certain types of social spending acceptable to the public. Today, “national
citizenship is no longer resonant as framing of entitlement […] Universalist arguments have
been eclipsed by narrowly framed needs-based, means-tested or behavioral conditions under the
rubric of “targeting” (Weston 2012; Van Lancker and van Mechelen 2015; Dwyer and Wright
2014). With universal citizenship-based discourse becoming no longer credible, “targeting” has
shaped what makes welfare legitimate in the eyes of the public. The discursive landscape of

future. The only concern is the aggregate consequences. “Targeting” is not concerned with parts
(or individuals) or the whole (society) but the relationships between them. In the past discourse
that explained crime and legitimated specific approaches to dealing with has done so via
individuals or society, however, whether the understood crime as collective phenomena or
something that resulted from individual pathology, the framing was about society vs. the
criminal. Those who take the individual as a unit of analysis function via the logic of intent and
personal responsibility underlies rehabilitation and authorizes clinical diagnosis. Those that
treat crime vis-a-vis society traditionally link it to demographic changes, social changes (like
increased drug use), improvement in the efficiency of law enforcement, and increases in the
punitiveness of sentencing systems. "More can be accomplished with models that allow for the
contingent interaction of all these factors" across institutions (Zimring and Hawkins 1997, 157).
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“targeted welfare” shifts individual needs to the foreground of thought. Today public support for
welfare policies rests on the perceived deservingness of the recipients (Ford and Koostra 2017;
Kootstra 2018). Targeting makes social welfare legitimate in the eyes of citizens because its
strongest criteria for social assistance is need.
People support welfare when they believe it is delivered to groups that deserve it.
Targeted social policies are credible because they are seen as more economically efficient. In an
environment of finite or austere budgets, targeting focuses scarce resources on those most in
need. As Greenstein explained, “With the funds available for social program interventions likely
to remain limited, too heavy an emphasis on costly universal approaches could result in too few
resources being directed to those at the bottom of the economic ladder” (1991, 457). “Targeted”
policies are believed to be fair (Higgs and Gilleard 2010). Instead of subsidizing middle-class
families, targeted programs allow the market to supply resources to those able to work and save.
In the public’s eyes, targeted programs avoid the redundancy and reverse-redistributive effects
of superfluous state support to the affluent, that they believe to be associated with universal
welfare.
MANAGING SOCIAL EXCLUSION
As many have noted, for welfare benefits to be legitimate, the public must perceive them
as cheap, fair, efficient, and effective. Since “targeting” meets all of four criteria, it has become a
salient notion in collective sentiment. The key argument for “targeted welfare policy” is that it
can deliver assistance to the right person at the right time, which corresponds to a strategy of
finding the neediest. The fact this notion is convincing is underlined by a sense the most
effective anti-poverty strategy is concentrating resources on individuals at greater risk of
poverty. However, within the rhetoric associated with “targeted welfare policy” alleviating
poverty is not a goal— but a means— for guaranteeing the ability to take part in social
interaction (Moffatt 2008, 876). This often entails justifying benefits in terms of health: “Low
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health and low income are factors that put people at risk for social exclusion and those “shut out
from material resources and social interaction” (ibid). “Targeted” welfare promises to alleviate
poverty in the name of preventing social exclusion.
“Benefits and amenities to show how health and wellbeing outcomes are likely to be
influenced by not only the generosity or coverage of entitlement but also by how its mode
of operation is understood. The pathways linking understandings of entitlement to
public health outcomes operate at individual levels (through, for instance, influencing
the likelihood of claiming) but also at structural levels, through fostering discourses of
social belonging or social difference” (Green 25).
Targeting” assuages economic arguments against welfare AND at the same time
addresses the call for expanded entitlements. The advent of “trickle-down economics” and other
ideas associated with “neoliberalism” turned the welfare recipient, the “freeloader” who
consumes resources without producing income, into “society’s villains” (Sommers and Block
2005) by framing government intervention as the problem and its curtailment as the solution.
Discourses associated with neoliberalism— such as, “the welfare system harms disadvantaged
workers through its impacts on the availability of jobs, on the overall reward from work, and on
the morale of disadvantaged communities” (Phelps 1994)— constructed welfare systems as
promoting passivity, leading to dependence, threatening social bonds, or degrading people. In
this framework, welfare was unequivocally negative. The rhetoric of “targeting” bridged the
general opposition to government welfare and the need to support some citizens by promising to
identify the neediest and the most deserving. Just as the notion of “social exclusion” superseded
the framing of welfare as a citizenship rights issue, “targeting” legitimated welfare by
delegitimating the government’s general responsibility to all its citizens.

GAPS AND SILENCES
Why are “targeted attacks” considered good solutions to terrorism? Why is “targeted
incapacitation” widely understood as a successful crime control strategy? Why does “targeted
welfare” enjoy support from the public and legislators? On the surface, these are straightforward
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questions. While “because they work” may be a tempting answer, figuring out what it means for
something to “work,” (or not work) has kept countless sociologists occupied since at least the
1970s. Thus, to address this question, it may be useful to return to the cancer nanomedicine ans
social theory and attend to the generic corrective character that organized the relationship
between chemotherapy and nano-based targeted delivery, and structuralism/ modernism and
poststructuralism/postmodernism. Treating poststructuralism and cancer nanotechnology as
embodiments of a general logic opens the possibility of looking to critiques of poststructuralism
to understand how and why “targeting” became a solution in medicine, the penal system, and
welfare policy. As Latour put it: modernism, was based “the great divide” between irreconcilable
opposites turned every interaction into a fight, a quarrel (1991,10), a war, not unlike the one
declared by The National Cancer Act of 1971 that cancer still seems to be winning.
Poststructuralism promised to replace modernism’s war with relationality in the same way that
nanomedicine positioned “manging interactions” as a cure for chemotherapy’s war on cancer.
Modern theories of power possessed a clear conceptualization of oppression, which made
it easy to name the enemy and assign responsibility. They functioned under the assumption that
oppression always works via “exploitation” or “domination” where an agent (or a group of
agents) knowingly takes advantage of or exercises power over, another in a deliberate and
calculated manner to gain something. The enemy was the oppressor, an “Other” and the solution
was a class war, conflict, or violent rebellion. With the entry of poststructuralism into the
academy and beyond, this way of thinking had fallen out of fashion. For academic feminism (an
arena in which poststructuralism thrieved), envisioning the problem as the binary nature of
gender, not as hostile relationships between men and women structured by patriarchy offered a
certain type of relief from the sheer magnitude of gender-based oppression as well as the
violence and destructiveness that such oppression entailed. Depending on the timeframe and
agency collecting the data, between 96% and 99% of those charged with rape were men.
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According to the United Nation’s figures, up to 70% of women experience sexual and physical
violence from men in their lifetime— the majority being by husbands, intimate partners, or a
man they know. Envisioning violence as an effect of the binary structure of gender as a category
(as Butler did)—not as organized, deliberate, and purposeful actions of one group against
another—turned perpetrators and their victims, roles which are clearly distributed along binary
gender lines into “co-operative allies in building a new gender-free world” (Schacht, 1998, 1).
Envisioning the distinction between men and women as arbitrary, contingent, and
“constructed” rather than permanent facts of life turned oppression and hierarchies that stem
from sex and gender into something, accidental and reversible. It freed women from having to
view men as the enemy. As one (male) theorist wrote: “too often feminism has been seen as a
“woman-only” arena or defined in competitive terms of male versus female privilege, rather than
a cooperative effort (Schacht, 1998, 1)15. By the late 1990s, feminism was “for everyone” (bell
hooks 2000). The relief from thinking in terms of conflict and envisioning men and women in
hierarchical terms, as classes with opposing interests that cannot be reconciled did not come for
free.
Thinking about power as operating without agents, behind the backs of people, as the
poststructuralists did, made naming the problem and locating it in larger structures very
difficult. Replacing the self/other binary with difference, fluidity contingency, complexity
rendered stable power structures that had endured over time invisible. The insistence on
relationality, malleability, and contingency caused permanence, inalterable facts, and
boundaries that are not traversable to fall out of the field of vision entirely. When racism,

This was a function of scale. When one goes down, one sees more specificity. Feminism
accounted for individual behavior and interactions between individuals as structured by turning
to broad societal norms and practices that distributed power and privilege based on gender; a
theory grounded in one way or another in the idea of "patriarchy"— a set of institutional
arrangements and norms that buttress a system of power that benefits men and harms women.
With the advent of deconstruction, the previously axiomatic vision of power appeared
"essentialist" and “exclusionary” because it looked at individuals.
- 285 15

sexism, and other forms of oppression become contingent entities, no longer encased in a stable
and permanent power structure, making sense of enduring forms of oppression vis-a-vis larger
processes becomes virtually impossible. The desire for non-binary thinking and its latent
longing for “non-violent relationships” (Hagglund 2004) produced a form of thought that
insisted questions about difference be “endlessly deferred” and ultimately left unanswered. To
move away from the imperative to come to terms with the discontinuities and possible
conflicting interests between the “self” and “other,” discourse associated with his tendency
insisted on foregrounding interconnectivity, intersubjectivity, and interdependence. The result
was an absence of clear demarcations between the exploiter and exploited, and the exploiter, or
the perpetrator and the victim, which paired well with Foucault and Butler’s claims that any
system of oppression contains the tools, practices, and strategies required to undermine it. Put
slightly differently, for Butler and Foucault, the solution was always already built into the
problem.
A CERTAIN REVERSAL
Vision practices determine what is seen, but in doing so they also structure what is
invisible. Like nano-based targeted delivery, the social thought associated with Foucault,
Derrida, Butler, and others papered over conflict, contradiction, and destruction with
relationality. The Enhanced Permeability Effect opened the door for nanotechnology’s entry into
the cancer laboratory by emphasizing the compatibility between nanostructures and the
morphological features of cancer tumors. By bringing “compatibility” into the center of its
symbolic universe obscured cancer’s invasiveness and aggressiveness.
Almost all deaths from cancer are caused by metastasis. Up to 90% of cancer mortalities
are the result of cells colonizing a variety of vital organs such as bones, lungs, the brain, or the
liver. As cancer cells colonize these structures, they block, squeeze, crush, or destroy them in
another way. For example, a metastatic tumor may press on the part of the brain that controls
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breathing and kill its host via asphyxiation (Chaffer and Weinberg 2011). And yet, concerns
regarding cancer’s invasiveness and its deadly, and destructive nature are completely absent
from the nanoscientist’s narratives.
Contemporary biologists see cancer as dangerous because it does not stay confined to
one place; it invades nearby tissue. Unlike their normal counterparts, cancer cells spread
throughout the body and colonize organ after organ. As cancer progresses, the “degrees of
aggressive and invasive behavior” do so as well (Weinberg 2007, 36). The longer a cancer tumor
persists, the more aggressive it becomes. Being the product of a long evolutionary heritage, the
invader cells that leave the tumor and travel through the bloodstream and colonize vital organs,
most notably, the lungs, liver, and bones are the most aggressive and “vicious” of all (ibid).
When cancer is understood as aggressive and invasive, an entity that colonizes every nook and
cranny of the body, leaving even the smallest trace of it in the body can have serious
consequences. For this reason, chemotherapy’s approach to treating it is as aggressive and
zealous as the disease itself.
Chemotherapy is based on the model of incommensurability. The “chemotherapeutic
gaze” sees cancer as dangerous because of its tendency to spread. This is reflected in the “staging
model,” which regards tumors that have invaded organs other than the original site as not only
incurable but untreatable. Thus, chemotherapy is an urgent and time-sensitive project, a race to
prevent the cancer tumor from reaching the fourth, metastatic stage. When cancer is visualized
this way, chemotherapy’s goal is to kill cells that did not belong to the normal order of the body,
to eliminate “selfish” cells that did not wish to act on behalf of the organism makes sense. While
it is true that chemotherapy cannot distinguish between normal and cancer cells and therefore
attacks indiscriminately, there is a reason that chemotherapy is administered systemically. The
general nature of chemotherapy ensures that all traces of cancer, each rogue cell that has been
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missed by other treatments and is too small to be detected through imaging apparatuses, are
destroyed it can form a tumor.
The logic underneath nano-based cancer therapy entailed a certain reversal. The
nanoscientist’s refusal to visualize cancer as an “other,” “an enemy to be vanquished” and its
treatment as war, was predicated on not seeing aggression. However, their blindness was highly
specific. In the nanoscientist’s narratives, the treatment— not the disease— was the aggressor.
In nanomedicine’s collective imagination, chemotherapy— not cancer— was violent, destructive,
and dangerous. The desire to eradicate cancer through compatibility, interaction, and affinity—
rather than killing and poisoning— authorized the rise of the nano-based targeted delivery at the
discursive and material levels by turning chemotherapy into an inadequate treatment; a
problem to be solved.

THE DARK SIDE OF TARGETING
Nanomedicine’s structuring idea, concretized in targeted delivery, is that it is possible to
address pathological elements in a system without ANY destruction, damage, negativity, or side
effects. As the case studies above illustrate, these concepts, ideas, and metaphors that
underlined targeting took on a reality of their own and coalesced into a theory regarding how to
identify noxious elements of society and what was to be done with them. “Targeting” became a
possibility for nanomedicine, due in no small part to the discovery of the Enhanced Permeability
and Retention Effect. The imagery associated with Maeda and Matsumura’s groundbreaking
research-grounded cancer nanomedicine’s system of metaphors and the logic underneath
nanomedicine’s approach to treating cancer. Like cancer nan-based targeting, the Enhanced
Permeability and Retention effect was an elegant and convincing idea
The unique affinity between the problem (cancer) and a solution (nanoparticles), which
structured its vision, found resonance in the laboratory, the clinic, and collective thinking. This
notion of “compatibility” spoke to the broader cultural logic that determined what an acceptable
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solution to social problems ought to look like. Thinking with “compatibility” authorized a shift
away from framing issues in terms of conflict. Instead of seeing social problems as cases of “us”
versus “them,” this new logic foregrounded relationships, affinities, and interactions. Its
demands that solutions be cooperative, mutualistic, and beneficial to all rendered interventions
based on militaristic thinking and metaphors of war— where one side is to be vanquished or
eliminated—as problems in their own right. As the integration of symbolic interactions into
sociology’s canon discussed in the previous chapter, nanomedicine is another instance of new
social ontology wherein the category of “power”— which requires violence, or force more
broadly— was replaced in the collective vision by positive “relationships” and “interactions.” It
speaks to a new view of relationality, where a “top down” model of authority falls to the wayside
in favor of relationality, interaction, and cooperation.
The Enhanced Permeability Effect has proven to be a powerful, evocative, and resilient
concept. It is considered to be “one of the most important phenomena governing the transport
of macromolecules and drug-delivery systems to the tumor site” (Waite et al. 2016, 22). Like
nano-based targeting in cancer, the only problem is that it may do work (see, for example,
Ekdawi 2016). As Moghimi and her co-authors put it in an aptly titled article, Just so Stories:
The Random Act of Anti-Cancer Nanomedicine Performance, “contrary to high expectations,
cancer nanomedicines have not delivered its promise” labeled (2014, 1661). Following many
others in the field, whose disappointment at the lack of therapeutic efficacy and limited clinical
success associated with cancer nanomedicine compelled them to scrutinize the integrity of
Maeda and Matsumura’s model, she labeled the Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect as
an “unrealistic representation of cancer” (ibid).
Despite 30 years of research and a “growing skepticism towards the use of nanocarriers
in the scientific community" (Salvioni 2019) manifested in discipline-wide debates such as the
one provoked by the “Nanotechnology is more Hype than Hope” conference held by the World
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Biomaterials Congress in 2016, neuroscientists have continued to maintain that nano-based
targeting can and will become a leading cancer treatment. The Enhanced Permeability and
Retention Effect is one of the primary reasons why researchers— including Christine Allen, a
Professor in the Department of Pharmacy at the University of Toronto, who publicly declared
that cancer tumors’ “leaky vasculature” and nano-sized particles unique ability to exploit is “why
[she] is holding onto hope for nano in oncology” (2016, 2604)— continue to believe that
nanomedicine will deliver the revolution Feynman and Drexler promised.
Has “nano” failed? No. There have certainly been some failures but there are always
failures […] The bottom line: the EPR effect exists and is heterogeneous, as is every other
aspect of cancer. We have made progress and the research continues so the story is not
over yet. The forward movement of nanomedicines into clinical development must be
based on rock-solid, comprehensive preclinical evidence. As scientists, we need to
remind ourselves of the underlying purpose of our research. It is not just about
publishing papers—it is about the development of treatments that truly make a
difference in patients’ lives. Unfortunately, given the incidence of cancer—prospective
patients include each of us and the family, friends, and colleagues we cherish” (Allen
2016, 2604).
The widely believed idea that blood vessels in tumors have “holes” as large as 800 nm—
the size range of most nanomaterials— transformed “compatibility” into a fulcrum of
nanomedicine’s discursive universe. As this discourse took on a life of its own, the perfect fit
between the size of the said holes and nanoparticles transformed into evidence that nanocarriers accumulate effectively and selectively in tumors over time. Even though cold, hard
evidence has pointed to the contrary, there is something incredible temping about
nanomedicine’s approach to cancer treatment.
Nano-based Targeted Delivery became a solution to cancer partly because it challenged previous
models that treated cancer as an enemy, a dangerous, and aggressive "other" harboring ill-intent
and envisioned cancer as a "complex, heterogenous" disease characterized by "architectural
uniqueness." Unlike the previous disquisition on the disease, nanomedicine does not treat
cancer as “an evil demon” (Sontag 1978). According to nanoscientists, tumor cells are different
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from normal cells in the way they build their vasculature. In their narratives, tumors are
“vulnerable,” poorly constructed, makeshift structures. A building without an architect.
Chemotherapeutic logic envisioned cancer as an enemy, an entity that cannot, under any
circumstances be reconciled with the body. Thus, the solution was to declare an all-it war until
every trace of it is removed—even if killing destroys cancer cells meant harming, poisoning, and
killing healthy tissue. Nano-based targeted delivery was predicated on no longer seeing cancer
as invasive, aggressive, and incompatible with the body. While reasoning this way may have
been liberatory, thinking about problems and solutions in terms of “compatibility” leads to an
inability to see the distinction between the two. For example, nanomedicine approached cancer’s
chaos, and disorder as both a dangerous threat and a means to eradicate it. According to
nanoscientists, cancer is difficult to treat due to its “architectural uniqueness,” yet the same
architectural uniqueness enables nanomedicine to "target" cancer.
Nanomedicine’s logic authorized researchers to treat to tumor architecture as both a
problem and a solution. The same logic can be found underneath the sense that selective
incapacitation “works”— even if it did not address the issue of crime simply because it solved—
or promised to solve—problems associated with general incapacitation, the idea that putting as
many people in jail for as long as possible will eradicate crime. However, “mass incarceration”
created its own set of problems, most notably overcrowding and enormous costs. “Selective
incapacitation” promised to address these by targeting specific people for longer sentences. It is
considered a success by legislators and their constituents. Similarly, “targeted bombings” did
not solve the problem of terrorism, that is, reducing the number of attacks) or even decreasing
civilian deaths. However, “targeting”— both as a warfare strategy and a class of weaponry has
been hailed as a sign of progress. This is so because the notion of “targeting” speaks to the
salience of avoiding civilian harm. On a discursive level, the idea of “targeting” decreases public
tolerance for attacks that result in civilian deaths and, in doing so, increases tolerance for war.
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Compared to older, non-specific bombings that have caused massive civilian deaths,
targeted strikes are better. However, this framing requires bracketing the problem of war— and
terrorism— in general. Like cancer, nanomedicine, and selective incapacitation targeted strikes
“work” because they address the issues created by previous solutions. The exact form of
reasoning has created a situation wherein countless drugs developed under the rubric of
targeted delivery have failed clinical trials, but, in the lay and expert imagination, cancer
nanomedicine is considered a “successful” cancer treatment.

TARGETED DELIVERY AS A LENS INTO “OUR TIME.”
In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida asked what it means to say, “our time." He was one
of the countless scholars who had wrestled with the meaning of Modernity and its possible
passing. Nanomedicine is an especially pertinent case study in which to examine what it means
to be Modern (or not) given that it matured in an intellectual climate in which intellectual trends
that paraded under the banner of Poststructuralism challenged Modernism’s hegemony,
questioned its values, and deconstructed its taken-for-granted ideas about collective reality.
Poststructuralism and Postmodernism were an antidote to Modernism’s aggressive vision of
progress, which treated imperialism and colonialism as signs of the West’s/ Modernity’s success
(Hall 2016), and to Marxism’s totalizing tendencies and authoritarian insistence on ironclad
boundaries between “truth” and “ideology,” which demanded a crusade against the latter.
“The contemporary attack on the critical notion of ideology coming from poststructuralism and postmodernism has new and more disturbing connotations which
seriously put in doubt those principles. Sabina Lovibond has understood very well this
dimension of the problem even if she still refers to false consciousness: “To reject ‘false
consciousness’ is to take a large step towards abandoning the politics of Enlightenment
modernism. For it means rejecting the view that personal autonomy is to be reached by
way of a progressive transcendence of earlier, less adequate cognitive structures”
(Lovibond, 1989:26). “There is no reason, only reasons, Lyotard argues, or what is the
same, society is a series of language games, each with its own rules and criteria of truth,
each incommensurable with one another. For such a conception, a negative concept of
ideology which pretends to know which are the contradictions in society and how they
can be truly solved shares with other ‘meta-narratives’ a totalitarian character: they are
not only over-simplifications but also ‘terroristic’ in that they legitimate the suppression
of differences (Lyotard, 1984:82)” (62).
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Postmodernism and Poststructuralism ultimately ended in abject failure (Hall 2016).
“It doubts whether a true and total understanding of social contradictions can
ever be achieved and hence the passing of judgment becomes impossible. A change in the
concept of ideology from a critical to a neutral notion is, therefore, less simple, and
innocent than it appears. In the context of postmodernism, the change is celebrated as
the triumph of incommensurable language games and the demise of the terroristic metanarratives which are at the basis of the critical concept of ideology […] Paradoxically, the
postmodernist stand fails fully to eradicate and implicitly postulates, the totalizing
perspective it seeks to abolish and therefore ends up contradicting itself. The failure of
postmodern theory is not that it has no notion of macrostructures but rather that it has
no way of theorizing the relations between different levels of abstraction, between the
microphysics of power and biopolitics, or between the child in the bubble and the
simulacrum” (ibid).
TARGETED DELIVERY “WORKS”— IT JUST DOES NOT CURE CANCER
Hall’s account of the failures of Poststructuralism and Postmodernism may be
instructive form making sense of the tragic story of nano-based targeted delivery. The collective
imagination was “primed” for cancer nanomedicine. By the 1980s, many Americans deemed
medicine too aggressive and invasive. They were afraid of its toxicity and suspected that its
"cures" were poisoning people to death. Oncologists grew tired of the logic of war and many
even began to suspect that war imagery may be harming patients; a fact confirmed by
researchers in 2003. Medicine too was ready for a "comprehensive demilitarization" (Nie 2016).
Cancer nanomedicine’s embrace of the compatibility between nanoparticles and cancer
tumors—which congealed into the paradigm of “targeted delivery— structured its subsequent
promise to treat the disease through interaction and affinity.
According to doctors and medical researchers outside of nanomedicine, chemotherapy
has disadvantages, but “it is still the most effective weapon in our arsenal” (Maugh 1974, 970).
Although contemporary oncology's therapeutic landscape is characterized by an emphasis on
innovative high-tech treatments including immunotherapy, combination treatment, or genebased approaches, on the ground, in the clinic, "hope and hype"—no matter how strong— cannot
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compete with the ability to withstand extensive clinical trials. While chemotherapy may seem
outdated and regressive, and its system of bio-militarist metaphor may be too violent or out-ofsynch with cultural sensibilities, it is an evidence-based modality whose efficacy has been
scrutinized scientifically. Whether the lay public or medical professionals in labs or clinics, like
it or not, the reality is that chemotherapy is a gold-standard treatment because it is better at
treating cancer than any other alternatives. However, as all sociologists know, evaluating a
particular technology’s relative failure or success is not a simple technical question.
The world is full of failed machines. These are not junked cars and used refrigerators
that people leave along roadsides and in garbage dumps, but the rusting hulks of aborted
ideas” (McKenzie and Wajcman 1999, 12). Some of these technologies had considerable
potential. Many great inventions were actively suppressed by the companies that had the
license to manufacture them; others could not be made because test models could not be
manufactured at affordable prices; some even made it to the market, but never sold well. The
world may be full of failed technologies, but nano-based targeted delivery is not among them.
Unlike the discarded technologies that fill the “junkyard of aborted ideas” through no fault of
their own, from a technical perspective, cancer medicine simply does not work. Also, unlike
the rows of mechanical carcasses that line highways, targeted delivery is a successful
technology— it just does not cure cancer. Targeted delivery was not a solution to cancer but to
chemotherapy.

TARGETING DOES NOT SOLVE THE ACTUAL PROBLEM. IT
“WORKS” BECAUSE IT REFRAMED IT
Unlike war, targeted strikes are legitimated on the basis of who they do not kill.
However, according to Targeted Killing with Drones, a widely cited article, “nobody argued that
this [targeted attacks] will end terrorism. It may weaken terrorist groups, cause demoralization,
force them into hiding, restrict movement and activity” (Meisels 2018, 8). Similarly, the
Department of Defense’s research has concluded that “despite seemingly endless drone strikes,
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for example, there is little evidence of the United States either running out of targets or
significantly diminishing the “terrorist threat,” either to itself or its allies. Targeted strikes did
not solve terrorism. By promising to avoid civilian deaths, it solved the public’s dislike of
violence and increased their support for the war. “Targeted strikes” are regarded as a solution to
terrorism not because they reduced the number of terrorist attacks but because they turned the
accuracy of older weapons into a problem.
One of the problems of legitimating welfare is the sense that people overuse and abuse it.
The “Achilles’ heel” of the welfare system is the widespread belief about over-utilization, fraud,
and abuse. “Although this approach is based on the idea that “targeting” those at greatest risk of
poverty is the most efficient way to address poverty, and targeting is indeed perceived as more
efficient, by the public, empirical evidence shows “targeted” welfare does not work as well as
general policies. Research has shown that general, universal benefits have better outcomes. Also,
unlike general, universalist benefit schemes, “targeting” requires surveillance, which is often
costly. Targeted welfare does not aim to solve poverty, but the problems/ perceived problems of
universal welfare. Targeted welfare policy is a corrective to the “centralist, comprehension errorprone welfare state.” “Targeted welfare” does the work of addressing anxiety about immigration
and sacristy— under the rhetoric of addressing the perception that the universalist methods of
distribution were unfair. “ Targeting” addresses the perception that welfare distribution goes to
undeserving people. The most prevalent concern is that immigrants are abusing the system.
“Targeting” goes hand in hand with rationing and distributing resources in an efficient
manner. Debates around the financial efficiency of increasing conditionality emerge when there
is a perception of scarce resources (McKee and Stuckler 2011; 2013). The appeal of targeting
resources more precisely at those who meet individualized conditions of need becomes
“seductive”’ (Carey and McLoughlin, 2014) when resources are scarce. In the penal system,
“targeting” is as much about targeting individual offenders as much as it is about "targeting"
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penal resources (Auerhahn 2003, 631). Selective incapacitation does not reduce crime, but the
costs associated with mass incapacitation. Unsurprisingly, the literature on selective
incapacitation paints the same picture. According to experts, it would be a good policy if the
prediction was accurate. As Auerhahn put it, selective incapacitation is seen as a success
because “there is something convincing about the model” not because of any data that shows it
works: “It is a marvelous idea. It simply has to work” (704).
Selective incapacitation, targeted killings, and targeted welfare all worked for the same
reason: they turned older solutions into problems. They promised to address undesirable
aspects of previous attempts, not the actual problem. “Targeting” in cancer nanomedicine did
the same thing. It framed chemotherapy—not cancer— as its problem. In early 2000,
chemotherapy became a problem for oncology when researchers discovered that when patients
overestimate the impact of treatment, they tend to refuse it, and as a result, many die from
curable cancers. They blamed culture, specifically the pervasiveness of the "fact” that
chemotherapy is a terrible experience and leads to suffering just as bad – worse even – than the
disease itself. Nanomedicine had an elegant and evocative and solution. Like other solutions
based on “targeting”— nano-based targeted delivery “worked” not only because it reframed the
problem without appearing to do so, but because its rhetoric, language, metaphors, and general
logic resonated with the cultural mood.
PREVIEW OF THE FINAL CHAPTER
The dissertation has argued that nano-based targeted delivery is one case of general
social logic. To describe and make sense of that logic, it has treated nanomedicine as more than
a mirror of culture but a lens through which to gleam legitimate insights about the social world.
By reading the origins of targeted delivery through and alongside discourse associated with
scientific, technological, and social-cultural developments, it has attempted to theorize
something akin to a “spirit” that was concretized in nanomedicine. The final chapter speaks to
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the persistence of this “spirit” and its tendency to take different forms and new guises even after
nano-based targeted delivery failed in cancer.
By 2018, cancer nanomedicine was in crisis. As one nanoparticle after another failed
clinical trials, more and more scientists publicly declared “targeting” a “delusion,” “make-belief
story” (Park 2016). Be that as it may, the field was reluctant to give up the paradigm of targeted
delivery. Cancer nanomedicine did not purge the language of “targeting” from its lexicon until
2020. Just as scientists and engineers began the painful process of cutting ties, “targeted
delivery” was handed another life as the basis of vaccines for Covid-19.
The Covid-19 vaccine became an unexpected addition to this narrative as an
instantiation of the same “spirit.” As nano-based targeted delivery made a leap from cancer to
immunology, its discursive foundation and structure of metaphor remained remarkably stable.
The same language of compatibility that turned nano-based targeting into a viable solution to
cancer also framed nanotechnology’s unique suitability to addressing the Covid-19 epidemic. By
January 2022, nano-based targeted delivery’s second failure appears imminent. The surge in
cases caused by a new variant that had bypassed the immunity afforded by the vaccine caused a
leading expert instrumental in creating one of the vaccines to conclude that “we cannot
vaccinate the entire planet every six months” (Pollard 2022). In his opinion— shared by many
other experts— since vaccines, developed with the premise of stopping as many infections as
possible, did not prove to be a “sustainable” solution, the world will simply have to learn to live
with the constant threat of Covid-19. First as Tragedy…
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
The Rise and Fall of Nano-based Targeted Delivery
“A prison, as I observed in a former letter, includes a hospital. In prisons on this
construction, every cell may receive the properties of a hospital without undergoing any change.
The whole prison would be perhaps a better hospital than any building known hitherto by that
name. But [in this hospital], infection, in general, must be sent to be cured elsewhere.”
— Jeremy Bentham (1785)
Jeremy Bentham once described his panopticon—quite fittingly, one that was never built—as a
hospital that does not cure infections. Bentham also promised that the hospital created
specifically for the purpose of not curing infections would be better than “any other building
hitherto known by that name” (1992, 20). Like Weber’s reference to Benjamin Franklin, who
operated his printing press as only a capitalist could at least 100 years before capitalism became
an economic system, Bentham may have caught a glimpse of something akin to the spirit of
nanomedicine long before Eric Drexel’s “self-assembling nanobots” (2003) became infamous or
AstraZeneca’s “homing devices” (which located and destroyed cancer cells one particle at a time)
failed to treat cancer.
Be that as it may, by 2010, a panoply of nano-based medicines had made their way into
countless clinical and pre-clinical trials. Although its origins lie in theoretical physics,
nanotechnology’s most common application is experimental cancer research, including the
development of drugs, drug delivery systems, and imaging technologies from particles made
with polymers, lipids, viruses, and other substances. Before 2010, the US alone had invested 3.7
billion dollars into nano research (Rajiv, 2010). Nanomedicine’s research program emphasized
“non-invasive” treatments that preserve healthy tissue by targeting the tumor directly, genetic
sequencing, and cell-by-cell imaging technologies that enabled precise classification and tailored
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treatments in contrast to older modalities such as chemotherapy. In fact, after the discovery of
nanogold shells in 2003, researchers were filled with hope for a new (nano)medicine that does
not wage war (for war and disease metaphors, see Jain, 2013; Haraway 1991) but forms affinities
with cells (Invernici et al., 2011) and treats cancer in collaboration with the body. Since the
1960s, researchers have subjected countless nano-based targeted delivery systems to trials in
laboratories. While most of these nanomedicines have been successful in pre-clinical research,
no formula has made it past phase 1 or the safety stage of human clinical trials. Nanomedicine
did not accept the failure of targeted delivery in cancer until 2020. A year later, the technology
that did not revolutionize oncology gave scientists a means of administering the Covid-19
vaccine. Like its cancer counterparts, the vaccine utilized encapsulation, PEGylatin, and
targeting technologies that nanoscientists developed painstakingly over the last six decades.
As this dissertation has argued, nanotechnology was never just a scientific or technical
project, but an ideological program—a logic, "spirit," or collective vision merged into a novel way
of understanding and dealing with harmful elements within a system. Targeted delivery in
cancer was an exemplary concretization of the form of thought that developed step by step as
nanomedicine attempted to treat cancer by "engineering compatibility." Telling nanomedicine’s
story through three concepts— scale, structure, and force— culminated in an account of how
nano-based targeted delivery “concretized” the theoretical substrate laid down by the
discipline’s founder’s strata by strata. Examining these elements separately before they came
together to form nano-based targeted delivery alongside socio-cultural artifacts illustrated that
the rise of nanotechnology in general and nanomedicine specifically were one manifestation of a
broader shift in collective thought. This shift was characterized by the waning of logic based on
warfare and violence and the rise of an ethos centered around engineering, designing, and
managing collaboration, affinity, and compatibility between things commonly understood as
incompatible. As the last chapter hinted, and this chapter concludes explicitly, nano-based
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targeting was a perfectly appropriate strategy for cancer treatment. The only problem is that it
did not work. The final chapter of this dissertation considers what it means for a technology to
fail or "not to work." Going even further by way of concluding, here, I also extend the logic of
this thesis by examining the discourse and logic of strategies associated with the Covid-19
pandemic so as to further shed light while looking back on nanomedicine as a scientific and
ideological endeavor.
Technical “products” are typically understood as objects that have made their way into
social life after being deemed effective, necessary, and desirable. The history of cancer
nanomedicine demonstrates that discourse can also be a technical product in its own right. The
material products created under the rubric of targeted delivery in cancer nanomedicine
ultimately failed. However, the elegant, evocative, if not beautiful models and theories that
emerged from nanotechnology’s foray into oncology have proved to be useful in another way.
Even though targeted delivery did not work in the strict sense, that is, while it did not succeed at
treating cancer by delivering compounds to the tumor and tumor only, nanomedicine’s legacy
goes beyond its technological products.
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, cancer nanomedicine's discourse
centered around "targeting,” a category that organized nanomedicine's conceptual universe into
a coherent ideological program based on substituting force, killing, and war for compatibility,
cooperation, and interaction. This chapter concludes cancer nanomedicine’s story by turning to
the imperative of avoiding destruction and harm that became nanomedicine's logic, spirit, or
"fulcrum (...), the center upon which relations are concentrated and from which they are once
again reflected" (Foucault 1971, 21). By attending to the match, or lack thereof, between
nanomedicine's ideological program and broad thought patterns regarding Covid-19's
management, this chapter ends this dissertation by asking: does the logic underneath what I
have called the "spirit of nanomedicine” match the logic at work within society, medicine, and
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other institutions that have become tasked with managing the global pandemic? It begins by
telling the story of the rise and decline of nano-based targeted delivery by specifying and
examining the meaning of “targeting” within the peer-reviewed scientific literature in
nanotechnology journals. The second part of the chapter looks at how "targeting" became an
organizing metaphor in the "war" against Covid-19. By theorizing Covid-19 as a test of "the spirit
of nanotechnology," it exposes the hidden contradictions embodied in nanomedicine's
discursive project. The framing and handling of the Covid-19 crisis provide a unique lens to
reflect on the veracity of this dissertation's theoretical conclusions as is the case with all cruises
and social problems, the discourse associated with the process of identifying, framing, and
contending with the global pandemic operated via a specific logic. This logic reflects a
meditation on broad questions regarding the nature of society and how to identify and address
pathological elements within a social system.
THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF NANOMEDICINE
Before a technical product can enter the social sphere, it must be tested. Testing a
product or gadget is simple. It is difficult to consider what testing an “ideology” or mode of
thinking may mean or how such tests would be carried out. As the formulation of the Covid-19
vaccine tested the efficacy of the technology and its suitability for mass use, it also created a
unique platform for evaluating the ideas, presuppositions, and assumptions consolidated under
the rubric of "targeted delivery."
Whether technological, psychological, pedagogical, medical, juridical, statistical,
political, or religious, testing is an essential and familiar form of modern society (Marres and
Stark 2020). The test has become such a generic and ubiquitous entity that almost anything can
be a test situation. While most assume that tests are deliberately planned and executed, many
tests are incidental, and some cases are only grasped as a test after the event has been
completed. Tests contain what Robert Merton called "latent" purposes. For example, the data
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tests the invited partner even if its purpose is not seen in such terms. On a larger scale, online
dating provides opportunities for population‐level testing to see which presentations of self
attract more responses as well as the kinds of responses different selves elicit (Ellison, Heino, &
Gibbs, 2006). Similarly, a pregnancy test is not merely a mechanism to determine the presence
or absence of Human Chorionic Gonadotropin hormone (HCG) in a woman's body, but an
examination of her relationship with her partner, her family, her employer, as well as society in
general. While nanotechnology's lackluster performance in the oncology lab foreclosed the
possibility of testing its scientific and medical efficacy on a mass scale, examining the discourse
and practices around the framing of a nano-based vaccine as a solution for the Covid-19
pandemic as a “test” of sorts provides a unique perspective from which to reflect upon the
meaning of the discourse and logic associated with nano-based targeted delivery. Before
discussing the test situation in more detail, let me summarize the most salient features of
nanomedicine’s ethos as theorized in previous chapters.
Scientific medicine is "scientific" because, unlike its predecessors, it is effective. That is,
it kills. It kills because the compounds in its arsenal are incompatible with life. That is, they are
toxic to all living forms, from disease to healthy and perfectly functional cells, tissues, and
organs. Pharmacology, the most potent weapon in medicine's arsenal, treats disease and
dysfunction as hostile others; dangerous invaders whose interests are irreconcilable with the
host population and thus enemies to be vanquished at all costs. The notion of incompatibility
underneath this vision legitimizes destruction and frames force as the only way to cure illness.
Medicine governs the body through coercion, not consensus. Like a dictator or a totalitarian
state, characterized by "the use of force to suppress disaffection and the disorder to which it
gives rise" (Oxford English Dictionary), pharmaceuticals cure disease because they have the
power to kill, push aside, and eradicate. They work by “introducing a lesser evil, a benevolent
evil (...) to outstrip the onset of more serious, imminent harm” (Canguilhem 2012, 32-33).
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Pharmaceuticals suspend, alter, or intensify the normal functioning of the body’s systems even
when doing so is incompatible with normal functions and threatens the organism’s survival. For
example, under normal circumstances, the immune system does not kill healthy cells. Doing so
would be deadly; however, it readily slaughters all newly developed cells when compelled by
chemotherapy. Civilian deaths and damage to infrastructure caused by bombs, missiles, and
other tools of contemporary warfare may be tragic. But they are inevitable. Killing civilians is
not a crime if the threat is more significant than the potential effects of eliminating it. In war,
“collateral damage” is a price to be paid for the peace that destroying the enemy is believed to
bring. In chemotherapy’s war on cancer, the destruction of healthy cells—which patients
experience as pain and side effects— are nothing more than “collateral damage.”
Nano-based targeted delivery refuses the logic of destruction and the assumption that
disease is an incompatible element that must be driven out by force. Unlike surgery, radiation,
and chemotherapy, which are buttressed by the ideas of waging war to save the body from
invasion, nano-based targeted delivery promises to treat cancer through engineering
compatibility. Nanotechnology's foundational insight is that physicochemical properties
acquired during the transition between the molecular and microscopic scales give rise to unique
interactions between phenomena (Etheridge et al. 2013, 2). The emphasis on relationality is
especially pronounced in nanomedicine. Thus, for nanoscientists and nanoengineers in the
oncology lab, the category of "relationships” is central to understanding the world and its things.
As one researcher put it, drug delivery is "about nano-bio interactions” Rather than studying
nanoparticles and cells individually nanomedicine focuses on the "interface between them "
(Polo et al. 2017, 215).
According to Lawrence Tamarkin, a leader in the field, if even a single nanotechnologybased targeted delivery platform can pass human clinical trials, oncology's current paradigms
will be turned on their heads. This is so because nano-based pharmaceuticals would eliminate
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the trauma of a cancer diagnosis (Schneider 2009) and remake cancer into an entity resembling
diabetes, chronic disease, and easily managed by pharmaceuticals that coexist and co-operate
with the body's molecules and cells. These, and other promises, including the creation of drugs
that distinguish between normal and malignant cells and can locate and target tumors directly,
were authorized by a disavowal of destruction that coalesced thereafter into nanomedicine’s
organizing logic.
Underneath peer-reviewed descriptions of various nanostructures’ modes of action lies a
new logic for approaching malignant phenomena. According to this logic, conflicts of interest
can be addressed without struggle or competition ending when one side loses; that side
acquiesces to another because their opponent’s show of force has overpowered them.
Nanotechnology’s alternative, “engineering compatibility,” is one of the key concepts in the
complicated and contradictory but largely implicit theory regarding force and its desirability.
THE MEANING OF TARGETING
Although “targeting” evolved into the “leitmotif” of cancer nanomedicine (Yang 2005),
this notion was not nanotechnology's. The delivery of anticancer drugs specifically to tumor sites
without damaging normal tissue has been the dream of all scientists fighting against cancer
since the discovery of chemotherapy. Within oncology, “targeting” has been a well-established
modality since the 1990s. Whereas many standard chemotherapies kill cells through
indiscriminate poisoning, newer “targeted” chemotherapy drugs work by intervening with
processes that govern cell growth and prevent cell proliferation. However, nanomedicine’s
idiosyncratic definition of targeting has little in common with its normative usage in cancer
research.
In nanomedicine, the metaphor of “targeting” buttressed a unique discourse about what
it means to eradicate cancer. As the analysis of the language used by nanoscientists revealed, the
ability to engineer “affinity” between molecules that were previously assumed to be
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incompatible gave rise to a new logic wherein eliminating malignant elements does not have to
occur via killing. While researchers tended to avoid using the term “killing” explicitly, those who
did, often made a point of distinguishing it from older forms of killing. Unlike radiation and
chemotherapy, nanoparticles are involved in "specific" or "targeted" cell killing (Nakamura
2016), i.e., killing via interaction and affinity as opposed to vis-a-vis blunt force. Instead of using
force, nanomedicine works by “masking” conflict, incompatibility, and contradiction and
transforming properties that may lead them into undesirable interactions.
Presently, nanoscientists see the discovery of the Enhanced Permeability and Retention
Effect as opening a "privileged gate" for nanoparticles to enter tumor tissue (Salvioni 2010, 201).
It also furnished nanomedicine with a new vision of cancer not as an enemy or invader but as a
poorly constructed building that left its occupants vulnerable to the elements. The benign, if not
friendlier, image of cancer went together with the discovery that cancer cells and anti-cancer
medications could be made compatible at the nanoscale. According to early accounts, abnormal
tissue can be used to "target" tumors through site-specific drug delivery" (Tripti et al. 2019, for
example). The abnormal fluid dynamics caused by a lack of draining within the tumor create an
efficient transport system for nanoparticles just as the holes in vascular tissues are a perfect size
and shape for nano-sized structures. The perfect fit and unique compatibility between
nanoparticles and tumor tissue meant that such particles accumulate in tumor tissue more than
in normal tissue. This insight gave rise to the first generation of nanotechnology-based carriers,
based on the mechanical fit between nanocarriers and tumor tissues that is referred to as
"passive targeting.” Subatomic chemistry’s novel insights into the nature and function of bonds
between molecular structures revealed that the compatibility between cancer and nanoparticles
is deeper than the physical compatibility the EPR effect assumed.
Nanostructures are said to “target” cancer because tumors “over express” specific genes
or proteins. With relationships between atoms in a molecule at the center of their vision,
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researchers imagined that these “overexpressed” substances could function a kind of lure that
attract nano-sized particles or as though beacons guiding nanoparticles to the tumor site. This
was so because tumors and nanoparticles were, or could be made to be, compatible on a
chemical level. Thus, for nanomedicine, “targeted delivery” means “managing relationships” by
creating nanoparticles that not only “recognize” cancer but have a propensity to bind with tumor
cells. The metaphor of “interaction” works to link "targeting" to “compatibility” both on
ideological and practical levels.
In order for molecules to interact, there needs to be a special affinity between them.
Contemporary pharmacology understands that drugs work through drug-receptor interactions
that they often call “lock and key” relationships. These are characterized by two molecules fitting
together; by interacting, they open the door for further interactions. For chemists, “interaction”
refers to forming a bond of some sort. To interact chemically with a receptor, a drug molecule
must have the appropriate size, shape, and atomic composition. Thus, "targeting" is about
engineering this compatibility. Nanoscientists see controlling and managing or nano-bio
“interactions” as the primary object of their research. The challenge is to predict and control
interactions that the carriers may enter into by engineering the nano-carriers to be selective in
the kind of relationships they pursue. For example, certain nanoparticles can be made to
resemble blood cells, which means they can use the bloodstream as a transport.
Nanotechnology’s discourse about targeting is influenced by the idea that nanoparticles
have a high level of "biocompatibility” that goes hand-in-hand with flexibility and malleability.
Nanomaterials are said to be valuable in designing drug delivery systems because they are
tunable, which means that their properties and behaviors can be modified and controlled with
an unprecedented depth and degree of precision. The structural flexibility of nanomaterials
allows engineers to optimally design them to take part in “specific interactions." Researchers
believe that the advantage of nanoparticles is that they work at the same scale as cellular
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processes in the body and thus are able to "interact with biological systems” (Soares 2018,
2). The surface of nanoparticles can be “decorated” with receptor ligands that bind to molecules
found on the surfaces of malignant cells. By linking “targeting” to “compatibility” and
“interaction,” cancer nanomedicine positions itself as treating cancer in collaboration with the
body.
The interactions nanotechnology is interested in are those that are positive such as
cooperation, symbiosis, or recognition (Invernici et al. 2011: 59). While the ability to fine-tune
and engineer properties and interactions entail the notion of “control,” nanomedicine’s
discourse also redefined what control is. “Control” is not a direct synonym of coercion although
it is close. To “control” means to have the power to influence or direct behavior or the course of
events so as to dominate, command, or regulate another. In nanomedicine’s lexicon, “control” is
completely uncoupled from any implication of coercion. Researchers understand “controlling”
as designing and managing or as nano-bio interactions. Some interactions need to be
strengthened and encouraged, while others must be limited, and researchers’ challenge is to
predict and control interactions that the carriers may enter. They do this by engineering the
nano-carriers to be selective in the kind of relationships they pursue by letting the tumor’s
parameters designate the properties of the nanoparticle.
When cancer is understood as an enemy, an invader, or an aggressor, war is the only
viable solution. In the words of a leading oncologist, "Chemotherapy is one of the major
weapons we have in the ill-equipped battle against this threat" (Putz 2015). In the mid-1980s,
Maeda and Matsumura created the possibility of thinking about cancer differently. Seeing the
Enhanced Permeability and Retention Effect for the first time led to a shift in thinking regarding
what counts as an acceptable cure for the disease and authorized nanomedicine's foray into
oncology. It also shifted compatibility and relationality into the forefront of nanomedicine’s
discursive universe.
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THE FAILURE OF TARGETED DELIVERY
The idea of treating cancer without killing or destruction was evocative, intuitive,
elegant, and incredibly resonant for both scientists as well as the lay public. It “made sense.”
However, in 2013, a leading researcher declared that it was time to “face the truth about
nanotechnology in drug delivery” (Park 2013). In his venom-filled article published in the ultraprestigious Journal of Direct Delivery, he characterized nanoparticle-based tumor delivery as
an “illusion” and nothing more than “pretty pictures” (Park 2013, 5). Others expressed the same
sentiment, albeit slightly more diplomatically: “The targeting approach has great therapeutic
potential; however, it is currently limited” (Rosenblum et al., 2018). “Despite a decade of
intensive preclinical research, the translation of cancer nanomedicine to the clinic has been
slow” (Jiang 2017, 369). “Only a small percentage of nanoparticles reach the diseased site, and
[…] the amount reaching off-target sites and causing toxicity remains substantial” (Zhang, 2020,
3). “Their effects on survival have been modest and, in some examples, less than those of other
approved therapies (Martin 2020, 251). According to another researcher:
The so-called “targeting” by nanoparticles is a misleading concept because the current
nanoparticles cannot find their way to an intended target but are simply distributed
throughout the body through the blood circulation. Only a very small fraction of the total
administered nanoparticles ends up at the target site, mostly by chance. The concept of
the enhanced permeability and retention effect is frequently cited whenever
nanoparticles are used for drug delivery to tumors. However, most studies have not
quantitatively measured the actual number of drugs reaching the target tumor, and thus
there is no quantitative information on the role of the EPR effect in targeted drug
delivery. If nanoparticles are such a great tool for delivering drugs to target sites, why is
it that almost all nanoparticle systems are developed for targeted delivery to tumors?
There are so many other important diseases, but only a few of them have ever been dealt
with in terms of nanoparticle formulations. This is why we have to expand our
imagination outside the box. If the next generation of scientists are all bound inside the
current box of nanotechnology, creating new drug delivery systems will take longer. It is
time to try different ideas and approaches (Yun 2015, 2-7).
`

In 2016, Steve Lammers published a highly influential review article titled “Is

Targeting Our Target?” wherein he unequivocally concluded that “patients do not benefit from
targeting” and urged the field to think beyond “targeting” as a central paradigm. Despite its high
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citation index, the article, and others like it, had little to no effect on publications and funding
within the field. Rather, these continued to increase at the same rate as the number of “targeted”
formulas that failed one trial after another. In other words, targeted delivery in cancer
nanomedicine seemed to be immune to refutation. This “immunity” came to an end in 2020.
REVISITING THE DATA
The conceptualization of nanomedicine in this dissertation drew from data
harnessed from articles published in top nanomedicine journals between 2010 and 2016. As the
project draws to a close, though, I decided to revisit the publication record one final time. While
cancer nanomedicine has continued to be an active field of research, and the discourse on
compatibility has continued to be a significant part of nanomedicine’s discursive landscape,
there was a marked shift in the language, tone, and structure of metaphors in the literature.
Beginning in 2020, articles written by nanoscientists had acquired a distinct sense of skepticism
and disappointment. The generic mood within nanomedicine was that nano-based carriers,
especially gold nanoparticles, have an advantage when compared to classical molecular
pharmaceuticals, but so what? Nanoparticles were expected to exhibit higher retention in
tumors when having the proper size, shape, charge, and coating (Silva 2021), but this has not
been translated clinically. When subjected to studies, nano-biopharmaceuticals have
consistently “shown a sub-optimal biodistribution with more or less prolonged accumulation in
non-target organs, mainly the liver and spleen” (ibid). Although nanomedicine’s models were
complex, elegant, and “fitting,” they simply did not work.
There were several other differences between the data I had collected between 2010 and
2016 and the review articles published between 2020 and 2021. First, there has been a move
away from the sense that nanotechnology alone will solve the problem of cancer. An extensive
review of the state of the field, including published preclinical studies, concluded that “nanocarrier-based delivery systems are not expected to be a valuable alternative to more
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conventional molecular radio-pharmaceuticals designed for systemic administration” (Liu et al.
2021, 1). The revolutionary fervor that once animated the discursive landscape had been
replaced by a sense that nano’s greatest potential is to be used in combination with other
delivery systems. At a practical level, the new tendency is to treat nanotechnology as an adjunct
to current treatment modalities. For example, this might include adding nano components to
existing treatments. Or it might entail combining nanomedicine with other approaches such as
immunotherapy, nuclear medicine, gene editing, or using nanotechnology to modify and
improve treatments currently in use (i.e., “controlled modification with different molecular
entities to further improve their pharmacological profile” (Silva 2021,1).
According to one account, radiolabeled gold nanoparticles can be developed and used “in
combination with topical administration. Such an approach might open new avenues in
modalities that combine cancer diagnostics and treatment; these are so-called “theragnostic”
approaches which promise to minimize detrimental side effects) (24-25). In short, then,
nanotechnology has been relegated to an auxiliary position in cancer treatment. As one team,
who referred to nanoparticles as “allies” of traditional treatment modalities put it, “it is our
conviction that nanocarriers can play a role in future applications of nuclear medicine by
providing unique combinations of imaging and therapy modalities to improve the diagnosis,
treatment, and management of cancer” (Oliviera et al 2021, 2). As another article pointed out,
many patents on medicines are expiring in the next few years. Consequently, “the greatest
potential of nanotechnology may be to add a nano component to improve them” (Yang 2021,
251).
Second, one of the primary justifications for targeted delivery had been developing an
alternative to the toxicity and violent side effects associated with chemotherapy that many fear
more than cancer itself. In fact, virtually every recent publication addressing cancer
nanomedicine -- and whether formal or informal -- used the rhetoric of toxicity to draw a
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distinction between nanomedicine and other approaches. In fact, targeted delivery positioned
itself as a solution to poisoning and toxicity. However, by 2020, there emerged a new concern
that nanoparticles themselves may be toxic. Although fears around “nano-toxicity” are not new
– i.e., researchers have long been worried about the risks of using and handling nanomaterials
since standard tests cannot evaluate their toxicity given their novel size and physicochemical
properties (Stoccoro et al. 2013: 1)— this did not emerge as a theme in targeted delivery in
cancer literature until 2020.
Researchers still emphasize nanoparticles’ “low toxicity, and biocompatibility.'' However,
there is a growing awareness that the compatibility between the nano and the bio may lead these
materials to penetrate membranes, bodies, and ecosystems at a level science is not prepared to
measure or deal with. One article claimed that nanoparticles are known to cause damage to the
central nervous system, circulatory system, respiratory system, and cardiovascular system.
Another reviewed current research aimed at determining the level at which properties
associated with biocompatibility, such as flexibility and malleability – these properties allowing
nanomaterials to enter tissues that have been off-limits to other matter -- might constitute an
“assault [emphasis mine] to the atmosphere, animals, and humans” (Ojo 2021, 12).
The general tempering of hope and excitement that characterized the literature
up to 2016 culminated in a sense that nanomedicine has not been a success. To account for
cancer nanomedicine’s failure in the clinic, scientists focus on the complexity of cancer. It turns
out that the occurrence of different types of tumors and the multifactorial etiology of cancer
makes it an extremely “complex and heterogeneous disease.” Although nanomedicine always
treated cancer this way, its research agenda was buttressed on a certain level of uniformity and
predictability of cancer tumors and their behavior. Today researchers believe that every patient
develops almost a unique expression of biomarkers, and cancers do not follow the growth
patterns and evolutionary trajectory described by cancer biologists. Each cancer is a unique
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entity in its own right and it is hard to predict the treatment modalities to which it will respond.
Thus, according to researchers, the development of so-called “precision” and personalized
medicine is essential to achieving better diagnostic and therapeutic outcomes (Silva 2021,1).
These three discursive trends culminated in a downgrading of “targeting” from the center of
discourse.
Absences and silences often reveal more than what is present and stated. Contemporary
researchers have purged “targeting” from their lexicon the same way that they eradicated
“killing” in 2010 to 2016. As the examples below show, the discursive shift away from “targeting”
has been subtle but definite: “Aiming drugs at the cancer cells happens through two dissimilar
schemes: inactive and active targeting. The inactive site of tumor cells by nanoparticles hangs on
an EPR effect. Although it is said to be active, aiming might be the probable approach of
polymeric nanoparticles to bring chemotherapeutic drugs to cancer cells” (Thakur 2021, 81).
Another team used “targeting/stimulating” to describe what was previously known only by the
first term (Silva 2021).
NOT A FAILURE
Although Lammer’s highly influential article unequivocally stated that “patients do not
benefit from targeting,” the quote had a second part “and a reported tumor accumulation of
0.7%ID does not mean that nanomedicines do not work” (2016). Although most in the field
openly acknowledge that progress has stalled, and it is “well evident that compared to the
overabundance of works that claimed success in pre-clinical studies, merely 15 and around 75
cancer nanomedicines are approved, and currently under clinical trials, respectively” (Alshehri
2020, 1), targeted delivery in cancer nanomedicine has been hailed a success.
A few nano-based formulas have made it to the market. The most common are sold
under Doxil/Caelyx and Abraxane. The global nanomedicine market is anticipated to reach
$350.8 billion by 2025, according to a new report by Grand View Research Most of the revenue
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was generated by the products currently on the market. Although Doxil is better tolerated,
enables prolonged drug dosing, and is more suitable for integration into a combination regimen
with other therapies, it is not side effect free (although individuals who use Doxil do tend to lose
less hair.) More importantly, Doxil does not “target.” Similarly, Abraxane has clear advantages
over Taxol (which is the most famous and commonly prescribed breast cancer drug) in that it is
more stable in the blood. Also, its infusion time is shorter; and it causes less inflammation.
Abraxane “has a more favorable performance in combination regimens,” but it does not target
(Lammers 2016). Like most nano-formulations, it does not ensure a tumor accumulation rate
exceeding 0.7% per gram (ID/g). The only feature that makes Abraxane and Doxil “nano” is the
size of their particles. Neither has fulfilled the agenda laid out by cancer nanomedicine, but they
have nonetheless become signifiers of nanotechnology’s success in treating cancer.
Although researchers have begun the monumental task of erasing “targeting” from their
stock of metaphors and images following a lack of clinical success, cancer nanomedicine did not
experience a catastrophic failure or disillusionment that is typically followed by intense
reflection or “taking stock.” Despite the initial excitement and hope attached to its conceptual
agenda, the notion of “targeting” appeared doomed to “wither away.” And after its
unceremonious death, nothing more would be said about “targeted delivery.”
“Targeted delivery” did not receive a proper burial. But it was also not left for dogs and
vultures to eat as a punishment for its disgrace. An entire paradigm, painstakingly assembled
over 60 years, had evaporated into thin air, and nobody seemed to care or even notice. As is the
case with tragedies, by the time anyone realized that grave mistakes were made, it was too late to
fix anything.
FIRST AS TRAGEDY
In March of 2020, the social and biomedical landscapes were profoundly altered by the
Covid-19 pandemic caused by severe accurate respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. As of March
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2021, more than 114 million cases have been confirmed with more than 2.55. million deaths
attributed to Covid-19, rendering it one of the deadliest pandemics in history. Responses to the
pandemic, which included travel restrictions, lockdowns, social distancing, mask mandates, and
mass testing, have resulted in significant social and economic disruption across the world. At
present, there is no specific effective treatment for coronavirus disease; people with more severe
cases are treated in hospitals with mechanical ventilation. As cases spiked and the world ground
to a halt, the possibility of life returning to normal appeared more and more remote. Until
December 11th, 2020, that is, when the US Food and Drug Administration issued the first
emergency application for a nanotechnology-based coronavirus vaccine. Since that time, three
more formulas have been approved for use in the US.
The vaccines are known for their novel delivery system, a creativeness that has graced
the pages of countless newspapers, journals, and webpages. Unlike older vaccines such as MRR
which induce an immunological reaction is similar to a natural reaction, mRNA vaccines give
the body instructions to “produce one specific” part of a virus— the so-called “spike” protein— to
induce an immunological response. The vaccine’s nanotechnology-based delivery system
“targeted specific cells to make them more effective at delivering their cargo” (Talibien 2020,
589). Scientists claim that by “packaging” or “encapsulating” the active chemicals in drugs
inside nanoshells [... ], they get to their targets with fewer unwanted side effects… Encapsulating
the active components of a nanoparticle protects them from being broken down by the body’s
defense systems and allows them to mimic nature’s method of slipping past the immune system
to deliver treatment to target cells” (ibid). According to an article published in Nature, moving
RNA into target cells and grabbing them to express proteins is “difficult because hereditary
material is fragile and the body’s defense system breaks it down before it can reach its
destination. Targeted delivery addresses this limitation by encapsulating the active components
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in nanoshells that protect the “fragile material” from the body’s clearing mechanisms through
masking.
The structure of metaphor in the peer-reviewed literature around the Covid-19 vaccine is
barely distinguishable from that associated with targeted delivery in cancer. The same promises,
the same rhetoric, but now these have been used and linguistically associated with a different
disease. Like the nanoscientists in oncology labs who promised an alternative to current cancer
treatments by vilifying chemotherapy for its toxicity and systemic application, vaccine
researchers claim that current attempts to treat Covid-19 have not been successful because they
are non-specific: “Non-specific antivirals and symptomatic treatment have been ineffective in
reducing the severity of the disease, hospital stay and saving lives” (Chausdhary 2021, 8). The
same nanoscientists also claim that the drugs used to treat symptoms of the disease as well as
antibacterial agents that prevent the virus’s spread are “toxic,” irritating, and lead to side effects
and unfavorable reactions in the human organism. Once again, nanotechnology became a “safer
alternative.” This time, though, the safer alternative was not to cancer but to the use of toxic
chemicals such as disinfectants in medical settings” (Musyuni 2021,15); “nanoparticles can both
enhance the efficacy of an antiviral drug and also reduce its toxicity” (Chatham 2021, 5).
Moreover, the same rhetoric of “compatibility” that brought cancer nanomedicine to life
also underlies the literature on the Covid-19 vaccine. Most accounts rely on the idea that the
virus, as well as the immune system, is uniquely compatible with nanostructures to justify
nanomedicine’s centrality in addressing the pandemic: “Researchers are engineering and
utilizing viruses for smart delivery of molecules... The future of vaccines involves designing
precise and sensitive nano-based sensors to quickly identify the infection or immunological
response” (2). While some emphasized the compatibility between the nanostructures and the
body by claiming that the immune system is “more tolerant” of nanoparticles than other
structures, focusing on the similarities between the virus and nanoparticles was more common.
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According to researchers, nanotechnology is uniquely suited to solve the Covid-19 epidemic
because of nanoparticles’ special compatibility with the coronavirus. Consequently, “one
solution is to fight the tiny with the tiny” (ibid). Since the size of coronaviruses lies in nanoscale
dimensions, nanotechnology “possesses an enormous potential to understand its structure,
growth, and lifespan… after all, viruses are naturally occurring nanoparticles, and indeed, the
nanotechnology community has long been trying to capitalize on the properties of viruses and
mimic their behavior, for example, for the design of virus-like nanoparticles for targeted drug
delivery and gene editing” (Jones 2020, 2411). The same rhetorical framing can be observed in
an editorial published in August of 2020 in Nature Nanotechnology: “These nanoparticles are
much similar to coronavirus (...) once they enter into the host's cells, they restore the immune
system to fight against the infection caused by this type of virus. Furthermore, these
nanoparticles of similar sizes are capable of binding with Covid-19 viruses and disorganizing
their structure” (Aswini et al. 2021, 1). The structure and tone of the immunologist’s claims
suggest that they had discovered something, revolutionary, and innovative. With the loss of
origins and refusal to reckon with history, which characterizes nanotechnology in general, and
cancer nanomedicine specifically, repetition, and innovation have become indistinguishable.
Nanotechnology has experienced "openings" and "first times" many times over. The
technological artifacts, scientific knowledge, or the language they used to describe their vaccine
was not their own, it was handed to them.
PUTTING NANOMEDICINE TO THE TEST
Even though “targeting” is no longer a dominant paradigm in cancer research, the
discursive universe built around the notion has continued via the Covid-19 vaccine. The logic of
“targeting” continues and will continue to inform strategies for addressing malignant elements
in the body, society, and other systems as long as its symbols and motifs retain their cultural
resonance. Targeted delivery may not have produced the innovations it promised at a material
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level. However, the ideological program that culminated from over six decades of work in the
laboratory has proved equally significant. The Covid-19 vaccine created an opportunity for
nanomedicines’ agenda to continue its life. A crisis is a "laboratory" for new ideas, approaches,
and innovative solutions. In this respect, pandemics are highly generative in that they reveal
something about society, medicine, science, technology, and the relationship between them.
When society is functioning normally, certain features of social life remain hidden but emergent
situations bring these phenomena to the foreground. As the authors of a review of
nanotechnology’s impact in “combating Covid-19” put it, large-scale infections “have
transformative attraction” to scientists (Ragavasami 2020, 2666). However, scientists are not
the only experts on pandemics. The management of Covid-19 was no exception and, as such,
speaks to a specific collective logic operating underneath the veneer of social order.
This dissertation has argued throughout that the notion of “targeting” is a fulcrum of this
logic. As a social phenomenon beyond the confines of nanomedicine, “targeting” indexes a sense
that addressing a noxious element in a system does not have to involve coercion and a belief that
creating compatibility and managing relationships are viable alternatives to blunt force. The
following section examines how this logic manifested in the American response to Covid-19, and
how the response made a vaccine the only solution that could possibly work, amounting to “a
light at the end of the tunnel.”
A LACONIC RESPONSE
According to epidemiologists, the US response to Covid-19 began with an inability or
unwillingness to acknowledge the novel coronavirus threat (Carter and May 2020). As I will
show, this was coupled with shying away from using coercive force. The pattern can be seen at
every level; a refusal to use federal powers allowed states to retain their autonomy to create
“guidelines” rather than “mandates.” Some states and localities did not impose any restrictions
while others opted for voluntary social distancing or stay-at-home orders. Even stringent
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measures (e.g., those with noncompliance penalties) “were institutionally weak.” In general, the
United States relied on normative social pressure rather than instruments of coercion. In lieu of
formal large-scale state intervention, a myriad conglomerate of entities from community
associations to celebrities took to social media to “encourage” compliance with stay-at-home
mandates (Carter and May 2021, 10).
The notion of “flattening the curve” buttressed an ideology of mitigation and
management; it was a “softer” alternative for framing the virus response as a war that must be
won (Bennett and Berenson, 2020). However, even limited mitigation measures were at odds
with the economic interests of the country. The discursive landscape around Covid-19 was
haunted by the tension between “flattening the curve” and “opening the economy.” However,
rather than adjudicate between them, the US took half-measures such that, for example,
restaurants were allowed to continue providing takeout or to function at lower capacities.
Instead of taking one side or the other, as a war framing would demand, life in the US ground to
a partial halt.
Much to the world's shock, the US witnessed a rush of protests in response to lockdowns
and mask mandates by the beginning of April. Many dismissed the protestor’s demands, i.e.,
that their states "re-open" for regular business and personal activities, as being right-wing.
Although activists insisted that lockdowns were a violation of personal rights, the protestors also
decried the economic and social consequences of stay-at-home orders. The Covid-19 pandemic
was more than a public health crisis; among other things, it triggered a disastrous economic one.
Social distancing guidelines and stay-at-home policies abruptly froze entire sectors of economic
activity across the U.S. and worldwide with near-immediate consequences. As the economic
impact took center stage, resistance to coronavirus curtailment measures began to grow, calling
into question the sustainability of mitigation measures (Carter and May 2021).
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By May 1st, demonstrations occurred in more than half of the states. In response, many
governors started to take steps to lift restrictions despite the urging of experts not to do so.
Many people had simply refused to comply with social distancing and other guidelines. As
outbreaks of various sizes and public outcry over social and economic freedom became the “new
normal,” it became clear that physical contact – i.e., limiting mechanisms such as lockdowns,
self-isolation, and social distancing -- were not sustainableas long-term countermeasures
against the spread of the virus.
Scientists began to view non-pharmaceutical interventions such as mask-wearing and
social distancing as contingency plans. The “realistic” solution for the ever-spreading Covid-19
pandemic was expected elsewhere, most probably in pharmaceutical solutions such as vaccines.
The plan was simple: develop a vaccine and possibly save the world” (Sui and Cai 2020). With a
pronounced need for vaccines to halt the spread of the virus, local and international
communities, private and public entities became “bound by the same shared, determined, and
fervent desire to see the world vaccinated and return to “normal” (25).
THE VACCINE AS A SOLUTION

“Evolution proves that any solution can be found using trial and error, but it does not
mean that a solution is good enough to solve a particular problem.”

—Eric Drexler (1987)
On December 3rd 2020, New York then-governor Andrew Cuomo announced that a
Covid-19 vaccine would be the “weapon to win the war.” Just over a week later, the US Food and
Drug Administration issued the first emergency application for a vaccine. Approval for a second
vaccine followed within days. Dr. Fauci, the public face of the pandemic, claimed that “normality
or close to it” would be restored by the end of 2021. If 75 to 80% of Americans can be vaccinated,
the US should reach the herd immunity herd threshold three months later. The vaccine
appeared to be a viable solution as it avoided choosing between the imperative to protect the
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economy and halt the virus while eliminating the need to force people to comply with public
health mandates. By reconciling the contradictory desire for the country to open and for the
virus to be contained, it embodied the desire to avoid coercive measures in favor of an entirely
positive approach where “everyone wins.”
As historians and theorists of medicine have shown, public health has always functioned
along the lines of policing, requiring one form of coercion or another. Modern society has at its
disposal the state, a monopoly of violence. And yet, at least in the beginning, the response to
those who refuse to vaccinate has been characterized by a hesitancy to use force and coercion. In
the past, health care providers operated with the idea that they were morally obligated to treat
everyone with non-maleficence and avoid harm to society at all costs. Thus, even if vaccines had
side effects or disadvantages for a few individuals, the net benefit to society took precedence
over individual damage. Research has shown that approximately one in every 100,000 vaccines
will result in an injury. These are good risk odds because of the benefit that vaccines bring to
society. From a bioethics perspective, achieving herd immunity and minimizing the number of
“freeloaders” was in the community’s best interest. Thus, forcing people to get vaccines was
justified. But something has shifted.
“Vaccines can work miracles “but only if we solve the human challenge as effectively as
we solved the viral problem” (Thompson 2021, 1). “Targeted delivery” gave rise to a novel
vaccine strategy. At the ideological level, the notion of “targeting” proliferated in expert
literature on vaccine hesitancy. Although this has changed, in February 2021, the first expert
literature on the topic was characterized by a reluctance to entertain the possibility of deploying
coercive measures. Many bioethicists rejected mandatory public vaccination (for example Hart
2021) and an overwhelming majority argued for a strategy that uses “persuasion, not coercion or
incentivization” (Pennines et al. 2021). As the situation developed, those who would not take the
vaccine became the noxious element in the social system. In fact, according to experts, what is
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now called “vaccine hesitancy” is an enormous challenge in the battle against Covid (For and
Fowler 2020). Thus, the question of what can be done to compel people to vaccinate and
shoulder the necessary risks on society’s behalf came to take center stage.
The 31% who do not intend to get the vaccine were labeled “vaccine-hesitant,”— not
“anti-vaxxers.” Unlike “anti-vaxxer,” a hostile, critical, and aggressive term that speaks to
immovability, “hesitancy” suggests that a change of heart is possible, that consent can be
“engineered.” The terminology speaks to the general attitude towards managing the problem.
Thus, according to researchers, the solution was to build stronger relationships and create
positive interactions between the medical community and the public. The early literature on
vaccine refusal in the time of Covid was structured around the category of “relationality.”
Countless publications speak to “educating” and “targeting” populations with “tailored”
messages. The newly minted experts in vaccine hesitancy recommend “carefully targeted ads”
and information campaigns to deal with the problem not by force but by persuasion. Others
argued that creating a “tailored” information campaign to target those who do not want to be
vaccinated […] clear and transparent, information rooted in available data, and applied with
precision to targets” as well as more “specific steps” such as voluntary self-isolation (Zhong
2010). Not a single article suggested using force or the coercive power of society to compel
people to get vaccinated. Just as nanoscientists believed cooperation and affinity were the best
approaches to treat cancer, psychologists and others argued that consensus-building would
solve the “human problem” of vaccine efficacy.
The idea that people can be persuaded to get vaccinated is underlined by assumptions
about malleability and flexibility. If individuals can be “educated into” doing the right thing,
there is no need for force or coercion. As one scholar who spent their entire career pondering
similar problems pointed out, a stronger predictor of the refusal to stay home was “antisocial
potential” – namely, low acceptance of moral rules, cynicism about the law, and weaker feelings
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of society (Ribeud 2020). In fact, most psychologists, believe that this “anti-social potential” is a
permanent part of one’s psyche; therefore, one cannot be “taught” to act in a pro-social way.
There is good evidence that communicating pro-social messages or offering payments did not
make people more likely to vaccinate. Here, in this thesis’ conclusion, my concern is bnot
whether or not human thought and behavior is flexible or can be changed but, rather, with how
the existence of flexibility has been taken for granted as a fact despite a long-standing debate
across the social sciences about whether permanence of thought patterns and behavior actually
exists. Like the case of cancer nanomedicine, the experts on “vaccine hesitancy” were enamored
by the belief that “targeting” or “tailoring” can mitigate previous failures and lead to a different
outcome. However, the discussion of a vaccine mandate has been largely absent in public
discourse except for a short debate around mandatory vaccination for school children and the
New York Bar Association public letter urging the government to consider making vaccination
mandatory (Fernandez 2020).
A STRANGE WEAPON THAT IS NOT FORCED ON THE POPULATION, BUT
TAKEN WILLINGLY
The epidemiological literature on Covid-19 is structured by the sense that the US has not
been militant enough in its response. Many are critical of the government’s lack of willingness to
utilize forceful and coercive means. According to one article, “only the most aggressive measures
such as stay-at-home orders and mask mandates have produced results” (Jacobson and Chang,
2020). Many countries that dealt with COVID-19 as a large problem and dealt with it
aggressively — in contrast with the piecemeal approach that the US took— have recorded zero or
near-zero numbers while the US continues to struggle with subsequent outbreaks. For example,
according to epidemiologists, China imposed the most aggressive control measures and had the
best results. Teams visited hospitals, laboratories, companies, wet markets selling live animals,
train stations, and local government offices: “everywhere you went, anyone, you spoke to, there
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was a sense of responsibility and collective action, and there’s war footing to get things done”
(ibid). The narratives told by the scientists emphasized the notion that only the most extreme
mitigation efforts could have led to the most favorable economic outcomes in the long run, and a
sense that nobody listened to them. According to epidemiologists, the US’s refusal to
acknowledge certain contradictions, and treat the pandemic as a war that is exercising
aggression, coercion, and force against its population, caused more damage in the long term by
prolonging the problem and making the pandemic much more severe than it would have been
otherwise.
As the response of the government ramped up, the pandemic began to be framed as a
war. As former president Donald Trump put it in a press conference on March 18, 2020, “It’s the
invisible enemy... That’s always the toughest enemy: the invisible enemy. But we’re going to
defeat the invisible enemy.” The framing of Covid-19 as war has led to the vaccine becoming a
weapon, but a strange weapon that is not forced onto the population but taken willingly. A
Newsday article titled “Vaccination is the Fight Against Covid-19” published Cuomo’s speech
characterizing the vaccine as the “weapon that will win the war,” and promising that the state is
going to be “very aggressive” in its distribution of vaccines. Similarly, while arguing against a
militaristic approach to vaccination, bioethicists and psychologists believed they were fighting
an “information war” (Schiavo 2020), a “war on expertise” (Rutledge 2020), “fighting
misinformation” (Caufield et al. 2020). By extention, more “aggressive corrections” were
deemed as essential to “fight the Covid-19 infodemic” (Kreps et al. 2020). Just as nanomedicine
turned chemotherapy— not cancer— into its problem, the discourse around the Covid-19 vaccine
framed the vaccine-hesitant individual -- not the virus -- as the most critical point of
intervention.
FORMING RELATIONSHIPS WHILE PURSUING THE ENEMY
RELENTLESSLY
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By the 2000s, even biomedical researchers documented that using war metaphors is
harmful to patients and leads to worse outcomes. Several called for “demilitarizing oncology.”
Cancer nanomedicine promised to eradicate the tumor without collateral damage to normal and
healthy cells through “targeting.” The rhetoric of “targeting” allowed nanomedicine to legitimate
itself as an alternative to the violence, toxicity, and killing associated with chemotherapy and
other treatments. Nanomedicine promised to eradicate cancer through interactions, affinity, and
compatibility. Nanotechnology was always more than a technical solution to drug delivery. Its
approach to malignant cells in the body shares structural features with US society’s strategies of
identifying and dealing with dangerous social elements. If the Covid-19 pandemic could be
imagined as a test of “targeting” that shorted out which part of nanotechnology’s ideological
agenda may be accepted and which was rejected in the collective imagination, then the discourse
around the Corvid-19 vaccine interwove compatibility, affinity, and interaction with militaryflavored language. It thrust war back into the foreground.
A closer (re) examination of the nanoscientist’s discourse revealed that war had been
there all along. First, nanomedicine’s logic of avoiding unnecessary violence is shared by drones
and other “precision” or “smart weapons” that are used in “targeted killings” to reduce civilian
casualties of war. Secondly, many of its metaphors were ambiguous. “Homing,” a term that
refers to the nanostructures’ ability to locate cancer tumors, means guiding or directing
homeward or to a destination especially by mechanical means. It can be used to describe a
weapon, or a piece of equipment fitted with an electronic device that enables it to hit a target or
a tendency to return home as in a “homing beacon” or a “homing instinct” possessed by pigeons
trained and/ or bred to fly home from a great distance. Similarly, “payload,” a term often used
by researchers to describe the active pharmaceutical compounds nested inside the protective
nanoshells, could be used to refer to passengers and cargo that is a load carried by a vehicle,
especially an aircraft from which revenue is derived or an explosive thread carried by a missile.
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In both cases, the military and non-military definitions of the term are fitting so it is not possible
to decide which one the researchers were referencing. It does not matter.
Secondly, cancer nanoscientists had turned cooperation, compatibility, and interaction
into weapons. synonymous with conflict, eradication, or killing. In ordinary usage,
“compatibility” is said to prevent conflict as in the case, for example, of those seeking to make
their bond permanent through marriage are often advised to assess their level of compatibility
with the help of a professional in order to ensure that they can live together without strife.
However, nanomedicine refashioned compatibility, cooperation, and interaction into weapons.
Since a cancer cell is a “perfect molecular match” for the nanoparticle that is designed to destroy
it, from the point of view of the cancer cell, compatibility is deadly. The better-suited substances
are to one another, the more killing can take place. The more compatibility and interaction that
can be created, the better nanostructures are able to eradicate tumors.
These warfare-flavored metaphors, however, were generally not used to describe cancer
as an invader or its treatment as war. The researchers’ language shows a subtle shift toward
military operations when describing the nanostructures’ journey through the body. To get to a
cancer tumor, the nanostructures must first “conquer the body’s defense machinery.” The
immune system and other clearing mechanisms are described as the biggest threat to the
nanoparticles, and scientists used words including “stealth,” “arsenal” or “homing” “tackling” to
refer to strategies of bypassing the body’s defenses. The ability to “overcome the body’s
defenses” is attributed to the nanostructures’ ability to “act smart,” something nanostructures
share with today’s high-tech weapons. Since the Vietnam War, the US had recognized that
interaction and cooperation make effective weapons and has pursued a similar military strategy
often referred to as “winning hearts and minds,” a tactic that has continued into contemporary
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military strategists see the use of force against terrorists as
counterproductive. They believe that the best approaches involve creating liaisons, fostering
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cooperation, and “improving ties” between governments, intelligence agencies, and the local
community. Unlike dropping a bomb, though, these operations will be delicate and complex.
The promise to treat cancer one cell at a time without side effects or “harming a single
cell”- i.e., without conflict, violence, or killing, as characterizes nano-based targeted delivery ,has
failed numerous clinical trials. Yet, for decades, scientists and the public have held on to this
idea. The reasons for this are complex but, as this dissertation has shown, there is something
salient in the notion of “targeting.” The “nano-frame” created a vision, a “space of radiation,”
wherein “targeting” became a fulcrum or center around which relations are concentrated and
from which they are once again reflected (Foucault 1971, 12). While nanotechnology created a
complex and evocative metaphoric landscape of its own, this landscape was never free from the
force and destruction it promised to eradicate. Underneath the notion of “engineering
compatibility”—nanomedicine’s key paradigm— is the desire to solve problems without using
destructive force. As this story has shown, thinking with the category of compatibility, and
believing that all incompatibility can indeed be engineered away at will is, predicated on
masking, covering up, concealing and encapsulating conflict and contradiction.
General David Petraeus once described the US military strategy in Iraq as “forming
relationships with people on the ground while pursuing the enemy relentlessly” (2008, 34).
Unlike those who longed, or still long for nanomedicine, Petraeus recognized the chilling
compatibility between “forming relationships” and “pursuing the enemy relentlessly.
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